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Introduction 
  
This thesis regards legal argumentation in international law. Its main object are the 
precedents and doctrinal teachings that enter this argumentation as “authorities”. 
 The argument starts with an uncontroversial observation: international litigation and 
arbitration, indeed every kind of international legal advocacy, to a large extent turns on the use (and, 
sometimes, misuse) of authorities. Parties and adjudicators spend time and effort marshalling 
supportive authorities, distinguishing or refuting unhelpful ones, and monitoring legal 
developments in unrelated cases and in academic debates to bolster their arguments. 
This practice is essentially the same before all international courts and tribunals, although 
the most relevant authorities can change. It has profound implications, for many important issues 
of international law (its sources, the role of precedents, its fragmentation, etc.) are also questions 
about the nature, scope and relevance of authorities in international law. In short, the practice of 
citing authorities warrants a comprehensive inquiry into its modes and consequences. 
 There is little research on what parties, courts and tribunals do when they cite a case or a 
doctrinal authority, and even less empirical research on this practice. Likewise, very little research 
has tried to elucidate what makes an authority authoritative. As a result, assumptions – such as the 
idea that authorities are merely cited for their persuasive power – have yet to be scrutinised. This 
thesis closes those gaps in the literature: its main purpose is to investigate the practices of citing 
authorities in international dispute settlement, as well as their characteristics and consequences. 
Based on international judgments and awards (and the citations therein) treated as a dataset, 
this thesis sheds light on what makes an authority “authoritative”; how parties and adjudicators 
use authorities; and the broader consequences of authority-based argument for international law. 
 Chapter I defines “authorities” as a material used in support of legal reasoning, and examines 
their place in international law. Chapter II reviews the gaps in the existing literature when it comes 
to authority-based argumentation, and describes the methodology underlying this thesis. 
 Chapter III questions the idea that authorities are only cited in function of their inherent 
persuasiveness, and identifies and investigates the factors that may underlie the “authoritativeness” 
of authorities, such as the identity of the “author”, their age or language.  
The next three chapters consider the practice of citing authorities by three different actors in 
international disputes: courts and tribunals (Chapter IV); individual judges and arbitrators in 
opinions (Chapter V); and parties in their pleadings and submissions (Chapter VI). These practices 
vary alongside the strategic considerations of these different legal protagonists.  
 Finally, Chapters VII and VIII review two systemic consequences of the use of authorities 
and conclude to their important role in two aspects of international law: in developing the judicial 
dialogue between international judicial bodies, and in developing and defining international law.  
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Chapter I – “Authorities” in legal argument 
 
Authorities, as mentioned several times below, are material from the past informing the 
present. It is therefore especially appropriate to start this study of authorities with reference to a 
past when authorities reigned supreme in argumentation, and to travel back in time to a sunny day 
of March 1148. Before cardinal and bishops gathered in Council at Reims, Gilbert of Poitiers, a 
former professor at the University of Paris, stands for trial before Pope Eugene III. He is expected 
to defend his writings against several counts of heresy brought by Fra. Bernard of Clairvaux.1 
For our purposes, the story matters not for its place in the history of the medieval Church, but 
for Gilbert’s defence strategy. Indeed, on the first day of trial, Gilbert’s entry into the courtroom is 
an event in itself: assisted by his clerks, he carries with him voluminous books that, he solemnly 
declares, prove the rightfulness of his theses.2 Bernard’s secretary Gottfried of Clairvaux later noted, 
somewhat coyly, that by contrast the authorities Bernard intended to invoke fitted on a single page.3 
Sources further indicate that the stunt, together with Gilbert’s erudition, allowed him to prevail 
against Bernard. 
Gilbert of Poitiers’s (literally) book-heavy argument belonged very much to the intellectual 
framework of his time, when “authorities” were a primary element of intellectual argumentation.4 
Disputes in medieval times, and legal disputes especially,5 were centred around the authorities that 
supported the propositions in debate.6 Gilbert only had the good sense to make this reliance highly 
 
1  C. Monagle, “The Trial of Ideas: Two Tellings of the Trial of Gilbert of Poitiers” (2004) 35 Viator: medieval and renaissance studies 113. 
Monagle reports how this trial was part of Bernard’s strategy to use “the adversarial structure of a trial to impose a polemical split between 
monastery and school, and also between himself and the cardinals who were present at the case.” 
2  Otto von Freising, Ottonis Gesta Friderici I. imperatoris, lib. I, cap. LVIII. Tellingly, Otto also described Gilbert as someone who “from 
his youth had subjected himself to the instruction of great men and put more confidence in the weight of their authority than in his own 
intellect.” 
3  Gaufridus de Clara-Valle, De condemnatione errorum Gilberti Porretani, at 589C: “… et nos paucas auctoritates Ecclesiae in sola schedula 
haberemus”. 
4  J.M. Ziolkowski, “Cultures of authority in the long twelfth century” (2009) 108 Journal of English and Germanic Philology 4, at 447. 
See also D. Ibbetson, “Authority and Precedent”, in Mark Godfrey (ed.), Law and Authority in British Legal History, 1200-1900 
(Cambridge University Press 2016), at 69. 
5 Ibid., supra note 4, at 63: “The jurists of the medieval ius commune recognised the value of arguments from authority”, and pointing out 
that these authorities included Homer and Vergil, for they are cited in the Digest and the Institutes. Compare with the practice of 
“authoritativeness by association” mentioned below in Chapter III. 
6 Another example is revealing: Abelard was once accused of having cited no authority on a sensible question. Confronting one of his critics, 
he advised him to open the book in which the challenged proposition was found, and then to turn the page: sure enough, a citation by 
St. Augustine was then provided, and the critic and his followers “blushed by embarrassment” (“obstupefacti erubescant”): see Ziolkowski 
supra note 4, at 445. Compare this, inter alia, with the ad hoc committee in CDC Group plc v. Republic of Seychelles, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/14, Decision on Annulment (29 June 2005), at §49, finding that “again, the Republic [of Seychelles] cites no authority 
for the proposition that such an error necessitates annulment.” 
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visible, and to complement the intellectual weight of his arguments’ supporting authorities with 
their sheer weight in parchment, calf-skin and ink. 
Such a staging of authority remains a crucial part of the legal craft even today. It straddles 
the common-civil law divide (although the most relevant type of “authority” in use might differ),7 
and is undoubtedly prevalent in international law, where “judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” are recognized as a formal, albeit subsidiary, 
source of law.8 Because international law is for the most part neither codified nor regulated by a 
central legislator or lawmaker, it is a particularly fertile field for authority-based legal 
argumentation.9 
If (sadly) no one nowadays enters a court room pushing forth carts loaded with medieval 
manuscripts, 10  international adjudicators are still confronted with the weight of (presumably 
supportive) materials attached to the parties’ submissions. Judge Bedjaoui deplored the length and 
extent of the pleadings before the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), as every annex is meant to 
be printed in the ICJ Reports. 11  Alain Pellet similarly complained of the increasing size of 
submissions in international disputes, opining that “[t]oo much is too much and we are well over too 
much.”12 International arbitrators routinely ask for parties to print only the necessary minimum, 
 
7  Although “precedents” might not figure in disputes in civilian jurisdictions as much as in disputes in common law jurisdictions, appeals 
to the “doctrine,” another type of authority is very common, especially in the conclusions of the Advocate General where such an institution 
exists. While this varies in different civil law jurisdictions (see J. Bell, Judiciaries within Europe: a comparative review (Cambridge 
University Press 2009)), the rarity of explicit citations to cases in civil law judgments is often counterbalanced by the role of implicit 
citations, which are the common manner for some continental courts to signal their agreement with a precedent by adopting its language: 
see M. Van Der Haegen, “The Influence of Belgium’s Court of Cassation on the Lower Judiciary: Building a Legal Citation Network” 
(2016) 13 Utrecht Law Review 65. 
See also J.Z. Liu, L. Klöhn and H. Spamann, “Precedent and Chinese Judges: An Experiment” (2019) American Journal of Comparative 
Law, finding on the basis of an empirical experiment that although Chinese judges are explicitly prohibited from citing precedents in 
judgments, precedents nonetheless have a “significant influence” on their decision-making. 
8  ICJ Statute, article 38(1)(d). 
9  H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Cambridge University Press 1934), at 14, explaining 
that judges must follow precedent, or explain why they depart from it: “These considerations are of particular urgency in relation to 
international jurisdiction, which is essentially voluntary in character.”  
See also I. Scobbie, “Rhetoric, Persuasion, and Interpretation in International Law”, in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor 
(eds.), Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015), at 11: “International law […] is a rhetorically oriented rather 
than an axiom-oriented system because it is neither codified nor based on precisely formulated basic principles which can operate as major 
premises in deductive syllogistic reasoning.” 
10  Consider however the sometimes impressive “hearing bundles” prepared by parties – and carried by interns, modern-day Church clerks – 
in some international proceedings. See, e.g., the ICCA Drafting Sourcebook for Logistical Matters in Procedural Orders, available at 
https://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/3/14314586363730/icca_reports_2_final.pdf, which acknowledges the possibility of 
“voluminous” bundles at hearings, and yet recommend parties to prepare additional “key” or “core” bundles. 
11  M. Bedjaoui, “The ‘Manufacture’ of Judgments at the International Court of Justice” (1991) 3 Pace International Law Review 29, at 39. 
12  J. Crawford, A. Pellet and C. Redgwell, “Anglo-American and Continental Traditions in Advocacy before International Courts and 
Tribunals” (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International & Comparative Law 715, at 14. 
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knowing too well that printing in extenso all authorities is a useless waste of paper.13 This does not 
prevent them from citing numerous authorities in deciding a case, likewise invoking their own 
virtual mountains of ink and paper. 14  Similar mountains cast their tutelar shadow over 
international legal argumentation in state practice or in academic debates.15 
This thesis is interested in the implications and characteristics of this practice in international 
dispute settlement, and this introductory chapter lays the groundwork. Section 1 below will identify 
what makes an “authority” for the purposes of a “citation”: shortly put, an authority is material that 
informs a legal reasoning with content-independent reasons for action; a citation is the act of 
invoking that authority in support of a legal reasoning. 
Section 2 will then review the place of such “argument from authority” in legal 
argumentation.16 Section 3 analyses the few international rules that govern the use of authorities 
in international law, before zooming on the two main types of authorities that are central to this 
inquiry: precedents and “teachings”.17 Section 4, finally, reviews how “authorities” (plural) relates 
to the broader concept of an “authority” (singular). 
1. The definition of “authority” 
A) A typology of authorities 
Authorities are central to law and to legal argumentation. 18  Under most models of legal 
adjudication, decision-makers cannot render discretionary decisions absent a rule to this effect. 
Judicial power is delegated power, and the widely-recognised norm that judges should not “legislate 
 
13  The standard procedural order in ICSID proceedings directs parties not to print legal authorities: see, e.g., Abertis Infraestructuras, 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/48, Procedural Order No. 1 (11 October 2016), at §13.6: “Las autoridades legales 
deben presentarse solamente en formato electrónico, salvo que el Tribunal específicamente solicite una copia impresa.” See also at the ICJ, 
Practice Direction IX ter: “The Court has noted the practice by the parties of preparing folders of documents for the convenience of the 
judges during the oral proceedings. The Court invites parties to exercise restraint in this regard […].” 
14  The modern practice of filing electronic (or “soft”) copies of legal authorities might have only strengthened this inclination. As mentioned 
below (Chapter IV to VI), the number of authorities cited in judgments, individual opinions and pleadings has been growing for the last 
two decades. 
15  For the view that “legal argumentation” encompasses all these different instances, see Scobbie, supra note 9, at 5. For the role of precedent 
in government practice, see B. Jia, International Case Law in the Development of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2017), at 188. 
16  The specific reasons why different legal protagonists might choose to orient their legal reasoning around authorities are further studied 
below in Chapters IV to VI. 
17  Throughout this thesis, the term “teachings” is used to indicate the writings, scholarship, etc. that is used in international legal disputes. 
18  F. Schauer, “Authority and Authorities” (2008) 94 Virginia Law Review 1931, at 1934: “law is, at bottom, an authoritative practice, a 
practice in which there is far more reliance than in, say, mathematics or the natural sciences on the source rather than the content (or even 
the correctness) of ideas, arguments, and conclusions.” See also R. Posner, “The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special 
Reference to Law and Economics” (The Law School, the University of Chicago 1999), available at 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1577&context=law_and_economics, at 6, discussing law as an 
example of an “authoritarian” institution. 
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from the bench” means that their decisions must hinge on a legal – that is, authoritative – basis.19 
Few legal propositions or judicial pronouncements can be valid – or even appear valid – without 
supporting authorities. Consequently, the arguments of parties in legal proceedings are also based 
on authorities; typical legal debates revolve around the scope, and the appropriateness of the use of 
the adjudicator’s powers given such authorities.20 
This “authoritative basis” can take many forms and command varying levels of 
“authoritativeness”.21 In its common meaning, an authority can refer to a law or an equivalent 
positive rule from the legislator, which leaves little room for discretion for the adjudicator that must 
apply the rule to the case. The term can also refer to a private treatise on the subject at hand,22 
which can safely be disregarded in reaching a legal conclusion. All these are “materials” that will 
inform legal reasoning, building blocks that lead to a legal conclusion. 
What is an “authority” is therefore indissociable from the question of the “sources” of 
international law. These sources represent the valid authorities to be applied to a dispute.23 These 
“valid authorities” are not always readily discernible, however. Their existence and relevance 
sometimes need to be established by other authorities. This relationship between authorities and 
sources is a feature of article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, the most prominent legal rule governing the 
use of authorities in international law (as explained below, in Section 2). 
The range of what qualifies as an “authority” is thus relatively open-ended. Grappling with 
the ambiguity of the term in the Middle Ages – when “authorities” were the main building blocks of 
argumentation –24 Bartolus of Saxoferrato offered the following typology: 
▪ Descriptive authorities (historians, geographers, etc.); or 
▪ Prescriptive authorities, among which: 
 
19  J. d’Aspremont, “Bindingness”, in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: Contributions to Disciplinary 
Thought (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018), at 68. 
20  N. MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of law: a Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005), at 530. 
See also H. Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2010), at 127. 
21  Throughout this thesis, the rather awkward term “authoritativeness” refers to the authority of an authority. 
22  Briefs, especially when modelled on the US example, usually include many different sources in their “table of authorities”. See, e.g., 
Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Claimant’s Reply (21 August 1988), in which 
cases, statutes and textbooks are listed in the claimant’s table of authorities. 
23  See Schauer, supra note 18, at 1947, esp. footnote 54: “the entire shape of legal argument is determined by what sources can and cannot 
be used.” See also id, Thinking like a lawyer (Harvard University Press 2009), at 66. 
24  In the Middle Ages, the sources of persuasive argumentation “were not always seen to be the same, but authority was always one of them”; 
see Ziolkowski, supra note 4, at 432. 
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o those that have the power to make the law,25 such as the Emperor, or Roman 
jurists with the emperor’s assent (necessary authority); and 
o others, such as medieval commentators and glossators (probable authority).26 
This typology remains useful to understand the use of authorities today. As explained below, 
precedents and teachings most often operate as probable authorities in international law.27 These 
materials can be confronted one with another, distinguished, or even contradicted. They contrast 
sharply with necessary authorities, which in most cases directly and definitively resolve a case when 
applicable.28 Yet, these categories are neither closed nor hermetic: a precedent can serve in one 
context as a descriptive authority, and in another as a probable authority;29 a treaty rule can be a 
necessary authority when applied in a case that calls for its application, and a probable authority 
when used as an analogy in a different case. 
What is the common link between these varying forms of authorities, and what explains their 
use in international dispute settlement? 
B) Content-independence 
The authoritativeness of legal authorities in legal argument results from their content-
independence, in the fact that they possess weight regardless of their content.30 
 
25  Compare this with S. Sivakumaran, “The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law” (2017) 66 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1, at 5. 
26  See Ibbetson, supra note 4, at 64, citing Bartolus’s Commentaria, D.12.1.1. 
27  Precedents and doctrinal works were already classified as probable authorities in medieval times; see Ibbetson, supra note 4, at 69. 
28  The debate will then turn over whether or not the alleged necessary authority is applicable to a case. Often enough, this debate will be 
fought based on other authorities (necessary or probable), as “subsidiary means” of identification of the relevant necessary authorities. 
The practice of (some) international law adjudicators display some confusion (or, perhaps, some candid forthrightness) about the 
consequence of different kind of “authorities” on decision-making: witness the tribunal in Bilcon v. Canada citing probable authorities 
and then opining that these “[…] authorities in public international law require a high standard of factual certainty to prove a causal link 
between breach and injury”. Bilcon of Delaware et al v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Damages 
(10 January 2019), at §110. (my emphasis) 
29  See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, citing the judgments of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
Judgment (7 May 1997), both as an evidentiary source (at §312) and probable authority (at §402). 
30  See N. Krisch, “Liquid Authority in Global Governance” (2017) 9 International Theory 237, at 242, linking authority to “content-
independence – a ‘surrender of judgment’ – that contrasts with acts that result from substantive persuasion.” In the same sense, see also 
B. Çali, “Authority”, in d’Aspremont and Singh, supra note 19, at 41. 
The classic treatment of the subject can be found in L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Clarendon 1982), at 261: “[…] it is clear that the 
notion of a content-independent peremptory reason for action or something closely analogous to it enter into the general notion of 
authority, […].” 
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Frederick Schauer regards content-independence as the defining feature of authorities: they 
compel adjudicators to rule despite their own best judgment.31 In this narrative (and as seen in 
further details below), authority and “persuasion” are distinct notions: the terms “persuasive 
authority”, although frequently used in international law literature (and in international decisions), 
is nonsensical. Something that is persuasive does not need authority.32 
Schauer’s argument has the greatest force with respect to what he refers to as “genuine 
authorities”: statutes, codes, and precedents in a stare decisis system.33 These sources are content-
independent due to their very existence, as an adjudicator must necessarily apply them (if they apply 
to the case at hand). In Herbert Hart’s terminology, they embody “content-independent peremptory 
reasons for action.”34 
Probable authorities do not command the same level of authoritativeness; and yet, they can 
also be described in terms of content-independence. For some of them (e.g., influential treatises, 
decisions of another court of appeal in the U.S. federal system, etc.), this independence stems from 
the trust put in them, and their roles as cognitive tools.35 Adjudicators rely on these probable 
authorities because they know themselves as non-expert on a subject, and these authorities are 
sources in which they trust or have reasons to trust. For Grant Lamond:  
The role of theoretical authorities might be described as ultimately epistemic. The 
function is to assist others to form sound judgments over matters where they lack 
either the knowledge or the understanding to form a credible view of their own.36 
This does not cover all authorities, however; there remains a category of materials that are not 
cited because they are mandatory, or because the citing party necessarily trusts the expertise 
 
31  Schauer, supra note 18, at 1935: “the characteristic feature of authority is its content-independence.” Schauer sees in such obedience to 
authorities the hallmark of legal and judicial reasoning, whereas most other “decision-making environments” function on the basis of the 
decision-maker’s best judgment. 
32  Ibid., at 1945; id., supra note 23, at 67: “persuasion and authority are fundamentally opposed notions.”  
In the same sense, see also A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Courts and Tribunals”, 
in Cesare Romano, Karen Alter and Yuval Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University 
Press 2013), at 510-511.  
In most critical accounts of the question, the notion of authority likewise excludes in equal part persuasion and coercion: see F. Zarbiyev, 
“Saying Credibly What the Law Is: On Marks of Authority in International Law” (2018) 9 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 291, at 295. 
33  In short, Bartolus’s “necessary authorities.” 
34  See Hart, supra note 30, at 268. 
35  In some respects, this is similar to Walton’s point that the argument from authority might be nothing more than relying on the presumption 
that we can later ask the cited authority for further proof of the proposition supported by the authority; see D. Walton, Appeal to Expert 
Opinion (Pennsylvania State University Press 1997), at 72. 
36  G. Lamond, “Persuasive Authority in the Law” (2010) 17 The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19, at 21. Grant Lamond’s “theoretical” 
authorities correspond to the “probable” authorities studied here. 
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underlying them. Content-independence, nonetheless, still explains these materials’ 
authoritativeness, although it operates differently. The mere existence of an authority, indeed, 
grants that authority some measure of possible authoritativeness, as this existence proves that the 
argument it is meant to support is not arbitrary.37 Authorities can be used as an “anti-arbitrariness 
vaccine”,38 as a signal that an argument is not made of whole cloth.  
These authorities are cited merely because citing anything makes for a better argument. With 
respect to precedents, for instance, Mark Jacob opines that:  
it is often easier to convince a colleague of one’s position when a decided case is 
invoked […] there is some psychological comfort in turning to past decisions, since it 
suggests that any blame one might attract ultimately ought to be laid at another 
doorstep.39  
Under this view, some citations to authorities in international decisions (or briefs) can be 
retraced to a worried drafter who sought a tiny bit of material to put in a footnote – even if that 
authority has but the remotest relation to drafter’s argument. “The lawyer who points to an 
authority for support is in effect claiming an endorsement for her argument, and in law, as in life, 
having one endorser is at least better than having none at all.”40 
Consequently, authorities can be defined as a material that inform a legal reasoning with 
content-independent reasons for action: a citation to that material will enhance the source material 
by providing “authority” to the legal argument being put forward. 
C) “Authoritativeness” and “persuasiveness” 
Lawyers cannot however cite anything in support of their arguments. Probable authorities 
need to be selected before they can be cited41  (as opposed to necessary authorities that apply 
necessarily as soon as they are identified).42 This selection is based, in turn and to an extent, on the 
authoritativeness of the selected authority.43 
 
37  Schauer, supra note 23, at 74: “[…] it is worth noting that requiring minimal support is still a form, albeit a weak one, of genuine 
authority.” 
38  The expression is from J. Paulsson, “The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration”, in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under 
International Investment Agreements. A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010), at §4.16. 
39  See M. Jacob, “Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005, at 1013. 
40  Schauer, supra note 23, at 74. 
41  See Scobbie, supra note 9, at 150. 
42  The adjudicator who failed to identify the proper authority that dispose of the case could be reproached for deciding per incuriam. 
43  Scobbie, supra note 9, at 17. 
20 
 
Authoritativeness does not derive entirely from the persuasiveness of an authority. 44  As 
further explained in Chapter III below, the idea that the “persuasiveness of the reasoning” is the 
most relevant aspect of an authority is mistaken, theoretically and empirically. Authoritativeness 
and persuasiveness complement each other: both enhance the relevance of an authority, and its 
likelihood of being cited. Tellingly, Oppenheim cites both on the same level, when he observed that 
“the authority and persuasive power of judicial decisions may sometimes give them greater 
significance than they enjoy formally.” 45  Up to a point, persuasiveness can compensate for 
authoritativeness, and vice versa. 
This does not mean, however, that the relationship between authoritativeness and 
persuasiveness can be pictured as a spectrum. Although somewhat intuitive, the idea that “the 
higher the persuasiveness of the authority, the closer it is to be content-independent” is incorrect.46 
It cannot be the relative soundness of the content that moves an authority closer or farther from 
content-independence, because content-independence, by definition, is independent of this content 
in the first place. 
Rather, true content-independence most often proceeds from second-order rules or reasons that 
require the need to follow or take account of authorities irrespective of their content. Stare decisis is 
such a rule but is inapplicable in international law.47 Chapter III will identify some other possible 
candidates for what makes an authority authoritative, such as the notion of consistency in 
international law,48 the respect due to the expectations of the parties,49 or the “tendency to follow 
 
44  See H.G. Cohen, “International Precedent and the Practice of International Law”, in Michael Helfand (ed.), Negotiating State and Non-
State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press 2015), at 188, opining that authoritativeness 
depends on reasons that are external and internal to the authority. See also id, “Theorizing Precedent in International Law”, in Bianchi, 
Peat and Windsor, supra note 9, at 17, holding that such authority – at least for precedents – can be explained as a “burden” placed by 
the precedent over later interpretation or discussion of the same rule: “In the absence of any prior interpretation, an interpreter has a lot 
of latitude to choose a particular interpretation of a rule. Evidence of a prior interpretation seems to change that equation.” The notion 
of precedents (and other authorities) as “argumentative burdens” is further developed below. 
45  R.Y. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed, 1992), at 41. 
46  B. Jia, supra note 15, at §202: “precedents are either authoritative or persuasive in international law, with no halfway house of decisions 
occupying the space between the two extremes.” 
47  See M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge University Press 2008), at 97: “[…] it is universally accepted that stare 
decisis does not apply in relation to the Court […]”. But see also Thirlway, supra note 20, at 120 for more nuanced takes on this question.  
48  Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 135, citing Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 14. 
49  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (1 November 1996), 
at 14: prior decisions “create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are 
relevant to any dispute.” 
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language tested by settled principles.”50  All these factors51  can influence the authoritativeness 
(content-independence) of authorities, which in turn makes citations to them more likely.52  
2. Arguing from authority 
Parties and adjudicators in international legal disputes are usually not obliged to cite 
authorities on any given point or to point to content-independent material in support of their 
arguments. 53  And yet, citing authorities is a ubiquitous practice in international dispute 
settlement.54 If anything, as this thesis shows, the proportion of citations in international disputes 
has tended to increase in recent decades.55 The following section reviews the place and function of 
arguments from authority in these disputes. 
A) The argument from authority 
Citations generally come in two different forms. They can take the shape of a footnote (or, more 
rarely, an endnote) inserted in a text following a proposition asserted or discussed.56 Or they can be 
a full part of the main text where the proposition is found, often in a distinctive style (italics for case 
names), sometimes as a paragraph-length quotation. This difference in the “physical” display of 
authorities, be it deliberate or not, is likely meaningful.57 
 
50  Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 211. 
51  Jacob, supra note 39, at 1017, listing as relevant factors “equality, fairness, unity, stability, continuity, legal certainty, and the protection 
of legitimate expectations.” 
52  Although these second-order rules can explain the use and benefits of such “authoritativeness,” they do not explain the degree of an 
authority’s authoritativeness. This depends on other factors further investigated in the following chapters. 
53  Although international court and tribunals sometimes explicitly require parties to identify the authorities they wish to rely on: see, e.g., B-
Mex, LLC and others v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/16/3, Procedural Order No. 5 (4 June 2018), on post-
hearing briefs, at 1(i), but also at 5, 6. Questions from the tribunal included, at 1(ii): “Is there any NAFTA or other authority directly 
answering the foregoing questions either in the affirmative or the negative?” or at 1(iii): “Please identify the NAFTA or other authorities 
addressing the question of […].” 
54  And at least for precedents: see H.G. Cohen, “International Precedent and the Practice of International Law”, in Michael Helfand (ed.), 
Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press 2015), at 172. 
55  For an empirical confirmation, see below at p. 137. 
56  See A. Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History (Harvard University Press 1997) for the historical background of the footnote. See 
also Ridi, N. Ridi, “The Shape and Structure of the ‘Usable Past’: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International 
Adjudication” (2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200, at 240, for an empirical analysis of footnotes. 
The relevance of a footnote’s formatting is sometimes acknowledged in international decisions: see UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) 
and C.D. Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Award (9 October 2018), at §6 
57  These two forms of citing likely reflect different levels of emphasis on an authority and its authoritativeness.  
Footnotes are usually peripheral to the main text and can be overlooked when focusing on the main argument. To an extent, they reproduce 
the distinction between the medieval glossae and the text that is glossed, always central; on this point see N. Jansen, The Making of Legal 
Authority: Non-Legislative Codifications in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press 2010), at 105. 
In-text citations, by contrast are part of the legal language being developed. The italicized text, the quotes in themselves, sometimes in 
slightly shifted paragraph, stress the role of the authority in developing an argument. It as though, just like justice, it matters that citation 
be seen done. 
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Both forms of citations, however, do not appear in a vacuum: citations follow an idea or 
proposition. While other motives might prompt a citation, the argumentation’s audience usually 
perceives citations as supporting that idea or proposition. Citations are thus a part of the legal 
discourse developed by the citer, a discourse that is, for the most part, argumentative in nature 
(counsels want to prove their case; adjudicators explain their reasoning). It follows that citations are 
argumentative devices, and since most citations refer to authorities, most citations can be analysed 
as “arguments from authority.”58 
Authorities are sometimes cited for the purposes of being distinguished or contradicted. In 
these instances, it is true that the authority itself does not directly serve to support a reasoning, 
although the citation does. In the argument a contrario, the authority indirectly supports the 
argument by showing that it does not stand in the way, that it is not an argumentative burden that 
needs to be overcome. 
As explained below in Chapter II, however, this type of citation is rare and the greater bulk of 
authorities are cited because they support a reasoning, i.e., as an argument “from authority”. This 
is a traditional argument type with a background and history in Western logic and rhetoric.59 The 
standard form of the argument from authority is as follows: 
▪ X is an authority/expert in field F 
▪ X says that P (in field F) is true (false) 
▪ There are some grounds to believe (or deny) that P is true (false)  
 
In both cases should be kept in mind the commanding words of R. Whately, Elements of logic (1826), at 229, who warned against the 
fallacy of giving references, “trusting that nineteen out of twenty readers will never take the trouble of turning to the passages, but, taking 
for granted that they afford, each, some degree of confirmation to what is maintained, will be overawed by seeing every assertion supported, 
as they suppose, by five or six Scripture texts.”  
58  See, e.g., A. Pellet, “The Case Law of the ICJ in Investment Arbitration” (2013) 28 ICSID Review 223, at 228-229: “In the absence of 
any treaty rules, or of clear treaty rules, international courts and tribunals resort to case law – an easy and reassuring argument of authority 
[…].” See also L.M. Soriano, “The Use of Precedents as Arguments of Authority, Arguments ab exemplo, and Arguments of Reason in 
Civil Law Systems” (1998) Ratio Juris 11, at 90-102.  
 Of course, citations are sometimes used as other types of argument, and these are in any event not mutually exclusive. Precedents are 
sometimes cited as analogies; yet the argument by analogy implies that the cited precedent was correct in its appreciation of the law; to 
this extent, it is also an implicit form of argument by authority. See also C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, 
la nouvelle réthorique (UB Libre 1958), who also explain the use of “precedents” as arguments ab exemplo (at 477), and as arguments of 
formal justice (at 288).  
Lack of authorities, meanwhile, frequently serves as an argument a contrario: see, e.g., Stans Energy Corp. and Kutisay Mining 
LLC v. Kyrgyz Republic (II), PCA Case No. 2015-32, Decision on Jurisdiction (25 January 2017), at §233. This point is further 
investigated below in Chapter VI. 
59  Walton, supra note 35, at 32-63. 
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Arguments from authority have periodically attracted criticism by authors interested in 
rhetoric and in logic. The criticism usually goes as such: 
Logically, a proposition is either right or wrong, and what X might think about it is 
irrelevant. Given that what matters is the truth of the proposition (tantum valet 
auctoritas, quantum valet ratio),60 at best arguments from authority are useless, at 
worst they are a fallacy.61 
Avatars of this argument are identifiable in the legal context,62 often when writers insist on 
the “logic” of the law. A Manuel de logique juridique by French 19th century lawyer Berriat de Saint-
Prix presented a forceful example, as he opined that “[t]he barrister who bases the soundness of its 
case on citations of cases and modern books bets on the judge’s instinct for imitation, laziness of 
spirit, shyness and ignorance.”63 
There are echoes of these criticisms and appeals to logic in modern legal debates as well. 
Dissenting in a case before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Arbitrator Noori for instance deplored that 
the majority decision was fallacious, given its reliance on wrongly-decided decisions as authorities: 
Although the Tribunal’s awards must be made on the basis of respect for law, and 
although precedents – even those set down by the Full Tribunal – are not binding 
upon the Chambers in adjudicating their cases, it has regrettably been frequently 
observed at this Tribunal that a majority – simply because it is a majority – reaches 
a decision in some case by disregarding the most self-evident principles of logic, 
interpretation and law, and then refers in other cases to that very same earlier, unjust 
decision, in order to relieve itself of the burden of presenting arguments and reasons 
– doing so, of course, in such a way as to make it seem as if that previous decision 
were a splendid achievement in the history of law and justice. This unbecoming 
 
60  See infra, note 392. 
61  See the example given in Walton, supra note 35, at 65-66. 
The authorities cited in this thesis could probably incur the same criticisms, and there is certainly some irony in casting doubt on authorities 
by citing other authorities. Yet, if I am guilty of such inconsistency, I am in good company: see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
Prima pars, quaestio 1, art. 8.2: “[…] locus ab auctoritate est infirmissimus, secundum Boetium.” 
62  These remarks are valid, once again, only because this chapter focuses on “probable authorities.” By contrast, arguments based on necessary 
authorities are exceptionally strong in law: “argumentum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege.” See A.X. Fellmeth and M. Horwitz, 
Guide to Latin in International Law (Oxford University Press 2009). 
63  Berriat Saint-Prix, Manuel de logique juridique (1855) at 48 (my translation). Berriat however also accepts that citations are legitimate 
from a counsel’s point of view, given that any avocat worth his salt must try everything to win a case.  
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approach constitutes a sort of deception, and an abuse of the fact that readers lack 
access to the case files and the awards cited.64 
A second, “pragmatic” criticism is perhaps even more common in the legal context: 
Pragmatically, any “authority” or expert is prone to make mistakes at some points, 
and therefore the weight given to these arguments without further examination is 
unwarranted.65 Besides, you can find an authority for everything and anything. 
A variant of this “pragmatic” argument challenges authorities as being cherry-picked to 
support a given argumentation. In Ropper v. Simmons, Scalia J. suspected his colleagues, happy to 
cite foreign sources, of indulging in this exact sin: “[t]o invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s 
own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry.”66 Similarly, 
Shabtai Rosenne expressed dismay at the practice of citing official speeches (such as those in the 
Security Council) as an indication of what states think the law is, given that these often amount to 
mere “propagandist” exercises.67 
Yet these criticisms do not prevent the intensive use of authorities in legal argumentation. Nor 
should they, for arguments from authority are unavoidable in legal disputes. It is notable, for 
instance, that Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Obrechts-Tyteca contended that law was a field where 
arguments from authority are valid.68 There are two reasons for this. 
The first is that the logical criticism laid out above is weaker in the legal field than it would be 
in other contexts.69 Formal logic does not fully account for the judicial process,70 as it competes with 
other considerations (such as pragmatism, convenience, etc.). Hence a certain plasticity to the 
solution of a given case, a plasticity accentuated by the fact that, at bottom, the truth-value of legal 
rules is mostly conventional. Truth in mathematics or physics does not depend on conventions;71 it 
 
64  Watkins Johnson et al. v. Iran, Award No. 429-370-1 (27 July 1989), reprinted in 22 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 218, Dissenting Opinion of 
Assadollah Noori, at 258. 
65  See T. Fowler, The elements of inductive Logic (1883), at 270. 
66  Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551, 627 (Scalia J, dissenting). 
67  S. Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law (Oceana 1984), at 120. 
68  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra note 58, at 412. Notice that this practice in law, at least with respect to precedents, does not 
perfectly fit Walton’s theory of argument from authority as “appeal to expert opinion.” Walton himself analyses the use of precedent as 
an argument from analogy, but he mostly has criminal law in mind: see D. Walton, Legal Argumentation and Evidence, 
(Penn State UP 2002), at 29. 
69  Yet, the effectiveness of appeals to experts is documented even in purely scientific fields: see e.g., in the field of mathematics, M. Inglis 
and J.P. Mejia-Ramos, “The effect of authority on the persuasiveness of mathematical arguments” (2009) 27 Cognition and Instruction 1. 
70  See MacCormick, supra note 20, at 54; and, famously, O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881), at 1.  
71  See R. Posner, The problems of jurisprudence (Harvard University Press 1990), at 62: “Authority and hierarchy play a role in law that 
would be inimical to scientific inquiry.” 
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is undeniably true and cannot be challenged by contrary authorities. “Truth” in a legal system is 
“fabricated”, and often renegotiated anew in the context of new cases and new disputes – distinctions 
can be made, new categories crafted to accommodate new thinking. What was true of international 
law yesterday might prove wrong tomorrow, and this invites any party to try their chance at 
changing the status quo. Law’s malleability offers ground for the use of authorities, and an otherwise 
intellectually flawed legal proposition might attract support for its convenience or usefulness.72 
The second is that, as noted above, external factors support the argumentative power of 
authorities and ground their authoritativeness. Arguments from authority evidence consistency,73 
or serve as shortcut that introduce otherwise-known legal theories and arguments, for instance.74 It 
is also material that international law is, at least partly, a customary legal system, in which judges 
are merely supposed to discover and ascertain already-existing rules. Those rules are often 
predicated on the existence of some degree of universality, or of a consensus – a factual, empirical 
situation that is frequently proven with reference to authorities.75 In such a context, citing enhances 
the force of the authority cited as well as the proposition it is cited in support of.76 
B) The function of citation 
According to the literature, citations in international legal argument perform several functions, 
regardless of the author of the cited work.77 
First, citations assist in building up the “legitimacy” of a legal reasoning – a crucial element of 
any legal discourse, and perhaps even more so for international courts and litigants. 78  The 
“legitimacy” conferred by citations, and by the authoritativeness of the authorities cited,79  can 
 
72  See T. Schultz and N. Ridi, “Arbitration Literature”, in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International 
Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2019): “[a] legal decision may be intellectually hogwash, but socially genius, and thus a good 
decision.” 
73  L.L. Fuller, The morality of law (Yale University Press 1964), at 61. 
74  In this respect, see P. Facione and D. Scherer, Logic and Logical Thinking (McGraw Hill 1978), at 315. See also Ridi, supra note 56, 
at 225. 
75  See L.J. Boer, “‘The greater part of jurisconsults’: On Consensus Claims and Their Footnotes in Legal Scholarship” (2016) 29 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 1021. For the role of consensus in building up authoritativeness, see further Chapter III below. 
76  See C.P. Romano, “Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue” (2008) 41 NYU Journal of International 
law and Politics 755, at 770. 
77  This question is also further taken up, in the context of the decisions of international courts and tribunals, in Chapter IV below. 
78  See J. Gibson and G. Caldeira, “The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of 
Justice” (1995) 39 American Journal of Political Science 459, at 460. 
The phrase “legitimate authority” is often used in the literature but seldom explained. Closer inspection, however, finds it redundant: see 
Zarbiyev, supra note 32, at 311-312. 
79  Authoritativeness should not however be conflated with legitimacy: see Alter, K. Alter, L. Helfer and M. Madsen, “How Context Shapes 
the Authority of International Courts” (2016) 79 Law & Contemporary Problems 1, at 7. 
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operate in several ways.80 The main one has been identified above: citations manage to persuade the 
audience that a legal conclusion is not arbitrary, and, therefore, not illegitimate.81 Frederic Schauer 
puts it as such: 
Perhaps surprisingly to many people, a legal argument is a better argument just 
because someone has made it before, and a legal conclusion is a better conclusion just 
because another court has reached the same conclusion on an earlier occasion. The 
use of an authority that is not necessarily more persuasive or more authoritative than 
the one that could be marshaled for the opposite proposition provides at least the 
minimal assurance that the user of the authority is not simply making up the 
argument out of whole cloth.82 
The ICSID annulment proceedings in the Mobil v. Argentina arbitration offered a remarkable 
illustration of the latter point. In the underlying award, the tribunal had decided that Argentina 
could not rely on article XI of the Argentina-US BIT (an escape clause in situations of emergency) 
as a defence, finding that the state had contributed to its financial crisis. Before the ad hoc 
committee, Argentina argued that in so doing the tribunal conflated the customary international 
law defence of necessity and the BIT’s lex specialis. The committee agreed and found that the 
tribunal exceeded its powers in this respect. Remarkably, however, the committee did not think that 
this excess was “manifest” because previous tribunals, cited in the award, had reached the same 
conclusion.83 
Second, citations also strengthen the legitimacy of a reasoning by vouchsafing the intellectual 
competence and integrity of the citer. Citations evidence the citer’s gathering of relevant information 
and thoroughness in seeking to achieve the right outcome.84 Citing a range of different sources is a 
way to signal that no stone has been left unturned; that no credible argument had been left 
unanswered, and that no possible overlooked authority would have undermined the argumentation’s 
conclusions.  
 
80  L. Helfer and A.-M. Slaughter, “Toward a theory of effective supranational adjudication” (1997) 107 The Yale Law Journal 273, at 319. 
81  See Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 46, citing de Visscher saying that the ICJ cites its precedent, inter alia, “to forearm itself against the 
reproach of illogicality or contradiction.” 
82  Schauer, supra note 23, at 73. See also Lamond, supra note 36, at 29. 
 This “anti-arbitrariness vaccine” (Paulsson) also operated indirectly. By knowing that their decisions might later be cited as an authority, 
adjudicators are to some extent constrained to adopt legitimate-looking reasons: see Jacob, supra note 39, at 1022. 
83  See Mobil Exploration and Development Inc. Suc. Argentina and Mobil Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/16, Decision on Annulment (8 May 2019), at §100. 
84  P. Harris, “Difficult Cases and the Display of Authority” (1985) 1 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 209, at 210. 
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The importance of this legitimacy-conferring use of citations can be observed in the fact that 
authorities are sometimes cited in support of proposition they do not stand for – lip-service testifying 
to the value of what is disregarded. For instance, in the Continental Shelf case, Judge Gros deplored 
that his colleagues hypocritically quoted from a judgment they departed from.85 
Legitimacy is not however the sole driver of citations. At least four more humdrum 
explanations explain why legal participants cite authorities in judgments and pleadings.86 
First, citations can be a matter of elegance and style; 87 the way a point had been made by a 
former author, tribunal or court can be particularly apt for the case at hand.88 Likewise, medieval 
sources described authorities as sententia imitatione Digna, a formulation worthy of being repeated. 
Such imitation has a special importance in international law, where there is a common tendency to 
re-use similar language and draw from a common lexicon.89 
Second, citations can also appear for evidentiary purpose, as a “descriptive authority”.90 When 
used to mention the source of an idea, citation also serve to avoid plagiarism.91 Third, citing is also 
sometimes a matter of “professional ethic”: international lawyers (and judges) cite because it is a 
practice rooted in their field.92 Marc Bloch, the famed French historian, referred to footnotes as a 
“morale de l’intelligence”.93 In some fields, citing can proceed from a convention to support every 
statement with an authority, whatever that statement’s (or that authority’s) worth.94 
Fourth, authorities can also serve as a starting point for an analysis,95 in an echo of the 
traditional rhetorical practice that consisted in starting an argument from a point (a topoi) upon 
 
85  See Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, at 151. 
86  See G. Marceau, A. Izaguerri, and V. Lanovoy, “The WTO’s influence on other dispute settlement mechanisms: a lighthouse in the storm 
of fragmentation” (2013) 47 Journal of World Trade 481–574, at 487, devising a typology of the citations to WTO jurisprudence 
according to the functions of these citations (i.e., ascertain facts); ., A.Z. Borda, “The Direct and Indirect Approaches to Precedent in 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals” (2013) 14 Melbourne Journal of International Law 608, at 616 et seq., conducted a similar 
analysis for criminal courts. By contrast, Sivakumaran, supra note 25, at 27 et seq., devised a typology of manners to cite (a “see also” is 
not the same as a “compare / cf.”). 
87  Additional – and more cynical – reasons, such as currying favours with a cited superior, or showing solidarity with a cited colleague, would 
presumably be less relevant in a litigation context. For this argument in academia, however, see N. Duxbury, Jurists and Judges: An Essay 
on Influence (Hart Publishing 2001), at 10. 
88  See Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, as quoted in Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 42. 
89  U. Šadl and H.P. Olsen, “Can Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using Citation Network and Corpus 
Linguistic Analysis to Understand International Courts” (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, at 334-335. See also 
Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 211. 
90  Ibid., at 36. See also Posner, supra note 18, at 5. 
91  See, e.g., Duxbury, supra note 87, at 9. 
92  Cohen, supra note 44, at 189-190, identifying sociological reasons to cite. 
93  M. Bloch, Apologie pour l’Histoire (Armand Colin 1949), at 53. 
94  Schauer, supra note 23, at 73. 
95  For an empirical finding, see Y. Panagis and U. Šadl, “The Force of EU Case Law: A Multi-Dimensional Study of Case Citations”, 
JURIX (2015): “case law is the main building block of the text and the starting point of the Court’s argumentation.” 
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which all agree.96 The frequent practice consisting in interpreting international law instruments by 
invoking first the virtually unassailable authority of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(even when the subsequent application of these rules sometimes lacks seriousness97) is a fitting 
example.98 As further studied in Chapter IV below, however, this kind of citations might often 
acquire a ritualistic character.99 
Fifth, and finally, an authority can also lie behind a particular test or doctrine. Citing it is a 
question of efficiency – it is not necessary to explain it all over again. Citing – especially precedents 
– saves the time and efforts required to explain the full reasons underlying a particular result. This 
is especially the case when the citing party has trust in the cited authority and relies on its expertise. 
Michael Peil explained: 
Where a publicist has conducted a thorough review of State practice and concluded 
that the threshold for a rule of customary international law has (or has not) been met, 
judges frequently rely upon those teachings, rather than citing directly to primary 
evidence of State practice.100  
A common thread behind nearly all these functions links citations as a practice within the 
broader context of legal argumentation.101 Law is, above all, an argumentative practice.102 Legal 
arguments are built out of a back-and-forth between how an argument has been accepted or refused 
by an audience in the past, and how a party expects this audience to react to this argument in the 
future.103 The high stakes frequently involved in these cases lead to a cumbersome and agonizing 
process of ever refining the argument made.104 Citations in this context, regardless of the motives 
 
96  See Scobbie, supra note 9, at 1. 
97  M. Waibel, “International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation”, in Rainer Hofmann and Christian J. Tams (eds.), International 
Investment Law and General International Law : from Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration? (Nomos 2011), at 29. 
98  W. Werner, “Recall it again, Sam. Practices of Repetition in the Security Council” (2017) 86 Nordic Journal of International Law 151, 
at 161. 
99  As observable, to some extent, in the case law of the ICJ: see W. Alschner and D. Charlotin, “The Growing Complexity of the International 
Court of Justice’s Self-Citation Network: Institutional Achievement or Access-to-Justice Concern?” (2018) 29 European Journal of 
International Law 1, at 83. See also Duxbury, supra note 87, at 14. 
100  M. Peil, “Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International Court of Justice” (2012) 1 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, at 136. See also Lamond, supra note 36, at 28. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process (Yale University Press 1921), at 149. 
101  H.G. Cohen, “Theorizing Precedent in International Law”, in Bianchi, Peat and Windsor, supra note 9, at 268. 
102  MacCormick, supra note 20, at 14: “Law is an argumentative discipline.” 
103  On this point, see Lamond, supra note 36, at 33. The notion of “audience” is further taken up in Chapter IV below.  
104  P.M. Wald, “The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings” (1995) 62 The University of Chicago Law Review 
1371, at 1375. This point is of course also valid for non-judicial legal writings, such as pleadings submissions, or, indeed, PhD theses. 
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prompting them, serve as argumentative devices expected to strengthen the persuasive power of 
this argumentation.105 
3. Regulating authorities in international law 
The ubiquitous use of probable authorities in international legal argumentation does not mean 
citations are unproblematic. 106  If courts and tribunals feel obliged to consider the relevant 
authorities on any given subject, they also often escape their reach by distinguishing them or finding 
them unpersuasive.107 It is the point of probable authorities that they are not dispositive of a case. 
Given the relative open-endedness of the range of citable authorities, courts and tribunals need 
ways to focus the debate and to signal beforehand what is and what is not an authoritative authority. 
History is again our guide here: the role of authorities in argumentation was so important in 
medieval times that forgeries and misattributions were rife,108 while some fields (such as canon law) 
were replete with “discordant” authorities. This prompted reform, which notably started with 
Gratian’s Decretum,109 whose aim was to tell proper authorities from improper ones. 
The regulation of authorities typically follows one of two approaches. The criterion can be 
qualitative (i.e., what is a “good” or “bad” authority) or formal (i.e., what categories of sources can 
and cannot validly be relied upon). Although regulation of authorities is rarely exhaustive and 
complete,110 we can find instances of the two methods in international law. 
A) Good and bad authorities 
Given two conflicting authorities, which one the claim to be more authoritative?  
The preference could be for more recent authorities, as pope Alexandre III once decided.111 Or 
authorities could be judged depending on the reputation of their authors: St. Gregory was an 
authority on the matters of morals, Augustine on that of doctrine, and their authorities would have 
 
105  The exception would be, again, citations to ward off plagiarism. However, it is difficult in practice to distinguish this use of citations from 
any other.  
106  J. Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty, Arbitration and International Law (Kluwer 2007), 
at 880. 
107  But distinguishing is, implicitly, a way to accept the authoritativeness of the distinguished authority. See the observations of Judge Tanaka 
in Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1964 I.C.J. 6, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 70.  
108  Ziolkowski, supra note 4, at 439. 
109  Jansen, supra note 57, at 21-23. 
110  Schauer, supra note 23, at 81. 
111  Ziolkowski, supra note 4, at 440. 
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more weight on these respective subjects.112 Or the preference could go to the authority that is part 
of a winning numerical majority: the late Roman Lex citationum introduced head-counting as the 
proper way to deal with conflicting authorities, and assigned a greater weight to some jurists over 
others.113 
There is no (explicit) rule or regulation of the sort in international law.114 In this respect, the 
main restraint upon parties citing anything seems to be that, all things considered, and consistent 
with the use of authorities as argumentative devices, good authorities will be preferred to bad 
authorities – but in the citer’s own assessment of an authority’s value. 
The only kind of “regulation” available is the guidance found in article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which is commonly accepted as a summary of the sources 
of international law. That article, despite its limitations, also regulates (to an extent) the authorities 
that the Court can rely on – and, given the Statute’s influence, what other international courts and 
tribunals rely on in priority.115 While article 38(1)(d) does not provide any particular criterion to 
distinguish between the “judicial decisions” that can be cited, it does so with respect to “teachings”: 
only writings by the “most highly qualified of the various nations” can serve as a subsidiary source 
of law. 
The reference to the “various nations” hints at some form of worldwide consensus that should 
likely be embodied in authoritative teachings,116 although article 38 does not indicate how to assess 
that consensus. The qualifier “most highly qualified”, for its part, begs the question of who is meant 
to be highly qualified.117 If article 38(1)(d) does not therefore indicate much about which authorities 
can be cited, it does however foreshadow the Court’s exceeding caution in citing scholarship in its 
judgments (further studied below at Chapter IV). 
 
112  Ibbetson, supra note 4, at 65. 
113  Head-counting of the sort can still be occasionally witnessed in contemporary legal debates: see, e.g., Ph. Malaurie, “Baisse des taux 
d’intérêt, prêts à long terme et renégociation” (1988) Revue Dalloz, 317, where the author explicitly counts the doctrine writers in favour 
and against the position he argues. 
114  This does not prevent courts and tribunals to have and rely on implicit rules: see Jacob, supra note 39, at 1006: “All legal systems have 
rules of precedent, even if these are implicit, terse, or prohibitive.” 
115  A.Z. Borda, supra note 86, at note 28 and the authorities cited therein.  
116  Sir F. Berman, “Authority in International Law” (2018) KFG Working Paper Series, no. 22, at 15. 
117  Rosenne, supra note 67, at 119.  
Compare with the question-begging distinction of Oppenheim between “writers at large and writers of authority” and describing the latter 
as those “whose works have gained great influence”; L. Oppenheim, “The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method” (1908) 
2 American Journal of International Law 313, at 345. 
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B) Universe of authorities 
A blunter way to regulate authorities consists in identifying categories of valid authorities that 
can, or cannot be cited.  
The draft bills or constitutional amendments put forward in some US states with respect to 
foreign laws are a good example: the point was to discard ab initio one category of possible 
authorities, whatever their merits on particular issues.118 In the same vein, courts and tribunals 
sometimes indicate what part of a material is authoritative or not – as when the US Supreme Court 
clarified that headnotes to its decision were not prepared by the Court itself and therefore not an 
authority.119  Rules about the need to distinguish between ratio and obiter dicta in precedents 
partake in the same logic.120 
Here as well, article 38(1)(d) provides some guidance as to what authorities can serve as 
subsidiary sources for the determination of international law. Only two are listed: judicial decisions 
and “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations”. While these two 
categories are described as mere “subsidiary” sources,121 this qualifier is often held as superfluous,122 
for precedent and scholarship are commonly “the principal reference point for understanding the 
substance of [the parties’] rights and obligations.” 123  While precedents and teachings can be 
disregarded if need be, it remains that they are the prime source of international legal argument.124 
Singling out these two sources leaves much aside, however. Religious authorities, for instance, 
do not make the cut now that international law has been “laicized”,125 although they were important 
 
118  See the examples listed in A. Fellmeth, “US State Legislation to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law” (2012) 106 American 
Journal of International Law 107. See also, on this question, W. Pryor, “Foreign and International Law Sources in Domestic 
Constitutional Interpretation” (2006) 30 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 173 and the following contributions. 
119  Schauer, supra note 23, at 79, citing in particular United States v. Detroit Lumber Co. 200 U.S. 321 (1906), 337. 
120  Ibbetson, supra note 4, at 80. 
121  A. Pellet, “Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law?”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (International and European Papers 
Publishing 2018), at 15. 
122  A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law (London 1947), at 86-87. 
123  S. Schill, “Sources of International Investment Law: Multilateralization, Arbitral Precedent, Comparativism, Soft Law”, in Jean 
d’Aspremont and Sebastien Besson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2017). 
124  Notably in the way international law is taught: see A. Roberts, Is International Law International? (Oxford University Press 2017), at 135, 
discussing French and UK textbooks. 
125  Thirlway, supra note 20, at 27. 
But see also the oral pleadings in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), CR 2010/4, 
pleadings, at §30, when the counsel for Congo, Tshibangu Kalala, compared the words of the PCIJ to a Bible verse, “divine truth, […] 
where nothing can be added or substracted.” This elicited an answer from Alain Pellet, counsel for Guinea: see CR 2010/5, at §35: 
“I would nevertheless like to say a word about the ‘divine truth’ represented, to Professor Kalala’s mind, by the Permanent Court’s 
Judgment in the Oscar Chinn case. I would be loath, Members of the Court, to call into question this ‘Bible verse where nothing can be 
added or subtracted’ ⎯ to be sure, more satanic verses do exist.” 
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at earlier stages of international law’s development. In opining that spies were undoubtedly 
permitted by the law of nations, for instance, Grotius cited Moses’s envoy of twelve spies to the Land 
of Canaan. 126  As often happens, religious authorities have faded while leaving behind their 
vocabulary.127 Other corpora of knowledge (anthropology, sociology, philosophy, etc.) have yet to 
leave a mark in international disputes. 
To be sure, article 38 does not necessarily prohibit reliance on these other sources: it binds only 
the ICJ, and then incompletely. 128  Economics, for instance, has achieved a certain degree of 
importance before other international fora.129 The Court has also never shied away from relying on 
“descriptive authorities” such as dictionaries or maps.130 At the end of the day, although a litigating 
party or an adjudicator is unlikely to cite a statement from a family member in support of an 
opinion,131 nothing explicitly disallows such a citation. 
Article 38(1)(d)’s endorsement of precedents and teachings reflects that they are the two main 
types of authorities cited in international legal debates. They are further studied below. 
1 - Judicial decisions 
The terms “judicial decisions” in article 38(1)(d) are not further defined, although the adjective 
“judicial” leaves aside non-judicial types of “decisions” (such as those of the Security Council for 
instance). If the Court can be trusted to help interpret its own Statute, its practice establishes that 
“decisions” understood here are those, mainly, of international 132  courts and tribunals – and 
 
126  See Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, (1625), Book 3, Chapter 4. 
127  See, e.g., Gerald Fitzmaurice declaring that Oppenheim’s International Law is “the practitioner’s Bible”: see Sir G. Fitzmaurice, “The 
Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement” (1956) 19 The Modern Law Review 1, at 2. 
128  See Pellet, supra note 121, at 15: “Article 38 is strongly criticized first of all for being incomplete.” See also J. Kammerhofer, “Law-
making by scholars”, in Catherine Brölmann (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Law-Making (Edward 
Elgar 2016), at 308-309. 
129  J. Pauwelyn, “The Use, Nonuse and Abuse of Economics in WTO and Investor-State Dispute Settlement”, in Franz Stirnimann, Antoine 
Romanetti and Jorge Huerta-Goldman (eds.), WTO Litigation, Investment Arbitration, and Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2013), 
at 169. As Pauwelyn notes, this use can be controversial: the award in Enron v. Argentina was annulled partly because the tribunal relied 
on the opinion of an economic expert, without then translating this opinion into legal terms: see Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, 
L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment (30 July 2010). 
130  See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v United States), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 803, at §45, citing to the Oxford English Dictionary 
and Black’s Law Dictionary in defining “commerce”.  
131  And yet, references to family members’ opinions, if they qualify as another sort of authority, exist: see Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (22 September 2014), at footnote 474. 
132  A. Nollkaemper, “The Role of Domestic Courts in the Case Law of the International Court of Justice” (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 301, observing that citations to domestic cases are very rare in the jurisprudence of the Court. 
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primarily of the ICJ itself (including its advisory opinions).133  At an earlier point, the Court’s 
preference for its own output was seemingly a formal rule.134 
Much has already been written about precedents in international law (and the subject is 
further treated in Chapter IV below), 135  but rarely in terms of authorities used in legal 
argumentation. Precedents can serve as such authorities because they are based on legal 
propositions that have broader applications than the particular case they dealt with. As put by Judge 
Armand-Ugon, “[t]he very idea of a decision for a particular case […] is inadmissible.”136  This 
broader rule can, by its very nature, later serve as an impartial 137  and content-independent 
authority, provided that the similarities between the two cases are cogent.138  
If authorities generally are avatars of the past exercising some constraint on the present, then 
precedents specifically are the authority par excellence. The frequently-cited functions of precedent 
in international law – developing the law,139 ensuring predictability140 and certainty,141 preventing 
litigants from trying their chance every time the composition of the bench changes,142 etc. – all 
qualify as second-order reasons to follow authorities and give further relevance and importance to 
the citation of precedents as authorities (and not merely as persuasive pieces of legal reasoning). 
The ubiquity of precedents in international legal debates is indeed empirically established and 
further studied below.143 It is now commonly admitted that, even though precedents have no binding 
 
133  D. Charlotin, “The place of investment awards and WTO decisions in international law: a citation analysis” (2017) Journal of 
International Economic Law 279, observing that citations to other courts and tribunals is infrequent in the jurisprudence of the Court. 
134  H. Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice. Fifty Years of Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2013), 
volume I, at note 471, mentioning an “‘an unwritten rule of a drafting” in force in the 1960s. 
135  See, generally, Shahabuddeen, supra note 47; Cohen, supra note 44; G. Kaufmann-Kohler, “Arbitral Precedent Dream, Necessity or 
Excuse?” (2007) 23 Arbitration International 357; G. Guillaume, “The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators” (2011) 
2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 5. 
136  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1964 I.C.J. 6, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Armand-Ugon, at 165. 
137  Sir R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed., Longman 1992), I, at 41, §13. 
138  Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 43. See also Schauer, supra note 23, at 78.  
139  Sir A. McNair, The Development of International Justice (New York University Press 1954), at 16. See also C. de Visscher, Theory and 
Reality in Public International Law (Princeton University Press 1968), at 390. 
140  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1984 I.C.J. 392, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Jennings, at 547: “Law develops by precedent, and it is that which gives it consistency and predictability.” 
141  Judge Tanaka, supra note 107, at 65. 
142  Lord Wilberforce, a quoted in Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 146: “Nothing could be more undesirable, in fact, than to permit litigants, 
after a decision has been given by this House with all appearance of finality, to return to this House in the hope that a differently 
constituted committee might be persuaded to take the view which its predecessors rejected.” 
143  Cohen, supra note 44. 
 Accordingly, most of the empirical research has focused on this type of authority and the ways in which it is used in international 
jurisprudence, although this is also due to the difficulties in collecting data on citations to other authorities, as recounted in Chapter II 
below. 
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force upon later tribunals and parties, they should be followed except for good reason144 – and 
therefore qualify as a “probable authority”.145 As Lauterpacht puts it: 
No legal rule or principle can bind the judge to a precedent which, in all the 
circumstances, he feels bound to disregard. In that case he will contrive to do what 
he considers to be justice through the elastic process of ‘distinguishing’ and in other 
ways. But he is not free to disregard judicial precedent altogether. He is bound to 
adduce reasons for departing from the obligation of consistency and of observance of 
settled principles. These considerations are of particular urgency in relation to 
international jurisdiction, which is essentially voluntary in character.146 
The predominance of precedent over teachings of publicists (see below) probably explains why 
modern statutes focus on the former exclusively. For example, article 20(3) of the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone provides that “[t]he judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special 
Court shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.”147 As with article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ statute, such provisions 
are of limited guidance.148 They merely express a preference for some decisions, without specifying 
how they are to be relied on, and more precise statements as to how authorities are to be used and 
relied upon could be opportune.149 
2 - Writing of publicists 
By contrast, Article 38(1)(d) operates a triple regulation of “teachings”: they need to be 
authored by the “most highly qualified” writers; these must be “publicists,” and they must hail “from 
the various nations.” 150 Although the meaning of these qualifications is unclear151 – and it is even 
 
144  The argumentative structure “precedent is not binding, but we should follow it” can be witnessed in most treatments of the subject, be 
they academic (e.g., in Sir G. Fitzmaurice, “Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law” (1958) Symbolae 
Verzijl 153, at 171), or judicial (see Tanaka, supra note 107, at 76).  
See also A. Reinisch, “The Role of Precedent in ICSID Arbitration” (2008) 495 Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 495, at 497. 
145  Decisions of the court may be cited “[a]s ‘authority’, but not necessarily as authoritative”; see Sir G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure 
of the International Court of Justice (Grotius Publication Limited 1986), at note 22. See also Cohen, supra note 44, at 174: “precedent 
is like the embarrassing family member who no one talks about but whose presence is impossible to ignore”; Rosenne, supra note 67, 
at 56: “Precedents may be followed or discarded, but not disregarded.” 
146  Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 14. 
147  Article 20(3) of the SCSL Statute, 2178 UNTS 138. In practice, the SCSL relied extensively on this past jurisprudence. 
148  Borda, supra note 86, at 641. 
149  A. Nollkaemper, “Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the ICTY”, in Gideon 
Boas and William Schabas (eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff 2003) 277, 
at 296. 
150  The qualification that the “publicists” need come from “the various nations” likely indicate the drafters’ emphasis on universality. It may 
answer one particular suspicion attached to “publicists” in international law: that they side with the interests of their home state: see the 
observations of Max Huber in British Property in Spanish Morocco (23 October 1924) II RIAA 615, at 640. 
151  Kammerhofer, supra note 128, at 307.  
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unclear whether they are observed in practice –, they indicate that only a limited set of teachings 
can be accepted as a valid authorities in ICJ disputes. 
There are historical reasons beyond the inclusion of this category of authorities in the 
Statute.152 The absence of courts and international tribunals gave special importance to scholars, 
who alone could fill the gaps in international law.153 Baron Descamps, in drafting the Statute of the 
PCIJ, allowed the Court to use “the concurrent teaching of the authors whose opinions have 
authority,”154 mostly in order to avoid a non liquet. Teachings were a default option, and one that 
was less susceptible of unbound discretion by the adjudicators than the under-defined “general 
principles of law.”155  
The reference to “authors” and “publicists” could mean that the drafters of the Statute 
precluded any role for groups and institutions. 156  However, the travaux préparatoires give 
resolutions of the Institut de Droit International as examples of such scholarly work.157 This means 
that expert bodies such as the ILC or the Hague Conference could qualify as “publicists” – and their 
output as teachings.158 Some scholars have recognised this,159 while others have argued – with some 
reasons – that ultimately this debate is “artificial”.160 For the purposes of this thesis, works by such 
institutions (and notably the ILC) will be equated with teachings. 
The cautious embrace of scholarship by the drafters of the PCIJ statute in the State is reflected 
in the suspicion of other authors discussing the role of teachings in international law. Oppenheim 
cautioned against relying excessively on writers in practicing the “science of international law”:  
 
152  M. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008), at 112. 
153  Oppenheim, supra note 117, at 315. 
154  As quoted in Peil, supra note 100, at 138 (my emphasis). Baron Descamps also cited chancellor Kent: “when the greater part of 
jurisconsults agree upon a certain rule, the presumption in favor of that rule becomes so strong, that only a person who makes a mock of 
justice would gainsay it.” 
155  Ibid., at 139. Yet, Peil is not entirely convinced by the hypothesis that precedent displaced doctrine, noting that doctrine has never been 
important in the Court’s work to begin with: ibid., at 144-145. It is true that writing in 1958, Sir Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 22, saw 
no explicit reference to such authority in the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and the ICJ (which is not the case anymore). As mentioned in the 
Chapters below, however, writings used to be extremely common in the pleadings of the parties before the ICJ. 
156  See, e.g., A. Watts, The International Law Commission 1949-1998 (Oxford 1999), at 14. 
157 Procès-Verbaux of the Advisory Committee of Jurists (1920), at 336, comments by Lapradelle. 
158  Peil, supra note 100, at 148-149. 
159 Sivakumaran, supra note 25, at 4. 
160  Watts, supra note 156, at 15. 
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For even great authorities make mistakes, are influenced by their political fancies, 
take usages for customs, take the future for the present, confound their own opinion 
with what is generally recognized.161 
Judge Huber in the Morocco case further echoed this caution, as he was reluctant to give too 
much weight to the views of the “auteurs” on the topic of state responsibility, pointing to their 
incentive to lessen the liability of their own states or governments.162 
Tellingly, Judge Huber also nodded to the concurrent existence of a growing, and more reliable 
international jurisprudence on this topic. It is now commonly held that the jurisprudence of an 
increasing number of courts and tribunals has gradually taken over the function once exercised by 
scholarship: “as the body of judicial decisions increases, the authority of the commentator 
diminishes”.163 Other explanations point to the rise of treaties and customs as the central rules of 
the international legal system,164 or the “maturation” of international law.165 
This shift also likely reflects a changing sociology of international law. When most participants 
could be described as belonging to an “invisible college” composed of interpersonal bonds, citing 
publicists was probably more potent: everyone respected, or at least knew the authors being cited. 
When international law includes an increasing number of participants (especially at a time when 
the number of international law academics also balloon),166 parties might prefer to focus on higher-
authority sources such as precedents,167 whose number is concomitantly increasing.  
The consequence of this shift is clear: despite being put on the same footing in Article 
38(1)(d),168 precedents are now more authoritative than scholarship. With respect to the ICJ, Alain 
Pellet observed that “[i]f the influence of the doctrinal views on the [ICJ]’s decisions were to be 
evaluated according to the number of citations in the judgments and advisory opinions, it would be 
 
161  Oppenheim, supra note 117, at 345. This echoes the pragmatic and logical criticisms of the argument of authority identified in Chapter I 
above. 
162  British Property in Spanish Morocco, Award (23 October 1924) II RIAA 615, at 640. 
163  C. Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International Law (Manchester University Press 1965), at 105. See also Duxbury, supra note 87, 
at 8. 
164  Shaw, supra note 152, at 113. 
165  Sivakumaran, supra note 25, at 2. 
166  See James Crawford’s comments in Crawford, Pellet and Redgwell, supra note 12, at 11. But see also J. Dugard, “The future of 
international law: a human rights perspective – with some comments on the Leiden school of international law” (2007) 20 Journal of 
International Law 729, at 731. 
167  See infra, note 976 and Jean d’Aspremont’s article. 
168  See Pellet, supra note 121, at 16.  
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very close to nil.” 169  While scholarship is still cited in other contexts, such as in arbitration 
proceedings or (even at the ICJ) in the opinions of individual judges, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice gave 
what is the most accurate description of the question when he distinguished precedent and 
scholarship thus: 
No one who has been engaged in any international proceedings can doubt that the 
parties, their advocates and the tribunal itself, view in quite a different light such 
(material) sources of law as, for instance, the opinions of jurists (however eminent) 
and a decision, even if the tribunal giving it is composed of less eminent persons. No 
want of respect to the eminent jurist is involved in this; it is simply that a decision, if 
relevant to the case under discussion, has an actuality and a concrete character that 
causes it to impinge directly on the matters at issue, in a way that an abstract opinion, 
however good, can never do. This is easily seen in the attitude of both courts and 
advocates. When an advocate before an international tribunal cites juridical opinion, 
he does so because it supports his argument, or for its illustrative value, or because 
it contains a particularly felicitous or apposite statement of the point involved, and 
so on. When he cites an arbitral or judicial decision he does so for these reasons also, 
but there is a difference – for, additionally, he cites it as something which the tribunal 
cannot ignore, which it is bound to take into consideration and (by implication) which 
it ought to follow unless the decision can be shown to have been clearly wrong, or 
distinguishable from the extant case, or in some way legally or factually 
inapplicable.170 
The data analyses below confirms the by-now subsidiary role of teachings mentioned in this 
quote (and others171). And yet, teachings are still cited regularly in international disputes, indicating 
that they still play an important role. 
4. “Authorities” and “authority” 
“Authority” is a word accepting several meanings. The current thesis focuses on authorities 
as an element in a reasoning; this the “material” sense of “an” authority, not the broader meaning 
 
169  A. Pellet. “Article 38”, in Christian Tams (ed.) Statute of the International Court of Justice, §321. He adds, mischievously and perhaps 
unfairly, that “[t]he literature on doctrine in international law is inversely proportional to the use made of it in the Court’s decisions – a 
means for scholars to take their revenge […].” On the contrary, it seems that most of the literature on doctrine focuses on the type of 
authority that it the most cited: the work of the ILC. Besides, lack of citation does not necessarily indicate a lack of influence: see 
Kammerhofer, supra note 128, at 307. 
170  Fitzmaurice, supra note 144, at 171-172.  
171  Rosenne, supra note 67, at 119. See also MacCormick, supra note 20, at 67. See also supra note 145. 
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attached to “the” authority, as a concept.172 That concept’s traditional account has often reduced 
authority as “coercive power”. More recent accounts have however found that “authority” could and 
should be interpreted and studied in a broader sense that goes beyond the power to command.173 
The following chapters are informed by the renewed interest for this broader notion of “authority”.  
Crucially, most alternative definitions to the traditional understanding – e.g., von Bogdandy 
and Venzke’s “the legal capacity to influence others in the exercise of their freedom, i.e. to shape 
their legal or factual situations”174 – blur the distinction between “authority” and an “authority”. 
Parallels are indeed numerous: while Sivakumaran divides teachings into those empowered by 
states to say what the law is and others,175 accounts of “authority” in global governance distinguish 
between entities that have been similarly empowered and those have not.176 
The traditional understanding has also obscured the common etymological origin of the two 
concepts – and indeed, led to the paradox about cited “authorities” being, often, the one thing that 
is debated and challenged, whereas the notion of “authority” (proper) evokes commands that are 
beyond contest.177 
This common etymological root however offers a finer understanding of what underlies the 
two notions: in Ancient Latin, augeo referred to creating something new out of one’s own. 178 
Authorities of both types create something  The argument of this thesis is that the “authorities”, 
when cited, create boundaries: one by one, they delineate the scope of what is citable and what is 
not – that is, the scope of what is international law and what is not.179 
5. Conclusions 
A few conclusions can be drawn from this short foray into what an authority is and how it 
can be used in international legal argumentation. 
 
172  Çali, supra note 30, at 39. 
173  J. d’Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System (Cambridge University Press 2015), at 15, note 61. 
174  A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers”, in Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo 
Venzke (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking (Springer 2012), at 990. 
175  Sivakumaran, supra note 25, at 4. 
176  Krisch, supra note 30, at 249. 
177  The distinction between auctoritas and potestas was one way to discuss this paradox, and a staple in medieval debates. In rhetoric, this 
dichotomy might find its pendant in the distinction between administrative and cognitive authority: see Walton, supra note 35, at 76-77. 
178  M. Zink, “L’auctor du Moyen-Age”, in Antoine Compagnon (ed.), De l’autorité (Odile Jacob 2008), at 8. 
179  See Chapter VIII, above. 
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First, the preceding sections demonstrated that an authority can be defined as a material 
that informs a legal reasoning with content-independent reasons for action. The 
authoritativeness of this material varies normatively (e.g., between “necessary authorities” and 
“probable authority”), but derives, at least partly, from this material’s content-independence; legal 
reasoning and arguments are built upon these authorities. 
Citations, for the purposes of this thesis, are the explicit display of these authorities in 
support of a given legal reasoning. This support can be either direct or indirect as mediated by 
argumentative methods (such as an argument a contrario). It can be explicit or implicit, in the latter 
case working on common knowledge or on repeated language. 
This thesis studies only probable authorities, and more particularly precedents and 
scholarship, and only when they are explicitly cited.180 This is so for normative and substantive 
reasons. These two types of authority differ from other kinds in their authoritativeness. It is 
undisputed that international law has no system of precedent, and therefore precedents cannot be 
equated with “necessary authorities” such as treaties or even UN resolutions. As indicated in 
Chapter III, precedents and scholarship in theory apply and are relevant to a case only to the extent 
they are “persuasive”. While there are reasons to doubt this narrative, this makes them materially 
different from other international law authorities. Second, collecting data about other kind of 
authorities entail very distinct challenges that could not be tackled in a single PhD thesis. 
International dispute settlement is rife with citations and arguments to these two kinds of 
authorities, as well as with debates as to their value and the scope of what are valid authorities in 
international law. Chapter II will introduce a dataset of more than 180,000 citations, shared 
between nearly all 8,000 documents (decisions, opinions, pleadings) authored by different kinds of 
legal protagonists. 
Based on this dataset this thesis seeks to investigate the practice of citing authorities in 
international dispute settlement, in order to discover its variations, characteristics and 
consequences. This investigation will shed light on three aspects of this practice in particular: 
 
180  To be sure, some authorities are never cited. And many might be cited only implicitly and semi-explicitly: see B. Waltl, J. Landthaler and 
F. Matthes, “Differentiation and Empirical Analysis of Reference Types in Legal Documents” (2016, available at 
https://wwwmatthes.in.tum.de/pages/1p0nqp0j8y31v/Differentiation-and-Empirical-Analysis-of-Reference-Types-in-Legal-
Documents), which distinguished between tacit, implicit, semi-explicit and explicit citations. This thesis will focus on explicit citations, 
easier to capture on an empirical basis, and more interesting with respect to the focus on argumentation, sources and signalling. 
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(i) Which authority. Why are some authorities cited more than others? Why is one 
authority cited in lieu/instead of another? What explains why some authorities are 
more popular than others? 
(ii) Differences in practices. Do citing practice of different legal protagonists (courts, 
individual judges, and litigating parties) differ? If so, can we attach these varying 
practices to distinct strategic motives?  
(iii) Implications. What are the consequences of this practice for international law, as 
well as for the status of these authorities in international law? 
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Chapter II – Methodology 
  
PhD theses in Law, let alone in international law, are rarely based on large sets of empirical 
data. This thesis, by contrast, is an empirical enquiry relying on data analysis tools and methods. 
While the analyses below will rely and take inspiration from the relevant literature, they will also 
confront this literature with the empirical reality of international dispute settlement as can be 
observed from the data. In so doing, the discussion will try to shed light on three aspects of the 
practice of citing authorities in international dispute settlement: 
- What makes an authority “authoritative”?, a question investigated in Chapter III. The 
main answer is something other than “persuasiveness” is involved, as authorities are 
demonstrably more cited depending, inter alia, on their age, the identity of their author, 
their place in a coherent legal “whole”, and the language in which they are expressed.  
- Why authorities are cited, and what are the distinct strategies pursued by distinct actors 
in citing authorities?. These practices and their variations are reviewed in Chapters IV, 
V and VI, focused respectively on courts and tribunals, individual adjudicators, and 
litigating parties. To some extent, these distinct citation patterns of these different legal 
protagonists can be associated with varying strategic motives pursued by these distinct 
legal protagonists.  
- What are some of the systemic effects of the practice of citing authorities? Chapters VII 
and VIII identify a systemic role for authorities in two contexts: in the judicial dialogue 
between international courts and tribunals, and in defining international law insofar the 
range of “citable” sources inform the range of possible legal outcomes. 
These three inquiries are made pursuant to the thesis’s overarching purpose to investigate 
the characteristics and consequences of the practice(s) of citing authorities in international dispute 
settlement. 
As explained in further details in this Chapter, empirical methods and data analysis are apt 
to offer an answer to this research question. Exhaustivity, and therefore an outlook that 
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encompasses most if not all the empirical practice in this respect, is key. Consequently, instead of 
relying on case studies or other kind of qualitative research, this thesis mostly relies on quantitative 
data. This data is taken from a dataset (the “Dataset”) of more than 7,100 documents, that together 
cite 8,739 distinct authorities more than 180,000 times assembled by the author specifically for this 
thesis in years 1 and 2 of the PhD. 
This chapter retraces the methodology followed to create, develop, and prepare this Dataset, 
and discusses this methodology’s assumptions, underpinnings, and limitations. Section 1 first takes 
stock of the existing empirical literature in this field and concludes that it has barely touched upon 
the question studied here. Section 2 highlights the scope of the Dataset and introduces the courts, 
tribunals and authorities that are studied. Section 3 zooms in on the data-collection method. 
Section 4 details the methods of analysis and measures that inform the following chapters. 
Section 5 reviews in greater detail the empirical approach itself and notes its limitations. Empirical 
research has advantages and disadvantages. 
 This empirical study relied, and would not have been possible without the efforts undertaken 
by others, whether in collecting data or in sharing their experience, and I need at this point to thank 
Wolfgang Alschner and Aleksander Umov;181 as well as researchers at PITAD182 and in particular 
to IAReporter.183 I am also grateful for the data available on the websites of the various courts and 
tribunals studied in the Dataset. 
1. The existing literature 
This thesis’s research question and methodology place it at the intersection of at least two 
distinct strands of literature, namely (subsection A) the scholarship that studied precedents and 
teaching in international law used as an authority by international courts and tribunals and (B) the 
literature on citation analysis. There are only a few examples of (D) citation analysis applied to 
international dispute settlement, although guidance and inspiration can also be taken from (C) the 
literature that applied citation analysis to domestic courts. 
 
181  W. Alschner and A. Umov, “Towards an Integrated Database of International Economic Law (IDIEL) Disputes for Text-As-Data 
Analysis” (2016) CTEI Working Papers No. 2016-08, http://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294805/files/CTEI-2016-
08.pdf. 
182  D. Behn, M. Langford, O.K. Fauchald, R. Lie, M. Usynin, T. St John, L. Letourneau-Tremblay, T. Berge and T. Loven Kirkebø, PITAD 
Investment Law and Arbitration Database: Version 1.0, Pluricourts Centre of Excellence, University of Oslo (31 January 2019). 
183  Investment Arbitration Reporter, available at https://www.iareporter.com/. See also the disclosure at infra, note 253. 
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A) Authorities in international law 
 While precedents and teachings are often discussed in the literature in the context of 
studying the sources of international law, few contributions have focused on them and their use as 
authorities in dispute settlement in particular. 
The larger part of the literature on this question has focused on precedents, in line with their 
greater role and presence in citations to authorities than teachings. This was notably the conclusion 
of Shahabuddeen’s magnum opus on Precedent before the International Court of Justice, for whom 
“the case law of the Court has been moving in the direction of a marked attachment to precedential 
authority.”184 Yet, Shahabuddeen’s book did not treat at length the question investigated in this 
thesis. When he did mention or discuss the varying authoritativeness of precedents, as seen below, 
his empirical claims are not supported by the data.185 An empirical analysis is thus well-placed to 
extend and test his and similar works.186 
Most theoretical studies of the question, in line with Shahabuddeen’s, are characterised by a 
distinct topos (“precedent is not binding, yet de facto taken into account in most cases”). This 
frequent argument highlights the apparent paradox that precedents are ubiquitous in international 
legal argumentation, despite the “uncomfortable doctrinal reality” that they are meant to have no 
force in the same argumentation. 187  Dissatisfied with the failure of positivist and rationalist 
accounts of precedent to answer this paradox,188 Cohen prefers to attach the practice of citing 
precedents to “communities of practice”, and in turn to audiences – such as transnational lawyers – 
for whom precedents, albeit non-binding, still have meaning and argumentative force. Cohen’s focus 
on authorities primarily as a practice that has meaning for legal protagonists, while remarkable, 
also calls for an empirical investigation of the differences in citation practices.189 
 
184  M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge University Press 2008), at 241. 
185  See, e.g., ibid., at 144, finding a “glimmering of a disposition on the part of the Court itself to attach more persuasiveness to a unanimous 
decision than to a majority one.” As indicated below, in Chapter III, even this “glimmering” might be an overstatement. 
186  If B. Jia, International Case Law in the Development of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2017) was perhaps more attuned to the practice 
of citing precedents, he also barely discussed what makes a precedent more cited than another. 
187  H.G. Cohen, “International Precedent and the Practice of International Law” in Helfand, Michael A. (ed.), Negotiating State and Non-
State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 135. 
188  Which he investigated at further length in H.G. Cohen, “Theorizing Precedent in International Law” in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and 
Matthew Windsor (ed.) Interpretation in International Law (2015). 
189  For a different answer to this paradox, as applied to WTO jurisprudence, see notably K.J. Pelc, “The Welfare Implications of Precedent 
in International Law” in Johanna Jemelniak, Laura Nielsen and Henrik Palmer Olsen (eds.), Establishing Judicial Authority in 
International Economic Law (2016) 137, explaining that states’ ambivalence on this question functions as a means to empower weak 
international courts. 
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Most of the literature however rarely reviews the role of precedents are they are used in 
international dispute settlement. Although this literature often acknowledges the importance of 
precedents in judgments and awards, it rarely elaborates as to what this practice entails for the 
system of international dispute settlement. Guillaume, for instance, reviewed some examples of the 
use of precedent by international judges and arbitrators, before advocating a middle position 
between “the cult of precedent [… and] the rejection of precedent.”190 
 The literature on the use of teachings in international dispute settlement is comparable, and 
Jörg Kammerhofer rightly noted that “some platitudes are repeated over and over despite being of 
no help in elucidating the legal function of Article 38(1)(d).”191 Sivakumaran, however, went further 
than most when he identified multiple categories of teachings varying in their substance or form.192 
Sivakumaran’s article is one rare example of a discussion of the exact “influence” of these teachings 
on adjudicators.193 In this respect, the author held that citation analysis was a measure of this 
“influence” (albeit a limited one), “as a citation reveals the interaction between the judge and the 
writing.”194 This article however touched only tangentially on the determinants of what makes one 
authority more “influential” (or “authoritative”) than another – the topic of Chapter III below.195 
As such, though relevant as a background to the analyses in the next chapters, the 
scholarship related to the authorities (precedents and teachings) studied below rarely touched upon 
this thesis’s distinct research question. That literature’s concern with the normative causes and 
consequences of using authorities in international dispute settlement, as well as their lack of 
empirical depth (examples are often cited, but without any indication that they are, or should be 
representative) bolsters the case for a data-driven approach to probe their relevance and accuracy. 
B) Citation Analysis 
Citation analysis has emerged as one of the quantitative empirical methodologies in law. At 
the turn of the century, Richard Posner notably introduced citation analysis as a solution to what 
he thought was a “[s]carcity of quantitative scholarship [that] has been a serious shortcoming of 
 
190  See, e.g., G. Guillaume, “The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators” (2011) 2 Journal of international dispute 
settlement 5–23, at 23. 
191  J. Kammerhofer, “Law-making by scholars”, in Catherine Brölmann (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International 
Law-Making (Edward Elgar 2016), at 307. 
192  See S. Sivakumaran, “The influence of teachings of publicists on the development of international law” (2017) 66 International \& 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1.  
193  Ibid., at 23. 
194  Ibid., at 26. 
195  See also Section 5 below, explaining that this thesis is not concerned with the actual “influence” of authorities over adjudicators.  
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legal research”.196 The approach proposed by Posner held that, since adjudication is a “citation-heavy 
activity”, citations themselves have become “rich data” that could be leveraged to study adjudicative 
activities.197 According to him, citation analysis 
enables rigorous quantitative analysis of elusive but important social phenomena 
such as reputation, influence, prestige, celebrity, the diffusion of knowledge, the rise 
and decline of schools of thought, stare decisis (that is, the basing of judicial decision 
on previous decisions—precedents), the quality of scholarly output, the quality of 
journals, and the productivity of scholars, judges, courts, and university 
departments.198 
If Posner’s methods at the time were new, citation analysis later benefitted from the 
development of computer-assisted statistical analysis, and notably network analysis.199 Instead of 
merely counting citations, these developments have allowed reliance on more sophisticated 
measures of importance to study the centrality of authorities in a citation network. In the context of 
Dutch case law, van Opijnen tested various such measures (such as the PageRank measure used in 
this thesis200) against a composite benchmark of case “authoritativeness” (based, e.g., on annotations 
and citations to particular cases in academic literature) to assess the performance of these measures, 
and found that all of them outperformed mere citation-counting.201 
Not everyone agrees however that citation analysis can yield interesting results or inform 
legal analysis; as explained in further details below, there is a debate as to the proper remit or even 
usefulness of such analysis (see Section 5: Methodology). And yet, citation analysis is now an 
accepted method in international legal scholarship. In particular, Urška Šadl and Henrik Palmer 
Olsen have pleaded for a greater use of citation analysis and associated methods. They notably 
argued that network analysis enrich citation analysis by going beyond mere counting of citations, 
which is inappropriate for assessing the importance of precedents.202 They have also stressed that 
 
196  R.A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special Reference to Law and Economics (The Law School, the 
University of Chicago, 1999), at 1. 
197  Ibid., at 2. 
198  Ibid., at 3. 
199  See M. van Opijnen “Citation Analysis and Beyond: in Search of Indicators measuring Case Law Importance”, in Burkhard Schäfer (ed.) 
Legal Knowledge and Information Systems (IOS Press 2012), at 95. 
200  As explained below, PageRank, the original algorithm powering Google’s search results, is a measure of an item’s “centrality” in a network 
of items. Taking the citations between documents as such a network, PageRank identifies the most popular citations. 
201  Ibid., at 103. While Van Opijnen finds that PageRank is not the top performer, other works focusing on international law decisions (and 
not Dutch case law) have however relied on PageRank, as does this thesis; for further details, see infra p. 71 
202  Ibid., at 334. 
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empirical methods should not be seen as displacing, but as complementing and strengthening 
traditional legal scholarship.203  
C) Citation analysis and domestic courts 
 The first citation analyses of note, however, have focused on the use of authorities in domestic 
contexts. 
The US Supreme Court, in particular, proved a fertile ground for empirical studies, although 
most often for political scientists or economists. In a series of articles from 2007 to 2013, James 
Fowler and his co-authors studied the case law of the Supreme Court as a case citation network.204 
They identified for instance how the Court gradually adhered to a doctrine of stare decisis, before 
departing from it at some junctures (such as at the time of the Warren Court).205 They also found 
that the citation practice of individual justices obeyed strategic considerations and that, for instance, 
majority opinions rely more on precedents the more they are accompanied by dissents.206 Other 
studies have refined this analysis of the US Supreme Court,207 or studied similar case citation 
networks from other jurisdictions.208 
Another set of studies, with relevance for Chapter VIII on fragmentation of international law 
and judicial dialogue, also focused on domestic courts, but with a view to probing these courts’ 
reliance on external precedents: i.e., citations to foreign courts. In this context, scholars have 
particularly investigated the practice of the US Supreme Court and its Justices when it comes to 
relying on foreign legal sources. In a 2016 paper, Ryan Black et al. adopted an approach similar to 
this thesis and sought to investigate the practice of such citation at the US Supreme Court, after 
finding that the extensive normative debate on the same subject lacked empirical data.209 They 
 
203  U. Šadl and H.P. Olsen, “Can Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using Citation Network and Corpus 
Linguistic Analysis to Understand International Courts” (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, at 330. 
204  J. Fowler, T. R. Johnson, J. F. Spriggs, S. Jeon, and P. J. Wahlbeck, “Network analysis and the law: Measuring the legal importance of 
precedents at the US Supreme Court” (2007) Political Analysis 324–346. 
205  J.H. Fowler and S. Jeon, “The authority of Supreme Court precedent” (2008) 30 Social networks 16–30. 
206  Y. Lupu and J. H. Fowler, “Strategic Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2013) 42 The Journal of Legal Studies 151 – 
186. 
207  T.S. Clark and B. E. Lauderdale, “The genealogy of law” (2012) 20 Political Analysis 329–50. 
208  E.g., T. Neale., “Citation analysis of Canadian case law” (2013) 1 J. Open Access L. 1; M. Moser and M. Strembeck, “An Analysis of 
Three Legal Citation Networks Derived from Austrian Supreme Court Decisions” (2019) In Proceedings of the 4th International 
Conference on Complexity, Future Information Systems and Risk – Volume 1: COMPLEXIS, 85. 
209  R. C. Black, R. J. Owens, and J. L. Brookhart, “We Are the World: The US Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Sources of Law” (2016) 
46 British Journal of Political Science 891–913, at 891: “Our goal here is not to take a normative position on whether justices should 
cite foreign sources of law. Rather, we seek to examine the conditions under which justices in fact cite it.” See also the early efforts of 
D. Zaring, “The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis” (2006) 3 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 297–
331. 
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found that Justices were more likely to cite foreign law to support controversial legal positions, and 
that liberal and conservative Justices were as likely to resort to foreign-law-backed arguments.210 
A similar approach has investigated the reliance of foreign law between European courts. In 
a series of articles, Martin Gelter and Mathias Siems have identified around 1,400 cross-citations 
between ten Supreme Courts in European states over the 2000-2007 period. They found that such 
citations were relatively frequent, and for the most part meant in support of a comparative 
exercise.211 For the authors, greater rate of cross-citations between courts of the same language and 
legal tradition indicated a low level of cherry-picking, rebutting one of the common objections to this 
kind of cross-citation.212  
Gelter and Siems also performed data analyses to identify the courts (although not the 
individual authorities) most likely to be cited by other courts. They found that low levels of 
corruption and population size in the cited court’s country, for instance, predicted well which courts 
will tend to be cited or not. A common language between cited and citing courts was also a strong 
predictor in this respect.213 (Chapter III below will confirm that language is an important factor in 
the popularity of some authorities over others.) 
While often ground-breaking and full of interesting examples of data analysis, the relevance 
of this literature is however limited by the fact that it is concerned with domestic systems of law and 
domestic authorities. To a large extent, the research questions underpinning this literature, such as 
the weight of stare decisis or the role of foreign law, are however inapplicable or immaterial in an 
international law context. 
D) Citation Analysis and International Courts 
Often taking these pioneering studies (and notably Fowler’s) as a reference, scholars have 
also applied citation analysis to international dispute settlement – notably in the context of the “turn 
 
210  Ibid., at 908. 
211  M. Gelter and M. Siems, “Language, legal origins, and culture before the courts: cross-citations between Supreme Courts in Europe” 
(2013) 21 Supreme Court Economic Review 215, at 238. 
212  Notably in id., “Citations to foreign courts—illegitimate and superfluous, or unavoidable? Evidence from Europe” (2014) 62 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 35. 
213  Gelter and Siems, supra note 211., at 266-268. 
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to empiricism”214 in international legal scholarship. Yet, while particularly relevant for this thesis, 
few pieces shared its scope, methods, and overarching purpose. 
Important work has for instance been done on courts and tribunals beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Yonatan Lupu and Eric Voeten for instance studied the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights as a case citation network.215 They found that citations patterns at the Strasbourg 
Court fitted strategic motives, whereby the Court was mindful to emphasise its authority in 
situations that most required it, depending on a case’s audience, subject-matter and the divisions 
within the bench.216  The two authors also found that the Court’s cases could be regrouped in 
“communities” of cases centred around specific subject matters (such as types of alleged 
violations).217 Also studying the ECtHR, Jorge Leitão, Sune Lehmann and Henrik Olsen found that 
the Court’s citations were mostly driven by a rich-get-richer phenomenon: i.e., cases that are already 
much cited are expected to receive a disproportionate amount of citations over time.218 
These studies were however limited to the very particular context of the ECtHR as a “regional” 
international court, and their hypotheses informed by that court’s specific relation with domestic 
courts219 – considerations absent for the courts and tribunals studied in this dissertation. The same 
considerations apply for studies that have investigated other international courts and tribunals 
beyond the scope of this thesis, such as the International Criminal Court,220 the European Court of 
Justice,221 or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.222 
Several authors have however focused on one of the fora studied in this thesis, yet generally 
with a focus either on precedents or on teachings – never both. Jeffrey Commission looked at the 
citation of precedents by investment arbitration tribunals, relying on a limited, pre-2005 dataset.223 
He found that tribunals invariably professed not to be bound by precedents, but increasingly cited 
 
214  See, e.g., T. Ginsburg and G. Shaffer, “The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship” (2012) 106 The American Journal of 
International Law 1; G. Hernández, “The Judicialization of International Law: Reflections on the Empirical Turn” (2014) 25 European 
Journal of International Law 919. 
215  Y. Lupu and E. Voeten, “Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European Court of Human 
Rights” (2012) 42 British Journal of Political Science 413. 
216  Ibid., at 433. 
217  Ibid., at 436. 
218  J.C. Leitão, S. Lehmann and H.P. Olsen, “Quantifying Long-Term Impact of Court Decisions” (2019) 4 Applied Network Science 3, 
219  Lupu and Voeten, supra note 215, at 438. 
220  S. Manley, “Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court” (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 191–214. 
221  Y. Panagis and U. Šadl, “The Force of EU Case Law: A Multi-Dimensional Study of Case Citations”, JURIX (2015). 
222  E.g., E. Voeten, “Borrowing and Nonborrowing among International Courts” (2010) 39 The Journal of Legal Studies 547–576. 
223  J.P. Commission, “Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration-A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence” (2007) 24 J. Int’l Arb. 
129. 
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such authorities in their decisions.224 He also found, in findings relevant for Chapter VIII below, 
that ICSID tribunals were not averse to cite from non-investment awards, with judgments by the 
ICJ in particular attracting a lot of citations.225 Commission also briefly looked at what should make 
an award authoritative, stressing that it all comes down to that award’s reasoning, and that the 
community of investment arbitration practitioners carefully weigh that reasoning when relying on 
precedents.226 
 Sondre Torp Helmersen, meanwhile, penned what is seemingly the sole thesis-length 
contribution relevant to this thesis, although his doctoral dissertation on the use of teachings by the 
ICJ has not yet been published.227 Helmersen’s findings and methods were however partly published 
in two papers regarding the use of teachings by the WTO Appellate Body 228  or the ITLOS 229 
respectively.230 In both cases, Helmersen found that teachings are rarely cited in these two courts 
(teachings can be found only in individual opinions at the ITLOS), and identifies some of the 
underlying causes and reasons. In parallel, Helmersen identifies other reasons why some teachings 
are cited more than others, and these reasons (such as consensus or expertise231) overlap to a large 
extent with the factors identified in Chapter III below. While also of an empirical character, 
Helmersen’s methods differed (data collection was manual) and resulted on a much smaller dataset 
(around 300 citations for both the WTO and ITLOS). This thesis relies on a much larger dataset, 
including with respect to citations to teachings. 
 A handful of scholars have also attempted to study several international courts and tribunals 
at once.232 When this was done, it was typically in the context of empirically investigating the 
fragmentation of international law (the subject of Chapter VII below). An early effort in this 
direction was published by Nathan Miller, who reviewed “the case law of the ICJ, the ECHR, the 
ECJ, the IACHR, WTO Panels, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the ITLOS, the ICTY and the 
 
224  Ibid, at 148. 
225  Ibid, at 150. 
226  Ibid, at 154. 
227  S.T. Helmersen, The Application of Teachings by the International Court of Justice (University of Oslo 2018). 
228  Id, “The Use of Scholarship by the WTO Appellate Body” (2016) 7 Goettingen Journal of International Law 309. 
229  Id., “The Application of Teachings by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (2020) 11 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 20–46. 
230  For a similar study with respect to the ICJ, see M. Peil, “Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the 
International Court of Justice” (2012) 1 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, at 149. 
231  Helmersen, supra note 228, at 38. 
232  See, e.g., E. De Brabandere, “The Use of Precedent and External Case Law by the International Court of Justice and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (2016) 15 The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 24. 
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ICTR”.233 Published in 2002, this paper however relied on a dataset that was then much restricted 
compared to this thesis’s Dataset, and Miller did not use more advanced methods such as network 
analysis.  
A few articles also focused on a subset of citations between two international courts. 
Christopher Drahozal, for instance, drew upon a limited dataset to investigate citations to the 
IUSCT from investment tribunals;234 Alain Pellet did the same with respect to the case law of the 
ICJ in investment arbitration;235 and Gabrielle Marceau, Arnau Izaguerri, and Vladislav Lanovoy 
collected all citations to WTO case law in two dozen international courts and tribunals.236 
 One article in the literature landed closest to the interests of this thesis: in 2019, Niccolò Ridi 
studied three of the five fora investigated in this thesis (the ICJ, investment tribunals and the WTO) 
and collected a dataset of comparable size.237 Ridi was especially interested in how international 
adjudicators use precedents, and, as mentioned in the Chapters that follow, his conclusions match 
the conclusions reached in this thesis.  
Yet, in common with nearly all contributions listed above, Ridi focused solely on citations by 
courts and tribunals, and ignored citations by individual judges and, especially, all citations by the 
parties to a case. In this respect, one of the few, if not the only contribution to have looked at the 
submissions of the parties in this context is Krzysztof Pelc, who has investigated citations before the 
WTO panels and appellate body to empirically prove strategic behaviour of the parties in WTO 
disputes.238 
The literature on citations in international law is therefore characterised by a large 
fragmentation of the efforts, such that if a few papers and contributions overlap to some extent with 
this thesis, none of them had a scope of the same extent as this dissertation. To the extent, as 
explained below in Section 5, that the benefits of empirical analysis partly lie in its exhaustiveness, 
 
233  N. Miller, “An International jurisprudence? The Operation of ‘precedent’ across international tribunals” (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 483–526, at 487.  
234  C. Drahozal, “The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and Investment Arbitration: A Citation Analysis” (2008) 5 Transnational Dispute 
Management (TDM). 
235  A. Pellet, “The Case Law of the ICJ in Investment Arbitration” (2013) 28 ICSID review 223–240. 
236  G. Marceau, A. Izaguerri, and V. Lanovoy, “The WTO’s influence on other dispute settlement mechanisms: a lighthouse in the storm of 
fragmentation” (2013) 47 Journal of World Trade 481–574. 
237  N. Ridi, “The Shape and Structure of the ‘Usable Past’: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International Adjudication” 
(2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200–247.  
238  See K.J. Pelc, “The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application” (2014) 108 American Political Science 
Review 547. 
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examining a larger empirical dataset of the practice of citing authorities would complement and 
enrich the existing literature. 
2. The Dataset 
A) The set of international courts and tribunals 
The Dataset comprises data from the cases adjudicated by five international courts, tribunals 
and other adjudicative bodies. Throughout this thesis, the words “courts” and “tribunals” are used 
interchangeably. Others have expounded on what makes a court or a tribunal, let alone an 
international one.239 Although the modern increase in international courts and tribunals is well-
documented, this thesis focuses on a handful of the most prominent, for reasons further elaborated 
below.  
Table 1 below offers a bird-eye’s view of the courts and tribunals studied together with some 
main data points.240 
 Year-Range # Disputes # Docs # Judges # Words 
ICJ 64y 159 1,538 205 43 million 
INV 49y 492 1,117 470 28 million 
ITLOS 22y 25 242 54 1 million 
WTO 23y 199 426 275 32 million 
IUSCT 37y 658 1,372 35 5.5 million 
Table 1: Main figures241 
Disputes taking place before these courts cited the following authorities: 
 
# Authorities # Citations # Ratio 
Advisory Opinion 28 2193 78.3 
Dissenting 282 1192 4.2 
Judgment / Award 1431 94986 66.4 
 
239  See, most notably, K. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law – Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton University Press 2014), at 68. 
240  The data points correspond to the numbers currently in the Dataset. While the ICJ has heard more than 159 disputes, the documents in 
the Dataset represent only 159 of these disputes. 
241  Including individual opinions, but not standalone pleadings documents. Further info on this latter type of material is included in 
Chapter VII below. 
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Order 235 4619 19.6 
Provisional Measures 92 2546 27.7 
Separate Opinion 252 971 3.8 
Teachings 4756 20323 4.2 
Table 2: Number of authorities per type and citations to these authorities (absolute and average) 
Reading key: Advisory opinion in the Dataset received on average 78.3 citations each; 
dissenting opinions received on average only 4.2 citation each  
These fora and authorities are further introduced below. 
The International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice (abbreviated below as “ICJ”), based in The Hague, is the 
main judicial organ of the United Nations, as instituted through the UN Charter and the Statute of 
the Court. The Court settles disputes referred by states and offers advisory opinions on matters of 
international law. It has a rich history, studied elsewhere,242 and has seen a regain of activity in 
recent decades (after a noted slump in the 1980s243), with a current record number of pending 
disputes. With nearly 65 years of existence, the ICJ is the forum with the longest lifetime in the 
Dataset, during which it delivered binding rulings in nearly 160 disputes or advisory proceedings. 
Data was collected from the ICJ website, available at https://icj-cij.org. 
The World Trade Organisation 
  The World Trade Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (“WTO” and “DSU”) has 
been the foundation of a very successful system of dispute settlement, although it has recently come 
under stress.244 Under the DSU, WTO members can refer their disputes to panels of trade experts 
for first instance resolution. An Appellate Body (“AB”), composed of permanent adjudicators, hears 
disputes on appeal. Additional mechanisms allow for arbitration of disputes on compliance or other 
matters. So far, more than 580 WTO disputes have been initiated, although not all of them have led 
 
242  The range of the Court’s competences and functions, as well as its history, is very helpfully retraced in R. Kolb, The International Court 
of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013), at 913. 
243  E. Posner, “The Decline of the International Court of Justice” (2004) John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 
No. 233, at 1: “Adjusted for the increase in the number of states over its sixty year history, usage of the ICJ has unmistakably declined.” 
244  See, e.g., R. McDougall, “Crisis in the WTO: Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function” (2018) CIGI Papers No. 194. 
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to a first-instance decision. Data was collected from the WTO database (available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm), and other sources.245 
Investment Arbitration 
The last few decades have seen an increasing number of disputes between investors and 
states take place before treaty-based tribunals (“INV”). Most of these disputes are proceeding under 
one of the more than 3,000 bilateral investment treaties that provide for such arbitrations.246 The 
history and impact of these treaties is a controversial topic,247 but it is fair to say that few expected 
such a “boom” in investor-state disputes until two decades ago. Talks of reform of the investor-state 
regime have been going on for nearly a decade now,248 and in recent years states have met under the 
auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law to find a way forward.249  
As a reflection of the importance of this regime for international law practitioners today, a 
wealth of data providers has emerged to collect and analyse data related to investment arbitration. 
This thesis benefitted from the efforts of Italaw,250  the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes,251 and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.252 My work 
over the years with Investment Arbitration Reporter 253  has also been incredibly useful for the 
purposes of this PhD and is the main reason why so many examples of argumentative practices, 
below, are drawn from that field. 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”) was instituted in 1981 under the Algiers 
Accords between the United States and Iran to manage the flurry of litigation that followed the 
 
245  Notably from the dataset entitled “The WTO Dispute Settlement Data Set 1995-2016” made publicly available by Louise Johannesson 
and Petros C. Mavroidis, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/44568. 
246  See notably the data collected by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, at 
https://investmentpolicyhubold.unctad.org/. 
247  For a magisterial survey of the issues in their historical and economic underpinnings, see J. Bonnitcha, L.N. Poulsen and M. Waibel, The 
Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime (Oxford University Press 2017). 
248  See M. Waibel, A. Kaushal, K.-H. Chung and C. Balchin, The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration. Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer 
Law International 2010). 
249  The main issues and challenges of this reform process have been delineated by Anthea Roberts and others in a series of blog posts on 
Ejil:Talk!. See, e.g., A. Roberts and Z. Bouraoui, “UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: What are States’ Concerns?” (5 June 2018) Ejil:Talk!, 
available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-what-are-states-concerns/. 
250  Available at https://www.italaw.com/.  
251  The Centre discloses information about cases it has administered in its database, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx.  
252  Their Investment Policy Hub, which includes data about ongoing and past cases, is available at 
https://investmentpolicyhubold.unctad.org/.  
253  Since January 2017, I have been one of the most frequent contributors to www.iareporter.com. IAReporter reports on developments in 
the field of investment arbitration, and reviews arbitral awards and decisions in investment disputes. 
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Islamic Revolution of 1979. Private parties with claims over $250,000 were allowed to join 
proceedings before the Tribunal on their own, while smaller claims were litigated in bulk by the two 
governments. The tribunal has settled hundreds of disputes, mostly in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
and has now spent two decades working through the last remaining (and daunting) cases pending 
between the governments of Iran and the United States directly. Data was collected from Westlaw 
and the printed reports published by Cambridge University Press.254  In a dedicated article, I 
analysed the Tribunal and its work in detail.255 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
Finally, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”) has been instituted by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). Its main remit are disputes 
under the Convention or concerning the law of the sea. Within its timespan, the Tribunal has dealt 
with 27 disputes, of which 23 have led to a decision. Data was collected directly from the ITLOS’s 
website, available et https://www.itlos.org/. 
B) The set of sources and authorities 
Four main categories of data were collected from these courts and tribunals: (i) “decisions”; 
(ii) metadata; (iii) pleadings and submissions; and (iv) scholarship (as cited). These categories are 
reviewed in turn below, before turning to what was left out in the next subsection. 
(i) “Decisions” 
As all courts and tribunals differ in how proceedings are conducted, and in the shape of their 
rulings, there is no universally applicable definition of what constitutes a “decision” of an 
international court or tribunal. A functional definition (“any finding that is accompanied by binding 
legal effects”), for instance, would lead to unnecessary debates as to the status, e.g., of advisory 
opinions or some decisions on provisional measures. 
Instead, the Dataset followed the courts’ and tribunals’ own categorisation of their output in 
this respect, with a focus on decisions and rulings that embodied a definite and substantive 
 
254  I thank the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law in Cambridge for giving me access to their collection. I obtained approval from 
Westlaw and Cambridge University Press with help from the University of Cambridge’s Digital Humanities group. 
255  See D. Charlotin, “A Data Analysis of The Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s Jurisprudence – Lessons for International Dispute settlement 
Today” (2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 443. 
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interpretation of the law, especially when that interpretation was contested between the parties.256 
Some procedural decisions (on bifurcation in arbitration, for instance) entered the scope of the 
analysis, while others (e.g., extension of time-limits at the ICJ) did not. In general, and in any case, 
the latter category rarely relies on authorities in its reasoning – if a reasoning is even included – 
such that the omission has little impact on the broader thesis. The same principle informed the 
selection of what would count as a potential authority, i.e., as the target of a citation. Advisory 
opinions, for instance, were then counted as any other decision in the Dataset – although they 
present some distinctive features that are studied further below.257 
This open-mindedness is in keeping with judicial practice: as Daniel Terris, Cesare Romano 
and Leigh Swigart noted in their survey of international judges, when these judges cite 
jurisprudence from other courts and tribunals: 
the formal nature of a judicial finding does not matter. Judges consider decisions of 
other international courts regardless of whether they are final or preliminary 
judgments, orders, nonbinding advisory opinions, or anything else. What they look at 
is the jurisprudence rather than any specific case; what ultimately seems to matter 
is only that the reasoning that led the other tribunal to a given conclusion is legally 
sound and persuasive.258 
All individual opinions of judges or arbitrators also entered the Dataset, regardless of 
whether they qualify as “decisions” or “teachings” (a point that is debated in the literature).259 These 
opinions were grouped in two categories – separate and dissenting, with the former category 
regrouping all opinions that were not labelled as a dissent (e.g., opinions labelled as “concurring”, 
“separate”, or declarations). As mentioned below (in Chapter VI), there are meaningful differences 
between these types of decisions. Despite the debate as to the extent to which they really depart 
from the majority’s conclusions, 260 I nonetheless counted most individual opinions in the WTO 
jurisprudence as “dissenting”. 
 
256  See A. Pellet, “Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law?”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (International and European 
Papers Publishing 2018), at 22. 
257  Ibid., at 18. See also notes 19 and 20 for caveats as to the difference between judgments and advisory opinions.  
258  D. Terris, C. Romano and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), at 121. 
259  See Pellet, supra note 256, at 21, opining that they qualify as writings. 
260  See E.Y. Kim and P.C. Mavroidis, “Dissenting Opinions in the WTO Appellate Body: Drivers of their Issuance & Implications for the 
Institutional Jurisprudence” (2018) 51 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2018/51. The 
opinions Kim and Mavroidis described as dissenting are sometimes listed as “Separate” in the WTO Analytical Index (Cambridge 
University Press 2017). 
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Neither citations to decisions in a same case (say, a citation from a decision on the merits to 
a jurisdictional decision) were counted, nor citations between related (e.g., parallel) cases. These 
citations are less likely to reflect a decision’s engagement with an authority, and more likely to 
merely recall an adjudicator’s past decision;261 they are thus beyond the scope of this thesis. 
(ii) Metadata 
Metadata are essential for the analyses below, providing a set of independent variables useful 
for the purpose of investigating the practice of citing authorities in international disputes. Case 
metadata (title, date, judges, etc.) was obtained as a by-product of collecting the documents. 
Additional data, such as the nationality or gender of the individual adjudicators for each dispute, 
for instance, was collected from available databases when extant, and manually otherwise.  
This metadata also includes, to the extent possible, information as to the outcome of the 
different cases found in the Dataset. Given that the assessment of which party has won or lost a 
case is rarely a straightforward matter, this particular type of metadata warrants further discussion. 
 For all cases and all fora, outcomes were noted down at the main document (or “phase”) level. 
In other words, instead of judging the overall outcome of an entire case, separate (possibly different) 
outcomes were tagged for all stages of a dispute: decisions on jurisdiction or on the merits (at first 
or appellate instance), orders on provisional measures or on challenges. The reason for this 
methodological choice is that decisions, not cases, are usually cited in later documents.  
Outcomes were tagged according to three categories: “CLAIMANT”, “RESPONDENT”, or 
“MIXED”, reflecting the party that, on the whole, prevailed at any given stage.262 The following 
principles were followed in tagging individual documents: 
- Decisions on jurisdiction: all decisions that did not put an end to a claimant’s case were 
coded as a victory for that claimant. It is reasonable to think that a claimant prevailed on 
jurisdiction if some of its claims reached the merits stage, regardless of whether or not 
most of the original request for relief stumbled on jurisdictional objections. 
- Decisions on the merits: Likewise, a less-than-total win on the merits was still tagged as 
a win for a claimant (although see below how this principle varied by forum). The outcome 
 
261  Same methodological choice in Gelter and Siems, supra note 212. 
262  This reduction to a ternary categorisation of course does not pretend to fully represent the spectrum of possible outcomes. Yet, for reasons 
further expounded below in Section 5, this kind of reduction is a necessary element of data analysis. 
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on liability was what mattered in this respect: even decisions that found liability but 
declined to award damages (in investment arbitration, notably) were tagged as a “win” 
for a claimant. 
- Decisions on requests for disqualification: Challenges against party-appointed arbitrators 
were coded as wins or losses for claimants and respondents depending on who had 
appointed the arbitrator. In other words, a respondent’s unsuccessful challenge against a 
claimant-appointed arbitrator was tagged as being a “win” for that claimant. 
- Decisions on provisional measures: every decision that granted at least some of the 
measures sought was tagged as a win, regardless of the scope of the original request. 
 Tagging also differed between the different adjudicative bodies studied in the Dataset, along 
the following lines: 
- ICJ and ITLOS: both the Court and the Tribunal have clear operative sections divided in 
as many individual determinations (e.g., a vote on ordering the parties not to aggravate 
a dispute). These determinations were tagged according to the prevailing party, and 
labelled as MIXED when it was impossible to say. The overall prevailing party was then 
assessed based on the number of individual “wins”, the respective position of the judges 
ad hoc nominated by each party (as ad hoc judges are more likely to vote in their 
appointing party’s favour), and the importance of the individual determinations (win on 
merits that involve reparations have more weight than wins without). 
When this latter determination was impracticable or uncertain (typically in delimitation 
cases), the overall outcome of a case was tagged as “MIXED”. 
- Investment Arbitration: the tags relied on the outcome categorisation made by UNCTAD 
as to whether a case was won by an investor, a state, settled or discontinued.263 For those 
cases not in UNCTAD’s database, an original assessment was performed according to the 
principles delineated above. 
- WTO: coding relied on the data collected by Johannesson and Mavroidis for all panel and 
AB decisions up to 2016,264 which retraced determinations on every claim for every case 
as “1”s (a win for the complaining party or appellant), “2”s (a loss – and thus a win for the 
 
263  UNCTAD’s categorisation is at the case, not document level. Accordingly, for the cases described as “settled”, discontinued, or won by 
the state, I checked if the investor did not beforehand prevail at an interim stage before the dispute settled. 
264  See supra, note 245. 
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responding party or appellee) or “3”s (when a claim is dealt otherwise, i.e., set aside on 
grounds of judicial economy).  
For panel reports, the overall outcome of a party was calculated by comparing the number 
of “1”s to the number of “2”s, with “3”s weighing half as much in favour of a respondent 
(as they represent a “win”, or an averted “loss” for the respondent, but not on the merits). 
For AB Reports, I added up the scores of each party as appellant and appellee respectively 
in cases of cross-appeal. 
- IUSCT: wins or losses were coded according to the overall claimant in every case. The 
principles that informed this coding process are further described in another piece that 
dealt especially with the dataset of IUSCT decisions.265 
(iii) Pleadings and other submissions 
The Dataset includes nearly all written submissions before the ICJ and ITLOS, which are 
publicly available on their respective websites. It also includes pleadings before investment 
tribunals and WTO panels, when available (WTO pleadings are sometimes published in an annex 
to the Panel and AB reports). It also includes submissions and briefs from intervening parties or 
amici curiae. 
Importantly, the Dataset also retraced those pleadings that are summarised266 in decisions, 
taking care of distinguishing the voice of the tribunal/court from that of the parties. On the basis of 
headings (when extent), or manually (when no helpful heading existed), every decision was cut into 
sections covering a case’s procedural record, facts, arguments, or substantive determinations. In the 
Chapters that follow, the analyses often distinguish between “Pleadings” and “Pleadings (in 
decisions)”, unless otherwise specified. 
(iv) Teachings 
Just as with decisions, the form and origin of the cited teachings was irrelevant: blog posts, 
for instance, count as scholarship when they are cited.267 The academic credentials of the writing’s 
 
265  Charlotin, supra note 255. 
266  For the WTO at least, convincing work in this respect has shown that these summaries are meaningful: see M. Daku, K.J. Pelc, “Who 
Holds Influence over WTO Jurisprudence” (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 233. 
267  Valores Mundiales, S.L. and Consorcio Andino S.L. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/11, Award 
(25 July 2017), footnote 609 reporting Venezuela’s argument, citing M. Paparinskis, “The International Minimum Standard and Fair 
and Equitable Treatment” (12 August 2013) EJIL: Talk!, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-international-minimum-standard-
and-fair-and-equitable-treatment/. 
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author was likewise irrelevant. 268  (As noted below, this does not prevent different types of 
scholarship to have dramatically different importance in practice.269) The distinctive features of 
teachings as an “authority” are further studied in Chapter I above, and Chapter III, section 2, below. 
There is no unified database of the doctrinal works cited by international courts and tribunals, 
and of the related metadata (title, author, date). Consequently, a different approach was adopted for 
these authorities, as described in Section 2 below. That approach however means that it is likely 
that some cited teachings were not detected and failed to enter the Dataset – yet this likely account 
for less than 10% of all teachings, and the Dataset remains representative. 
C) Limitations to the Dataset 
 Practical and material requirements have meant this thesis is limited to these courts and 
types of authorities. Below, I explain in more details what was left out of the analysis, and conclude 
on the consequences of these limitations for the findings below. 
Other types of authorities 
Other types of “authorities”, beyond precedents and teachings, were excluded from this 
Dataset, for they often appear in the jurisprudence only sporadically. These categories of authorities 
however remain interesting and a subject for future research. 
Descriptive authorities. Maps, dictionaries, etc., were not counted or identified in the 
analysis,270 although they sometimes overlap with probable authorities. This category also includes 
other types of non-legal evidence, such as social science reports and statistics, which are still 
underused (or at least under-cited) in international decisions. These materials have become 
important before some fora, yet are not entirely accepted in proceedings before the ICJ, for 
instance.271 
These sources however often resemble the probable authorities studied in the following 
chapters, and often vary in authoritativeness in ways that seemingly matter for international courts 
 
268  See N. Stappert, “A New Influence of Legal Scholars? The Use of Academic Writings at International Criminal Courts and Tribunals” 
[2018] Leiden Journal of International Law 1, at 968. 
269  See Sivakumaran, supra note 192, at 12. 
270  This was also the methodological choice of M. Peil, “Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the 
International Court of Justice” (2012) 1 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, at 149 and 150: see also Helmersen, 
supra note 229, at 24. 
271  C.E. Foster, “Social Science Experts and Amicus Curiae Briefs in International Courts and Tribunals: The WTO Biotech Case” (2005) 
52 Netherlands International Law Review 433, at 436.  
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and tribunals. In Saadi v. Italy,272 for instance, the European Court of Human Rights opted to rely 
on reports by NGOs due to “the authority and reputation of [their] authors”. These authorities’ lack 
of legal character has however sometimes been a pitfall: the award in Enron v. Argentina, notably, 
was annulled after an ad hoc committee found that the award relied too much on economic reports 
and not enough on legal sources.273 
An interesting dynamic can sometimes link descriptive and “probable” authorities. For 
instance, in OTMTI v. Algeria, the investor tried to overturn reliance on a probable authority (a 
precedent) by relying on descriptive authorities (i.e., dictionaries), arguing that the tribunal that 
decided that precedent did not have the benefit of those (descriptive) authorities.274 That attempt 
succeeded, although these dictionaries were only a starting point in the tribunal’s analysis.275 
Law, hard and soft. All references to legal provisions, be they domestic or international (e.g., 
Civil codes, treaties, UN Resolutions, etc.), fell out of the scope of this research, as they amount to 
“necessary authorities” and therefore differ from the kind of “probable authorities” of this thesis.276 
Besides, these authorities present distinct challenges in terms of data collection, as they rarely are 
as easily identified automatically as citations to precedents or scholarship.277 (Of course, when these 
provisions were meant to be evidenced by a reference to a precedent or some scholarship, the latter 
was counted.) 
This type of authority, which is presumably associated with greater, if not a different kind of 
authoritativeness, entails its own research questions and would deserve a thesis of its own. There is 
so far little empirical study of these legal provisions on their own, and of their role in international 
decisions.278  
“Soft law” materials, likewise, were not counted as an authority, although they share many 
common traits with the “probable authorities” studied here. For instance, in Bankswitch v. Ghana, 
 
272  Application no. 37201/06, Judgment (28 February 2008), at §143. 
273  See supra, note 129. 
274  Orascom TMT Investments Sàrl v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35, Award (31 May 2017), at §239. 
275  See ibid., at §286. 
276  For the distinction between these two types of authorities, see above Chapter I. Of course, authorities that are formally necessary (legal 
provisions, for instance) are sometimes cited as a probable authority (in an argument by analogy for instance), but distinguishing between 
these uses would have required manual collection of the data.  
277  Both are generally cited as a variation on a common form (e.g., “X v. Y”). While international conventions are sometimes cited with their 
UNTS number, this is far from being always the case. 
278  For an exception, see O.K. Fauchald, “The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis” (2008) 19 European Journal 
of International Law 301, looking at how articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT – necessary authorities – are later used in arguments over 
interpretation. 
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a commercial arbitral tribunal said of the UNIDROIT Principles that “[they] are not binding on the 
Tribunal, but have persuasive authority”279 – a language often deployed to introduce the kind of 
authorities studied below. 
Relatedly, technical standards, such as the IFRS Principles, were not captured in the data 
collection process.280 This material can be controversial to the same extent as other authorities: in 
Gambrinus v. Venezuela, the investor (unsuccessfully) challenged the tribunal’s award on the basis 
of its alleged reliance on an accounting principle, IAS 7.281 Similar challenges to the authorities that 
informed a decision-maker’s reasoning is studied further below (in Chapter IV) with respect to 
precedents and scholarship. 
Non-legal writings. Finally, not every “writing” counted as teaching for the purposes of this 
thesis: references to literary or non-legal works, while interesting data points, were not counted. 
This includes, for instance, a quote by Immanuel Kant (“Out of the crooked timber of humanity no 
straight thing was ever made”) that is surprisingly popular in investment arbitration awards, being 
cited in Sistem v. Kyrgyzstan, 282  in a statement itself later quoted in Valores Mundiales 
v. Venezuela,283 Gavazzi v. Romania,284 and Koch v. Venezuela.285 The same quote can be found in an 
opinion by ICJ Judge Cançado Trindade,286  who is fond of citing from a wide pool of literary 
sources.287 
Likewise, political and administrative documents and briefs were not counted as 
“authorities”, yet here as well further research could helpfully indicate how parties and judges try 
to rely on such documents, and debate their importance. Two examples are instructing in this respect: 
in Grot v. Moldova, the claimant relied on a report by the EU and the Council of Europe, which 
 
279  Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. v. Ghana, PCA Case No. 118294, Award Save as to Costs (11 April 2014), at §11.170. 
280  See, e.g., Fouad Alghanim & Sons Co. for General Trading & Contracting, W.L.L. and Fouad Mohammed Thunyan Alghanim 
v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/38, Award (14 December 2017), at §442. See also Venezuela’s reliance on 
the International Valuation Standards Council in Koch v. Venezuela, at §9.134. 
281  Gambrinus, Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/31, Decision on Annulment (3 October 2017), 
at §145. 
282  Sistem Mühendislik Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. Kyrgyz Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/1, Award (9 September 2009), 
at §155. 
283  Valores Mundiales v. Venezuela, supra note 267, at §668. 
284  Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Award (18 April 2017), at §122. 
285  Koch Minerals Sàrl and Koch Nitrogen International Sàrl v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/19, Award 
(30 October 2017), at §9.5. The two last cases shared the same president in the person of V.V. Veeder. 
286  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade, at §200. 
287  To my knowledge, the only non-book “literary” reference in the dataset is the movie “Groundhog Day”, cited in Methanex Corp. v. United 
States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits (3 August 2005), at Part 2, Ch. E, note 18. 
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Moldova labelled a mere “brochure” unworthy of the tribunal’s attention.288 In Koch v. Venezuela, 
the respondent argued that “the reliance on ‘two short marketing publications’ created by Honeywell 
(which are not, contrary to the Claimants’ nomenclature, ‘position papers’) was irrelevant, and, 
further, those documents are prone to exaggeration and oversimplification.”289 These two examples 
also show how “labelling” an authority is an important argumentative practice: “brochures” are not 
“authorities”. 
Other international courts and tribunals 
This research could have been broader and covered international criminal courts, for instance, 
or to the sprawling jurisprudence from international human rights bodies. There are several reasons, 
however, why it is limited to the jurisprudence identified above. 
First, a lack of time and resources, notably to develop and study the vast datasets of decisions 
for these two regimes. Developing a dataset is a tedious endeavour. The data is reliably full of 
(mostly unfortunate) surprises, and individual datasets are characterised by idiosyncratic features, 
be it in the way the data is stored (older awards collected in the RIAA collection, for instance, are 
sometimes barely machine-legible), or in its accessibility to external researchers.290 The length of a 
PhD was sufficient to study the five fora present in the Dataset; studying other fora might wait for 
a later book.  
More importantly, and as highlighted in a previous paper,291 criminal and human rights 
jurisprudence are relatively self-contained systems; they rarely cite to the ICJ, and have even less 
in common with other regimes. They also, generally, have a more dedicated bench, whereas the same 
lawyers and adjudicators often straddle the WTO/Investment/IUSCT/ICJ/ITLOS lecterns and 
benches.292 Finally, past studies have demonstrated that human rights dispute settlement bodies 
and international criminal tribunals display deep, sophisticated networks of citations. The ECtHR 
alone over its lifespan has likely cited more authorities than the entire Dataset,293 while the dozens, 
 
288  Zbigniew Piotr Grot and others v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/8, Hearing on Jurisdiction and the Merits – 
Transcript, Day 2 (12 December 2017). 
289  See Koch v. Venezuela, supra note 285, at §9.146. 
290  It took me a few months to obtain access to the IUSCT’s online database, for instance, only to find out that Westlaw’s data was more 
complete. 
291  See D. Charlotin, “The place of investment awards and WTO decisions in international law: a citation analysis” (2017) Journal of 
International Economic Law 279. 
292  See for instance S. Puig, “Experimentalism, Destabilization and Control in International Law: Afterword to Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes’ Foreword” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1267, at 1269. 
293  See Lupu and Voeten, supra note 215. 
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if not hundreds of procedural decisions by the ICC, for instance, yield a comparable, if not greater, 
tally. Citation networks of these magnitudes would have complicated the comparisons and data 
analyses below. 
The same reasons explain why only international courts – and not domestic fora – are studied 
in this thesis, although the growing role of the latter in international law would certainly warrant 
further research into their use of international legal authorities.294 
Impact on the thesis’s findings 
To a large extent, these limitations should not affect the findings below. Indeed, for most of 
these findings, the thesis remains in general agnostic as to the whether they apply more generally 
beyond (i) the courts and tribunals, and (ii) the set of authorities studied here. In other words, 
citation practices with respect to other types of “authorities” identified above might differ from 
precedents and teachings; and other international courts and tribunals might have different citation 
practices even with respect to these two authorities. 
Some findings, nonetheless, are likely generalisable. In common with the entire literature on 
citation analysis, the analyses below have found citation networks to resemble natural networks 
where few authorities are disproportionally cited while the vast majority receive nary a citation. 
Besides, in focusing in particular on three fora specific to international economic law (WTO, INV 
and IUSCT), this thesis is in keeping with a literature that relied on this vibrant field of 
international law to study international dispute settlement in general.295 Unavoidably, this thesis 
will draw many examples from these three fora, and from the rich dataset of investment tribunals, 
but an effort to balance all sources has informed it as every step. 
3. The data-collection methods 
Data-collection is the process by which un-aggregated data points become parts of a single 
encompassing architecture. As explained in further detail below at Section 5, the purpose is to 
make sense and translate in a single idiom data points as different as judgments from unrelated 
fora, pleadings, metadata and cited authorities. As such, the data collection methods that built the 
 
294  See E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, “National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law” (2009) European 
Journal of International Law 59. 
295  Puig, supra note 292, at 1269. See also W. Alschner, J. Pauwelyn, and S. Puig, “The data-driven future of international economic law” 
(2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law, at 217. 
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Dataset are a crucial element of this thesis. In its breadth and complexity, the Dataset is unique 
and unprecedented in international legal scholarship. 
A) Data and Metadata 
All decisions by the courts and tribunals described above were downloaded from these courts 
and tribunals’ respective institutional websites, or from publicly available databases when this 
proved more convenient. Downloading was mostly performed by way of scripts written in Python, a 
general-purpose computer language used for data-collection and analysis.296 These scripts crawled 
through lists of webpages (e.g., case pages on the ICJ website), scrapped the relevant metadata, and 
downloaded the text of the decisions. 
In most cases, the text of international decisions was embedded in .pdf documents. While a 
ubiquitous format in modern life, PDF (for “Portable Document Format”) is not fit for data analysis, 
as this is a format mostly dedicated to ensuring consistent printing output across devices. The 
downloaded documents were therefore converted to .xml, a more data-friendly format. 297  Free 
alternatives exist, yet none was as handy or powerful as Abbyy Fine Reader 14 to convert all files in 
the Dataset. Abbyy also automatically detected headings and sections in most documents, which 
were later tagged semi-manually to identify different parts of every decision (e.g., procedural record, 
facts, etc.), and notably the pleadings of the parties when summarised. Indications delineating each 
document’s operative section (an identification that proved useful when noting outcomes) were also 
added. 
 Most of the international courts and tribunals studied in this thesis also provided metadata 
associated with the documents made available. For instance, the WTO’s database provides metadata 
for every panel or AB reports, including the relevant topics in these decisions, the international 
agreements cited as well as page numbers (see Figure 1 below). The Python scripts charged with 
locating and downloading these documents also collected this type of metadata. 
This information was inserted into the .xml documents themselves, at attributes of these 
documents’ main element. XML, as a mark-up language, allows to store data points (in this case, 
 
296  I have described Python and its importance for legal data analysis in D. Charlotin, “Identifying the Voices of Unseen Actors in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement”, in Freya Baetens (ed.), Legitimacy of Unseen Actors in International Adjudication (Cambridge University 
Press 2019), at 395. 
297  XML, which stands for “eXtensible Markup Language”, is a format that allows for the conservation of data in a hierarchical relation of 
different elements (more information is available here: https://www.w3schools.com/xml/xml_whatis.asp).  
65 
 
mostly texts) in elements set in a hierarchical relation. Citations, for instance, were stored as 
elements of parent “paragraph” elements, themselves “children” of section elements, all the way up 
to a root “body” element. All .xml documents thus eventually contained all parts of the original 
documents, in elements corresponding to various sections of the original .pdfs: headings, footnotes, 
paragraphs, quotes, etc. (see Figure 2 below).  
 
Figure 1: Extract from WTO document database 
66 
 
 
Figure 2: Top of a document with stored metadata (Lockerbie case at the ICJ) 
B) Citations 
Citations to precedents were collected using Python-based regexes,298 themselves designed 
on the basis of the metadata collected with the documents. This means, in particular and with some 
exceptions,299 that the universe of cited cases studied here overlaps fully with the universe of the 
citing decisions in the Dataset. In order to account for shortened or alternative names, every distinct 
case typically had several regexes associated with it.  
To avoid false positives, the Python scripts searched for matches in decreasing order of 
accuracy. A first search over an entire document identified those cases that were cited at least once 
(counting, of course, only cases and documents that predated the searched document). Every 
paragraph was then searched for this whittled down list of cases. When a case was detected in the 
paragraph of a citing document (thanks to its case number or its name), additional algorithms 
identified which citable document from that case (i.e., a decision on the merits or on jurisdiction, or 
 
298  Regexes, short-hand for “regular expressions”, are rules-based search terms that allow for powerful ways to parse and search texts, by 
looking for flexible patterns rather than given features or words. For example, the regex “bi.\d” includes the letters “b”, “i”, and the 
symbols ”.” and “\d”, which respectively mean (to the regex-based script’s digital eyes) “any character and “any number”. Applied to a 
piece of text, this regex would catch the terms “bit6” or “bil5” but not “bilboquet”. I described Regexes further in Charlotin, supra 
note 296, at 398. 
299  For instance, the rare citations to unpublished cases. On this topic, see below Chapter III, subsection E. 
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the individual opinion of an adjudicator) was precisely cited, with the help of clues such as dates, 
keywords, names, etc. 
This process was unfit for citations to scholarship, since there is no pre-existing database of 
all “teachings” cited in international dispute settlement,300 and the scope of scholarship is virtually 
open-ended (and not limited to a few hundreds of precedents). To collect these citations, then, a 
multi-stage “learning model” approach proceeded along the following lines:  
- Every paragraph was checked for text corresponding to either: 
o A known author’s last name, followed by a comma or a first name; or 
o the pattern of a citation, i.e., any text bracketed by (i) a proper name followed by 
a comma on one hand, and (ii) a year on the other hand.301 
- The script then checked if the captured text corresponded to a name already known, and 
then to a work associated with that name.  
o In case of a match, the script added a “Citation” element to the .xml file at that 
juncture; or 
o In case a citation was unknown, the citation was prompted on a screen to be coded 
manually as either (i) a new citation; (ii) a known citation under a different form; 
or (iii) a false positive. 
Following this method, the Dataset of cited teachings (and of cited authors) grew after every 
document was parsed. The documents were then parsed several times to account for the growing list 
of known authors, and to make sure an author only found in one of the last documents parsed is not 
also present, in a non-canonical way (say, in a citation that does not correspond to the usual pattern) 
in the first parsed documents.302 
 
300  Investor-State Law Guide has such a list for most investment awards, but I did not rely on it. 
301  For instance, something along the lines: “Damien Charlotin, Argument from Authorities in International Dispute Settlement, PhD Thesis 
(University of Cambridge 2020).” 
302  Interestingly, insofar judgments and award preferred to cite precedents over scholarship (a finding of the next chapters), this could also 
be seen in the difficulties in collecting this kind of data. Scholarship is often eluded, ignored, or referred to in vague terms that prevent 
identification of the particular works relied upon.  
A quote from the annulment committee in Venoklim v. Venezuela is typical in this respect, as the committee detailed the precedents but 
not the scholarship cited by Venezuela: see Venoklim Holding B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/22, 
Decision of the Annulment Committee (2 February 2018), at §138: “On this question, Venezuela referred to the decisions of the 
committees in MCI v. Ecuador, Fraport v. Philippines, Azurix v. Argentina and Enron v. Argentina, and to some doctrinal writings” 
(translated from the original Spanish, and emphasis added). 
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4. Methods of analysis and measures of authority 
The data analyses relied primarily on two methods: (i) topic analysis; and (ii) network 
analysis. In addition, these analyses often sought to measure the “authoritativeness” of authorities, 
and a brief discussion is required about what these measures imply (iii). Other methods, when used 
for unique analyses, are further described at the relevant junctures below.303 
A) Topic analysis 
Topic analysis seeks to identify the most frequent topics discussed in a dataset of texts. It 
relies on the co-occurrence of meaningful words in these texts to extract common topics defined by 
this co-occurring terms. In the literature, topic analysis has been used for instance to identify the 
references to human rights in national constitutions, 304  or the topics citing paragraphs in the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.305 
In this thesis, the analysis was performed thanks to MALLET, 306  an open-source topic 
analysis toolkit that operates in two steps:  
(i) over the whole (text) Dataset, the algorithm detected words that typically occur 
together, so as to create a pre-defined number of such clusters of words; for each 
cluster, the algorithm collected the most important words associated with that cluster 
(“keys”) ; and 
(ii) for every document in the Dataset, the algorithm computed the probability of that 
document belonging to a given cluster. Typically, the probabilities of one text 
belonging to different clusters follows a power law, with a handful of very probable 
clusters/topics and then most of them being much less likely. 
The clusters were then manually tagged to identify the topics they related to, on the basis of 
the common concept underlying these keys. For instance, the words “delimitation line para 
equidistance case equitable relevant method circumstances maritime coasts continental shelf area 
result boundary court special median areas” were associated with the topic “Delimitation”. The 
 
303  See, for instance infra, note 831. 
304  D. Law, “The global language of human rights: a computational linguistic analysis” (2018) 12 The Law & Ethics of Human Rights 111, 
finding two distinct topics in this respect, represented by a “universalist dialect” and a “positive-rights dialect”. 
305  W. Alschner and D. Charlotin, “The Growing Complexity of the International Court of Justice’s Self-Citation Network: Institutional 
Achievement or Access-to-Justice Concern?” (2018) 29 European Journal of International Law 1. 
306  See A. McCallum, “MALLET: A Machine Learning for Language Toolkit”, available at http://mallet.cs.umass.edu. 
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algorithm looked for 150 clusters which, when manually labelled (and once seemingly nonsensical 
topics were rooted out) resulted in 91 distinct topics (some topics were represented by distinct 
clusters, possibly representing nuances within these topics).  
In common with a solution adopted in another article,307 however, the topic analysis was not 
performed over the entire texts of documents, but only over paragraphs or sections that included a 
citation, as well as the preceding and following paragraphs. The purpose was to prevent the topic 
analysis from being flooded by facts- or procedure-related topics, but also to focus on the topics that 
are specific to citing paragraphs. 
Topics are indicated below as surrounded by square brackets (e.g., [Equity]). The labelling is 
meant to be self-explanatory, but the keys associated with a topic are also listed in Annex I below 
for reference. 
B) Network analysis 
The citations collected at the data-collection stage were used to perform network analyses, 
with a view to identifying the relationship between the different documents in the Dataset and the 
importance of authorities therein. 
Network analysis has its roots in the mathematical subfield of graph theory, a subfield 
spurred by Euler’s attempts to solve the Konigsberg Bridge Problem, namely, how to walk through 
the city’s seven bridges without crossing the same bridge twice.308 In recent years, network analysis 
has become a staple of the growing digital humanities scholarship, as it fits that scholarship’s goal 
of identifying relations and associations between a large number of data points. Network analysis is 
especially relevant for case citation networks, given “that the evolution of law mimics the evolution 
of other network phenomena and can be studied in the same way.”309  
A chief component of this approach relies on assessing the centrality of a given node in a 
network of links (also called “edges”) between these nodes.310 To do so, network analysis typically 
 
307  See Charlotin, supra note 255. 
308  See, e.g., the Wikipedia describing this problem, which Euler eventually concluded was impossible: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Bridges_of_K%C3%B6nigsberg. 
 For a longer review of the development of network analysis and its increasing role in legal scholarship, Ridi, supra note 237, at 203. 
309  See Šadl and Olsen, supra note 203, at 333. 
 Network analysis has however also been used to study “social” networks in international law. See, e.g., M. Langford, D. Behn, and R.H. 
Lie, “The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration” (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 301. 
310  Ibid. 
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requires two inputs: (i) a list of documents, the nodes in a network; and (ii) a list of links between 
these documents, the edges between the nodes. On the basis of these edges, a series of algorithmic 
calculations estimate the relevant distance between the nodes and produce two outputs: (i) visual 
maps of the relevant relationships between the nodes; (ii) and measures of the nodes’ importance in 
the network.  
Network analysis was also used to distinguish modularity classes amongst the authorities 
studied here. This is a kind of cluster analysis,311 meant to regroup nodes in groups with no a priori 
knowledge of what these groups should be. Nodes in a single modularity class have dense 
connections between themselves and sparser connections with external nodes and other classes.  
Since the characteristics of the nodes/decisions is not taken into account in network analysis, 
nodes from different fora could in theory be assigned by the modularity algorithm to the same class. 
In practice, however, and as indicated below,312 the modularity classes of the full network overlap to 
a considerable extent with the divisions between the various fora studied, making the few exceptions 
to this general finding worthy of interest. 
C) Measures of authority 
As noted above, the introduction of network analysis to empirical legal scholarship brought 
a more sophisticated approach to citation analysis. In particular, various measures of 
centrality/authority can be computed by network analysis algorithms from the assumption that 
cases are part of a citation network. There are several such algorithms, with different inner workings 
and features, yet they typically go further than just grouping cases that cite each other together or 
counting incoming citations. A typical algorithm would take into account triangular relationships to 
better account for authoritativeness. For instance, if case A cites case B and C, and if case B also 
cites case C (besides being cited by case A), the relationship between A and C is presumably stronger 
than if case B does not cite case C. 
These measures of authority include PageRank,313 the measure powering Google’s search 
algorithm, and which seeks to indicate the importance of a node in a given hub, based not only on 
how often they are cited, but also to what extent they also cite and are cited by authoritative 
 
311  “Cluster analysis” is also defined in Gelter and Siems, supra note 212, at 50. 
312  See Figure 11, at p. 166. 
313  As based on S. Brin, L. Page, “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine” (1998) Proceedings of the seventh 
International Conference on the World Wide Web 107. 
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authorities. PageRank is based on a probabilistic, “random walker” model meant to assess the 
likelihood that a person randomly walking between nodes on the basis of the links between them 
will arrive on any particular one.314 Repeated, these “random walks” converge on a ranking of nodes 
depending on their centrality to the network, 
The literature rightly acknowledges that “[d]ifferent measures should be used to answer 
different research questions”,315 with the consequence that it remains a matter for debate which 
measure is the most appropriate in any given case. 316  In this context, PageRank has been 
recommended to investigate case citation networks in international law,317 and used to such employ 
by other scholars in some of the contributions reviewed above at Section 1.318 The analyses below 
however systematically checked that other measures of authority did not yield contradictory results 
and that the findings were robust in this respect. 
In the Chapters that follow and unless otherwise mentioned, the PageRank score of 
authorities is therefore taken as a shortcut for their “authoritativeness”. In other words, the measure 
of “authoritativeness” below is not based on a crude counting of citations, but is always computed 
through mathematical means that take into account a broader range of relationships between 
authorities. 
5. Empirical methodology and its limitations 
This thesis’s methodology relies on empirical data and statistical analyses. As mentioned at 
the outset of this chapter, such methods remain relatively unusual in international law literature, 
especially in the context of a doctoral thesis. The thesis’ overall purpose, namely to investigate a 
practice, naturally calls for such a methodology.  
The thesis’s research question is, to a large extent, a factual question, whose answer depends 
primarily on an analysis of the empirical record; none of these questions is normative in character 
 
314  M. Derlén, J. Lindholm, M. Rosvall, and A. Mirshahvalad, “Coherence out of Chaos: mapping European union law by running randomly 
through the maze of CJEU case law” (2013) 3 Europarättslig tidskrift 517–535, at 523. 
315  Šadl and Olsen, supra note 203, at 334. 
316  Neale, supra note 208, at 11.  
See also M. Derlén and J. Lindholm, “Measuring Centrality in Legal Citation Networks-A Case Study of the HITS and PageRank 
Algorithms” (2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2910926, at 8, criticizing the measure (initial 
hub score) used by Lupu and Voeten, supra note 215, notably because it fails to take into account precedents that are overturned. 
317  Ibid. 
318  For uses of this measure in similar empirical studies, see, e.g., Y. Panagis and U. Šadl, “The Force of EU Case Law: A Multi-Dimensional 
Study of Case Citations”, JURIX (2015); Langford, Behn, and Lie, supra note 309, at 322; Neale, supra note 208, at 11. 
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or meant to receive a normative answer.319 In other words, this thesis is not interested, for instance, 
in what should make an authority authoritative, or in the legal framework of the practice of citation, 
or in the legal implications of this practice. Although, as will be seen in the chapters below, the 
normative answers given to these aspects of the practice studied here can be a useful starting point 
for the analysis, this thesis’s overarching purpose calls for an investigation, at least to some extent, 
on the basis of the empirical record. As a result, the analyses below are often deliberately descriptive 
in character; they let the data speak for itself. 
The citation practice(s) studied here, besides, has neither been studied under an academic, 
doctrinal lens, nor has it been particularly rationalised by the practitioners themselves.320 The 
magnitude of the citation networks studied below partly explain this state of affairs.321 An empirical, 
inductive analysis relying on the actual record is therefore among the most natural ways to 
investigate it.322 More traditional legal research methodology, because of their limitations in this 
respect, would incur the risk of being insufficiently representative or unduly specialised. As 
explained below, data-driven analysis by contrast permits exhaustivity and allows to draw 
conclusions from the entire dataset without incurring the risk of sampling bias.  
Several recent contributions to the literature have adopted a similar empirical approach, but 
as noted above thesis-length treatments of this subject are scant, if not so far inexistent. This 
empirical methodology deserves a brief discussion of its promises and its limits. 
A) Empirical analyses and big data 
The common intuition underpinning data analysis methods is that objects of study can be 
usefully compared when reduced to a common – often, mathematical – idiom. Translation is then at 
the heart of such analyses, and while a translation is, generally, a loss (“traduire, c’est trahir”, goes 
 
319  Compare with Black et al., supra note 209, at 891: “Our goal here is not to take a normative position on whether [US Supreme Court] 
justices should cite foreign sources of law. Rather, we seek to examine the conditions under which justices in fact cite it.” 
320  Likewise, see Helmersen, supra note 229, at 22: “A conventional legal methodology, which would focus on cases where judges explicitly 
decide or comment on legal questions, would be unhelpful here, since ITLOS judges have never said anything explicit about how they 
view teachings.” 
321  Ridi, supra note 237, at 201: “Doctrinal studies may restrict themselves to identifying specific case studies or selecting a manageable 
sample, building on what is perceived as strong anecdotal evidence on the development of citation practices. Though their merits of close 
forensic analyses of what constructs and justifications are invoked when negotiating an approach to the past or the other are readily 
acknowledged, they cannot capture the complexity of so sizeable a phenomenon.” 
322  Another approach, taken by Stappert, supra note 268, would rely on interviews with practitioners dedicated to this subject. However, as 
noted in Chapter III, it may be the case that the opinion of practitioners might not match the empirical data. As mentioned by Ridi, 
supra note 237, at 201: “reliance on what adjudicators say, rather than do, may be counterproductive in the context of the accurate 
mapping of a phenomenon whose importance also lies in its quantitative measurability.” (emphasis in the original) 
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the French saying), the expectation is this translation will allow the emergence of features, 
comparisons, analyses, that would not be available under a traditional approach.  
Franco Moretti, a scholar in literature, developed the idea of “close reading” and opposed it 
to a data-led “distant reading”. Moretti’s works have spurred the birth and development of “Digital 
Humanities” as a new and thriving academic field, to which this thesis partly belongs. He described 
the intuition that underpins this academic inquiry as follows:  
in other words: you reduce the text to a few elements, and abstract them from the 
narrative flow, and construct a new, artificial object like the maps that I have been 
discussing. And with a little luck, these maps will be more than the sum of their parts: 
they will possess ‘emerging’ qualities, which were not visible at the lower level.323 
 Likewise, the methods employed here are an attempt to abstract from the particulars of a 
given case. One citation to a precedent or a piece of scholarship might indicate nothing more than 
the idiosyncratic preferences of the citer; ten citations already constitute a pattern that is worth 
investigating. A hundred citations, in documents as varied as pleadings, judgments and individual 
opinions, indicate a relatively popular “authority”, and its popularity becomes an object of study in 
itself, regardless of the role of this authority in one particular case or for one particular party, or 
even the particular motives that led to this citation. 
Alschner, Pauwelyn and Puig see three advantages in data-driven analysis, and all three are 
relevant in the context of this thesis. First, “data-driven analysis, especially through text-as-data 
and network analysis, can be used to make latent patterns in legal data visible.”324 Practitioners and 
scholars in international dispute settlement encounter citations chiefly in the context of their 
practice or their readings of the jurisprudence; their knowledge and understanding of this practice 
is limited, and does not extend to cases in which they are not involved or not interested: it would 
take a full year and 7 seven months for someone to read back to back, at an average speed and 
without pause, the around 110 million words found in all decisions and opinions in the dataset, and 
probably more than double this if pleadings were included.325 
Nuance is lost in the process, but this is part of a trade-off with greater exhaustiveness. Data-
driven analyses do not share the limitations of traditional scholarship, in which the same “landmark” 
 
323  F. Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary History (Verso 2005), at 53. 
324  See Alschner et al., supra note 295, at 223. 
325  See https://wordstotime.com/. 
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cases are endlessly discussed and debated, tunnel vision set in, and the tree is often confused for the 
forest. Drawing conclusions from subsets of the jurisprudence or of the practice incurs risks in terms 
of bias and lack of representativeness.326 By contrast, approaches that seeks exhaustivity – although, 
of course, they incur their own set of risks – reduces the role of human judgment,327 and enhance 
reliability.328  
While, and as a result, the analyses below often acquire a strong descriptive character, there 
is however value in such a description, especially if it identifies unknown patterns or counters 
received ideas.329 Indeed, these empirical methods can also be used “to debunk widely held truths”,330 
as such “truths” are often based on a partial picture of the data available. Chapter III below attempts 
to debunk one such alleged truth (the idea that authorities are cited only insofar they are 
intrinsically persuasive); other parts of the thesis likewise endeavour to confirm or reject common 
intuitions, such as the idea that decisions rendered by majority are less authoritative than 
unanimous decisions. 
Thirdly, and relatedly, “text-as-data and network analysis allows us to quantify otherwise 
abstract phenomena.”331 Such fictions and abstract phenomena play an important role in law. Many 
key topics of international law, from “legitimacy” to “fragmentation”, are embodied by terms that in 
turn cover a manifold reality. While there are important limits to what quantification can achieve, 
data analysis allows to take steps towards a better understanding of this reality. 
B) The role of theory and literature 
No empirical analysis however operates in a vacuum: legal analyses, even empirical legal 
analyses, are meant to answer or illustrate preconceptions and research questions. In other words, 
“[d]ata-driven analysis does not […] mean ‘the end of theory’”,332 and “at least until computers are 
able to ‘read’ and comprehend text, [data analysis will remain] an imperfect mode of inquiry, another 
 
326  Alschner et al., supra note 295, at 222: “Selection bias in sampling, missing observations, or unwarranted generalizations can produce a 
skewed or misleading picture of the larger universe in question.” 
327  J. Hsiang and J. Nyarko, “Precedent Citation at the WTO-Shifting the Empirical Focus to Panelists” (2016), available at 
http://acle.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-center-for-law--economics/conferences/celse-2016/conference-
papers/session-iii/paper-hsiangnyarko-2016.pdf?1466066673136, at 12: “[t]he obvious advantage of using the frequency of references 
as a measure for reliance on precedent is its objectivity and reproducibility, as human judgment does not factor into our analysis.”.  
328  C. M. Oldfather, J. P. Bockhorst, and B. P. Dimmer, “Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial 
Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal Scholarship” (2012) 64 Florida Law Review 1189, at 1233: “One of the virtues of an automated 
approach is that it maximizes reliability.” 
329  See, likewise, Helmersen, supra note 229, at 24. 
330  Alschner et al., supra note 295, at 224. 
331  Ibid. 
332  Ibid, at 221. 
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tool in the scholar's toolbox, rather than a replacement for what has come before it.”333  Legal 
expertise, in short, remains necessary to identify relevant legal queries or legal distinctions between 
different empirical datums.  
Accordingly, this thesis also relies on the existing literature regarding authority and citations 
in international law, even if this literature was itself not empirical. Such academic literature often 
serves as a starting point to the analyses below; the analyses in turn seek to probe, disprove, or 
complete on the basis of empirical data the intuitions of theoretical scholars. Empirically-based 
measures of an authority’s authoritativeness, for instance, can then be compared with more 
qualitative assessments.334 The goal is, insofar as feasible, to shed light on doctrinal debates and 
ideas. This is also the approach adopted by the literature reviewed in Section 1. 
As mentioned above, 335  there could be a prima facie paradox in studying citations to 
authorities on the basis of citations to authorities. However, there are important differences between 
the use of authorities in dispute settlement settings and in an academic context.336 And while it is 
true that some of the analyses and conclusions below could undoubtedly be transposed to this latter 
context,337 this thesis does not pretend to challenge the legitimacy or the property of citations or the 
use of authorities in any context; if it seeks to identify patterns and to shed light on this practice, 
this is merely with descriptive or analytical, not normative conclusions in mind.338 The academic 
field, maybe even more than the legal field, is built upon citations and the work of past scholars.339 
This makes it an interesting object of study, but one that goes beyond this thesis’s scope.340 
 
333  Oldfather et al, supra note 328, at 1241. 
334  J. Frankenreiter, “Network Analysis and the Use of Precedent in the Case Law of the CJEU – A Reply to Derlén and Lindholm” (2017) 
18 German Law Journal 687, at 692-693. 
335  Chapter I, supra note 61. 
336  See W. Landes, R. Posner, “Legal Precedent: a theoretical and empirical analysis” (1976) 19 Journal of Law and Economics 2, at 251: 
“Scholarly citations, however, are not examples of the use of precedent. The normal function of the scholarly citation is not to adduce 
authority for a proposition but to give credit for prior original work, to refer the reader to corroborative or collateral findings by other 
scholars, and as a method of incorporating by reference relevant theorems, proofs, etc.” 
337  In non-legal fields, citation analyses typically focus on citations as they in the academic literature. Posner, supra note 196, at 2, noted that 
“both adjudication, a central practical activity of the legal system, and legal research are citation-heavy activities.” 
For a example of this type of research in the legal field, see, e.g.,  
338  In other words, if the citations in this thesis might, like citations by courts and tribunals, be influenced by more than the persuasiveness 
of the cited authority, it does not mean that it should refrain from citing. 
339  For a history of how citations have come to be predominant in humanities, see Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History (Harvard 
University Press 1997). 
340  International law scholarship has been partly studied by T. Schultz and N. Ridi, “Arbitration Literature”, in Thomas Schultz and Federico 
Ortino (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2019). 
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C) Data Collection and bias 
The “light” that can be shed by empirical legal analysis, however, should always be qualified; 
the methods, the inquiries, introduce bias in the research question that should not be ignored.341 
The collected data can be skewed in one way or another, and noise risks to be confused for 
patterns.342 
This is also why this Chapter took the time to retrace in detail the methodological choices 
that have informed the data collection and the analyses. Data collection is a product of choice, 
sometimes important ones. Collecting outcomes of cases, for instance, is fraught with pitfalls.343 A 
binary win-lose metric can hide more than it enlightens, and its limitations should be borne in 
mind.344 Nevertheless, once sufficiently qualified (for instance, “win/lose in jurisdictional contexts”), 
data on outcome can be helpfully used.  
A related concern – and another caveat that applies to all following chapters – regards the 
implied nature of the international adjudication process that underpins this thesis. Adjudication 
rarely proceeds through a smooth process whereby parties are experienced and helpful, the 
decisionmakers competent and diligent, and the most “naturally” authoritative authorities being 
ultimately relied upon.345 The reality of international dispute settlement is sometimes altogether 
different; and at all steps of the analysis, it needs to be acknowledged that some degree of arguing 
through and with citations is a human practice: with its flaws and drawbacks. Finally, it is a rare 
dataset that is perfectly clear of errors and inconsistencies. Notably, data converted from the .pdf 
format is prone to errors and imperfections.346 Errors of this kind are an expected reality of data 
analysis. 
 
341  See Hernández, supra note 214, at 923: “[…] an attempt to address and create knowledge through facts carries with it certain consequences, 
not least of which is that the choice to privilege certain facts in constructing a description is one that is inevitably value-laden.” 
342  See, e.g., X.-L. Meng and others, “Statistical paradises and paradoxes in big data (I): Law of large populations, big data paradox, and the 
2016 US presidential election” (2018) 12 The Annals of Applied Statistics 685–726. 
343  C. Rogers, “The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators” (2013) 12 Santa Clara Journal International Law 223, at 239. 
344  See K. Skubiszewski, “The Role of ad hoc Judges”, in Connie Peck and Roy Lee (eds.), Increasing the Effectiveness of the International 
Court of Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997), at 389: ‘I am not very convinced that the statistics about voting behaviour, like 
statistics about the number of ratifications of treaties and similar statistical games, tell us much about the law and the real posture [. . .].’ 
 But see also Charlotin, supra note 255, at 25, note 103. 
345  See J. Paulsson, “The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration”, in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under International 
Investment Agreements. A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010), at §4.21. 
346  To the extent possible, the most flagrant ones were corrected during the data-collection process (for instance, the frequent “Teemed” typo 
for “Tecmed”). 
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Yet, if the high burden of proof placed on empirical analyses is sometimes unfair,347 this is 
because it stems from a misunderstanding of what the analysis tries to achieve. Legal data analysis 
does not seek to offer a final, distinct answer to legal questions, nor even to supplant or displace 
other types of legal analysis. Empirical research is limited; it can rarely prove anything beyond 
doubt, and as such should not be overinterpreted.348 The efficiency gained by computational analysis, 
instead, is one side of a trade-off with the nuance and accuracy a human could achieve over a smaller 
dataset – especially when no human capacity could code or analyse the immense datasets in 
question.349 
D) Limitations of citation analysis 
Likewise, a misunderstanding of the goals and principles of data analysis often feed a further, 
common criticism that goes at the heart of this thesis’s underlying assumption, in denying that 
citations, the explicit display of the use of authorities, could in themselves be a proper and 
meaningful research object.350 
This thesis is not the first, nor the only scholarly to work from this assumption: as indicated 
above in the literature review, several recent academic endeavours have used citation analysis to 
shed light on the workings of international courts and tribunals. The list of citation-based scholarly 
works grows increasingly longer as scholars have found citations an interesting object of study.351 
And yet, replies to these works insist that the practice of citing, since it rarely obey any king of 
formal framework, is characterised by heterogeneity (of citing parties, of authorities, of motives to 
cite, etc.) and individual idiosyncrasies, such that no conclusion can be drawn from this data – at 
least not without extensive qualifications regarding these citations.352 
Citations can indeed serve many different roles in a reasoning: they can support that reasoning 
with legal reasons from the cited authority; distinguish or contradict an unsupportive authority; or 
 
347  Alschner et al., supra note 295, at 229: “computational legal scholarship faces another, more unique hurdle in the sense that tools often 
have to be perfect to convince in the eyes of many lawyers.” 
348  Rogers, supra note 343, at 240, cautions: “The problem is that, while these contentions [about investment arbitration] cannot be proven, 
an audience eager for data may be too willing to (mis)interpret the research as definitive proof of the policies they seek to promote.” 
349  A. van Aaken, ‘Opportunities for and Limits to an Economic Analysis of International Law’, 3(1) Transnational Corporations Review 27 
(2011), at 43, “[b]eing shortsighted is usually better than being blind”. 
350  For a history of citation analysis, see Ridi, supra note 309, at 202. 
351  Ibid., at 200. 
352  Landes and Posner, supra note 336, at 251: “The basic data for the empirical analysis are case citations appearing in judicial opinions. An 
initial problem is that a case citation is not the same thing as a precedent. Sometimes a case is not cited as a precedent; an example is a 
citation of the decision of a lower court (or courts) in the same case.” See also R.A. Posner, “An economic analysis of the use of citations 
in the law” (2000) 2 American Law and Economics Review 381–406, at 383 et seq. 
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serve as a mere “ornamental” illustration of a particular outcome.353 Some citations are mere noise 
in the data,354 and do not indicate or signal anything else than the random process that led to their 
inclusion in a decision.355 Other authorities might have been cited due to an unscrupulous clerk or 
junior lawyer who copied and pasted other sources.356 Explicit citations, besides, may be the tip of 
an iceberg of influences that does not tell us much about the process that led to a decision. Some 
sources might be very influential on a judge or arbitrator yet left uncited.357 There is anecdotal 
evidence that adjudicators are sometimes influenced by authorities that are deliberately not cited 
in the opinion.358 
This range of concerns has led some scholars to opine that citations can teach us very little, 
and in particular that they are a poor proxy to understand the authoritativeness of some sources, as 
usage is in any case not dispositive of the real, inherent “authority” of some materials.359 Since there 
is no hope to assess their actual influence, citations are a subpar guide to the process of decision-
making, this argument goes.360 
These concerns are however unsatisfactory, and, as explained below, they proceed from a 
misunderstanding what the empirical method seeks to achieve. 
 
353  See, e.g., Gelter and Siems, supra note 211, at 38, identifying several such “ornamental” citations in the jurisprudence of some European 
Supreme Courts. 
354  Landes and Posner, supra note 336, at 252, for whom critics of legal data analysis “assume that judges’ citation practices are altogether 
too idiosyncratic to be illuminated by general theory and statistical aggregation. Whether a judicial opinion cites many cases or few, old 
cases or new, is, they believe, more a function of the judge's personal style, tastes, erudition, pedantry, etc. than of systematic characteristics 
of the legal process.” 
355  Pelc, supra note 238, at 1: “[i]t is difficult to measure the degree to which precedent influences decisions, since in any given instance, there 
is little means of distinguishing courts’ sincere appeals to precedent from opportunistic ones.” 
356  N. Duxbury, Jurists and Judges: An Essay on Influence (Hart Publishing 2001), at 1-2. As put by one early study, citation analysis 
“reflect[s] only the superficiality of citation and not the deep undercurrents of unacknowledged reliance”; see J. Scurlock, “Scholarship 
and the Courts” (1964) 32 UMKC Law Review 228, at 230. 
357  The most influential authorities, the unavoidable works that leave deep imprints on the legal imagination of lawyers and judges, might, 
precisely because of their ubiquity, be left uncited: see Sivakumaran, supra note 192, at 34; Posner, supra note 352, at 388. 
Likewise, materials such as the ILC Articles on State Responsibility and their Commentary are so authoritative that they can probably 
stand on their own: see UAB E energija (Lithuania) v. Republic of Latvia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/33, Award (22 December 2017), 
at note 1250, where the Tribunal cites this Commentary while acknowledging that the parties did not introduce it to the record. 
358  S. McCaffrey, Remarks on the panel “The Role of International Tribunals in Managing Coherence and Diversity in International Law” 
(2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 170. 
359  Kammerhofer, supra note 191, at 307. 
360  Ibid., at 322 et seq.  
See also Frankenreiter, supra note 334, at 689, describing Derlén and Lindholm’s network analysis of the CJEU: as “limited to informally 
comparing various descriptive statistics and plots derived from the application of methods developed in network analysis to the network 
of citations of both courts. As a result, despite the authors’ pledge to improve the study of precedent use through quantitative methods 
[…], their findings appear rather subjective.” 
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Empirical Analysis and heterogeneity 
As explained at the outset of this section, the very point of data-driven empirical analysis is to 
iron out heterogeneity and idiosyncrasies and convert different data point to a common measure 
that allows for comparisons and analyses, and for observing larger trends invisible when focusing 
on single cases. Such “big data” analyses are premised on the important assumption that in a dataset 
that is sufficiently large, idiosyncrasies, and errors should be normally distributed and therefore 
have a limited impact on the analyses.361 In other words, even though some citations might be 
missing, wrong, unexpected or distinctive, a multitude of them, as found in regular and recognizable 
patterns, are enough for the purposes of data analysis.362  
As a result, what the study of the authorities cited at the individual case level cannot reveal, 
a pattern of cases maybe can. The value of the Dataset in the following Chapters resides in its 
breadth. For instance, it is impossible to know if citing more authorities than the opposing party 
helped any party to prevail in a given case; as explained in Chapter IV, however, over the entire 
Dataset and on average this seems to be the case. All analyses below, it is important to repeat, 
purport only to describe phenomena and relations on averages. 
While, again, some nuances might be lost under this approach,363 and these nuances would 
certainly enrich this thesis and its conclusions, data-driven empirical analyses need to proceed from 
a level of generality that (i) is workable; (ii) requires the least amount of discretion; while (iii) 
remaining informative.364 The level of generality chosen here fulfils these three conditions. 
First, the most important distinctions between citations are already taken into account, and 
indeed these distinctions are what makes most of these analyses possible.365 All cited authorities are 
 
361  Posner, supra note 352, at 390: “Critics of citations analysis often fail to note that if errors in data are randomly distributed with respect 
to the variable of interest (such as research quality or impact), they are unlikely to invalidate the conclusions of the study, provided that 
the data sample is large.” 
362  Landes and Posner, supra note 336, at 251: “However, the question whether or not the use of precedents is systematic does not have to 
be decided on a priori grounds; to the extent that judicial citation practices exhibit regularities explicable within a systematic analytical 
framework, a statistical analysis of precedent should reveal them.” 
363  See Clark and Lauderdale, supra note 207, at 330: “Opinion texts can be analyzed at several levels of abstraction, each of which involves 
different trade-offs between automation and careful definition of quantities of interest.” 
364  In this sense, see Posner, supra note 352, at 386: a same citation can “can signify an acknowledgement of priority or influence, a useful 
source of information, a focus of disagreement, an acknowledgment of controlling authority, or the prestige of the cited work or its author. 
All of these are forms of influence, in a broad sense, and that may be enough to justify lumping them together for purposes of citations 
studies concerned with measuring influence.” See also ibid., at 387: “imperfection of data is nothing new – nor, as we shall see, does it 
disable useful statistical analysis.” 
365  Authorities are sometimes cited in the reasoning of a decision-maker as an authority first introduced by a party. However, in this instance 
this type of authority becomes part of that decision-maker’s own reasoning. As indicated in Chapter IV, the greater part of what parties 
cite is indeed never taken up or acknowledged in the resulting decision. The conscious choice to focus on some of these citations in 
particular in the context of a legal reasoning is therefore meaningful and indicates, presumably, the importance of the authority in question 
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associated with their document’s metadata, in order to distinguish them according to their source 
(i.e., whether they are cited by parties, a court or in an individual opinion), forum, age, topic, etc. 
These are already plenty of distinctions to work with, and the analyses below reach meaningful 
conclusions on this basis alone.  
Second, going any further and distinguishing between different types of citations depending 
on these citations’ “motive”, however interesting and enriching, would entail immense challenges in 
terms of data collection and to categorise with accuracy different categories of citations.366 This is all 
the more the case as any additional distinctions would be far from clear-cut in practice,367 and the 
distinguishing exercise might too often come down to an exercise of judgment and discretion.368 In 
other words, “[a]n individual, substantive assessment of each [citation] would allow the researcher 
to ascertain the reasons for the reference […b]ut this would come at the expense of both labor and 
objectivity, as the measure would then depend on the individual’s contextual understanding and 
thus is prone to change based on the researcher assessing the document.”369 
Third, the analyses below, which found interesting regularities and patterns in the citation 
practice of different parties in international dispute settlement, testify that this level of generality 
remains informative.370 Again, this is not to deny that any more granular analysis would not enrich 
the thesis and these analyses; it would certainly do. However, in view of the material challenges this 
would entail, the choice was made to work with this level of generality. 
The research question 
This choice was also made because additional distinctions based on the motives of the parties 
would be, for the most part, unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis. Indeed, while it is always 
possible to distinguish ever-more granular nuances of citations and uses of authorities, nearly all 
 
366  See, for instance, the experience of S. Manley, “Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court” (2016) 27 European Journal 
of International Law 191–214, at 198, who opted for a manual data collection method, and consequently had to restrict his inquiry: “The 
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – the second matter to reach the ICC and the only other situation in which trials have 
commenced (and, in the case of Thomas Lubanga, resulted in a conviction) – was not chosen because the number of records generated 
(1,810) would have made a timely analysis unfeasible. Naturally, a higher number of records would result in superior data, and, in fact, a 
study that included all records from all situations would be preferable, but the author submits that the data presented herein – although 
limited – nonetheless provides meaningful insight into the ICC’s use of precedent.” 
 Likewise, while citations between footnotes and main text, varying stylistic choices between courts and tribunals introduce such variety 
that it would be hard to draw any kind of conclusions (not to mention that some courts, like the ICJ, do not use footnotes). 
367  Posner, supra note 352, at 386. 
368  Manley, at 198, mentioning that his own distinction between citations to a supporting precedent and citation to part of the procedural 
record was “a matter of judgment. At times, the distinction was a difficult one to make.” 
369  Hsiang and Nyarko, supra note 327, at 12. 
370  Compare with Oldfather et al, supra note 328, at 1233, in the section entitled “viability of automated assessments”, in which the authors 
confirm that their automated approach yields results equivalent to a more labour-intensive, manual coding approach. 
81 
 
citations in the Dataset qualify as defined above, as “explicit display of an authority in support of a 
legal reasoning”. 
That definition is interested in citations as signals of what is permissibly invokable as an 
“authoritative basis” – a source – to support a legal argument, however the actual (and unknowable) 
role of this source in the mind of the citing party. That this does not shed light on authorities’ 
inherent and potential authority, or on their influence on an adjudicator in any given case, is true 
enough. Yet citations do indicate the extent of these authorities’ authoritativeness in practice.371 
Even if a citation, in reality, played no practical and material role in a given reasoning, this citation 
would still inform parties and future decision-makers as to what is, at least, citable – and what is 
not. Authorities can be self-fabricated and self-referential – but then, so is (international) law 
itself.372 In short, a citation, whether it endorses or reject an authority, whether it comes sua sponte 
or was provided by the parties, remains a citation – and this is what is studied here.373 
An empirical analysis of the authorities that are, in fact, cited, regardless of the motives 
underlying these citations, is thus at the very least a first step in better understanding the three 
aspects of the citation practice studied in the following chapters. This approach can shed light: (i) on 
the cited authorities themselves, what makes them citable and authoritative independently of any 
given case; (ii) on what different parties might deem legitimate in legal argumentation and why 
(resulting in distinct citation practices);374 and (iii) on the systemic consequences attached to this 
citation practice(s).  
 
371  See Duxbury, supra note 356, at 8-9: “The basic premise of citation analysis is that documents cited frequently are likely to be more 
influential than those which are cited less frequently, and therefore the impact of a particular document can be estimated by counting the 
number of occasions on which it has been cited. Citation, in short, might be treated as a proxy for influence.” See also C. Perelman and 
L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traité de l’Argumentation, la nouvelle réthorique (UB Libre 1958), at 116, for the idea that writers infuse their 
choice of arguments with “presence” (whatever this means): “By the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the 
audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed, such a choice endows those elements with a presence, 
which is an essential factor in argumentation.” 
372  And indeed, international law participants usually think citations are important. Witness how the UN keeps track of the international 
decisions that have cited the ILC Articles on Responsibility, for instance: see, e.g., Report of the Secretary General, A/68/72 
(30 April 2013). 
373  As put by James Fowler and Sangick Jeon, “[e]ach judicial citation contained in an opinion is essentially a latent judgment about the case 
cited”, such that the very presence of an authority in a later case indicates some extent of that authority’s importance for the party citing 
it: see Fowler and Jeon, supra note 205. 
It is true that an authority cited but distinguished/contradicted by a party or a tribunal, for instance, could indicate greater 
authoritativeness (as this authority would then truly operate as an “argumentative burden” that needs to be lifted). It is to be doubted, 
however, that the results of the analyses undertaken would differ if this dimension were taken into account. 
374  F. Schauer, Thinking like a lawyer (Harvard University Press 2009), at 81: “[…] a legal citation has an important double aspect. A 
citation to a particular source is not only a statement by the one citing it that this is a good source, but is also a statement by the citer 
(especially if a court) that sources of this type are legitimate.” (emphasis in the original) 
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This approach and level of generality is therefore not defeated by the existence of citations to 
authorities that are distinguished or contradicted by a party or a decision-maker. Although they 
tend to attract the most attention, such citations in the Dataset are in any case dwarfed by the 
number of citations that merely support a statement without more, as the typical citation is found 
in a footnote on top of other citations and receive little engagement from the citing party.375 This has 
also been the conclusion of other scholars who studied citations,376 including those that manually 
collected citations in international jurisprudence: Nathan Miller reviewed nearly 184 citations to 
external precedents and found that only 11 of them distinguished or contradicted the cited authority, 
i.e., around 5%.377 Stewart Manley, who manually annotated more than 1,000 citations from the 
International Criminal Court mentioned no citation that did not, in one way or another, support the 
Court’s reasoning.378 
Consequently, these investigations are not concerned with the “influence” of a particular 
authority on the outcome of a given case.379 All analyses below are questions of average and trends, 
and of shedding light on why some authorities in general are cited or not; how citations patterns can 
differ on average; and what are the broader consequences of such citation practice overall. Indeed, 
focusing on average is, ultimately, the only way for an empirical endeavour of this kind to have any 
kind of scientific and scholastic relevance. Knowing why a particular judge or party cited anything 
in any given case is, as a rule, of limited interest beyond that particular case; knowing why a 
particular authority is in general preferred over others is a question worthy of academic interest.  
E)  Conclusion 
Any empirical scholar would have wished a larger, cleaner, and more representative Dataset, 
without biases and which includes all relevant data to carry out statistical analyses. The reality is 
 
375  Same finding with Helmersen, supra note 229, at 29, with respect to teachings in the jurisprudence of the ITLOS. 
376  Hsiang and Nyarko, supra note 327, at 12-13. 
377  Same conclusion for Miller, supra note 233, at 492, in the context of external citations: “By a margin of 173 to 11, however, tribunals 
are much more likely to refer to one another in a positive or neutral way than to distinguish or overrule.” Miller also found that in the 
vast majority of instances, citations are meant to support or offer guidance to the citing party’s reasoning.  
378  Ibid., at 198, where Manley only distinguishes between citations to a supporting precedent and citation to part of the procedural record. 
 See also Black et al., supra note 209, at 901, finding that negative references to foreign law in the decisions of the US Supreme Court were 
a clear minority of all citations. 
379  See Duxbury, supra note 356, at chapter 2, “The dynamics of influence” for the issues associated with this concept. 
 See also Sivakumaran, supra note 192, at 3: “citation by courts and tribunals is indeed a useful measure of influence […] However, citation 
is not the same as influence; and lack of citation does not necessarily mean lack of influence.” See also ibid., at 26: “[…] a citation reveals 
the interaction between the judge and the writing.” 
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however rarely so kind, and imperfect dataset combined with imperfect and probabilistic methods 
are what one has to work with. 
Yet this is why the goals of empirical legal analysis are more modest: it seeks to (i) answer 
the need for more accurate data in a principled manner; and (ii) shed light on some issues otherwise 
identified by more qualitative research.380 Ultimately, despite its limitations, this thesis adheres to 
Olsen’s and Šadl’s plea in favour of data analysis: 
[Q]uantitative methods, such as corpus linguistics and citation network analysis, 
ensure the reproducibility, generalizability, and empirical validity of doctrinal 
studies. They add to the transparency of legal methodology while substantially 
clarifying the legal method. They can provide empirical evidence to validate hunches 
and prove legal intuitions correct. Furthermore, they effectively address the 
limitations of traditional legal scholarship, including a lack of precision, subjectivity, 
a surplus of anecdotal evidence, and a tendency to succumb to herd behavior. 
Quantitative methods set objective benchmarks from which legal scholarship can, 
when required, criticize the practice of international courts for a lack of coherence of 
legal reasoning, for unjustified breaks with established case law, or for deviations 
from precedent which exceed judicial powers and competences; yet such methods also 
provide a necessary means of critically evaluating the research practice of the 
discipline itself.381 
The next Chapters will now study the practice of citing precedents and teachings in 
international dispute settlement in keeping with the goals and principles of empirical legal analysis. 
 
 
380  See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 343, at 257: “[t]o date, the role of precedent and legal doctrine has not been meaningfully accounted for in 
empirical research in investment arbitration”. 
381  See Šadl and Olsen, supra note 203, at 330. See also S.D. Franck, “Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration” 
(2007) 86 North Carolina Law Review 1, at 4, for whom empirical legal analysis aims at “test[ing] conventional wisdom [and] dispel[ling] 
myths”. 
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Chapter III – Beyond persuasion: Reconceptualizing Authority 
 
“Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo”.382 Although St. Paul mostly had political and governing 
authorities in mind, medieval thought deduced from his proposition that there was nulla auctoritas 
nisi a Deo: “no authority that does not proceed from God.”383 A statement that was unhelpful and 
question-begging when it came to distinguish proper from improper authorities, and yet was still an 
answer to the question of why an authority should be authoritative: because of its relation to God 
and His will. 
A few centuries and epistemological leaps later, however, what “constitutes” authority? In 
the legal domain, what claim to authoritativeness can previous decisions and scholarly works 
command? As we saw in Chapter I, article 38 of the ICJ Statute remains relatively non-committal 
about these two supplementary sources, and yet precedents and teachings are omnipresent in 
international legal debates and cited frequently in judicial and arbitration decisions. How to explain 
that practice? 
And, perhaps more crucially, how to explain that only some cases and authors are cited and 
held to be “authoritative”, whereas others are not?384 
Investigating the sources of “authoritativeness” is crucial to understand the practice of citing 
authorities in international law, as these source demonstrates that this practice does not proceed in 
a haphazard way that would defeat any kind of empirical inquiry. To the contrary, some authorities 
are cited more than other, and the question is why.  
One answer has found favour in the literature: that these authorities are worth citing and 
relying upon only insofar they are persuasive. And yet, as seen in Chapter I, upon closer inspection 
 
382  “[…] for there is no authority except that which God has established”, Romans, 13:1 (New International Version). 
383  A. Compagnon, De l’autorité (Odile Jacob 2008). 
384  See J.C. Leitão, S. Lehmann and H.P. Olsen, “Quantifying Long-Term Impact of Court Decisions” (2019) 4 Applied Network Science 3, 
“[a] major question in law is how a court uses past decisions to legitimize new decisions” See also J. Paulsson, Award and Awards, Keynote 
Address for the BIICL 9th Investment Forum Public Conference (14 September 2007), at 1. Text available at 
https://www.biicl.org/files/3062_jan_paulsson_-_awards_and_awards.doc: “[w]hat is it that makes one award influential – and another 
best forgotten?” 
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the concept of “persuasive authority” is a contradiction in terms.385 Authoritativeness cannot derive 
solely from persuasiveness. 
This Chapter therefore develops an alternative answer to the same question. It contends that 
authorities are authoritative beyond persuasiveness because of a set of characteristics that are 
unrelated to their substantive content. Section 1 below reviews why the standard account based on 
persuasiveness is flawed, or at least holds only for a definition of “persuasiveness” that goes further 
than the inherent persuasiveness of an authority. Section 2 reviews the many factors that can 
influence the “authoritativeness” of an authority, such as the type of authority, the identity of the 
author, and other material and epistemic features. 
1. Persuasiveness as a basis for authoritativeness 
A) The standard account 
Countless opinions in the literature and jurisprudence contend that authorities are only cited 
for their “persuasive value”, or because they “persuasively” support a legal proposition. In this 
understanding,386 the main and most important part of any cited authority is the legal reasoning of 
that authority that led it to adopt a legal position that is later relied on in a citation, or more 
accurately the “strength”, or “weight”,387  of that legal reasoning.388  The more “convincing” this 
reasoning, the more authoritative the authority should prove to be. “Persuasiveness”, as the main 
determinant of authoritativeness, can therefore be opposed to other supposed factors.389 In most 
accounts, the inquiry stops there: “persuasiveness” does not need to be described or analysed further. 
The assumption is that it is self-evident. 
 
385  A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Courts and Tribunals”, in Cesare Romano, Karen 
Alter and Yuval Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2013), at 511. 
386  An understanding that relies on a narrow meaning of “persuasive”: see below for more on this point. 
387  See C.J. Tams, “The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (ed.) 
Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law? (International and European Papers Publishing 2018), at 70: “More significantly 
no […] State [other than the states parties], is bound by the Court’s decision; they all need to be persuaded by the strength and weight of 
the Court’s reasoning”. 
388  See A. Pellet, “Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law?”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (International and European 
Papers Publishing 2018), at 38: “there are judgments and judgments. Central to the question is the persuasiveness of the legal reasoning”. 
389  See P. Palchetti, “The Authority of the Decisions of International Judicial or Quasi-judicial Bodies”, in Decisions of the ICJ as Sources 
of International Law? (Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series ed, International and European Papers Publishing 2018), at 119: “Persuasiveness, 
rather than competence, should be the key for determining the authority of a finding of law.” 
See also G. Sacerdoti, “Precedent in The Settlement of International Economic Disputes: The WTO And Investment Arbitration Models”, 
in Arthur W. Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers (Brill 2011) 225: “It 
is the persuasiveness of the reasoning in the previous case, besides the reputation of those who have previously decided, that will ultimately 
make a given decision a leading case, commanding respect and which will be followed.” 
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International adjudicators likewise describe the role of precedents and other authorities in 
their reasoning pursuant to this understanding.390 The tribunal in Abaclat v. Argentina, for instance, 
opined that decisions of international tribunals should be given consideration when “such 
consideration is appropriate in the light of a specific factual and legal context of the case and the 
persuasiveness of the legal reasoning of these earlier decisions”.391 Some ICJ judges have conveyed 
the same sentiment by embodying it in the Latin maxim “tantum valet auctoritas quantum valet 
ratio”.392  
Concluding their sociological account of international judges and arbitrators, Daniel Terris, 
Cesare Romano and Leigh Swigart observed that “what ultimately seems to matter is only that the 
reasoning that led the other tribunal to a given conclusion is legally sound and persuasive”.393 
According to one international judge quoted on this very question, it is not certain “that there is 
much great practical difference between a decision that is binding, and one that is not binding but 
persuasive.”394 
This standard account has two important implications: first, it is useful as an answer to the 
question of the binding character of precedents in international law.395 Faced with two true yet 
seemingly conflicting accounts of international law – (i) there is no stare decisis and past decisions 
are not binding; and (ii) international legal argumentation relies on past decisions396 –, the focus on 
 
390  B. Jia, International Case Law in the Development of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2017), at §163, concluding a review of several 
international courts’ position on precedent and concluding, in the general understanding, reliance on these precedents is based, “mainly in 
the persuasiveness of the jurisprudence”. As indicated below, Jia is however sceptical that this is the case in practice. 
391  Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/15, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (4 August 2011), 
at 292. (emphasis added.) 
392  The maxim can roughly be translated as “as is [quality of the] reasoning, so is the authority”; see Interpretation of Peace Treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Winiarski, at 91-92: 
“Opinions [of the PCIJ] are not formally binding on States nor on the organ which requests them, they do not have the authority of res 
judicata; but the Court must, in view of its high mission, attribute to them great legal value and a moral authority. This being the case and 
if tantum valet auctoritas quantum valet ratio, the Court, as a judicial organ, will surround itself with every guarantee to ensure thorough 
and impartial examination of the question.”  
See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro, at 173-174, opining 
that the value of precedents and opinions only proceeds from the “validity of the reasoning” (although the original French “valeur” would 
probably be better translated by “value,” or “worth” than by “validity”). 
393  D. Terris, C. Romano and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), at 121. 
394  Ibid, albeit in the context of discussing reliance on external precedents. In the same context, see M.Q. Zang, “Shall We Talk? Judicial 
Communication between the CJEU and WTO Dispute Settlement” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 273, at 290. 
395  See, e.g., the debates regarding the authoritativeness of IUSCT awards, in which the persuasiveness theory has appeared more than 
once: D. Caron, “The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution” 
(1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 104, at 105: “the precedential value of an international decision should turn upon its 
persuasiveness to the next panel […].”; M. Pellonpää, “The Process of Decision-Making”, in David D. Caron and John R. Crook (eds.) 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the Process of International Claims Resolution (Transnational Publishers 2000), at 238. 
396  H.G. Cohen, “International Precedent and the Practice of International Law”, in Michael Helfand (ed.), Negotiating State and Non-State 
Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press 2015), at 173, talking of the practice of citing 
precedent “butt[ing] up against an uncomfortable doctrinal reality” (i.e., that precedent is not binding). 
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persuasiveness offers a convenient approach to reconcile the two accounts.397 That approach explains 
away references to precedents as the mere recitation of convincing reasoning.398 
A second implication of this standard account is that it partakes in, and strengthens, the 
commonly-held position that international adjudication is divorced from any kind of law-making 
activity.399 A focus on persuasiveness deflates the charge400 that adjudicators legislate commonly 
through a process of repeated citations to authorities: if authorities are only persuasive, then in 
citing precedents and scholarship judges are not legislating, but merely applying the law 
persuasively laid out in an external material.401 Conversely, if judgments and awards are cited only 
based on their persuasiveness, then in deciding today’s case adjudicators are not expected to 
legislate (i.e., to create a legal solution that is not only persuasive but also authoritative).402 A call 
to persuasiveness, in short, is a call to the greater rationality of everyone; it is a plea that anyone 
would reach the same conclusion, which trivialises the role and importance of citations and 
authorities. 
 
397  M. Jacob, “Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005, at 1008. Jacob seemingly 
offers another way out of this conflict, however, by pointing out that the absence of binding power does not entail lack of influence. This 
is true, but only puts the onus on a better account of “influence”. 
398  G. Sacerdoti, “A Comment on Henry Gao, ‘Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes’” (2018) 17 World Trade Review 535, 
at 5380. Likewise, Reinisch, following an observation that tribunals all assume “no stare decisis” in the ICSID system, observes that 
“Investment law ‘precedents’ are followed, not because of any intrinsic binding value, but rather as a result of their ‘persuasive’ force. It is 
the strength of the argument expressed in an award or decision that will command adherence.” See A. Reinisch, “The Role of Precedent 
in ICSID Arbitration” (2008) 495 Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 495, at V. 
399  Pellet, supra note 388, at 40, citing H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Cambridge 
University Press 1934). 
400  See, for instance, the opinion of arbitrator Pedro Nikken in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Award (30 July 2010), Separate Opinion of Pedro Nikken, at §24, arguing 
that the tribunal’s interpretation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) standard was “based on recent arbitral jurisprudence”, and 
opining that this jurisprudence was not a proper source of law, as well as flawed in its particulars. (The irony is, as always, that Mr. 
Nikken’s Opinion is replete with citations to other cases he deemed more correct.) General Dynamics v. Iran, Award No. 123-283-3 
(16 April 1984), 9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 153, Dissenting Opinion of Hamid Bahrami, at 169. 
See also G. Guillaume, “The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators” (2011) 2 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 5, at 23. 
401  See I. Venzke, “Judicial Authority and Styles of Reasoning: Self-Presentation between Legalism and Deliberation”, in Johanna Jemelniak, 
Laura Nielsen and Henrik Palmer Olsen (eds.), Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2016), at 426. 
402  See also N. Ridi, “The Shape and Structure of the ‘Usable Past’: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International 
Adjudication” (2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200, at 243-244, for a finding that international judgments and 
awards, when they cite precedents, are characterized with a language that displays strong analytical features and a neutral sentiment score, 
“suggesting, […] that reliance on precedent is associated confident [sic], but not boastful, tone that furthers the ‘rhetoric of inevitability’ 
that adjudicators seek to promote.” 
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B) Questioning the standard account 
This trivialisation however generates a great deal of ambiguity and tension when scholars 
are working with notions of authority, persuasiveness and law-making.403 
A first confusion resides in the conflation between the distinct persuasiveness of (i) an 
argument/reasoning that cites authorities, and of (ii) those very authorities. The “persuasiveness of 
the legal reasoning” or “the strength of the argument” of (ii) does not however entirely determine 
the persuasiveness of (i). As seen in Chapter I, citing authorities can bolster the persuasiveness of a 
reasoning regardless of the persuasiveness of the authorities cited, as a reasoning is often more 
persuasive by the sheer fact that it cites something, (which could be) anything. 
The second, related confusion proceeds from the varying aspects of what can “persuade”. 
While “the strength of the legal reasoning” can be an important plank in what makes a legal 
authority authoritative, it does not mean that this is the only, let alone the most important plank. 
Persuasiveness of legal reasoning may be a necessary condition to authoritativeness, but it does not 
follow that it is a sufficient one.  
“Persuasiveness”, besides, is susceptible to several definitions of various breadths. The 
narrowest definition focuses on substantial persuasiveness – i.e., the cogency of the reasoning, a 
first-order reason for persuasiveness. Broader definitions encompass second-order reasons for 
persuasiveness,404 and accept that a reasoning can be “persuasive” not only because it is convincing 
(a reader would be likely to agree with the conclusion given the premises), but also because of 
features external to it: the authority’s source (who can be trusted), the process leading to the 
production of the authority (that ensured the right views were adopted), the amounts at stake (which 
means that special care was given to the reasoning), etc. These “marks of authority”405 and others 
potential features of a broader understanding of persuasiveness are studied further below. 
 
403  See, e.g., A. Bjorklund, Remarks on the panel “The Role of International Tribunals in Managing Coherence and Diversity in International 
Law” (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 175: “Of course, a third question is what kind of authority and 
legitimacy the other tribunal has. At least at present, we think of perhaps the European Court of Human Rights, the WTO Appellate 
Body, certainly the ICJ, as having a great deal of legitimacy and authority. That makes their rulings, if you will, presumptively persuasive, 
something worth looking at, but I think looking at that in a careful manner is good, as well.” It is far from clear how the concepts of 
“legitimacy”, “authority”, or the “presumption of persuasiveness” relate to each other. 
404  N. Ridi, “‘Mirages of an Intellectual Dreamland’? Ratio, Obiter, and the Textualization of International Precedent” (2019) 10 Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement 361. 
405  F. Zarbiyev, “Saying Credibly What the Law Is: On Marks of Authority in International Law” (2018) 9 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 291, at 298. 
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The standard account ignores these two sources of confusion to present an image of 
international legal adjudication unified by the (universally compelling, rationality-based) idea of 
persuasion. This is a clear “Motte-and-Bailey” argument:406 until questioned, the standard account 
assigns a great importance to the narrowest understanding of persuasiveness (i.e., inherent, or 
substantial persuasiveness), only to rely on the broader meaning of the term when pressed.  
Relatedly, this focus on persuasiveness is often riddled with readily-apparent contradictions. 
Judge Shahabuddeen’s impressive study of the role of precedent at the ICJ unwittingly provides 
several examples. For instance, while generally subscribing to the idea that persuasiveness explains 
the citations to some authorities more than others, Judge Shahabuddeen also considers that the 
unanimity of a decision should be material for its authoritativeness,407 while judgments in chambers 
might be less authoritative.408 (As demonstrated below, both these observations are not empirically 
verified.) Judge Shahabuddeen further noted that a failure to cite sometimes does not go unnoticed 
by parties in ICJ proceedings,409 which is also inconsistent with the view that the only thing that 
matters is persuasiveness. With respect to individual opinions, Judge Shahabuddeen both opines 
that the name or standing of the cited judge is “not material”410 to an authority, and acknowledges 
that a handful of judges are particularly authoritative. 
If the prestige of a particular judge were irrelevant, we would expect a random distribution of 
citations to individual judges (under the assumption that they are all equally persuasive, an 
assumption that is not unreasonable given the high quality of the international bench).411 Instead, 
some authors have clearly left a deeper mark in international jurisprudence. Seven different 
individual opinions by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht are cited 71 times in the Dataset, while Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice comes close with 8 different opinions cited 64 times. And this is without counting their 
 
406  In epistemology, a motte-and-bailey argument refers to a proposition that is susceptible of two meanings: a highly-defensible one (the 
motte), and a meaning desirable to the argument’s proponents, but that is difficult to defend (the bailey). When pushed to explain what 
they mean, the proponents of that kind of argument will generally insist that they intended the “motte” meaning of the argument all along, 
while pushing for the “bailey” meaning until it is contested. For further analysis, see N. Shackel, “Motte and Bailey Doctrines” 
(5 September 2014) Practical Ethics, available at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2014/09/motte-and-bailey-doctrines/.  
407  M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge University Press 2008), at 144. He writes that “[t]here is at least the 
glimmering of a disposition on the part of the Court itself to attach more persuasiveness to a unanimous decision than to a majority one.” 
“Authoritativeness” is probably the more appropriate term here, and not “persuasiveness”. 
408  Ibid., at 171.  
409  Ibid., at 142. See also H.G. Cohen, “Theorizing Precedent in International Law”, in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor 
(eds.), Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015), at 284. 
410  Shahabuddeen, supra note 407, at 142. 
411  That is, weighted by the number of “citable” authorities they produced.  
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respective scholarly publications: the 21 doctrinal works authored by Lauterpacht in the Dataset 
attracted more than 350 citations; Fitzmaurice’s 18 different writings more than 200 citations. 
More fundamentally, the focus on persuasiveness is notably unable to explain why anything 
is cited at all: if citations are trivial (they only refer to a reasoning that is persuasive), then why not 
laying down that reasoning in extenso (slightly adapted to the needs of the case at stake)412 without 
mention of its source? Why incur the costs413 of locating, referencing, and writing down authorities 
when this has no importance aside from the reasoning contained in that authority – especially when, 
as seen in Chapter IV, this reference can later be a ground for challenge? In other words, there would 
be no point in citing a precise authority (except perhaps to avoid plagiarism) if that authority’s 
substantial persuasiveness was its only relevant feature. Citations are far from the optimal medium 
to bolster an argument, given that a reader might not take the trouble of checking what the cited 
authority actually stands for.  
Far from merely repeating bits of persuasive reasoning, arguments in international disputes 
do cite authorities and explicitly assign an origin to a given legal argument. This practice is at odds 
with a view of authorities being based purely on persuasiveness for at least three reasons. 
First, citations to authorities in the Dataset obey distinctive patterns, whereas some 
authorities are much more cited than others, something we would not necessarily expect were 
citations based entirely on persuasiveness.414 Save if only the ICJ, say, were capable of producing 
persuasive reasoning, this focus on persuasiveness fails to explain: why ICJ cases are 
disproportionally cited on any given point – and not other authorities; or why some authorities are 
not cited, despite their probable persuasiveness – for instance, between two international courts;415 
or even why most citations are not explained or engaged with: readers are usually left to find out for 
themselves what was so persuasive in the cited authority, if they can even locate it. 
 
412  And yet they cite those sources: see G. Lamond, “Persuasive Authority in the Law” (2010) 17 The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19, 
at 28. 
413  Citations entail costs: see W. Landes, R. Posner, “Legal Precedent: a theoretical and empirical analysis” (1976) 19 Journal of Law and 
Economics 2, at 252. See also F. Schauer, Thinking like a lawyer (Harvard University Press 2009), at 67: “[…] when we are genuinely 
persuaded by substantive reasons, we have no need for authoritative pronouncements.” 
414  Ibid., at 70. See also Sir G. Fitzmaurice, “Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law” (1958) Symbolae Verzijl 
153, at 171. 
415  Zang, supra note 394, at 275, saying that adjudicators, although “open up to judicial externality”, are “reluctant to do so.” See in general 
Chapter VII below. 
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Second, the standard account is inconsistent with the common practice of distinguishing ratio 
from obiter in international precedents,416 as a legal proposition’s substantive persuasiveness should 
be left intact regardless of its role in deciding a case. More fundamentally, a focus on persuasiveness 
fails to explain why a major part of the activity of courts and tribunals, and the parties before them, 
is to debate the relevance of various authorities – often on grounds unrelated to the merits of their 
reasoning. 
Third, “persuasiveness” is likely impacted by time: the persuasiveness of older authorities 
should decrease as the context of their reasoning fades from view, while newer authorities should 
be informed by, and build upon previous persuasive material. In short, as seen by Lauterpacht, a 
precedent’s value is “in the long run ... no greater [than] the inherent value of the legal substance 
embodied in it”417 – which implies that authorities should (relatively) depreciate with time: either (i) 
their content is increasingly accepted, and they require less citing; and/or (ii) new and updated 
authorities will take their place. And yet, some authorities on the contrary show no clear 
depreciation, and most adjudicators tends to cite increasingly older precedents and teachings.418 
This is not to say that the persuasiveness is irrelevant. It is, on the contrary, and as 
recognised by the entire literature, an essential ingredient in any authority. Judge Tanaka saw this 
division clearly in his opinion in the Barcelona Traction case, as he contrasted the “formal authority” 
(i.e., authoritativeness) of the Court’s decisions (which he derived from the requirement of 
consistency in international law) with their substantive (i.e., persuasiveness) authority. While Judge 
Tanaka feared that the former would often weigh heavier than the latter,419 a proper assessment of 
this question requires to put the standard account aside, and review what makes authorities 
authoritative on top of their inherent persuasiveness. 
 
416  Ridi, supra note 404. 
417  H. Lauterpacht, “The So-Called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought in International Law” (1931) 12 British Yearbook 
of International Law 31, at 52. 
418  Ridi, supra note 402, at 210. 
419  Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1964 I.C.J. 6, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 65. Note that Makane M’Bengue argues that Judge Tanaka’s premonition in this respect has 
come to pass and that “[c]onsistency has today become a pretext for international courts and tribunals to focus more on the form than 
the substance of the case law.” See M.M. M’Bengue, “Precedent”, in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International 
Law: Contributions to Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018), at 712. 
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2. The determinants of authoritativeness 
What, lies at the source of authoritativeness? What makes one authority more authoritative 
than another, even an equally situated one? 
The existing literature is unhelpful in this respect, unclear as it is with respect to the reasons 
behind the success of some authority and the obscurity of others.420 “[T]here are awards and awards, 
some destined to become ever brighter beacons, others to flicker and die near-instant deaths,” said 
Jan Paulsson,421 who offered little as to how to distinguish between flickers and beacons. Likewise, 
it is common to hear of “leading cases,”422 or of influential works of scholarship in international 
law,423 with no clear account as to how any authority has acquired that status. And the rare authors 
who have looked at the question424 have never confronted their intuitions with the empirical reality 
of the practice of international courts and tribunals. 
This empirical reality was captured, to an extent, in the Dataset. The following section 
reviews in turn the impact on authoritativeness of: (A) the type of authority (judgments and awards 
are not on the same level as scholarship); (B) the identity of the authority-maker (institutional or 
individual); (C) the process underlying an authority; (D) questions of consensus and consistency; and 
(E) questions of culture and availability.425 
A) The type of authority 
The two main types of authorities studied in this thesis are precedents and teachings. While 
both types of authorities are used and cited because they embody legal pronouncements,426 they 
nonetheless differ in important respects. These differences explain why they do not always appeal 
to the same extent to the same parties or adjudicators. 
 
420  S. Sivakumaran, “The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law” (2017) 66 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1, at 8. 
421  J. Paulsson, “The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration”, in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under International Investment 
Agreements. A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010), at §4.29. 
422  See, e.g., E. Bjorge and C. Miles, Landmark Cases in Public International Law (Hart Publishing 2017), at 4. 
423  H. Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2010), at 126-127. 
424  Marc Jacob, for instance cited a “plethora of factors” that could have an impact on the future authority of a precedent, “such as the 
hierarchical rank of the court, whether the prior decision was made by a full bench or not, the reputation of that court, the precedent’s 
age, the soundness of the reasoning employed, the presence or absence of dissent, its reception by the larger epistemic community, changes 
in social and legal reality, and more.” See Jacob, supra note 397, at 1016. 
425  The analysis undertaken below echoes, but does not fully overlap with, that of Thomas Frank in researching the determinants of legitimacy 
in international rules: see the summary of his findings in H.G. Cohen, “Fragmentation”, in d’Aspremont and Singh, supra note 419, at 653. 
426  J. Kammerhofer, “Law-making by scholars”, in Catherine Brölmann (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International 
Law-Making (Edward Elgar 2016), at 308. 
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Precedents 
The first striking observation from the Dataset is that, everything else being equal, 
precedents are generally preferred to equivalent scholarship.427  This is especially the case for 
citations found in decisions, as opposed to individual opinions or the pleadings of the parties. As 
seen in further details below, there is something in a precedent that makes it more valuable to the 
reasoning of an adjudicator – something that the view of one or several scholars, however sound, 
will not be able to match. 
Accordingly, a first, unmistakable aspect of precedents is that they are much more likely to 
be cited than scholarship – especially in majority decisions as opposed to individual opinions and 
pleadings. This is true when looking across fora: citations to precedents average around 96% of all 
citations, with only 4% of citations to scholarship. 
 
Dissenting 
Opinion 
Decision 
Separate 
Opinion 
Pleadings 
Pleadings  
(in 
decision) 
Advisory Opinion 4.57 0.67 4.80 1.77 0.00 
Teachings 24.46 3.88 26.15 22.19 3.98 
Dissenting Opinion 2.79 0.09 2.52 0.42 0.00 
Decision 59.65 91.63 52.88 70.65 92.22 
Order 2.09 2.53 5.85 2.79 2.86 
Provisional Measures 3.57 1.08 4.27 1.70 0.93 
Separate Opinion 2.49 0.08 2.67 0.36 0.00 
Table 3: Percent of citations to different categories by type of document  
Reading key: 4.57% of all citations in dissenting opinions are citations to Advisory 
opinions. 
There are important discrepancies, however. For instance, precedents are  cited more than 
authorities in pleadings, but this ratio is even greater in the resulting decisions by courts and 
tribunals – that often relegate teachings as authorities to pleadings and individual opinions. Before 
 
427  See, notably, the quote by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, at p. 37 above. 
For an illustration, see UN Assembly General, 73rd Session, Report of the ILC on the works of its 70th Session, Intervention of François 
Alabrune (24 October 2018), questionin on the ILC’s suggestion to determine how imperative a norm is by reference to international 
jurisprudence and teachings. 
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the ICJ, for instance and as seen in Table 4 below, a third of all authorities cited in pleadings are 
teachings, a proportion broadly similar to that found in individual opinions, but which collapses to 
nearly nothing when considering only decisions by the full Court.  
 
Opinions Decisions Pleadings 
Precedents Teachings Precedents Teachings Precedents Teachings 
ICJ 68 32 99 1 70 30 
INV 91 9 90 10 85 15 
ITLOS 86 14 100 0 67 32 
IUSCT 75 25 93 7 94 6 
WTO / / 99 1 98 2 
Table 4: Percent of all citations, precedents and teachings  
Reading key: at the ICJ, 68% of all citations in individual opinions are to precedents and 
32% to teachings 
As mentioned in Chapter II above, advisory opinions at the ICJ and the ITLOS were counted 
as “Precedents”, although the differences between these opinions and judgments on contested cases 
might put into doubt their qualities as an authority for future cases.428 Yet, to the extent they too 
rule on points of law as the outcome of a deliberating process, advisory opinions do not differ from 
judgments.429 As a matter of fact, each ICJ advisory opinion has been cited 83 times on average in 
the Dataset, as opposed to 93 times for ICJ judgments. Some advisory opinions have indeed acquired 
tremendous authority in some respects,430 and are cited beyond the ICJ’s ow jurisprudence.  
A previous analysis of the ICJ’s network of citations found that “advisory opinions are more 
connected to each other than to the rest of the ICJ network of precedents (a conclusion that suggests 
the development of the law on its advisory jurisdiction), but are also, in aggregate, far from isolated 
from the rest of the network”.431 This is confirmed in Figure 3, which gathers all ICJ decisions 
(coloured per types) around the most cited in the middle of the graph: orange nodes (advisory 
opinions) form a distinct cluster, which situates most of them in the vicinity of each other. This 
 
428  Sir F. Berman, “Authority in International Law” (2018) KFG Working Paper Series, no. 22, at 17: “for all their weighty authority in 
general and in particular, even judicial decisions, simply by virtue of their essential character as reasoned conclusions deriving from open 
analysis and argument, are out there for comment and examination, and have to earn their ranking in the marketplace of ideas. In relation 
to the ICJ, one can see this particularly strongly in the case of Advisory Opinions.” 
429  de Castro, supra note 392, at 174. 
430  J. d’Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System (Cambridge University Press 2015), at 42. 
431  Ridi, supra note 402, at 222. 
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indicates a degree of specialisation based on more frequent cross-citations, likely due to the Court’s 
citing on matters relevant for its advisory function. At the same time, these nodes are nonetheless  
far from severed from the rest of the network – which indicates that they remain a relevant authority 
for judgments and opinions of the Court. 
 
Figure 3: Network of ICJ decisions, per type432 
Teachings 
Table 3 above indicates that courts and tribunals, even in majority decisions, do not resort 
uniquely to precedents: teachings sometimes find their way to the reasoning of adjudicators and are 
frequently cited as an authority for a legal proposition. In the Paquete Habana case, the US Supreme 
Court underlined the usefulness of scholarship in international law: 
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilised nations, and, as 
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, 
research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the 
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals not for 
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.433 
 
432  Nodes are coloured per type of decision: Advisory opinion in orange, orders in Pink, and decision on jurisdiction or on the merits in 
Green. Advisory opinions form a cluster on the figure’s top left, indicating that they cite each other more often than other types of 
decisions (if citations had been random, the orange nodes would be dispersed throughout the figure. 
433  The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677 (1900), p. 701 (Grey J.). 
96 
 
This quote dates from the early 20th century. As explained in Chapter I, however, the status 
of teachings in international law has seen a distinct shift since then, as the importance and 
predominance of scholarship was slowly eclipsed by the growing number of international judgments 
and awards. These decisions are credited for filling the gap in international law that scholarship 
filled before,434 and to bring light to an international legal field that was in the past “surrounded by 
large areas of vagueness and obscurity.”435 
This distinct shift in the status of scholarship is readily observable in the Dataset: Figure 4 
below illustrates that the proportion of citations to teachings in the Dataset has dramatically 
decreased over the past 70 years. For some judges, scholarship now is a second-rate source,436 to 
which they would rarely cite.437 As seen from Table 4 above, this results in that only a portion of the 
total writing cited in pleadings finds their way to a final decision, as judges in majority decisions are 
now often reluctant to cite scholars directly.438 
 
Figure 4: Percent of all citations to teachings and precedents, per date 
 
434  See G. Hernández, “The Responsibility of the International Legal Academic”, in Jean d’Aspremont, Tarcisio Gazzini, André Nollkaemper 
and Wouter Werner (eds.), International Law as a Profession (Cambridge University Press 2017), at 174. Yet see Kammerhofer, 
supra note 426, at 307, casting doubt over this narrative. 
435  See Berman, supra note 428, at 12. 
436  See N. Stappert, “A New Influence of Legal Scholars? The Use of Academic Writings at International Criminal Courts and Tribunals” 
(2018) Leiden Journal of International Law 1, at 966. 
437  A good example can be found in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Merits, Judgment, 
2002 I.C.J. 3, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at §44. 
438  See Hernández, supra note 434, at 174, note 75. 
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Given these limitations, why cite teachings at all? On the basis of interviews with 
international judges sitting on criminal courts, Nora Stappert identified three reasons to use 
doctrinal sources in international decisions: (i) when there is a lacuna in the law; (ii) to provide new 
analyses on unclear aspects of the law; (iii) and as a starting point to a reasoning.439 This rough 
framework is echoed in other accounts: Fuad Zarbiyev notes that WTO panels and the AB cite 
scholarship on topics they are not experts in – general international law, for instance.440  
This leaves some room for citations to scholarship but does not indicate which scholarship in 
particular should be (or is) cited in any given circumstance. As noted in Chapter I, article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute in this respect tries to restrict the field of “citable” scholarship to the consensual best. 
Scholars working on the question have similarly tried to draw distinctions between teachings: 
Sivakumaran distinguished between scholars empowered to make the law and others;441 Oppenheim 
between “writers at large and writers of authority”.442  
This reflects to some extent the actual practice of citing scholarship, which in the Dataset 
takes the shape of a power law distribution, whereas the most cited works are disproportionally 
more cited than less-cited ones.443 And yet, it is exceedingly rare that parties or courts actually try 
to pin down why a particular scholar or article is worth citing under the criteria laid down by Article 
38444 – or indeed why they are worth citing at all. 
This is not exactly remedied by the common practice of courts and tribunals to “throwaway 
adjectives”445 to qualify a particular author or a particular work – although that practice indicates 
that, compared to precedents, “teachings” seemingly need more justification when they are cited. 
Witness, for instance, the award in Vivendi v. Argentina (II): 
 
439  Stappert, supra note 436, at 974-975. 
440  Zarbiyev, supra note 405, at 303. The Dataset however indicates that the WTO also cites many works of scholarship in international 
trade matters.  
441  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 5. 
442  L. Oppenheim, “The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method” (1908) 2 American Journal of International Law 313, at 345. 
Oppenheim’s identification of the writers of authority is however tautological: see ibid: “Now, who are the authoritative writers? They are 
those whose works have gained great influence; […]” 
443  Hernández, supra note 434, at 175. 
444  Berman, supra note 428, at 13: “I don’t think I have ever once seen an attempt by the party concerned to explain why this particular author 
(or this particular piece of writing) should be given special credence by the tribunal.” 
445  Ibid., at 13: “The most that one gets – and then only sometimes – [in explaining why scholars are worth citing] is the throwaway adjective 
‘leading,’ ‘highly respected,’ ‘authoritative.’” 
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As Dr. F.A. Mann, one of the twentieth century’s leading authorities on the 
interaction between municipal law and public international law wrote in 1981: […].446  
The same phenomenon is replicated in countless international judgments and awards. In 
SAS v. Bolivia, for instance, Campbell McLachlan is described as “a prominent author,” and grouped 
up with other “well-known authors” cited by the parties.447 Likewise in individual opinion: Judge 
Lauterpacht’s separate opinion in the Petitions Advisory case introduced James L. Brierly as “a 
writer of authority noted for his restraint.”448 And while referring to Manley Hudson in a joint 
dissenting opinion in the Aerial case, Judges Lauterpacht, Koo and Spender mentioned that 
Mr. Hudson “is regarded as the most authoritative commentator on the Statute, who was a Judge of 
the Permanent Court and who was present on behalf of that Court both in the Committee of Jurists 
at Washington and in the relevant Committee of the Conference of San Francisco”.449 
Pleadings of the parties show the same inclination. Nigeria’s Rejoinder in the Land and 
Maritime Boundary case, for instance, relied on Oppenheim’s International Law, introduced as 
“Oppenheim, of which the senior editor is Jennings. Jennings is a distinguished authority and a 
former President of the International Court.”450  The investor in ADF v. USA invoked likewise 
attempted to place its position under the patronage of Sir Jennings’s prestige by listing his 
achievements. 451  It is unclear how these achievements would contribute to the intrinsic 
persuasiveness of his theses. 
Throwing away adjectives never truly explains how a writer became authoritative or worth 
citing. This is not an irrational practice, however, as citers hope that in “this way, the reader is 
assured that the individual whose work is being relied upon is someone whose views really can be 
taken seriously.”452 And yet, it is also plausible that the most authoritative authors do not need such 
 
446  Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award 
(20 August 2007), at §7.4.8 (my emphasis). Later in the same award, a further reference to a work by Christie is introduced as such: “[a]s 
Professor Christie explained in his famous article in the British Yearbook of International Law more than 40 years ago, […].”: see ibid., 
at §7.5.20. (emphasis added) 
447  South American Silver Limited v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award (30 August 2018), at §§213-214. 
448  Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 
1955 I.C.J. 67, Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, at 90. 
449  Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment (26 May 1959), 1959 I.C.J. 127, Joint Dissenting Opinion by Judges Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender, at 174. 
450  Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Rejoinder of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (4 January 2001), at §3.44. 
451  ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Investor’s Reply to US Counter-Memorial on 
Competence and Liability (28 January 2002), at §261: “Sir Robert, need one remind, is former Judge and President of the International 
Court of Justice at the Hague and former President of the Institut de Droit International. In 1993, Sir Robert received the Manley Hudson 
Gold Medal from the American Society of International Law.” 
452  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 11. 
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extended introductions: everyone knows (or should know) that they are authoritative sources. Thus, 
Christoph Schreuer’s Commentary of the ICSID Convention 453  is frequently cited without 
introduction in investment arbitration (in which his is by far the most cited work454); the same goes 
for Rosenne’s Law and Practice455 in proceedings before the ICJ. 
It is not only in authors that we find variations in authoritativeness: the medium of the 
authority surprisingly matters a great deal. A substantial part456 of the different teachings cited in 
the Dataset were tagged depending on whether they referred to (i) a book; (ii) a journal article; or if 
they were (iii) a document from UN (including the works of the ILC); or (iv) from the Hague Academy.  
While “books” amounted for half of all tagged teachings (in itself, an interesting datum, given 
the much wider universe of citable articles), they accounted for 70% of all citations. Likewise, works 
stemming from the Hague Academy (usually found in book-length format) also account for a greater 
number of citations than their small number would lead us to expect, a testimony of the enduring 
influence of this forum for international practitioners. 
This should not be overly surprising, given that books (typically) contain more material and 
therefore more “citable” content. This content, especially in textbooks, is also usually more balanced 
as the various sides of an argument are generally spelled out. The most cited works will also be more 
familiar to more readers and have thus a “pervasive influence”.457 Typically drawing from a large 
set of sources, they embody (or at least are expected to embody, to some extent) “the “conventional 
wisdom” of the day.458 Finally, while books usually take longer to write and, as a consequence, are 
more likely to be out of date, they are also (in theory) subject to a more rigorous editing and “quality 
control” than articles.459 
 
453  C. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch and A. Sinclair (eds.), The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd ed., Cambridge University 
Press 2009); 3rd ed. forthcoming. 
454  Sacerdoti, supra note 398, at note 61. 
455  S. Rosenne, Law and Practice of the International Court: 1920-2015 (Brill Nijhoff 2016). 
456  Given the total number of different teachings cited (more than 5,400 unique references), it was not possible to tag them all, and a semi-
automatic script was used instead that tagged half of these authorities with a high degree of confidence on the basis of clues and citing 
style. These tagged authorities however represent more than half of all citations to teachings in the Dataset. 
457  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 30, and the quotes provided to the effect that textbooks and legal education influence future practitioners. 
458  D.J. Bederman, “Review Essay, International Law Casebooks: Tradition, Revision, and Pedagogy” (2004) 98 American Journal 
of International Law 200; see also A. Roberts, Is International Law International? (Oxford University Press 2017), at  32. 
459  F. Baetens and V. Prislan, “The Dissemination of International Scholarship: The Future of Books and Book Reviews” (2014) 27 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 559, at 560. 
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Table 5: Proportion of teachings, in Dataset (left) and in citations (right), per type  
Reading key: Whereas books amount to around 50% of the unique authorities cited in the 
Dataset, they amount to nearly 75% of all citations 
Remarkably, the differences between the most cited teachings in pleadings and in decisions 
is not particularly marked, as adjudicators and parties seemingly draw support for their arguments 
from the same sources. Table 6 below lists the most cited teachings (in absolute numbers) in the 
Dataset, by type of forum, and distinguishing between citations found in pleadings460 or in decisions 
and opinions. Works that belong to the Top 5 in both categories are shaded green, and are nearly a 
majority. 
These sources are often canonical works,461 and most likely of a relatively general character 
– or at least focused on questions of general international law (witness, for instance, how WTO 
 
460  Including pleadings as summarised in judgments and awards. 
461  Important works also typically endure. Nearly all names of past influential international law scholars listed by Louis Sohn in 1995 are 
still cited nowadays, although they are rarely in the most cited works nowadays: see L.B. Sohn, “Sources of International Law” (1995) 25 
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 399, at 400, citing Vattel, Moore, Hackworth, Whiteman, Phillimore, Hall, 
Westlake, Oppenheim, Bonfils, Fauchille, Scelle and Rousseau. Of all these, only Charles Rousseau still figures as a top-cited authority – 
yet likely because it was for long the main French international law textbook and, like most French legal textbooks, went through many 
editions.  
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panels make use of sources regarding treaty interpretation). Some of them are found in different 
fora, evidencing their general application even in a field as diverse as international law. 
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Decisions and Opinions Pleadings 
Title # Title # 
ICJ 
Rosenne, Law and Practice 148 Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law 125 
Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942  48 Rosenne, Law and Practice 82 
Trindade, International Law for Humankind - Towards a New Jus Gentium 41 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (76) 76 
Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law 37 O’Connell, International Law (75) 75 
Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International 
Court  
37 Rousseau, Droit International Public (73) 73 
INV 
Schreuer, Malintoppi, Reinisch, Sinclair, The ICSID Convention 378 Schreuer, Malintoppi, Reinisch, Sinclair, The ICSID Convention 283 
Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility 90 
Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law 
227 
Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals 52 
Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals 199 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 51 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 195 
Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law 39 Muchlinski, Ortino, Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 163 
ITLOS 
Rosenne, Law and Practice 5 Jennings & Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 18 
Colombos, International Law of the Sea 4 Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries 17 
O’Connell, International Law 3 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 17 
Lowe, The Law of the Sea 3 Lowe, The Law of the Sea 15 
Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court: An Attempt at a Scrutiny 3 Wolfrum, The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 12 
IUSCT 
Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals 
41 
Dumbauld, Interim Measures of Protection in International 
Controversies 2 
Corbin, Contracts 
33 
Elkind, The Aegean Sea Case and Article 41 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice 1 
Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals 22 
Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
1 
Simpson & Fox, International Arbitration 
21 
Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals 1 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 21 Fridman, The Law of Agency 1 
WTO Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 52 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 25 
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Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT 27 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 25 
Jennings & Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 26 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 18 
Yasseen, L’interprétation des traites d’après la Convention de Vienne 21 You, Article 138 of the Rules of the ITLOS, Revisited 14 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 19 Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT 14 
Table 6: Most cited teachings in decisions (left) and pleadings (right), top five, per forum 
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The dynamic between the two 
Albeit prima facie of a different nature, cases and scholarships work similarly as authorities, 
such that the distinctions between them should not be exaggerated. While both amount to legal 
opinions, they are “distinguished only by their origin and by their generating process.”462  
As we shall see further below, however, “origin” and “generating process” matter a great deal 
when it comes to what becomes authoritative and what does not. This might be key to understand 
why, as is generally accepted, “[j]udicial decisions […] have more weight than teachings.”463 
This predominance of precedents over scholarship is not to be expected a priori. Scholarship 
could on the contrary have had greater weight, as teachings (i) have a broader scope of application 
(i.e., they are not tethered to a particular case);464 and (ii) legal scholars are (arguably) primarily 
accountable to “ideal entities such as the scientific community, the truth, the public”,465 and not to 
the parties that appointed or sought recourse from them. Once again, if intrinsic persuasiveness 
(and therefore, truth) was all there is about authorities, then doctrinal authorities could, or even 
should, be more relied upon than precedents bound to a particular factual situation.466 
The fact that precedents are nonetheless preferred by international courts and tribunals 
suggests there is something about the authoritativeness of decided cases that goes beyond 
persuasiveness, although this “something else” is hard to pin down. Possible reasons include the 
greater strength of precedents with respect to the process that created them (see below), or their 
greater “actuality and […] concrete character”.467 This preference might also be only relative, as a 
reflection of scholarship’s own shortcomings (i.e., suspicions of self-interested reasonings, conflicts 
of interest, etc.). 
Be that as it may, it is interesting that precedents and scholarship are sometimes cited at the 
same time, typically in the same paragraph and on the same issue. This practice might just be an 
 
462  Berman, supra note 428, at 17; see also Thirlway, supra note 423, at 118. 
463  S.T. Helmersen, “The Application of Teachings by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (2020) 11 Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement, at 31. 
464  Of course, the point of citing a precedent is to extract a general rule from its application in a particular case; but the very fact that it had 
been applied in a particular case is a source of endless ammunitions for those who want to distinguish the scope and weight of the general 
rule. 
465  A. Peters, “Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour” (2013) 25 European Journal of International Law 533, at 540. 
466  But see another, less rosy view of scholarship as found in Paulsson, supra note 421, at §4.14. 
467  Fitzmaurice, supra note 414. See also the Procès-Verbaux of the Advisory Committee of Jurists (1920), at 336, where Lapradelle is 
quoted saying that he “thought that jurisprudence was more important than doctrine, since the judges in pronouncing sentence had a 
practical end in view.” 
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attempt to prove unanimity (or at least large consensus) around an issue (a criterion studied below). 
It might also be intended to add a further gloss on a finding of law in a precedent, through the 
interpretation of a learned scholar.468 Yet, some examples also show that the point is sometimes 
more broadly to benefit from “authoritativeness by association”, and to bolster both categories of 
authorities’ respective authoritativeness.469 
A typical example of this practice can be found in the pleadings of Nicaragua before the ICJ 
in the Armed Activities case. In support of its contention that the Court had jurisdiction, Nicaragua 
notably cited an article by “[Manley] Hudson, whose authority in these matters was noted by the 
dissenters in Aerial Incident […].”470 The state then proceeded to cite the Joint dissenting Opinion 
by Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender, including the extended 
introduction vouching the authoritativeness of Mr. Hudson quoted above.471 
This practice remains however relatively infrequent in the data: out of 106,000 different 
citing paragraphs, only around 3,300 (~3.1%) cite both to precedents and to teachings (hereinafter, 
“Dual Paras”). Around 90,000 cite only to precedents and another 12,000, only to scholarship (in 
both cases, labelled as “Simple Paras”). The practice is somewhat more popular with investment 
tribunals (and parties before it) and with the IUSCT. 
% Opinions Decisions Pleadings 
Simple Dual Simple Dual Simple Dual 
ICJ 90 10 99 1 92 8 
INV 89 11 90 10 87 13 
ITLOS 92 8 100 0 92 8 
IUSCT 73 27 94 6 89 11 
WTO / / 99 1 99 1 
Table 7: Percent of paras citing to both teachings and precedents  
 
468  This gloss can even be critical of the precedent: see one example given in Helmersen, supra note 463, at 30. 
469  Jacob, supra note 397, at 1025. 
470  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Memorial of Nicaragua 
(30 June 1984), at §50, citing M. Hudson, “The Twenty-Fifth Year of the World Court” (1947) 41 American Journal of International 
Law 1, at 10. 
Along the same lines, see also South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Counter-Memorial filed by the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa (10 January 2964), at 96, citing the Australian domestic case Ffrost v. Stevenson (1937) 
58 Commonwealth Law Reports 528, and then noting that it had been cited by judge McNair in International Status of South West 
Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, Separate Opinion by Sir Arnold McNair, at 151. 
471  See supra, note 449. 
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Reading key: 90% of all citing paragraphs in ICJ individual opinions cite only to either 
teachings or precedents; the remaining 10% cite to both at the same time 
 The type of authorities cited in these paragraphs is instructive. Based on a proxy for an 
authority’s authoritativeness (i.e., their PageRank score), it is possible to check whether the total 
“authority score”472 of precedents and teachings found in Dual Paras differed from those in Single 
Paras. The results are as follows: 
- Precedents in Dual Paras are substantially less “authoritative” than precedents found in 
Single Paras; and 
- Teachings in Dual Paras are more authoritative than teachings found in Single Paras. 
Together, this dual finding indicates that weaker precedents need to be accompanied by 
stronger teachings to benefit from their authoritativeness. 
B) Identity of the author 
The identity of the authority’s author is a second element that holds important weight in an 
authority’s authoritativeness.473 This identity is crucial to an authority’s standing, as anonymous 
submissions are unlikely to bear any weight in a reasoning or a legal argumentation.474 As the 
etymological vicinity of the terms indicates, authorship is closely related to, and partakes in the 
authoritativeness of an authority. 
There are two kinds of authorship that are relevant in this respect: institutional and 
individual. As explained below, they likely differ in their effects on authoritativeness, and have a 
dynamic of their own. 
 
472  That is, the cumulated score of all authorities found in this paragraph. If a Dual Para cites a precedent that is otherwise cited 50 times 
and an authority that is unique in the Dataset, then its authority score is 51. 
473  See, e.g., N. Jansen, The Making of Legal Authority: Non-Legislative Codifications in Historical and Comparative Perspective 
(Oxford University Press 2010), at 105. 
474  Contrary examples of course do exist: the Federalist Papers for instance were first published anonymously and helped shift the debate 
between Federalists and anti-Federalists: see D. Adair, “The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers” (1944) 1 The William and 
Mary Quarterly 97, at 99, noting however that “the identity of the three authors was not an especially well-kept secret.” By the time they 
became authoritative in future constitutional debates, however, the identity of the Papers’ authors was widely acknowledged, although 
there are still some debates regarding the precise authorship of individual papers.  
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Institutional identity 
Starting with institutional identity, it is trite to say that different courts and tribunals, and 
different academic contexts, will have varying authority in future cases and contexts.475  
The point is further studied below in Chapter VII for external citations by courts – but it is 
valid as well for scholarship and teachings. Sivakumaran observes, for instance, that “[a]n 
individual might make the very same point in two different capacities – for example, as an individual 
publicist and as a state-empowered entity – but it is the statement in the capacity as a state-
empowered entity that tends to be taken up and preferred.”476 
Pointing out that some authorities are more authoritative because they originate from an 
authoritative institution still begs the question of what makes this institution authoritative in the 
first place, however. In this respect, the ICJ’s approach to the jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
Committee (“HRC”) in the Diallo case offers a good illustration of what the Court deems 
authoritative: 
Although the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to 
model its own interpretation of the Covenant on that of the Committee, it believes 
that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent 
body that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty.477 
The Court opined that the HRC should be followed because of its expertise and the quasi-
judicial process underlying its opinions. (As noted in Chapter VII below, this holding was 
concomitantly an attempt by the Court to lay boundaries as to what non-ICJ authorities it considers 
as authoritative.) In a similar manner, the World Court has been strongly deferent to the ICTY’s 
findings of facts in the cases regarding the Bosnian Genocide. International courts and tribunals 
seemingly rely increasingly on expertise in technical fields, as witnessed by the reliance of 
investment tribunals on damages textbooks.478 
The high level of process leading to the HRC’s interpretations of the Covenant was also a 
reason underlying the ICJ’s reliance on its interpretations. In this respect, virtually the only non-
precedent authority cited in decisions at the ICJ is the work of the process-heavy International Law 
 
475  For instance, permanent courts are meant to be more authoritative than ad hoc tribunals: see A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law 
(London 1947), at 86-87. 
476  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 32. 
477  Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639, at 664. 
478  Zarbiyev, supra note 405, at 303. 
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Commission, whose members – like international judges – are chosen by states. Finally, impartiality 
and neutrality are presumably important in strengthening the authoritativeness of an institution; 
some authors opine that the authoritativeness of the Red Cross Committee, for instance, proceeds 
from exactly these attributes.479 
Remarkably, the features noted above (expertise, process, neutrality) are all reviewed in the 
following sections as explaining the authoritativeness of authorities themselves.480 This is not a 
coincidence: a virtuous circle is likely at play in this context, whereby the authoritativeness of an 
institution infuses the authoritativeness of its output, which in turn impacts the authoritativeness 
(and reputation) of its original institution. 
Individual identity 
Individual identity is no less important in identifying the sources of authoritativeness. 
Tellingly, works from institutions (such as the International Law Commission) are often cited 
specifying the particular author at work, especially when this author is already well-known.481 This 
importance is further evidenced by the frequent controversies over the exact author of a given 
authority (this controversy would be inconsequential if its legal reasoning was the main feature of 
an authority).482 It also relates to the growing challenges associated with the questions of diversity 
and representation on international benches.483  
Yet, what exactly makes an individual author authoritative is hard to pin down. Oft-invoked 
notions of “prestige” 484  are notably self-referential: prestigious individuals are those that are 
 
479  Ibid., at 301, citing the Committee’s “perceived ‘neutrality, impartiality and independence’”. 
480  “Process” and expertise are reviewed below in sub-section C; “neutrality” proceeds from the same intuition as the feature of “externality” 
reviewed in subsection E. 
481  For instance, in the Dataset, several works by the ILC are cited together with their (final) special rapporteur: the Articles on Responsibility 
by James Crawford; Dugard’s work on Diplomatic Protection; etc.  
482  Witness for instance the controversy over tribunal secretaries writing up portion of the awards in investment and commercial arbitration. 
There was a time, however, when arbitrators deplored that secretaries did not participate in drafting: G. Lagergren, “The Formative Years 
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 23, at 27. 
 See also R. Higgins, “Remarks of Rosalie Higgins” (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 218, describing 
the ICJ judges writing their own decisions and opinions as the “point of pride at the Court.” 
483  In the IUSCT context, for instance, the legacy of the tribunal had been cast into doubt due to the prevalence of western nationals on the 
tribunal: for the charge and a reply, see C.N. Brower and J.D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff 
1998). 
See also V. Shikhelman, “Diversity and Decision-Making in International Judicial Institutions: the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee as a Case Study” (2018) 36 Berkeley Journal of International Law 60, finding however little evidence that diverse benches 
differ in terms of decision-making. Likewise, there is little evidence in the Dataset that the nationality or gender of authors matter a great 
deal in terms of citations to the authorities they authored. 
484  Prosper Weil, for instance, wrote that “[t]here are those awards that are a source of law, insofar as they have authority, they were rendered 
by prestigious arbitrators, [...] and they inspire the follow-up in the future, other awards.” P. Weil, “Comments by Prosper Weil”, in 
Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi (eds.), Precedent in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing 2008), at 152. See also Guillaume, 
supra note 400, at 14.  
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prestigious. As with “leading cases” and authorities, commentators rarely try to explain what makes 
any author a member of the group Great Men and Women of International Law. Sivakumaran 
describes well how the authoritativeness of an individual author impacts the quality of his or her 
output – yet fails to go further than limited concepts such as “expertise” or “reputation”. 
[T]he expertise of an individual publicist and the quality of his or her teachings are 
of particular importance. The eminence of an individual publicist, usually based on 
his or her expertise, but also on associated factors such as title and reputation, can 
also affect the weight to be given to the work. In this way, the user can rest assured 
that the propositions stated in the work are reliable.485 
The difficulty of identifying a “prestigious” publicist does not prevent the existence of a 
consensus as to the main members of that group. Hersch Lauterpacht, for instance, is invariably 
presented as one of those great past authorities. Illustrative is Rosenne’s view in this respect, for 
whom Lauterpacht’s opinions are: 
cited – in diplomatic texts, in the literature, and in the debates in the United Nations 
– as much as the majority opinions themselves, and it is very likely that the time will 
surely come when, many of the collective judicial pronouncements having passed 
inevitably into the reservoir of international legal precedents, it will be to 
Lauterpacht that the student, the lawyer, the social scientist, the statesman, and the 
philosopher – aye, the international judge too ! – will turn to ascertain not only what 
the law was during the years 1955-1959, but why it was so.486 
To some extent, the boundaries of this consensus can be seen in the frequent examples of 
name-dropping in international dispute settlement.487 One such example can be seen in the award 
in El Paso v. Argentina, in which the tribunal decided between two branches of a jurisprudential 
split by citing not only the “important precedents” that persuaded it, but also the names of the 
arbitrators who had presided over these precedents.488 Some awards or decisions take a step further 
 
485  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 11. 
486  S. Rosenne, “Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s Concept of the Task of an International Judge” (1961) 55 American Journal of International 
Law 861. 
487  See, e.g., Canfor Corporation v. United States of America, US Rejoinder Submission on Place of Arbitration and Bifurcation 
(11 December 2003), at 2: “It is noteworthy that the members of the tribunals subscribing to this view include recognized arbitration 
experts such as Professor Dr. Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Judge Charles Brower, L. Yves Fortier QC, Justice Kenneth Keith, Marc Lalonde, 
William Rowley QC, and V.V. Veeder QC, among many others.” 
488  El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(27 April 2006), at §82, holding that it would follow “the important precedents set by Tribunals presided over by Judge Feliciano, Judge 
Guillaume and Professor Orrego Vicuna.” 
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and are mindful of listing the members of every tribunal they are citing to.489 This is a practice also 
followed by some parties (or, more accurately, their counsel), who certainly hope that name-dropping 
prestigious authors will increase the authority of the citations to their decisions.490 
While it is hard to explain what makes an individual author “prestigious” and/or 
“authoritative”, just as with institutional authority, however, the beginning of an answer can be 
gleaned from the features – studied below – that impact the authoritativeness of authorities 
themselves.  
Subsection C below highlights the importance of “hard work” (for lack of a better term): the 
idea that authoritativeness proceeds from exhaustiveness and thoroughness. And indeed, there is 
some weight to the idea that the authoritativeness of an author is related not only to his or her 
quality, but also to his or her quantity. The most prestigious authors often have a long and 
distinguished career in international law; they have produced a large and wide output on various 
subjects (or an even larger output on a specialised topic); and have cumulated different functions 
and positions over the years.491 
Notably, being engaged both in the scholarship and the practice of international dispute 
settlement puts you in prime position to acquire authoritativeness. In discussing what makes some 
investment arbitration awards more authoritative than other, Paulsson described the impact of 
arbitrators that are also “premier rank as international lawyers” and among the “most frequently 
appointed members to international investment tribunals panels”. He likewise highlighted how 
these individuals have had a career in other prestigious redoubts of international law, and thus 
“surely qualify” as publicists under article 38.492  
(Remarkably, this multi-tasking is increasingly susceptible nowadays to be described (and 
castigated) as impermissible double-hatting (at least when it takes place at the same time).493 Some 
 
489  OI European Group B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/25, Decision on Application for Annulment 
(6 December 2018); see also most citations in Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Company and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award 
No. ITL 59-129-3, Interlocutory Award (27 March 1986), reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 248. 
490  See, e.g., three submissions by Arnold & Porter, LLP in as many distinct cases: Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of 
Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Respondent’s Rejoinder on the Merits (21 October 2011); Victor Pey Casado and President 
Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Letter from Chile (18 December 2013); Bridgestone Licensing 
Services, Inc. and Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/34, Respondent’s Counter-Memorial 
(14 September 2018). 
491  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 32. 
492  Paulsson, supra note 421, at §4.33. 
493  For a thorough analysis of the question in investment arbitration, see notably M. Langford, D. Behn, and R.H. Lie, “The Revolving Door 
in International Investment Arbitration” (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 301, at 322. 
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adjudicators have consequently reportedly refrained from carrying out the different roles, at least 
contemporaneously,494 while the ICJ has banned its judges from serving on investment tribunals.495 
Only the future will indicate to what extent this practice should impact their individual 
authoritativeness.) 
The Dataset supports this intuition, as the most cited publicists also top the ranks of the 
most cited individual judges and arbitrators: those are the Lauterpachts, McNairs, and Cançado 
Trindades.496 Out of the 20 individual judges whose opinions are the most cited at the ICJ, 15 are 
also cited at least once as authors of teachings. Conversely, out of the 20 most cited publicists, only 
4 are not also present in the Dataset as an adjudicator in at least one dispute; most of them have 
also appeared at some juncture as counsel before the ICJ.497 Straddling the boundaries between the 
bench and academia therefore seems to yield added authoritativeness. 
The dynamic between the two 
Both identities are important: writing in a less prestigious journal might amount to a loss of 
authority, even for a very authoritative author, or might increase the chances of a teaching being 
overlooked. Likewise, the springboard of a high-authoritativeness institution can give resonance to 
the voice and opinion of individuals until then relatively unknown. 
Just like precedents and scholarship, therefore, there is a dynamic between individual and 
institutional identity, whereby one can shore up the other.498 Presumably, an institution gains by 
being staffed with authoritative individuals. For instance, Judge ad hoc Ammoun at the ICJ once 
cited a judgment from the (rarely-cited) United Nations Administrative Tribunal, and – tellingly – 
 
494  E.Y. Kim and P.C. Mavroidis, “Dissenting Opinions in the WTO Appellate Body: Drivers of their Issuance & Implications for the 
Institutional Jurisprudence” (2018) 51 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2018/51, at note 8. 
495  See L. Leão Soares Pereira, “Restrictions in appointing sitting International Court of Justice judges in arbitration proceeding” 
(5 May 2019) LASIL, available at https://www.lasil.org/post/restrictions-in-appointing-sitting-international-court-of-justice-judges-
in-arbitration-proceeding. Speech by H.E. Mr. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, President of the International Court of Justice, on the Occasion of 
the Seventy-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly (25 October 2018). 
496  Although in the latter case it is mostly due to his own habit of citing himself, a phenomenon further studied below at p. 188. 
497  For instance, of the top 30 most cited individual authors of teachings, 17 are listed at least once as appearing in an ICJ dispute. The three 
most common counsel, advocates and agents before the Court, namely Pellet (79 appearances), Brownlie (48) and Crawford (41), are all 
within the top 15 of the most cited authors of teachings. 
498  See H. Mistry, “‘The Different Sets of Ideas at the Back of Our Heads’: Dissent and Authority at the International Court of Justice” 
(2019) 32 Leiden Journal of International Law 293, at 305, arguing that in the context of international courts the individuality of 
individual judges matters a great deal. 
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found it necessary to specify that George Scelle, an authoritative publicist, was a member of that 
tribunal.499 
These intuitions are partly backed up by the data, but not in every context. At the ICJ and 
at the ITLOS, the presence of highly authoritative writers on a bench (as determined by the total 
citation to teachings they participated in, either as sole or co-author) is indeed correlated with the 
number of citations later targeting a precedent – yet only weakly, with an R-squared score of around 
0.4.500 Both correlations are next to inexistent, however, for investment arbitration.501 In other 
words, awards of investment arbitrators who also publish and are cited in the Dataset do not attract 
more citations. 
The cumulated experience of judges sitting on the World Court’s bench (as a number of 
appearances in previous cases, or over all cases), 502  meanwhile, correlates weakly with the 
authoritativeness of the Court’s precedents, and similar results obtain at the WTO or at the ITLOS. 
Again, this does not hold for investment arbitration, as the cumulated number of appointments of 
arbitrators in a given tribunal was barely correlated with the authority of that tribunal’s decision 
for the future.503 This indicates that, contrary to intuition,504 the individual authority of arbitrators 
does not necessarily influence the authority of their awards. 
Finally, the number of authors of a given writing, or the number of adjudicators on a bench, 
likewise, has also little influence on the number of subsequent citations to a particular authority. 
Whereas some authors have opined that judgments and decisions made by Chambers at the ICJ 
should be less authoritative,505 the Dataset fails to bear that out. Despite being strongly imbalanced 
(216 decisions adopted in Full Court and only 9 in Chambers), the two sets of decisions have the 
same profile in terms of citations to these decisions, PageRank, or other measures of 
authoritativeness.506 
 
499  Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, Advisory Opinion, 
1973 I.C.J. 246, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun, at 250. 
500  The correlations are always statistically significant. 
501  There were too few citations to teachings by judges at the WTO or the IUSCT for the analyses to be instructive. 
502  I calculated two measures: “judge_bench”, reflecting the cumulated experience (in terms of appearances in the full Dataset) of the judges 
deciding any given case; and “judge_experience”, summing up only the appearance of judges in the Dataset up to the point of any decision.  
503  The correlation was ever-so-slightly better when looking only at the chair’s number of appointments, as opposed to the co-arbitrators. 
Even then, however, it might be related to the fact that important cases are more likely to be chaired by important arbitrators. 
504  See the quotes from Jan Paulsson, supra note 492. 
505  See Guillaume, supra note 400, at 10. 
506  This is confirmed by the averages of these sets of decisions, reviewed through a t-test or a Mann-Whitney test. Both tests checks whether 
the average of 2 independent samples differ in a statistically significant way; the differ in the expected distribution of the samples, with t-
test being more robust over normally-distributed samples. 
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C) Process, hard work, and dispositiveness 
This Chapter started by casting doubt on the weight of “persuasiveness” as a feature of 
authoritativeness, and the two previous subsections accordingly reviewed features unrelated to the 
individual content of an authority. Yet, as explained below, the substance of this individual content 
can also be relevant for authoritativeness in ways unrelated to its persuasiveness.  
Process 
 First, it is often said that an authority’s content should be more authoritative (again, 
unrelated to its persuasiveness) if it is the outcome of a “process” designed to weigh competing views. 
Process in this respect provides authorities with a sort of prima facie authoritativeness, by 
guaranteeing that content’s overall soundness. Authorities that are not the outcome of such a 
process, meanwhile, should be held as less authoritative.507 
This is relatively common view in the literature. For instance, Fuad Zarbiyev explains that 
international precedents are authoritative “due to the independence, impartiality and adversarial 
nature of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, statements of international law offered in such 
proceedings tend to be equated with international law itself.”508 The fact that courts have benefitted 
from exhaustive pleadings and were likely well briefed on an issue counts as an epistemic reason to 
accept the authoritativeness of that court’s precedents.509 A decision that has taken stock of as much 
criticism as possible and has thus been informed of the “true complexity of the debate”510 should 
therefore, in theory, be more authoritative. 
The same point is underlying Alain Pellet’s observation that individual opinions, albeit mere 
“teachings” under article 38 of the ICJ Stature, are: 
exceptionally authoritative – not only because of the eminence of the Judges 
(accepting that, as a matter of postulated definition, all are eminent…) but also – and 
even more – because they have reached their position after having benefited from a 
 
507  See Shahabuddeen, supra note 407, at 138: “The question of the precedential weight to be assigned to a decision made without argument 
is tied up with the associated question of the permissibility or propriety of such a decision.” 
508  See Zarbiyev, supra note 405, at 300. 
509  Ridi, supra note 404, at 370. 
510  Paulsson, supra note 421, at §4.15. 
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double adversarial debate (between the Parties on the one hand and inside the Court, 
with (or against?) their colleagues, on the other hand) […].511 
The importance of this process is clearly visible for ICJ advisory opinions,512 but is a feature 
that also informs the authoritativeness of scholarship, as authors have noted that following a specific 
process is often what makes influential “teachings”.513 These considerations find an echo (and take 
a particular salience) when confronted with the renewed definitions of “authority” mentioned at the 
close of Chapter I above: if “legitimacy” in international law is the outcome of “a process of 
interaction of different bodies (domestic, transnational, international) rather than to a single, 
commanding institution”,514 then the authorities that have followed such a process should acquire a 
particular authority. 
One crucial aspect of this process is the growing international law duty to give reasons and 
to explain the sources of a decision (see Chapter IV below).515 In this vein, Guy Canivet associates a 
judgment’s authoritativeness with its “pedagogical” aspects; the authoritative judgment is the one 
that explains what it is doing and how it goes from point A to point B.516 
This emphasis on process as a mark of authority finds support in jurisprudence. As 
mentioned above, in the Diallo case the ICJ broke with a decades-long (mostly) consistent reluctance 
to cite non-ICJ authorities. The Court’s decision to rely on the view of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (“HRC”) hinged upon its finding that the HRC was an “independent” body 
especially concerned with the “supervision” of the ICCPR.517 This finds a clear echo in the HRC 
insisting that its General Comments are an “authoritative determination” of the Covenant, because 
they are “arrived at in a judicial spirit”.518 
 
511  Pellet, supra note 388, at 22. See also Thirlway, supra note 423, at 119, opining that individual and dissenting opinions should be granted 
more weight (than scholarship) because “they set out conclusions reached after considering the arguments presented by the parties on each 
side”. 
512  Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, Dissenting Opinion 
by Judge Winiarski, at 89. 
513  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 10. 
514  N. Krisch, “Liquid Authority in Global Governance” (2017) 9 International Theory 237, at 251. 
515  See, for arbitration, A. Stone Sweet and F. Grisel, The Evolution of International Arbitration: Judicialization, Governance, Legitimacy 
(Oxford University Press 2017), at 120. 
516  G. Canivet, “L’autorité du jugement”, in Antoine Compagnon (ed.), De l’autorité (Odile Jacob 2008), at 26. 
517  See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, supra note 477, at 663. 
518  See General Comment No. 33, The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, CCPR/C/GC/33 (25 June 2009), at §§11 and 13. See also I. Venzke, “Semantic Authority”, in d’Aspremont and 
Singh, supra note 419, at 823, citing an amicus curiae submission from the HRC before a US Court, in which the Committee explained 
the sources of its authoritativeness, and cited notably its “over 55 years of experience”, as well as its receiving twice the Nobel Peace Prize. 
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In some form of infinite of mise en abîme, the process leading to the creation of a new 
authority also depends on what (past) authorities are used and relied upon by that (new) authority. 
The ILC is a clear example of a doctrinal author whose work has acquired authoritativeness thanks 
to a conjunction of features, and notably the high level of process that goes into its reports. This 
authoritativeness, however, can be challenged if the Commission does not rely, in turn, on 
authoritative sources. When the ILC presented its report on jus cogens, for instance, the French 
representative opined that: 
L’autorité des travaux de la Commission du droit international repose sur ses 
méthodes de travail, qui implique une analyse précise et complète de la pratique 
internationale, dans toutes ses formes et manifestations. Or il ressort de l’examen des 
travaux sur le jus cogens que le Rapporteur spécial sur le sujet tend à appuyer ses 
propositions essentiellement sur des références doctrinales plutôt que sur la pratique 
internationale pertinente.519 
 Assessing the empirical importance of these considerations however requires a good proxy to 
assess the level of “process” that went into a precedent. The word length of pleadings and 
submissions, for instance could be such a proxy. Yet, this measure for each forum520 fails to predict 
a judgment’s authority in terms of future citation or PageRank score. Under-argued cases are as 
likely to be cited or influential as over-argued cases (the most authoritative judgments, most often, 
proceed from cases with an average level of argumentation as assessed from the length of pleadings). 
Nor does the time length of a case influence its authoritativeness much. There is no such 
relationship for ICJ or ITLOS cases, and only a very weak (R² of around 0.2) relationship between 
length of proceedings and authoritativeness for ICSID decisions. 521  Likewise, the number of 
procedural developments leading to an ICSID decision, or the number of days of public hearings for 
ICJ or ITLOS decisions, does not correlate with any measure of authority either. 
There are other indications that the role of process should not be over-emphasised. As noted 
above, the distinction between scholarship and precedents is sometimes blurry.522 The latter is 
however consistently more authoritative, maybe because it is more likely to result from a 
 
519  See UN Assembly General, 73rd Session, Report of the ILC on the works of its 70th Session, Intervention of François Alabrune 
(24 October 2018). Mr. Alabrune then confessed that “[a]dmittedly, international practice on this topic is limited”, but saw there an 
extra reason for caution in dealing with this subject. 
520  As mentioned in Chapter II, however, pleadings data is exhaustive only for the ICJ and the ITLOS. 
521  Only ICSID decisions were reviewed for the purposes of this section, as ICSID’s practice of detailing the procedural developments of the 
cases it administers offers a rich dataset to evaluate the role of process in these cases.  
522  See Thirlway, supra note 423, at 118. 
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sophisticated process. However, while individual opinions are akin to scholarship in this respect,523 
they are not cited or relied upon more than teachings. 
If the process that led to the creation of a precedent has any impact on that authority’s 
influence, then, it is difficult to find evidence in the data. While this does not prove or disprove this 
hypothesis (as mentioned, teachings associated with stringent processes are indeed among the most 
authoritative), it is also possible that the proceedings of international courts and tribunals are not 
sophisticated enough to diminish the importance of this factor between two precedents, everything 
else being equal. 
“Hard work” 
The idea that the more work was necessary to create an authority, the more authoritative it 
is, is closely related. The teachings of individual publicists are sometimes cited not only on their own 
merits but also based on the publicist’s “broader reputation”. 524  As noted above, the most 
authoritative of them have particularly active public lives. For precedents, meanwhile, Lauterpacht 
said of arbitral jurisprudence that: 
International arbitral law has produced a body of precedent which is full of 
instruction and authority. Numerous arbitral awards have made a distinct 
contribution to international law by reason of their scope, their elaboration, and the 
conscientiousness with which they have examined the issue before them.525 
 This of course echoes the Paquete Habana dictum cited above, which gave weight “[…] to the 
works of jurists and commentators who by years of labour, research, and experience have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”526 
The idea remains that authorities should be granted deference in part because they pull 
together different threads of the law in a coherent whole.527 The hard work deemed to be embodied 
in authorities also responds to the possible laziness of the citer, as in Louis Sohn’s description of the 
work of government legal advisors: 
 
523  See supra note 511, and the associated quote from Alain Pellet. 
524  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 32. 
525  H. Lauterpacht, supra note 399, at 17 (emphasis added). 
526  The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677 (1900), p. 701 (Grey J.). 
527  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 14. 
117 
 
These authors did the research; we do not have time to do any new research, as the 
decision-makers want instant response.528 
Just like “process”, “hard work” is difficult to test. One indicium in favour of the role of hard 
work is, once again, that the works of the International Law Commission are among the most 
authoritative; they are virtually the only teachings cited in majority judgments at the ICJ. The ILC 
reports, in turn, are typically exhaustive and the result of a long and careful process.529 If only for 
this reason, the ILC’s hard work in pre-digesting international law literature makes it worth 
citing.530  
The ILC’s enhanced authoritativeness might also be due, as noted above, to the identity of 
its members (and the fact that they are appointed by states like international adjudicators). Yet, it 
is interesting to note that one of the main authorities cited by investment tribunals are the reports 
compiled by UNCTAD (on the fair and equitable treatment standard or the law on expropriation, 
for instance). These reports likewise are the result of the gruelling task of digesting international 
jurisprudence, yet have less prestigious authors then the ILC. 
The Dataset also displays a clear correlation between the number of works penned by an 
author (as long as they are listed in the Dataset) and the number of citations to this author – but 
these two variables are not independent. And as found above (in Section A above), among teachings, 
books – which presumably require more “hard work” than standalone articles531 – are cited more 
than other types of scholarship. 
“Dispositiveness” and obiter dicta 
The authoritativeness of a pronouncement is also allegedly stronger if that pronouncement 
was necessary in reaching the outcome of a decision (part of the ratio) – as opposed to being of a pure 
academic character (obiter dicta). Under this view, obiter dicta are less authoritative. This is the 
proposition that the rule as used matters, and not the rule as stated.532  
For Jan Paulsson, this feature of authoritativeness finds its source in the author’s personal 
responsibility (and thus, relates to the idea of “hard work” identified above):  
 
528  Sohn, supra note 461, at 400. 
529  But see above, note 519. 
530  Berman, supra note 428, at 16. 
531  Baetens and Prislan, supra note 459, at 560. 
532  Ridi, supra note 404, at 366. 
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Arbitrators’ opinions are no more or less interesting than opinions of commentators. 
What we really want to know are the reasons which they said led them to the outcome 
for which they have taken personal responsibility. That is where, one reasonably 
surmises, they exhibit particular care.533 
This is also related to questions of process. For instance, Sir Percy Spender opined that 
individual opinions that go beyond the questions treated by the Court – and thus were not subject 
to the debate between the parties – lose their judicial character and their authoritativeness.534 For 
instance, in ConocoPhillips’s ICC arbitration against Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., the arbitrators 
fully departed from an earlier ICC award between the same parties on an issue that, the arbitrators 
held, had not been debated between the parties and was therefore not authoritative.535 
If obiter dicta are not authoritative due to  a lack of process, conversely process matters less 
than for the ratio. This intuition was neatly illustrated by the decision of the annulment committee 
in Caratube v. Kazakhstan. The investor in that case challenged a footnote of the award, in which 
the tribunal allegedly decided a question on which the parties had not been heard. The committee, 
however, declined to annul this part of the award, after finding that the challenged footnote was an 
obiter dictum. As such, the committee concluded, it “ha[d] no precedential value and d[id] not have 
any effect as res iudicata […] it had no conclusive effect for the dispositive section of the Award, nor 
did it affect the Tribunal’s reasoning.”536 
As seen above, the idea that only “the rule as used” matters, from which the distinction 
between obiter and dicta proceeds, indicates that persuasiveness is not the only determinant of 
authoritativeness, since persuasiveness should not depend on whether a legal proposition was 
dispositive or not.537 Accordingly, parties and adjudicators routinely use dicta in the same manner 
as other authorities. As noted by Henry Gao, “[i]n many cases, various dicta have been picked up by 
later courts and elevated to ‘a position hardly distinguishable from that of a direct adjudication’.”538 
 
533  Paulsson, supra note 384, at 11. 
534  South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, Declaration of President 
Sir Percy Spender, at §32. 
535  Phillips Petroleum Company Venezuela Limited, Conocophillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A., Corpoguanipa, S.A., 
PDVSA Petroleo, S.A., ICC Case No. 20549/ASM/JPA (C-20550/ASM), Final Award (24 Avril 2018), at §1006. This kind of 
argument is related to the lack of authority of per incuriam decisions. 
536  See Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. The Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Decision on the Annulment 
Application of Caratube International Oil Company LLP (21 February 2014), at §§297-299. Both parties agreed that the part of the 
award discussed here by the Committee was an obiter dictum.  
537  See, e.g., Kammerhofer, supra note 426, at 308. 
538  See H. Gao, “Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes” (2018) 17 World Trade Review 509, at 515. 
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The key to these conflicting accounts likely is that what is obiter for one adjudicator can be 
important for another. Ultimately, indeed, there are no clear-cut distinctions between dispositive 
findings and obiter dicta.539 Gao continues that, in the jurisprudence, the notion of obiter is mostly 
an “ambiguous and unhelpful tombstone” under which subsequent courts seek to bury the annoying 
findings of earlier ones. It is an argumentative trick – not a genuine reflection of the reality, and as 
such should have an unpredictable effect on the authoritativeness of individual authorities.540 
The Dataset contained around 50 citations that labelled a specific paragraph from an 
authority as being obiter. Half of these were also cited at least one other time in the Dataset without 
any mention that this paragraph was an obiter dictum.541 For instance, in Wintershall v. Argentina, 
the tribunal recounted the opinion of Christoph Schreuer, expert for the claimant, that a holding of 
the Enron v. Argentina542 tribunal was obiter in holding that amicable settlement clauses in BITs 
amount to a jurisdictional requirement.543 This did not prevent the tribunal in Tulip v. Turkey to 
later cite and endorse the exact same paragraph without any hint that the arbitrators considered it 
obiter.544 
D) Consensus and consistency 
Consistency 
That consistency is often held as a good reason to follow precedents further confirms that 
there is more to authorities than mere persuasiveness. If an authority needs to be followed for 
consistency reasons, if “in exercising its choice [of a judicial solution], [the ICJ] must ensure 
consistency with its own past case law in order to provide predictability”,545 then the persuasiveness 
of a precedent is not the end of the story. It can only be relevant in two respects: (i) by coincidence 
 
539  As acknowledged, indeed, by Paulsson himself: see supra note 421, at §4.37. 
540  See Gao, supra note 538, at 515. 
541  The assumption is that paragraphs in decisions embody one main idea (that is later cited in support of a similar proposition). This 
assumption is of course challengeable.  
542  Precisely Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(14 January 2004), at §88. 
543  See Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award (8 December 2008), at §133 and §144. 
544  See Tulip Real Estate and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Decision on Bifurcated 
Jurisdictional Issue (5 March 2013), at §§65-70. 
See also Uruguay’s heavy reliance on this paragraph in Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. 
v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Uruguay's Memorial on Jurisdiction (24 September 2001), at §62. 
545  Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 279, Joint declaration of 
Vice-President Ranjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, at 330, also opining that 
“[c]onsistency is the essence of judicial reasoning.” 
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(in that the authority with which consistency is required is also persuasive); and (ii) as an upper 
limit on what should be followed for consistency reasons. 
In practice, however, parties typically focus on consistency and often leave persuasiveness 
inchoate. Consistency is indeed a powerful argument: in the Armed Activities case, for instance, 
Congo asked the Court to rule in its favour “in accordance with both the doctrine and unanimous, 
settled international jurisprudence […]”.546 Some scholars consider the ICJ’s decision on the binding 
character of provisional measures in LaGrand to be unpersuasive.547 Regardless, this decision has 
been granted great authority because of its convenience,548 but also because of the difficulty to break 
rank with past jurisprudence. The LaGrand judgment at the ICJ even paved the way for what some 
insist is even less persuasive reasoning in the framework of the ICSID Convention.549 
With respect to precedents, consistency is of course related to the powerful idea that 
precedents should be followed because “like cases should be decided alike”.550 This is the primary 
factor behind what some scholars have dubbed the “spell of precedents”.551  The opinion of the 
tribunal in AES v. Argentina is exemplary in this respect: 
the Tribunal would nevertheless reject the excessive assertion which would consist in 
pretending that, due to the specificity of each case and the identity of each decision 
on jurisdiction or award, absolutely no consideration might be given to other decisions 
on jurisdiction or awards delivered by other tribunals in similar cases. […] In 
particular, if the basis of jurisdiction for these other tribunals and/or the underlying 
legal dispute in analysis present either a high level of similarity or, even more, an 
identity with those met in the present case, this Tribunal does not consider that it is 
 
546  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Order of 
10 July 2002, at 32. 
547  LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, at §§98-102 and §109. 
548  See Pellet, supra note 388, at 52-53, opining that the LaGrand decision is “a very controversial interpretation of a treaty provision, 
irreconcilable with its wording,” as well as “inconvenient” in practice, and yet undoubtedly part of positive international law.  
549  See, e.g., the opinion of Marcelo Kohen in Fouad Alghanim & Sons Co. for General Trading & Contracting, W.L.L. and Fouad 
Mohammed Thunyan Alghanim v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/38, Award (24 November 2014), 
Statement of Dissent by Marcelo Kohen, opining that ICSID tribunals have wrongly concluded that they could “order” and not 
“recommend” provisional measures. The opinion of Mr. Kohen is not available online but is summarised in D. Charlotin and L. Peterson, 
“Alghanim v. Jordan Part One: at Provisional Measures Phase, Arbitrators Disagree whether Jordan should be Enjoined from Enforcing 
Tax Debt – but later Agree to Dismiss all Jurisdictional Objections” (28 December 2017) Investment Arbitration Reporter. 
550  See S. Schill, “Sources of International Investment Law: Multilateralization, Arbitral Precedent, Comparativism, Soft Law”, in Jean 
d’Aspremont and Sebastien Besson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2017), 
at 1105. 
 This is aptly put by M’Bengue, supra note 419, at 710 in the idea that that international law should be guided, in regard to international 
jurisprudence, with a “rule of three”: “consistency, certitude and continuity.” 
551  See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 385, at 511; some other factors they cite – “the symbolism of judges’ robes, the atmosphere 
of the court room, […] the language of the law [,… a] belief in the independence and fairness of international adjudication as well as the 
appeal of the outcome” – are further studied below. 
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barred, as a matter of principle, from considering the position taken or the opinion 
expressed by these other tribunals.552 
Yet, consistency is also valued with respect to teachings. Consider a remarkable footnote by 
the Mercer v. Canada tribunal: after noting that Canada had cited “Schreuer, The ICSID Convention 
(1st ed.)”, the tribunal was mindful to observe, in brackets, that it “has checked the second edition 
of this work which has a passage to similar effect on Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention, see 
p. 853ff”.553 In other words, a reasoning is all the stronger if it has been consistently held.554 In a 
similar fashion, in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, Nigeria objected to Cameroon’s reliance 
on teachings by Sir Jennings, as the state argued that Cameroon’s citation referred to an old, 
idiosyncratic view of Jennings, while other, newer material from him was more relevant.555 
Consensus 
The latter example also illustrates that, relatedly, authorities are more authoritative if they 
reflect a consensus and are not idiosyncratic.556 
This is why some authors see a “cumulative effect” in the authority of precedents that come 
to the same conclusions in succession.557 In the same vein, Oppenheim held that the criterion to 
choose between conflicting teachings is to opt for “the[se authorities that are] are unanimous”.558 (At 
an extreme, however, this idea can fall back on a crude number game.559) As aptly put by Guy 
Canivet, “the interpretative authority of a judgment is determined by its insertion in a whole […], 
 
552  AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction (April 26, 2005), at §25. 
553  Mercer International Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/3, Supplementary Decision (10 December 2018), at note 8. A third 
edition is forthcoming. 
554  See also T. Wälde, “Confidential Awards as Precedent in Arbitration: Dynamics and Implication of Award Publication”, in Emmanuel 
Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi (eds.), Precedent in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing 2008), at 124. 
555  See supra, note 450. 
556  The notion of consensus has found particularly fertile applications in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: see 
D. Peat, Comparative Reasoning in International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press 2019), at 140. 
557  Paulsson, supra note 384, at 3. 
558  Oppenheim, supra note 442, at 347. See also Helmersen, supra note 463, at 38. 
559  T. Schultz and N. Ridi, “Arbitration Literature”, in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International 
Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2019), comparing legal scholarship to religious battles: “The same happens to legal thinking, which 
changes not only like paradigms, but also like religion. Central ideas in a field can also be imposed by brute force. Our central idea is 
better than yours because I am stronger. I can push it by inundating thee field with publications by our gang mates, organizing conferences 
around our central idea, launching journals that take our approach, by telling our students (in a broad sense) that mine is the only correct 
way of thinking, exclusively marks the proprieties. Our school eventually prevails over yours.” 
See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Annulment (14 December 2018), at 174, in which the committee noted that the tribunal’s 
position on MFN was not unanimous in the jurisprudence, yet nonetheless supported by a “considerable body of jurisprudence.” 
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in an order that it contributes to create, as well as by this judgment’s potential to alter or correct 
this order.”560  
In the jurisprudence, extra authoritativeness is also assigned to views that gather the 
consensus of both the jurisprudence and the scholarship.561 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute actually 
hints at this “consensus premium” in assigning value to the teachings of publicists “from the various 
nations”, suggesting that the geographical breadth of authorities weigh in their authoritativeness.562 
This echoes Louis Renault’s opinion that: 
Lorsqu’une question controversée aura été tranchée de la même façon par plusieurs 
tribunaux d’arbitrage, on comprend quelle autorité aura une solution donnée à 
diverses reprises dans des conditions de complète indépendance par des juges d’une 
grande valeur appartenant à divers pays. On ne pourra reprocher à une pareille 
solution d’être inspirée par des vues étroites, des préjugés ou des intérêts nationaux. 
Elle entrera dans le corps du droit international a titre de raison écrite comme 
répondant à la justice et aux intérêts généraux de l’humanité.563 
By contrast, splits in the literature (or in the jurisprudence) will elicit caution,564 as courts 
and tribunals often acknowledge.565 Casting an authority as an outlier is accordingly a powerful 
argument against that authority’s overall authoritativeness,566 especially when it cannot otherwise 
be distinguished. In B-Mex v. Mexico, for instance, the state challenged the investor’s reliance on the 
award in Ethyl Corp v. Canada567 inter alia because: 
- It was the first notice of intent, and the first case decided under NAFTA (inexperience); 
- The case was settled (which comes back to dispositiveness); 
- It was never subject to review by NAFTA domestic courts (lack of endorsement and 
therefore of consensus); and 
 
560  Canivet, supra note 516, at 28. 
561  See, e.g., Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, 2012 I.T.L.O.S. 4, at 197, Separate Opinion of Judge Gao, at §18. 
562  See Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 9. 
563  As quoted by Shahabuddeen, supra note 407, at 44. 
564  Or at least deserve a mention: see LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 
at 501, mentioning “extensive controversy in the literature”. 
565  See North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at §41, citing the “rather vague 
and general terminology employed in the literature of the subject [of absolute proximity].” See also Lighthouses Arbitration between 
France and Greece, Award (24 July 1956), XII RIAA 155, mentioning “l’état chaotique de la doctrine” on state succession. 
566  See, e.g., Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-01, Award (2 May 2008), Dissenting 
Opinion of Gary Born, at 49. 
567  Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction (24 June 1998). 
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- It has been explicitly criticised by NAFTA parties in later pleadings (lack of consensus).568 
Likewise, in Karkey v. Pakistan, the investor challenged Pakistan’s reliance on the “newly 
issued” Içkale v. Turkmenistan award by stressing how isolated that award was at the time:  
Karkey submits that this reading is contrary to the weight of prior investment 
jurisprudence, and Pakistan itself admits that the Içkale award ‘is the only 
investment treaty award’ that has adopted Pakistan’s restrictive reading of the MFN 
clause.569 
The same concerns underpinned the debate over the relevance of IUSCT awards for later 
courts and tribunals: Samuel Asante, one of the main critics of the Iran-US Tribunal’s output, 
notably opined that the Tribunal’s awards on expropriation were not persuasive because (i) they 
were few; and (ii) they were not implemented, usually because a settlement later occurred.570 It is 
telling that attempts to de-emphasise the idea of consensus and consistency, or to deflate the charge 
that unique authorities should be discounted, often fall back on persuasiveness. For instance, 
Charles Brower and Jason Brueschke replied to Asante’s charges with respect to the IUSCT 
jurisprudence by opining that:  
One would suppose that a dearth of decisions on a particular point would enhance 
rather than diminish the value of each such precedent and that the fact of compromise 
at the enforcement or execution stage, often dictated by acutely practical 
considerations likewise would not detract from the substantive value of a principled 
decisions.571 
Finally, consistency and consensus are also related to the question of process mentioned in 
the previous subsection. For instance, processes that allow third parties to intervene in the 
proceedings of courts and tribunals have been praised for ensuring some kind of “community control” 
on judges572 – and thus ensuring some measure of consistency and consensus. 
 
568  See B-Mex, LLC and others v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/16/3, Reply on Jurisdictional Objections (1 December 
2017), at 110. See also ibid., at 118. 
569  Karkey Karadeniz Elektrik Uretim A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/1, Award (22 August 2017), at §197. 
570  His views are summarized in Brower and Brueschke, supra note 483, at 653. 
571  Ibid. 
 The absence of consensus sometimes becomes an argument in itself, which can grant adjudicators greater discretion to choose between 
several options. For instance, in Enkev Beheer v. Poland, the tribunal observed that it had cited a range of authorities “at some length to 
demonstrate that the issue of interpretation dividing the Parties is not straightforward, with even more that could be said by each Party in 
support of its case.” See Enkev Beheer B.V. v. Republic of Poland, PCA Case No. 2013-01, First Partial Award (29 April 2014), at §373. 
572  See Sacerdoti, supra note 403, at 180. 
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Unanimity and compromise 
Relatedly, if consensus with the broader international community is an important factor, the 
authoritativeness of precedents can also hinge on how consensually they were adopted. In other 
words, if judgments are supposed to be proof of a communis opinio juris, then the existence of 
dissents and concurring opinions might undermine the authority of a majority opinion,573 regardless 
of its persuasiveness. 
The assumption is thus that consensus and unanimity impact a decision’s eventual 
authoritativeness.574 For instance, Chief Justice Warren of the US Supreme Court reportedly battled 
to make sure that the upcoming judgment in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka575 was the fruit 
of a consensus, and that other justices refrain from appending individual opinions.576 In the South 
West Africa case, invited to depart from its 1950 Advisory Opinion,577 the Court replied that “[t]he 
unanimous holding of the Court in 1950 . . . continues to reflect the Court’s opinion today. Nothing 
has since occurred which would warrant the Court reconsidering it.”578 
This has led commentators to surmise that, “[t]hough the opinion of the majority certainly 
was the opinion of the Court in the case in hand, a change of jurisprudence might more readily be 
made and the case over-ruled if the Court had been fundamentally divided.”579 Judges typically 
assign some weight to cases decided unanimously.580 It is not necessarily an issue in this respect 
that this consensus might be based on a compromise. Reasoning on the future legacy of the IUSCT, 
Matti Pellonpää wondered whether the tribunal’s awards might be less authoritative because they 
were frequently based on a compromise between the arbitrators. He tentatively opined that, to the 
 
573  See Lagergren, supra note 482, at 31. 
574  Ralston also reported that one commissioner of the Jay Treaty Fisheries Commission proposed that only unanimous awards should be 
granted formal authority, but this view failed to convince his fellow commissioners: see J. H. Ralston, The Law and Procedure of 
International Tribunals (Stanford University 1926), at 109-110.  
575  347 US 483 (1954). 
576  R. Kluger, Simple Justice (Knopf 1976), at 657. 
577  International status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion (11 July 1950), 1950 I.C.J. 128. 
578  South West Africa (Liberia v. South Africa), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 319, at 334. (emphasis added)  
In view on this emphasis on unanimity, the fact that this decision was decided by eight to seven votes, and the whole case later dismissed 
by the “narrowest and most adventitious of majorities”, of course appears as highly ironic: see R. Falk, “The South West Africa Cases: 
An Appraisal” (1967) 21 International Organization 1, at 1. 
579  See R.P. Anand, “The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication” (1965) 14 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 788, at 797. 
580  See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 482, at 218, noting that on delimitation cases it is “really important for the Court to have a very good 
majority.” See also Guillaume, supra note 400, at 10: “All […] judgments, however, do not have the same value […], judgments or 
advisory opinions adopted as a full Court, unanimously or by a very large majority – as well as oft-cited decisions – naturally carry more 
weight than isolated judgments, adopted by Chambers, or decided by a narrow majority.” As noted above, Gilbert Guillaume’s opinion as 
to the authority of judgments in chambers is also not borne out by the data. 
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contrary, “in very controversial legal issues, a somewhat cautious approach reflecting the need to 
reach compromises may be more conducive to a stable development of case law […].”581 
Yet, the literature also records an entirely opposite theory, according to which non-
unanimous, non-compromise decisions are, in fact, more authoritative. The idea is that those 
decisions, precisely because they have benefitted from the dissent of some decisionmakers, are better 
reasoned and leave a deeper mark in the jurisprudence. For instance, again with respect to IUSCT 
awards, Baker and Davis opined that “the need to reply to the criticisms of the concurring arbitrator 
may have forced the chairmen to give more reasoned support for their awards than they might 
otherwise have been inclined to do, thereby improving the overall quality of the awards”.582 (As noted 
in Chapter V below, at the IUSCT at least, majority decisions tend to be more authoritative than 
unanimous ones.) 
The practice, however, does not confirm either side of the debate. At the ICJ, for instance, 
the most divided decisions generally attracted fewer citations further down the line. Yet, decisions 
taken by the largest majorities, or even by unanimous benches, fare similarly. As seen in Figure 5 
below, it is mostly decisions with fair, but not overwhelming majorities that are cited more 
frequently. In investment arbitration, meanwhile, awards adopted by majorities are on average less 
cited and less authoritative (lower PageRank score) than unanimous awards, but the difference in 
means is not statistically significant. 
 
581  M. Pellonpää, supra note 395, at 238. 
582  S.A. Baker and M.D. Davis, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Practice: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation 1992), at 165. Charles Brower and Charles Rosenberg reach the same conclusion with respect to investment 
arbitration: see C.N. Brower and C.B. Rosenberg, “The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van Den Berg 
Presumption That Party-Appointed Arbitrators Are Untrustworthy Is Wrongheaded” (2013) 29 Arbitration international 7, at 33-34. 
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Figure 5: Number of citations per ratio of unanimity583 
Annulled and unadopted authorities 
Does an authority stop to be an authority when it is annulled, or otherwise nullified?  
Once again, annulment would be immaterial if persuasiveness were key, as it leaves 
unaffected an authority’s reasoning, especially if the annulment proceeds from a basis unrelated to 
that reasoning. At most, annulment shows that a reasoning might not be persuasive to everyone. 
And yet, there are many examples of parties assigning some weight to the fact that a given authority 
has been set aside. 
One telling example occurred in the Petrolane et al. v. Iran case before the IUSCT. In 
proceedings aimed at correcting the award in that case, Iran was protesting that the chamber should 
not have cited the Phillips Petroleum award,584 which had been rendered moot by the parties’ 
subsequent settlement agreement in that case. (Iran also protested that only an English version of 
the award existed, as the settlement intervened before a Persian translation was ready.) The 
chamber dismissed the requested correction, pointing out that: 
 
583  The 2nd-order regression line is fitted to the data points and indicate that the number of citations seems to vary with the unanimity ratio 
of the decisions being cited. 
584  Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran et al., Award No. 425-39-2 (29 June 1989) reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 79. 
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While the parties in their subsequent settlement agreed that they would deem that 
Award null and void upon the issuance of an Award on Agreed Terms giving effect to 
their Settlement Agreement, that cannot alter the fact that Award was rendered in 
English and stated the conclusions and reasoning of the Tribunal. As such, the 
subsequent citation of that Award cannot be considered erroneous.585 
On closer inspection, this reasoning is a non sequitur – or, at the very least, the Chamber 
awkwardly left most of its reasoning implicit. Presumably, what was meant here is a variation of 
the persuasiveness theory: the “conclusions and reasoning of the Tribunal” have been aired out, “in 
English”, and thus should live or die on their own merits.  
Parties are nonetheless usually aware that annulled authorities face an uphill struggle. In 
FYRM v. Greece, for instance, the Hellenic Republic took time to explain why the authority it was 
relying on – the Klöckner v. Cameroon (I) award – was valid, albeit annulled, pointing out that it 
had been annulled for reasons unrelated to the point that Greece was seeking to rely on.586 
This caution is warranted, as the jurisprudence indicates that courts and tribunals are ready 
to discount the authoritativeness of annulled authorities. 587  Discussing a statement from the 
Metalclad v. Mexico588 award on the interpretation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard, 
the tribunal in Accession Mezzanine v. Hungary for instance observed that: 
176. There is little force in this statement [from the Metalclad tribunal] as persuasive 
authority because it amounts to a conclusion that what is a breach of the fair and 
equitable standard must also be an expropriation. The Tribunal cannot accept this to 
be a correct statement of the law. There is no further analysis in the award as to 
whether the particular requirements of an expropriation have been satisfied […].  
177. The Tribunal also notes that the Metalclad tribunal’s decision on the Article 1105 
claim, and its decision that its findings in respect of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard also resulted in an expropriation under Article 1110 (as quoted above), were 
 
585  Petrolane et al. v. Iran, Decision No. Dec. 101-131-2 (November 25, 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 264., at §4. Brower and 
Brueschke, supra note 483, at 251, note that the “award in Phillips Petroleum not only remains persuasive but is fully precedential”, and 
observe that it was later cited in the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility.  
586  Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), Greece’s Counter-
Memorial (19 January 2010), at §8.24. 
587  See, e.g., in the ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela ICSID award, the claimants’ reliance on the Mobil v. Venezuela award was qualified in a 
footnote, seemingly by the tribunal: “On this point, the Claimants refer to paras. 224 and 225 of the [Mobil] Award […]. These 
paragraphs, among others, have been annulled by the Decision on Annulment, dated 9 March 2017, para. 196(3) […].” See 
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Award of the tribunal (8 March 2019), at note 13. 
588  See Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000), at §§176-177. 
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annulled upon a subsequent challenge to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The 
basis for that annulment was, in the estimation of the Tribunal, controversial, 
however, it is a factor that must at least be acknowledged in an assessment of the 
Metalclad award.589 
Likewise, in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, the tribunal chided the claimant’s counsel for 
citing two awards without mentioning that they had been annulled; the tribunal opined that this 
was a “limitation on the pertinence of those awards”.590 (What this limitation amounted to, however, 
was not specified.) 
The data on this point is murky, however, and it is difficult to draw clear conclusions given 
the limited population of “annulled” decisions (the main international courts and tribunals are final 
courts without appeal).  
However, investment awards that have been annulled591 seem to be as authoritative in later 
jurisprudence (in terms of their average PageRank score and citation counts) as awards that never 
saw a request for annulment. Awards that have been only partly (as opposed to fully) annulled score 
much better on both metrics, but the difference with non-annulled awards remain statistically non-
significant.592 On the other hand, when compared only to the average of awards that withstood 
annulment (as opposed to all awards), partly annulled awards differ in a statistically significant 
way.593 This is hard to reconcile (partly annulled awards are seemingly more authoritative than 
those who withstood annulment entirely), yet likely due to the limited population of partly annulled 
awards.594 
The picture is markedly clearer for the WTO. The authoritativeness of unadopted panel 
reports (of which there were ten) is lower than that of adopted panel reports. Although in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II,595 the Appellate Body acknowledged that “a panel could nevertheless find 
useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it considered to be relevant”, in 
 
589  Accession Mezzanine Capital L.P. and Danubius Kereskedöház Vagyonkezelö Zrt. V. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/3, Award 
(17 April 2015), at §176-177. 
590  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award (16 September 2003), at §24.7. 
591  6 fully and 10 partly. 
592  The p-value is 0.3. 
593  The p-value is below 0.01. The difference between awards that saw a request for annulment and those that did not, in turn, is not statically 
significant, but nearly there (p-value of 0.2) 
594  The authoritativeness of these awards is thus likely due to other intrinsic characteristics, such as their older age on average, or the fact that 
most of them have been widely publicised. They indeed include such blockbuster cases as Amco Asia v. Indonesia, the first 
Vivendi v. Argentina award, CMS v. Argentina, Tidewater v. Venezuela, Occidental v. Ecuador, etc.  
595  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (1 November 1996), 
at 14. 
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fact unadopted panel reports are significantly less cited (15 citations in average as opposed to around 
130), and have a lower mean PageRank score. 
E) Language, availability, externality and age 
The previous sections reviewed features inherent in authorities that, in some way, still relate 
to their merits and the quality of their holdings. Yet, authoritativeness can also be influenced by 
considerations further removed from the merits. As argued below, features such as the language, 
age or availability of an authority can have a crucial impact on its authoritativeness and use in 
future decisions. 
Language 
English has become the lingua franca of international law,596 which gives authorities in that 
language an advantage when it comes to their influence on the ground. English was not always 
dominant, though, for it only displaced French as the dominant language of international law over 
the course of the 20th century597 (though arguably French still vies with English for influence in some 
fora).598 As a result, some older French decisions remain authoritative and part of the corpus of well-
known international law decisions. But this remains an exception. 
Consider for instance the decision on jurisdiction in Consortium RFCC v. Morocco.599 This 
case proceeded before the exact same tribunal as the case in Salini v. Morocco600; the findings in 
both cases are similar, and identical on the topic of what constitutes an investment under the ICSID 
Convention. The tribunal even released its decision in the Consortium RFCC case a few weeks 
earlier than in the Salini case. Yet, the “Salini test” is now a staple of investment arbitration, while 
there is no “Consortium RFCC test”. It is likely that the difference originates in the fact that, by 
2003, the Salini decision had already been translated and disseminated (in the International Legal 
Materials and then in the ICSID Reports),601 while the Consortium RFCC decision never was. 
 
596  Roberts, supra note 458, at 4. 
597  The IUSCT offers a good illustration of how French was gradually effaced by English: see G.H. Aldrich, “The Selection of Arbitrator”, 
in Caron and Crook, supra note 395, at 68. 
598  See Roberts, supra note 458, at 10. 
599  Consortium RFCC v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Decision on jurisdiction (16 July 2001). 
600  Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(31 July 2001). 
601  It is also likely relevant that the decision was translated by Emmanuel Gaillard, a well-known and central protagonist in the development 
of investment arbitration. 
130 
 
Likewise, writings and teaching of publicists are now mostly expected to be in English or 
published in English-speaking journals.602 Holding out against this growing norm has an impact on 
the reach of some scholars’ views: the insistence of Russian scholars not to speak English at the UN 
reportedly lessened the reach of their ideas, notably compared to their German and Japanese 
peers.603 
This is to be expected. On a sociological level, international lawyers are now accustomed to 
the English language,604 and non-English sources cannot be accessed and/or read by everyone. In a 
context where availability matters (see below), this should discount their authoritativeness. Citing 
something in the original language will prevent the source being checked as easily as if it were cited 
in a common language; suspicions arise that these citations are misleading. What cannot be expected 
to be understood by all readers in the expected audience should, all things being equal, be expected 
to be cited fewer times. 
The Dataset confirms that authorities that were not originally written in English are more 
frequently discounted. In the investment arbitration sphere, decisions that are cited at least once 
but that were not originally written in English are cited nearly three times less, and have a sharply 
lower PageRank score, than English-only decisions. There is, in this respect, little difference on this 
measure between French and Spanish-decisions, which are equally shunned compared to English-
only decisions. 
Availability 
The concern for language is related to the idea that authorities should be available for 
inspection in order to be authoritative.605 
Thus, if investment arbitration awards rely more on past precedents than commercial 
arbitration awards, this might be because “investment treaty awards are regularly published (online 
and in print journals) and intensively discussed not only by parties to future investment treaty 
arbitrations, but also analysed in IIL scholarship.”606 No wonder then that arbitral centres are now 
 
602  Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 21. 
603  L. Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (Oxford University Press 2015), at 92. 
604  As Anthea Roberts put it: “One’s access to the ‘international’ often depends on whether one can understand, speak, and read [English], 
which vests tremendous advantage in native English speakers, together with their concepts and approaches.” Roberts, supra note 458, at 4; 
see also at 168, about why US and UK case law is much more cited in foreign textbooks. 
605  Jansen, supra note 473, at 110. 
606  Schill, supra note 550, at 1104. See also Sacerdoti, supra note 398, with respect to commercial arbitration: “the absence of comprehensive 
information on awards being rendered that renders recourse to precedent problematic.” 
131 
 
trying to publish awards and decisions, as they expect that these authorities will “furnish focal 
points around which arbitrators will coordinate, and help to socialize new entrants.”607  
The authoritative value of confidential authorities is likewise reduced. A lack of publicity 
entails a possible surprise on the part of all parties to the proceedings in which the until-then-
unknown authority is cited, especially when the decision’s holdings are not representative of the 
expected consensus.608 Authorities that have not been previously available have not been checked, 
verified and discussed by third parties, as opposed to authorities that were, and adjudicators – in 
particular – are likely not familiar with them.609 It is thus not a coincidence if certain supposedly 
confidential international arbitral awards are sometimes suspiciously disclosed or leaked, to be later 
used as authorities by future tribunals. And indeed, timing and availability of relevant authorities 
are likely to be an important factor in the outcomes of international disputes.610 
Availability is thus important because it is often felt that a decision’s reasoning should be 
available to be tested. (The same concerns have driven the increasing efforts to make sure that 
international adjudicators reason their decisions, as explained in the next Chapter.) The importance 
of availability indicates the limited role of the persuasiveness of a reasoning in determining 
authoritativeness: if only that reasoning mattered, then it would make no difference that an 
authority is only available to the parties and the tribunal.611 
Tellingly, in the course of discussing the IUSCT’s (majority) decision to publish awards, 
Howard Holtzmann opined that publication “contribute[d] to the effective function of the tribunal,” 
notably because it allowed them to be cited “by the parties and in awards.”612 While the Iranian 
arbitrators originally objected to this decision, this did not prevent them to later challenge the 
majority for their reliance on unpublished awards in making a case.613 
 
607  Stone Sweet and Grisel, supra note 515, at 120. 
 On the idea of international law as a “focal point” to settle disputes, see, e.g., P.K. Huth, S.E. Croco and B.J. Appel, “Bringing Law to the 
Table: Legal Claims, Focal Points, and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes Since 1945” (2013) 57 American Journal of Political 
Science 1, at 90. See also Sivakumaran, supra note 420, at 29, describing teachings, such as the Tallinn manual, that “have emerged as the 
focal point around which discussions of the issue revolve.” 
608  Wälde, supra note 554, at 121. 
609  See, e.g., Brierly, as quoted by Shahabuddeen, supra note 407, at 42. 
 See also Iran’s challenge to the IUSCT citing the Philipps Petroleum award, as recounted above, at p. 127. Iran’s criticisms stemmed in 
part from the fact that the award had not been published in Persian. 
610  C. Rogers, “The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators” (2013) 12 Santa Clara Journal International Law 223, at 256. 
611  Berman, supra note 428, at 14. There are examples of for a where it seems permissible to rely on unpublished authorities, but they are 
usually proceedings in which a limited number of stakeholders are involved and can rely on decisions available between themselves. Sports 
arbitration is such an example.  
612  H. Holtzmann, “Drafting the Tribunal Rules”, in Caron and Crook, supra note 395, at 83-84. 
613  See supra, note 64 and the accompanying text. 
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Beyond their discounted authoritativeness, un-available authorities can even fail to enter the 
record. In Participationes v. Gabon, for instance, the state challenged the claimant-appointed 
arbitrator by pointing to his participation in a previous case, Transgabonais v. Gabon, whose award 
was (and still is) unpublished. 614  ICSID’s Secretary General refused however to rely on the 
Transgabonais award, notably because Gabon did not produce it in the proceedings, but also because 
it has not been published at that point in time.615 
As mentioned in Chapter II, unpublished authorities amount for an infinitesimal portion of 
the Dataset.616  It is rare for a case to hinge upon one such authority – more often than not, 
unpublished authorities will be cited in circumstances where other authorities would equally suffice 
to make an argument. For instance, several investment tribunals in disputes against Spain have 
taken to cite the 2014 preliminary award in PV Investors v. Spain617 years before that decision was 
ultimately published in 2020, likely because this was the first decision to rule on Spain’s 
jurisdictional objections. Countless tribunals have reached the same conclusions since then. As a 
result, the unavailability of the PV Investors decision is not as problematic as it could be. 
Externality 
Authorities also benefit from being sufficiently external and remote from the case at hand. 
This is notably related to questions of impartiality and neutrality. Such an authority has no stake 
in the issue of the case at hand, something that will reinforce its authoritativeness (rather than its 
substantial persuasiveness), and strengthen arguments that rely on it.  
(In this respect, the concern for externality notably relates to the concerns surrounding the 
practice of double-hatting, notably in investment arbitration. As the author of an authority can 
expect that it will later be relied upon, she can to some extent craft the authority’s content to 
maximise this reliance. While most authors can rarely predict the circumstances in which such 
 
614  Compagnie d’Exploitation du Chemin de Fer Transgabonais v. Gabonese Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/5, Award (7 Mars 2008). 
615  Participaciones Inversiones Portuarias SARL v. Gabonese Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/17, Decision on the Proposal to 
Disqualify an Arbitrator (12 November 2009). 
616  There are some examples in investment arbitration, where authorities are introduced by repeat players, either parties, law firms or 
arbitrators. For instance, in Convial Callao S.A. and CCI – Compañía de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/2, Decision on Provisional Measures (22 February 2011), a case chaired by Brigitte Stern, the tribunal cited an 
unpublished decision on provisional measures from the Barmek v. Azerbaijan – a case in which Mrs. Stern also officiated. Likewise, in 
ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, supra note 587, the ICSID tribunal cited the unpublished award in France Telecom v. Venezuela, in which 
ConcoPhillips’s counsel at Freshfields had participated. 
617  The PV Investors v. the Kingdom of Spain, PCA Case No. 2012-14, Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction (13 October 2014). 
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reliance will arise, this is not the case in case where the author is a repeat player that participates 
in different cases and in different roles.618) 
This distinguishes authorities from, e.g., legal opinions submitted in some cases, whose status 
as teachings is debatable.619 In the Dataset, these opinions are however sometimes cited in other, 
unrelated cases to which they are external.620 
Age 
Finally, authorities necessarily precede any kind of reliance on them. They are avatars of the 
past; reliance on authorities amounts to linking that past to the present,621 with the hope that the 
former will hopefully constrain (to an extent) the latter.622 There is no such thing as a “future” 
authority; court and tribunals, on the contrary, sometimes suspend proceedings to wait and rule 
only after a relevant authority has spoken. 
Does it mean that older authorities are more authoritative? On the one hand, any system 
relying on authority might fall for the attraction of age. The Middle Age scholar and poet Walter 
Map observed with amusement that people would think of him as an authority after his passing, 
reflecting that people always prefer “old copper to new gold”.623 James Crawford saw Grotius’s 
practice of citing the Bible as “giving international law the respectable patina of the ages.”624 Some 
investment tribunals are fond of citing old precedents from the beginning of the 20th century, even 
on matters (the “fundamental basis” of a claim for instance625) that are often addressed and further 
developed in more recent authorities. 
In the Dataset, older authorities are indeed typically more cited and have a higher PageRank 
on average than newer authorities. This is unsurprising, as older authorities have been around for 
 
618  The concerns about double-hatting cast doubt on the authority of the view, dictum or pronouncement that is impugned, not on its 
persuasiveness. See, generally, Langford, Behn and Lie, supra note 493, at 322. 
619  See notably Berman, supra note 428, at 14.  
620  See Olin Holdings Ltd v. Libya, ICC Case No. 20355/MCP, Award on Jurisdiction (28 June 2016), at note 146, which saw Libya 
relying on “quotes of Profs. Schreuer and Reinisch […] taken from their legal expert opinion in the CME v. Czech Republic case.” These 
authorities can however be challenged as too case-specific – as the claimant did in that case. 
621  See R. Kozel, Settled versus Right – A Theory of Precedent (Cambridge University Press 2017), at 8. 
622  See this argument for literary studies in L. Scanlon, “Auctoritas and potestas: a model of analysis for medieval culture”, in Narrative, 
Authority and Power: The Medieval Exemplum and the Chaucerian Tradition (Cambridge University Press 1994), at 37-54. See also 
Schauer, supra note 413, at 36: “Law characteristically faces backward.” 
623  W. Map, De Nugis Curialium (date unknown): “[…] quia tunc ut nunc vestutum cuprum preferetur auro novello.” 
624  J. Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2013), at 31.  
See also Cicero, “Orator 34.120”, in Loeb Classical Library, Cicero, V (Harvard University Press 1962), at 394-395, for whom citations 
to the past increase the “authority and credibility” of the present argument: “Commemoratio autem antiquitatis exemplorumque prolatio 
summa cum delectatione et auctoritatem orationi affert, et fidem.” 
625  For which the Woodruff Case, Award (1903-1905), IX RIAA 213, for instance, is often cited in investment awards. 
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longer – and have had more opportunities to be cited. Yet this finding confirms that, in common with 
citation analyses conducted in other fora, authorities in international law are likely affected by the 
notion of “preferential attachment” – the idea that precedents that are already cited will get 
increasingly cited (i.e., a “rich-get-richer” phenomenon).626  
Scholars have convincingly demonstrated that preferential attachment can explain a 
substantial part of the citations to certain precedents at the European Court of Human Rights.627 
Niccolò Ridi also found that the authoritativeness of older authorities do not necessarily depreciate, 
as the average age of cited authorities has steadily, if sometimes weakly, increased over the past 
two decades for all fora in the Dataset.628 As suggested by Sondre Helmersen, “[t]ime can thus work 
as a filtering mechanism for quality.”629  
On the other hand, to the extent younger authorities better reflect the state of the law today, 
they should be more authoritative in any given case. The increasing “judicialization” 630  of 
international law in recent decades should also be expected to strengthen some of the features of 
authoritativeness identified above: better decisionmakers operating within authoritative settings; 
greater emphasis on the process informed by the accrued experience of international dispute 
settlement; a greater opportunity to look for consensus and consistency between decisions.631 To the 
extent newer international decisions display these characteristics, we would expect them to be cited 
more. 
There are signs that more recent authorities attract more citations in some contexts. 
Factoring out the effect of preferential attachment can be performed by calculating the “hypothetical 
citations” of each authority, by dividing the number of citations to a precedent in a forum by the 
number of future decisions of the same forum in the Dataset.632 On this measure, at any given time 
younger precedents from the ICJ, the ITLOS and the IUSCT tended to be cited more, although the 
 
626  Ridi, supra note 402, at 205. The underlying mechanisms for this rich-get-richer phenomenon are not altogether clear, although Posner 
may offer the beginning of answer in the lower costs associated with citing well-known authorities: see RA. Posner, “An economic analysis 
of the use of citations in the law” (2000) 2 American Law and Economics Review 381–406, at 389. 
627  See Leitão, Lehmann and Olsen, supra note 384. 
628  Ridi, supra note 402, at 208-211. 
629  Helmersen, supra note 463, at 32. 
630  See, e.g., A. Føllesdal and G. Ulfstein (eds.), The Judicialization of International Law (Oxford University Press 2018). 
631  Of course, the same phenomenon might have had the opposite effect, and notably with respect to consistency: these are the concerns 
regarding fragmentation, studied further below at Chapter VII. 
632  For instance, the ICJ’s judgment in Corfu Channel has been cited 289 times, but this is not surprising given that there are 2,223 documents 
(judgments, opinions and pleadings) that postdate it and had had a chance to cite this authority. By contrast, the judgment in Maritime 
Dispute (Peru v. Chile) was cited only once in the 147 documents that followed it chronologically. The first judgment thus had a higher 
“potential citation” score (of 289 / 2223 = 0.13) than the latter one (1 / 147 = 0.007). 
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correlations range from very weak (R² of 0.2 at the ICJ; 0.3 for the ITLOS) to weak (R² of 0.44 for 
IUSCT awards). There was no correlation for WTO decisions nor investment awards. 
3. Conclusions 
What, then, makes an authority authoritative? This chapter found that factors other than 
the persuasiveness of the authority’s content and reasoning account for authoritativeness. While 
persuasiveness plays an important role, the empirical record indicates that several further 
considerations share the stage.  
The empirical analysis in this Chapter confirms that the type of an authority, as a precedent 
or a teaching, likely has an impact on its authoritativeness, as does the identity of its author. 
Analyses also indicated that the amount of “work” or of process put into creating that authority may 
also have a role in its authoritativeness for future decision-makers. 
Other intuitive considerations do not count as much as expected: the unanimity of judgments 
at the ICJ, for instance, is seemingly unrelated to the number of citations these judgments receive. 
It is unclear whether obiter dicta are any less authoritative than rationes decidendi – perhaps 
because the boundary between these two categories is unclear in practice. Other factors such as the 
age of an authority or its language, by contrast, seem to have an outsized importance for the 
authoritativeness of precedents and teachings. 
This Chapter does not – and indeed cannot – constitute the final word on the question, as the 
interplay of multiple factors underlying authoritativeness can be studied along multiple dimensions. 
The findings above describe only averages: a counsel might successfully argue a point in a given case 
by noting that she relies on a unanimous judgment. Hopefully, this Chapter will prompt further 
research into the empirical determinants of the authoritativeness of authorities. 
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Chapter IV – Citing authorities in decisions 
 
The preceding Chapter demonstrated that authorities are not cited purely for their 
persuasiveness; citations to authorities are plentiful and display recognizable patterns, across times 
and fora. Some authorities are cited more than others, depending on several features (the identity 
of its author; its age; its availability; the extent to which it reflects a consensus; etc.) that are 
unrelated to the substantive persuasiveness of that authority. On average, some of these features 
seem to correlate with authoritativeness. 
This chapter and the following review in more depth the citation practices of international 
courts and tribunals. As mentioned in Chapter I, citing has a cost – and therefore, it is assumed, a 
benefit. The strategic use of authorities might however differ depending on how they are cited by 
adjudicators in decisions (this Chapter), in individual opinions (Chapter V), or by parties in their 
pleadings (Chapter VI). 
In the background to this question, the Dataset indicates that citations are ubiquitous in 
international dispute settlement. Nearly 4/5 of the decisions collected in the Dataset (including 
orders and interlocutory decisions) contain at least one citation, a ratio that has been stable, if not 
increasing over time (see Figure 6 below). This is congruent with the observations made in the 
literature that citations – notably to precedents – play a central role in the jurisprudence of every 
forum present in the Dataset.633 
This chapter first reviews why judges and arbitrators choose to cite (Section 1); it sheds light 
on the various motives, from the requirement of giving reason to the need to follow (or acknowledge) 
precedents, that prompt adjudicators to cite authorities. Section 2 then reviews the features of 
these authorities when they are cited in majority judgments and awards, and notably the topics 
 
633  See J. Paulsson, “The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration”, in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration under International 
Investment Agreements. A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010), at §4; G. Sacerdoti, “Precedent in The Settlement of 
International Economic Disputes: The WTO And Investment Arbitration Models”, in Arthur W. Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in 
International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers (Brill 2011) 225, at 230. 
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most likely to prompt a citation. A third section attempts to measure the role of these authorities 
in the final decision. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Percent of documents with citations in Dataset, 2-year moving average634 
1. Citing as a practice 
Chapter I surveyed the role of citations in legal argumentation. As explained at that juncture, 
citing has a cost, be it the mere fact of finding and checking the citation (effort cost), as well as the 
intellectual vulnerability associated with it (reputation cost). 635  This section now focuses more 
precisely on the reasons likely to explain the practice of citing in decisions – as opposed to other 
types of international legal material such as pleadings or individual opinions. 
 
634  The peak at the juncture between the 1960s and the 1970s represents a busy period at the ICJ. 
635  N. Ridi, “The Shape and Structure of the ‘Usable Past’: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International Adjudication” 
(2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200, at 202. 
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A) Judgment writing 
Reason-giving 
As a preliminary matter, it would be unnecessary to cite anything if international decisions 
did not take the form of a reasoned piece of writing and merely recorded the outcome of a dispute. 
Why do international courts and tribunals even write and reason their decisions? 
The answer lies in the growing sentiment – if not now a duty – that international adjudicators 
should give reasons to support their decisions. A “typically modern idea”,636 reason-giving has taken 
root in domestic legal settings in the course of the 20th century – even in jurisdictions where giving 
reasons has not previously been part of the legal tradition, such as in France.637 International courts 
and tribunals have followed course, and scholars opine that giving reasons is now required of any 
kind of international adjudication.638 
This phenomenon can be observed in the ever-expanding length of international judgments 
and awards. (Although this expansion can, of course, also be partly explained by other causes such 
a possible growing complexity of international disputes.) Figure 7 below illustrates a slight upward 
trend for most of the fora studied in the Dataset, as the average number of words in decisions 
(counting only the sections that contain a court’s reasoning) has increased in most years for all courts 
and tribunals – albeit to varying extents. If anything, adjudicators are now perhaps tempted to 
“overwrite” and overstate their case in some circumstances639 – especially when their reasoning can 
be challenged by a higher body.640 
 
636  M. Cohen, “When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach” (2015) 72 Washington & Lee Law 
Review 483, at 468. 
637  Domestic courts are part of this trend: even the French civil law system, with its emphasis put on the legal syllogism and a paucity of 
express reasoning, has for years tinkered with the reasoning of its judgments, and the French Cour de cassation is increasingly adopting 
citation of precedents under the purpose of clarifying the motivation of judgments. See, e.g., an example of this new approach in 
Cass. Mixte, 24 February 2017, n° 15-20.411. 
638  See an overview in J. Hepburn, “The Duty to Give Reasons for Administrative Decisions in International Law” (2012) 61 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 641. 
639  H. Gao, “Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes” (2018) 17 World Trade Review 509, at 516.  
640  Ibid., at 529.  
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Figure 7: Average number of words (reasoning only) per decision per year641 
Reason-giving, however, does not per se require citing authorities. As seen in Chapter III, if 
authorities mattered only to the extent they are persuasive, reason-giving would militate against 
citing, and in favour or restating an argument in full (since the citation adds nothing to its 
underlying persuasiveness). The tribunal in Romak v. Uzbekistan,642 for instance, argued as much, 
holding that it was not “bound to follow or to cite previous arbitral decisions as authority for its 
reasoning or conclusions.” (It is telling however that this tribunal cited more than its share of 
authorities.643) 
Yet, the emphasis on reason-giving proceeds notably from the assumption that written 
judgments are there to persuade.644 And as noted above (in Chapter III), this emphasis on persuasion 
is a fruitful ground for using, citing and discussing authorities, even if this does not mean that 
authorities are cited because themselves are persuasive, independently of the reasoning they contain 
and embody.645  
 
641  The peak around 2009 and 2011 for the WTO is notably due to the gargantuan panel and AB reports in the Civil Aircraft cases. 
642  Romak S. A. v. Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA 280, Award (26 November 2009), at §171. 
643  At around 85 citations, this award even cited more than twice as many authorities as the average investment award in the Dataset 
(35 citations on average). 
644  For the argument in the US context, see, e.g., E. Volokh, “Chief Justice Robots” (2019) 68 Duke Law Journal 1135, at 1148 et seq. 
645  As noted above in Chapter III, there is an important different between the persuasiveness-enhancing power of authorities and their own 
inherent persuasiveness. 
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In this respect, past cases and doctrine ease the task of giving reasons; they can be used as 
shortcuts,646 or merely as building blocks in reasoning.647 In short, “[i]t looks as if judicial dicta are 
simply too useful to be neglected”,648 evidencing that citations are an important tool in international 
courts and tribunal’s sense of their judicial economy, and a material to use strategically in their 
efforts to persuade.649 
The audience 
Reason-giving, however, might not be only or even mainly directed at persuading: others have 
countered that judgments and awards are primarily aimed at placating an audience and rooting out 
sources of contestation.650 While the two views are not mutually exclusive, this begs the question of 
the nature of international courts and tribunals’ audience. 
That audience likely drives an adjudicator’s choice of type of reasoning and arguments: all 
audiences will not be persuaded by the same arguments, or grant the same weight to all authorities. 
The sociological viewpoint of the adjudicator,651 and, in turn, his or her expected audience,652 will 
inform the authoritativeness of the authorities cited.653 In other words “[t]he boundaries of what is 
 
646  See M. Jacob, “Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005, at 1013: “precedents 
can save time and work.” See also J. Odermatt, “The International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
Between Fragmentation and Universality of International Law”, forthcoming in William A. Schabas and Shannonbrooke Murphy (eds.), 
Research Handbook on the International Court of Justice (Edward Elgar 2019): “the CJEU often uses the ICJ jurisprudence as a short 
cut route to discover international law rules, but rarely engages with the reasoning of the ICJ judgments.” 
 For a recent and clear example of such a practice, see the decision in Rockhopper Italia S.p.A., Rockhopper Mediterranean Ltd, and 
Rockhopper Exploration Plc v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14, Decision on the Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection 
(26 June 2019), in which the tribunal contended itself with citing and quoting from a previous decision by the same chair, in CEF Energia 
BV v. Italian Republic, SCC Case No. 158/2015, Award (16 January 2019).  
647  See Jacob, supra note 646, at 1013. 
648  C.J. Tams, “The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (ed.) 
Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law? (International and European Papers Publishing 2018), at 67. 
649  See L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Plurality in the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a Managerial Approach: A 
Rejoinder – Fears and Anxieties” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1275, at 43; Lupu, Y. and E. Voeten, “Precedent in 
international courts: A network analysis of case citations by the European court of human rights” (2012) 42 British Journal of Political 
Science, at 417. 
650  I. Venzke, “Judicial Authority and Styles of Reasoning: Self-Presentation between Legalism and Deliberation”, in Johanna Jemelniak, 
Laura Nielsen and Henrik Palmer Olsen (eds.), Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2016), at 241. 
651  S. Schill, “Sources of International Investment Law: Multilateralization, Arbitral Precedent, Comparativism, Soft Law”, in Jean 
d’Aspremont and Sebastien Besson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2017), 
at 1114. 
652  See also B. Legum, “The Definitions of ‘Precedent’ in International Arbitration”, in Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi (eds.), 
Precedent in International Arbitration (Juris Publishing 2008), at 8, defining precedent as “any decisional authority that is likely to justify 
the award to the principal audience for that award.” (my emphasis) 
653  F. Zarbiyev, “Saying Credibly What the Law Is: On Marks of Authority in International Law” (2018) 9 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 291, at 309. 
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permissible in legal argument and which styles of legal reasoning in fact support judicial authority 
or detract from it is contingent on the predilection of relevant audiences.”654 
What is then the audience of international judges and arbitrators? The answer655 likely 
differs for the five fora studied in this thesis. It is also probable that international adjudicators have 
several audiences in mind when writing down their reasoning, and every decision can accept several 
levels of reading depending on these expected audiences. 
A look at the jurisprudence however yields few explicit answers to this question. Arbitral 
tribunals have been typically clearer on this point than standing courts, at least to profess that they 
see their audience as relatively more limited. The ad hoc committee in Amco Asia v. Indonesia for 
instance opined that: 
An arbitral award addresses itself first and foremost to the parties before a tribunal. 
The parties thus are the readers to which the statements by an arbitral tribunal are 
presented in the first place. In the ICSID system, by refusing their consent to the 
publication of the award (cf. Art. 48, para. 5) the parties may even prevent the 
emergence of other readers. The parties moreover, may be expected to understand 
the award in its context. Uncontradicted pleadings and uncontested references to 
cases and authorities will enable them to fill what outside readers might deem to 
constitute lacunae in the reasoning of the award.656 
By contrast, rulings from the WTO’s Appellate Body are meant to reach a larger audience, 
given the “systemic interest” of every WTO member in the AB’s findings.657 Yet, even the AB’s 
audience remains limited to the parties to the relevant treaties. By contrast, the ICJ reportedly 
considers that its audience extends to the entire assembly of states rather than the sole parties to 
the treaties at stake.658 Accordingly, it should give special care to its pronouncements.659 
The parties (actual or potential) to international disputes are not the only possible audience 
of international courts and tribunals, however. Adjudicators indeed often write their decisions with 
 
654  Venzke, supra note 650, at 256. 
655  C.P. Romano, “Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue” (2008) 41 NYU Journal of International law 
and Politics 755, at 763. 
656  Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision of the ad hoc Committee 
(16 May 1986), at §40. The committee’s relaxed latitude towards “lacunae” might not convince more recent committees. 
657  See G. Sacerdoti, “A Comment on Henry Gao, ‘Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes’” (2018) 17 World Trade Review 535, 
at 537. 
658  G. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (Oxford University Press 2014), at 124. 
659  See R. Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013), at 1011. 
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other judges and arbitrators in mind.660 This is especially true of international law, a field where 
frequently the “commentators, the readership, and the object of study – all of it is one and the 
same.”661 
These different conceptions of these fora’s audience might explain, among other things, the 
sharp differences in the average age of authorities they cite. ICJ judgments (but also its judges in 
their opinions) mostly cite cases and scholarship that are at least 20 years old on average. This 
reflects the Court’s self-imposed practice to cite mostly from its own jurisprudence, yet does not 
explain the emphasis on older doctrinal teachings as well. It is telling that the ITLOS, another 
international and multilateral court, likewise cites relatively older authorities. Strategically, it 
would make sense for courts, interested in some kind of universality – general international law for 
the ICJ, the Law of the Sea for the ITLOS – to bind their decisions to authorities that have withstood 
the trials of time. 
Meanwhile, investment tribunals and the WTO panels and AB cite much more recent 
authorities on average than the ICJ and ITLOS, a testimony to the fact that most precedents in this 
field emerged only over the last two decades, but also to the fact that the law in these two fields is 
much more fragmented among diverse states and their varying policies.  
These discrepancies suggest a tentative typology of international courts and tribunals: (i) a 
first type, with a broader audience, will be more cautious to cite older, less-contested, and better-
known authorities over newer ones; these adjudicators will be careful to inscribe their reasoning in 
a long line of cogent authorities. By contrast, (ii) a second type of adjudicators will be concerned 
primarily with the parties before them and with resolving their dispute; this second type will have 
less trouble citing more recent authorities and accommodate a fast-changing jurisprudence. 
 
Teachings Precedents 
ICJ 24.61 17.78 
INV 14.06 6.69 
ITLOS 20.75 18.79 
 
660  In the US context, this quote from Justice Kagan illustrates it well: leaving the Solicitor General Office to become a Supreme Court Justice, 
she said, was akin to shifting “from persuading nine [Justices] to persuading eight.” See P. Brown, “Associate Justice Elena Kagan Visits 
NYU Law” (5 Avril 2016) NYU Law Commentator, available at https://nyulawcommentator.org/2016/04/05/associate-justice-
elena-kagan-visits-nyu-law. 
661  See T. Schultz and N. Ridi, “Arbitration Literature”, in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International 
Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2019). Although they refer to investment arbitration, the point remains valid for public international 
law more generally. 
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IUSCT 14.30 4.11 
WTO 17.95 6.62 
Table 8: Average age of authorities cited in decisions  
Reading key: teachings cited at the ICJ are 24.61 years old on average, and precedents 
17.78 years old on average. 
Investment arbitration tribunals would exemplify this second type of adjudicative bodies. 
And yet, it is possible that the mutations of international law in the past two decades have resulted 
in all courts and tribunals broadening their expected audience and converging in terms of citing 
strategies, even those that profess to focus on parties and resolving disputes at hand. According to 
Ingo Venzke: 
[…] international courts and tribunals have rendered more than 90 per cent of their 
decisions since 1990. That change in quantity has gone hand in hand with a shift in 
quality, turning international courts and tribunals from sporadic dispute settlers into 
multifunctional actors who contribute to the making of international law.662 
This opinion finds echoes in Karen Alter’s recommendation that “international judges must 
consider how their decisions will be understood not only by today’s litigants, but also by potential 
future litigants and other legal actors who may be affected by their rulings.”663 In this new context 
where judicial pronouncements acquire such a potent force, courts and tribunals will likely adapt 
their reason-giving strategy, and thus their citation practice. In practical terms, this means that 
they will likely shift to a citation practice closer to the first type of international courts and tribunals. 
The data bears this out, as the average of precedents has been growing for all fora in the 
Dataset, albeit at various rates, as seen in Figure 8 below. (This is accords with independent 
analyses of a similar dataset of citations. 664 ) Interestingly, however, this concerns mostly 
precedents: the average age of teachings, by contrast, had sometimes decreased, notably in the 
pleadings of the parties. This might however only reflect the growth of international law scholarship, 
 
662  See I. Venzke, “Semantic Authority”, in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: Contributions to 
Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018), at 825. 
663  See K. Alter, L. Helfer and M. Madsen, “How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts” (2016) 79 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 1, at 4.  
664  See N. Ridi, “The Shape and Structure of the ‘Usable Past’: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International Adjudication” 
(2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200, at 210. 
144 
 
which offers parties a broader, newer, and more diverse range of materials to cite and rely upon in 
disputes.665 
 
Figure 8: Average age of cited authorities, per year 
Law as a shared language 
Whatever they might be, the expectations of the audience of international bodies will be 
defined in terms of language. Law, the legal field, is indeed a phenomenon that is indissociable from 
the language used to express it: “there is in law no other way to argue and justify than through 
words.”666  
The choice of words and set of terms to use in giving reasons therefore acquires a particular 
salience, for, in order to be persuasive, adjudicators need to match or hew closely to the expectations 
of their audience. In Niklas Luhmann’s theory of communication, “[a] legal system may receive 
information from external sources, and it will process that information in a way that enables the 
 
665  The list of new publications collated by International Law Reporter evidence that international law scholarship has been growing in the 
past 10 years; see A. Roberts and D. Charlotin, “Data Analysis of International Law Reporter”, draft on file with the authors. 
666  M. Jacob, “Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005, at 1025. 
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creation of legal meaning.”667  This is exactly what courts and tribunals will do in resolving a 
case: settling on a language that answers the parties’ contentions, in a manner informed by these 
contentions and by the broader experience and knowledge of the adjudicators on the bench.  
In other terms, “law is a matter of words; and it may be said that the choice of words to convey 
a legal point is in itself the decision of, or a decision on, that point.”668 Not all words will do; some 
will be more potent than other. To settle on a persuasive reasoning, adjudicators will therefore 
primarily “draw on the common stock of arguments and values shared by the judiciary.” 669 
Accordingly, the use of words and language in creating a new legal ruling is often more of a repetition 
than a creation.670 For there is no point starting from scratch in every decision, adjudicators will 
tend to trust a language from the past as long as that language is uncontested and readily 
recognizable by the parties to the dispute.671  
Hence the importance of authorities in this context, as ready receptacles of past language 
and law, cited and acknowledged by the adjudicator that relies upon this language.672. Empirical 
studies have shown that authorities are often not only cited but quoted, with the quoted text serving 
as “prefabricated, tested formulations [and] argumentative building blocks”.673 This is also why the 
most popular authorities tend to get cited more by the sheer virtue of their popularity: the most 
familiar an audience is with an authority (to the extent it is not widely contested), the more weight 
for its use in a later decision.674 
Of course, sometimes international judges and arbitrators take a step further and reframe 
an uncontested concept in a more felicitous or clearer way, or adapt it to new circumstances.675 In 
 
667  As recounted in Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 649, at 37. 
668  See H. Thirlway, “The Drafting of ICJ Decisions: Some Personal Recollections and Observations” (2006) 5 Chinese journal of 
International Law 15. 
669  G. Lamond, “Persuasive Authority in the Law” (2010) 17 The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19, at 33. 
670  It is thus not surprising that psychological studies indicate that repetition enhance persuasiveness. See the works cited in N. Ridi, “‘Mirages 
of an Intellectual Dreamland’? Ratio, Obiter, and the Textualization of International Precedent” (2019) 10 Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement 361, at 391. 
671  See Merck Sharpe & Dohme (I.A.) Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-10, Award (25 January 2018), 
at §701: “the Tribunal was at pains to leave to the Respondent, Ecuador, a free choice of the measures to be used to achieve the objective 
laid down, using for this purpose a form of words coined by the International Court of Justice in the LaGrand case and subsequently 
employed on various occasions by the International Court itself and by other tribunals.” 
672  But see, for instance, courts inspired by the Civil Law system, as in French and Belgium, where jurisprudence evolves by repetition of 
similar languages without explicit citations to past cases using that language. M. Van Der Haegen, “The Influence of Belgium’s Court of 
Cassation on the Lower Judiciary: Building a Legal Citation Network” (2016) 13 Utrecht Law Review 65, has for instance treated such 
repeated language as implicit citations in the Belgian jurisprudence. 
673  See Ridi, supra note 670, at 388. 
674  This emphasis on the past might however run the risk of turning citations to authorities in some sort of ritualistic incantations, a question 
further studied below. 
675  Remember from Chapter I this observation by Fitzmaurice, according to whom a precedent might sometimes be cited “not in virtue of 
its inherent authority but because of the felicitous way in which it gives expression to a common thought.” See supra, at p. 37. 
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some instances, they will even coin a new concept out of a legal datum.676 Courts and tribunals also 
have an eye towards the future, and are (or should be677) mindful of how their pronouncements might 
be received by later judges and parties.678 As further studied in Chapter VIII below, international 
adjudicators thereby participate in some form of law-making. They “make law through precedents 
because they are able to establish their statements about the law as authoritative reference points 
for later legal discourse.”679 In other words, a discourse based on citations itself becomes a cited 
reference in a discourse that might later get cited – and so goes the lifecycle of international law and 
adjudication. 
We should expect the citation practice of courts and tribunals to reflect the two considerations 
indicated above: the need to reach and speak to different audiences (beyond the opposing parties to 
a dispute), and to do so on the basis of a commonly shared language.  
B) A duty to cite? 
Before this, however, another aspect of the question should be investigated. Authorities, 
indeed, are not merely cited as a by-process of writing judgments and awards; they are also often 
cited for considerations external to this process, under a sense that they should be cited.680 Yet, 
expecting citing to be a duty entails dangers, as both under-citing and over-citing engender their 
own challenges. 
Following Precedent? 
Citing precedents typically involve interrogations regarding their binding character.681 
 
676  See the transparent attempt at coining the concept of an “Azinian Principle”, in Fouad Alghanim & Sons Co. for General 
Trading & Contracting, W.L.L. and Fouad Mohammed Thunyan Alghanim v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/13/38, Award of the Tribunal (14 December 2017), at §293. Just like “fetch” in the renowned movie Mean Girls, 
however, the “Azinian Principle” is unlikely to ever be a thing. 
677  See above, note 663. 
678  See A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Courts and Tribunals”, in Cesare Romano, 
Karen Alter and Yuval Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2013), at 508. 
679  Ibid., at 511. 
680  On this point, see also the M. Koskenniemi, Report of the ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682), which 
described the systemic implications of legal reasoning in international law, and mentions a “political obligation on law-appliers to make 
their decisions cohere with the preferences and expectations of the community whose law they administer”. Such political obligation, in 
turn, may require citations to the relevant authorities.  
681  Although this is not discussed below, there is of course nothing necessary in this conflation: precedents could be followed without being 
acknowledged and cited, and citations could be (and sometimes indeed are) only made to indicate the adjudicator’s awareness of them. 
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The extensive literature on the subject offers at least three conclusions. First, most agree on 
the lack of a stare decisis rule in international law, at least in a strict sense.682 Second precedents 
matter to international litigation to a large extent, as should be obvious to every observer of 
international courts and tribunals. Notably, international litigants rely extensively on precedents,683 
and have even been observed initiating “test” cases to establish authoritative interpretations or 
precedents.684 The fact that citations to precedents have been booming in international decisions is 
by now well-documented.685 
Third, and crucially, the reasons generally adduced for citing precedent can vary, ranging 
from consistency 686  (and the associated benefit of predictability 687 ) to due process, 688  to the 
opportunity to “shed light” on the issues at hand.689 In other contexts, scholars have convincingly 
demonstrated that the number of citations to precedents correlates well with other doctrinal 
accounts of the importance of stare decisis.690 
Given this, there are roughly speaking two positions regarding the relevance of precedents 
in international law. On the one hand, in line with the consensus that precedents are not binding, 
they might be plainly irrelevant qua precedents and matter only insofar as their persuasiveness will 
take them. This idea that was reviewed – and found wanting – in Chapter III above. 
On the other hand, two kinds of “realist” positions are available: (i) precedents might be cited 
only as post-hoc justification for an already-arrived-at decision;691 or (ii) precedents could inform (to 
some extent) the decisions of international courts and tribunals, as adjudicators will want to remain 
within the bounds of past decisions. These alternative realism arguments are not incompatible. It is 
plausible that precedents both inform a range of judicial possibilities (the argument of 
 
682  M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge University Press 2008), at 99. 
683  J. Pauwelyn, “Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation before the WTO Appellate Body”, in Johanna Jemelniak, Laura Nielsen and 
Henrik Palmer Olsen (eds.), Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law (Cambridge University Press 2016), at 148-
149. 
684  M. Daku, K.J. Pelc, “Who Holds Influence over WTO Jurisprudence” (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 233. 
685  N. Ridi, “The Shape and Structure of the ‘Usable Past’: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International Adjudication” 
(2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200, at 208. 
686  On this point, see Pauwelyn, supra note 683, at 146. See also von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 678, at 508: “courts will place their 
decisions within a stream of precedents not least because the appearance of consistency will increase their authority and legitimacy.” 
As noted above, the tribunal in Romak notably disagreed with the idea that tribunals had a duty of consistency in international investment 
law: see Romak v. Uzbekistan, supra note 642, at §171. 
687  See ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 
Award of the Tribunal (2 October 2006), at §293. 
688  See next section. 
689  See Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. The Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Award (5 June 2012), 
at §§234-235. 
690  J.H. Fowler and S. Jeon, “The authority of Supreme Court precedent” (2008) 30 Social networks 16. 
691  See, e.g., Legum, supra note 652, at 8. 
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Chapter VIII below, albeit for all authorities), and are used as strategic arguments to build up a 
reasoning in support of one solution within this range. 
This uncertainty as to the role of precedents in international law results in a rather tortured 
status quo that conveys contradictory signals to international litigants and adjudicators. The pattern 
(as has been noted692) is always the same: “precedents are not binding, yet we will consider them 
anyway to some extent”. 693  There is an undeniable (and somewhat ironic) aesthetic to it: in 
Cargill v. Poland, for instance, the tribunal opined that “it is not bound by previous decisions”, and 
then cited a former case in support of that statement.694 
In truth parties often know that precedent matters and act on that assumption. Evidence 
from the IUSCT, for instance, shows that parties and arbitrators knew the precedential importance 
of the Tribunal’s holdings,695 as Iran often use settlement to nip in the bud possible adverse, and 
precedent-setting, awards. 696  While some voices downplay the role of precedents, Armin von 
Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke echo the feeling of numerous observers: 
The weight that the Appellate Body and other international courts and tribunals 
attach to their previous decisions almost makes a mockery out of the international 
law mantra that earlier judicial decisions have no legal effects beyond the parties to 
the dispute.697 
 As seen above in Chapter III, the Dataset illustrates well this importance of precedents in 
judgments and awards. Especially when compared with what parties or individual judges cite or 
discuss, decisions of courts and tribunals tend to rely mostly, if not exclusively, on precedents – and, 
as will be seen further below in Chapter VII, mostly on precedents made by themselves or their 
predecessors on a given international bench.  
In this context, the fact that the most important precedents remain popular during the 
lifetime of the different fora is remarkable. In investment arbitration, for instance, the awards in 
 
692  Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 649, at 43-44. 
693  See the same observation by Stephan Schill with respect to investment arbitration: “Even though arbitral tribunals do not become tired of 
emphasizing that arbitral precedent is not binding, they nevertheless attach importance to it up to a point where a jurisprudence constante 
becomes more authoritative as an argument than reference to a formal source of international law.” See Schill, supra note 651, at 1104. 
694  See Cargill, Incorporated v. Republic of Poland, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/2, Final Award (29 February 2008), at §224, citing 
AES v. Argentina, supra note 552, at §§30-32. 
695  Phillips Petroleum v. Iran, Award No. 425-39-2 (29 June 1989), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 294, Statement by Judge Khalilian: “in 
light of the blatant defects therein, which I shall list herein-below […] it will not be possible to rely upon this Award as precedent.” 
696  See P.D. Trooboff, “Settlements”, in David D. Caron and John R. Crook (eds.) The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the Process of 
International Claims Resolution (Transnational Publishers 2000), at 297. 
697  See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 678, at 509. 
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Mondev and Tecmed quickly became the most cited precedents and have remained so up to this 
day: when looking at the most popular precedent each quarter of a year, one of these two awards top 
the ranking of most-cited precedents 75% of the time. Likewise on a quarterly basis, the precedents 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf and Military Activities in Nicaragua have been the most cited 
authority in nearly half quarters in the ICJ’s history. Importantly, both are cited on a large number 
of distinct topics. 
These results indicate that once a precedent becomes authoritative and important, 
arguments of the participants in international disputes soon start to revolve around them and these 
authorities are cited on a distinctly higher number of unique topics than the average authority. 
Due process 
Citing might also be a question of due process: given the parties’ extensive reliance on 
authorities (as further studied in Chapter VI below), courts and tribunals often feel bound to answer 
their contentions in this respect. These considerations take a particular salience in international 
law, where sovereigns expect (and often pay for) thorough decisions answering their legal 
positions.698 (The flip side of this due process argument is the idea that a court or tribunal should 
not cite something unexpected without seeking the arguments of the parties in this respect – a point 
further discussed below.) 
For Jan Paulsson, the duty to answer the parties’ contentions primarily explains citations. 
In other words:  
to the extent that any party’s case place central reliance on a proposition derived from 
previously decided cases, arbitrators are required to give consideration to them and 
to express their assessment of the persuasiveness of that reliance.699 
These considerations however sit oddly with the fact that international courts and tribunals 
(in line, it seems, with some domestic courts700) mostly ignore the authorities cited by the parties. 
As indicated in Table 9 below, most fora (except the WTO) only cite between a quarter to a half of 
the authorities found in the parties’ submissions, a proportion that rises slightly when counting 
 
698  See H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Cambridge University Press 1934), at 34. 
699  Paulsson, supra note 633, at §4.10. 
700  C. M. Oldfather, J. P. Bockhorst, and B. P. Dimmer, “Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial 
Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal Scholarship” (2012) 64 Florida Law Review 1189, at 1238. 
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citations to precedents only (which, ex hypothesi, are likely harder to ignore than citations to 
teachings701). 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
All Authorities (in brackets: 
only precedents) 
9.0 
(12.7) 
42.8 
(47.1) 
10.4 
(15.5) 
35.5 
(35.9) 
61.3 
(65.0) 
Authorities cited by both 
parties 
19.1 
(25.1) 
60.1 
(61.8) 
37.5 
(40.2) 
100.0 
(100.0) 
79.5 
(80.6) 
Authorities cited by Claimant 9.8 
(13.7) 
45.1 
(47.8) 
12.8 
(20.4) 
35.9 
(35.9) 
66.9 
(69.5) 
Authorities cited by 
Respondent 
10.0 
(15.1) 
43.8 
(47.8) 
11.5 
(16.3) 
39.3 
(39.9) 
68.5 
(70.9) 
Table 9: Ratio of authorities cited in pleadings found in decisions 
Reading key: only 9% of the authorities cited in pleadings (12.7% when counting only 
precedents) are cited in the resulting decision at the ICJ. 
This relatively low rate of reply to the authorities cited by the parties is not overly surprising. 
Indeed, the practice of international courts and tribunals is informed by judicial economy: there is 
no point, for instance, in discussing authorities that are not in debate between the parties, or that 
are only cited in passing. In cases where the parties have adopted a “kitchen-sink” approach to 
authorities, adjudicators should be expected to focus only on the most important ones.702 
The Data backs up this intuition, as the most cited authorities in the arguments of the parties 
have a higher probability of being cited in the resulting decision. In other words, all things otherwise 
equal, courts and tribunals will cite in priority those authorities that were cited multiple times in 
the parties’ arguments, as opposed to authorities that made but a fleeting appearance. 
As seen above, the audience of international courts and tribunals go beyond the parties to a 
case; in these circumstances, a court that speaks to a broader audience might want to strategically 
orient its message around fewer authorities, and presumably these authorities that are the most 
well-known across its audience (as opposed, notably, to authorities that might be more specific to a 
 
701  See N. Duxbury, Jurists and Judges: An Essay on Influence (Hart Publishing 2001), at 13. 
702  On the other hands, the ratios in Table 9 are rising over time (the ICJ, e.g., cites a larger portion of the authorities found in pleadings 
now that it used to 50 years ago), consistent with a model in which decisions are more likely to discuss in extenso the arguments of the 
parties. 
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given case, but well-known only for the parties). The distinction identified above between courts 
mindful of their external audience and those likely more attuned to their role in settling a dispute 
can be seen in Table 9 as well. 
Two related observations are interesting in this respect. First, all courts and tribunals seem 
mindful to cite a greater proportion of the authorities that are cited by both parties. Second, and as 
can be seen in Figure 9 below, the most-cited authorities in the parties’ pleadings are more likely to 
figure in the ultimate decision of the adjudicators. The left-hand side of the graphs below represents 
the authority that is the Nth most cited authority in sets of pleadings; the graphs records (in the red 
curve) how often this Nth most-cited authority is then cited in the adjudicator’s consequent 
decision.703 
All curves display the same relationship with the authorities cited in the parties’ 
pleadings: the most cited authorities in pleadings are more likely to be cited in the decision. Yet, in 
all cases, even the 1st most-cited authority is not assured of finding its way into the decision, and for 
both the ICJ and Investment tribunals, the curves start to cross early on, with the 2nd or 3rd most-
cited authorities. WTO panels, meanwhile, are seemingly more mindful of citing back the main cases 
relied upon by the parties more often than not.
 
703  Only decisions where at least one citation by the parties is known are recorded here. Given that the Dataset only accounts for a limited 
amount of the parties’ pleadings (even at the ICJ, oral pleadings are not counted, for instance), these calculations should not be held as 
definitive – yet, the trend is likely to be accurate. 
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Figure 9: Most cited authorities in pleadings, as found in decisions  
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This is a par with the findings below that a large part of the citations in decisions are not 
cited at all in the submissions of the parties. Together, both observations indicate that due process 
might explain part of the authorities cited in decisions, but by no means all. 
C) The danger in citing 
Citations are rarely uncontroversial. In particular, parties are frequently suspicious than the 
reliance on authorities is only a fig-leaf concealing the adjudicator’s ruling in accordance with his or 
her subjective views. The opinion of some adjudicators, such as the ad hoc committee in 
Impregilo v. Argentina, that a “tribunal is entitled to and often quotes from other decisions in 
deriving or in support of its own reasoning and quoting from rulings of other arbitral tribunals 
certainly constitutes a valid form of reasoning”704, has frequently been tested. 
At the individual case level, decisions have sometimes been challenged by disappointed 
parties on account of the citations they contain. For instance, in Quiborax v. Bolivia, an ad hoc 
committee was facing a plea by Colombia that the tribunal had preferred to rely on precedents rather 
than on the “clear text of the [BIT]”.705 This challenge was unsuccessful, but it is hardly unique.706 
The United States recently even asked a panel, in the context of an interim review, to delete a 
reference to the idea of a “well-established principle in WTO case law”, arguing that it could be 
“misunderstood as indicating that prior panel and appellate reports have precedential value”.707 
The argument also rages, however, at the systemic level, where a system’s reliance on 
authorities is often a ready argument to challenge it. The United States’ request just mentioned 
takes part in general criticism of the use of precedents by WTO panels and the Appellate Body.708 
The current movement to reform the investor-state dispute settlement framework, meanwhile, has 
seen a number of criticisms directed at the practice of tribunals citing authorities relevant for 
different investment treaties. 
 
704  Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for 
Annulment (24 January 2014), at §156. 
705  Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, 
Decision on Annulment (18 May 2018), at §43. 
706  See, e.g., the quote by arbitrator Noori, in Chapter I supra, note 64. 
707  See China – Tariff Rate Quotes for Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS517/R, Report of the Panel (18 March 2019), at §6.20. 
708  See, e.g., S. Lester, “The Origins of the ‘Cogent Reasons’ Approach to the Precedential Value of Appellate Body Reports” (24 June 2019) 
International Economic Law and Policy Blog, available at https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/06/the-origins-of-the-cogent-reasons-
approach-to-the-precedential-value-of-appellate-body-reports.html. 
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Why refrain from citing? 
All this adds to the cost of citing anything in a decision, and adjudicators will settle on a 
balance between what could and what should be cited in any given decision. Sometimes it is better 
not to cite. 
A fair amount of these “non-citations” is not deliberate. The quality of the debate between 
the parties, for instance, will have an impact on what will be cited, as will the lack of diligence of the 
adjudicators (and their assistants). In this respect, it bears stating the obvious point that every 
adjudicator is different,709 and their understanding of what is a relevant authority to cite, or even a 
relevant argument to make, will differ. At the ICJ, for instance, Judge Bustamante and Jessup sat 
on the same term (from 1961 to 1970) and heard the same cases. Judge Jessup, however, averaged 
3.6 citations per 1,000 words, while his Peruvian colleague’s opinions included only 0.17 citations 
per 1,000 words.710 
As for positive, deliberate reasons not to cite authorities, two are particularly relevant. 
First, judges and arbitrators are reluctant to cite authorities they disagree with. Indeed, as 
mentioned above in Chapter II, citations are most commonly included in a reasoning to support a 
part thereof. “Citing to say ‘they got it wrong’ is generally avoided, even severely frowned upon.”711 
In the Dataset, rare are the citations that unambiguously seek to overturn or contradict an 
authority,712 and even rarer when it comes to teachings of publicists (as teachings that a decision-
maker disagrees with would just be ignored). This is consistent with the role of precedents as 
argumentative burden,713  whereas teachings, unless they are particularly authoritative, rarely 
qualify as such a burden.  
Second, judges and tribunals routinely refuse to cite an authority from outside the scope of 
what they consider proper authorities – oftentimes, in priority, their own jurisprudence. The prime 
example in this respect is the ICJ, which for a long time was reluctant to cite any non-ICJ 
 
709  See N. Stappert, “A New Influence of Legal Scholars? The Use of Academic Writings at International Criminal Courts and Tribunals” 
[2018] Leiden Journal of International Law 1, at 975. 
710  This is only counting the opinions they wrote entirely on their own. Judge Jessup wrote nearly 200,000 words during his term on the 
Bench, while Judge Bustamante wrote only around 79,000 words. Dame Rosalyn Higgins, who also wrote a similar amount, holds the 
record at close to 5.4 citations per 1,000 words. The extent to which these discrepancies depend on a Civil Law / Common Law divide 
is further studied below, in Chapter V. 
711  See D. Terris, C. Romano and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s 
Cases (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 120-121. 
712  This is congruent with other analyses: see Stappert, supra note 709, at 969. 
713  Jacob, supra note 666, at 1015. 
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jurisprudence: “even though there are other international courts in existence today, the ICJ is 
regarded, and presumably regards itself, as the supreme public international law tribunal, as such 
would not wish to be seen to rely too heavily on the jurisprudence of other bodies.”714 (The primus 
inter pares status of the ICJ is further analysed below in Chapter VII; the conscious decision taken 
by courts and tribunals to cite certain categories of authorities and not others is the topic of Chapter 
VIII.) 
The peril of under-citing 
Not citing however leaves adjudicators vulnerable to at least two kinds of criticisms.  
First, it offers a ready argument for future decisionmakers to contest the legal finding of a 
past ruling. Among the several reasons why the Siag & Vecchi v. Egypt tribunal was suspicious of 
the “continuous nationality” theory endorsed by the Loewen tribunal, for instance, was that “the 
Loewen Tribunal did not cite a single authority in support of any of its propositions with regard to 
continuous nationality.”715 Before the IUSCT, it was frequent for some dissenting arbitrators to 
complain that the majority did not cite anything in support of its holdings716 – despite complaining 
at other times of the majority’s practice of citing “wrong” precedents to justify its conclusions. 
Relatedly, a lack of citations invites the suspicion that a ruling is (impermissibly) steeped not 
in law but in equity. This found a fine illustration in the decision of the first annulment committee 
in Klöckner v. Cameroon, who noted that the tribunal had failed to cite anything in support of a legal 
principle that proved key to the case’s resolution. 
71. Does the ‘basic principle’ referred to by the Award (p. 105) as one of ‘French civil 
law’ come from positive law, i.e., from the law’s body of rules? It is impossible to 
answer this question by reading the Award, which contains no reference whatsoever 
to legislative texts, to judgments, or to scholarly opinions. In this respect the contrast 
is striking between Section 2 (on the ‘duty of full disclosure’) and Section 3 (on the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus, […]). Section 3 contains a great number of 
references to scholarly opinion (doctrine) as well as, directly or indirectly, to case law 
 
714  M. Mendelson, “The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law”, in Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
(eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press 1996) 83. 
715  Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(1 June 2009), at §498.  
716  Petrolane et al. v. Iran et al., Award No. 518-131-2 (14 August 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 64, Dissenting and Concurring 
Opinion of Seyed Khalil Khalilian (18 March 1992), at §19: “The Award fails to cite any judicial precedents in support of the majority’s 
position.”; see also Reza Nemazee and Luz Belen Nemazee v. Iran, Award No. 487-4-3 (10 July 1990), reprinted in 25 Iran-
U.S.C.T.R. 153, Separate Opinion of Judge Parviz Ansari, at §2. 
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(jurisprudence). One could therefore assume that in the case of Section 2, regarding 
the duty of frankness, the arbitrators either began a similar search for authorities 
but found it unproductive or, more likely, thought that a search for positive law was 
unnecessary. 
[…] 
75. In any event, in the absence of any information, evidence or citation in the Award, 
it would seem difficult to accept, and impossible to presume, that there is a general 
duty, under French civil law, or for that matter other systems of civil law, for a 
contracting party to make a ‘full disclosure’ to its partner. 
[…] 
77. Now, the Award’s reasoning and the legal grounds on this topic (to the extent that 
they are not in any case mistaken because of the inadequate description of the duty 
of ‘full disclosure’) seem very much like a simple reference to equity, to ‘universal’ 
principles of justice and loyalty, such as amiable compositeurs might invoke. 
This is not a sure method to annul an ICSID award, however. In another ICSID dispute, 
Venezuela likewise tried to annul an award on the basis that the tribunal failed to cite anything, 
only to be rebutted by the ad hoc committee for whom “[t]he fact that the Tribunal’s reasoning does 
not contain references to cases or scholarly comments does not mean that that its reasoning is absent 
or contradictory.”717  
In other words, a lack of citation in itself is not a failure to reason or decide in accordance 
with the law. Yet given that this remains a common argument for disappointed parties, it does 
engender suspicions and should prompt courts and tribunals not to overlook this part of their reason-
giving duties. 
D) Iura novit curia 
Evidently, decisions, judgments and awards do not spring from a vacuum. They have been 
informed by a set of considerations, of whom the parties’ arguments are the most important.718 What 
 
717  See OI European Group B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/25, Decision on Application for Annulment 
(6 December 2018), at §349. 
 See also, along the same lines, TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Decision on 
Annulment (5 April 2016), at §§312-313. 
718  See T. Streinz, “Winners and Losers of the Plurality of International Courts and Tribunals: Afterword to Laurence Boisson de Chazournes’ 
Foreword” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1251, at 1255, mentioning the role clerks and amici curiae as well. 
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is being cited by a court or a tribunal is then inspired, in no small measure, by what has been pleaded 
before it.719 Since judges and arbitrators expect parties to marshal authorities and evidence for their 
benefit, it is unsurprising that there is shared language between the two.720 
Yet how does the iura novit curia principle, the idea that the Court, ultimately, knows the 
law and can apply it notwithstanding the parties’ pleadings and submissions, fit in this framework?  
There is a certain tension between the iura novit curia principle and some elements of due 
process:721 no party would enjoy the “surprise” of learning that an adjudicator ruled relying on an 
authority they did not have the chance to discuss.722 It has therefore been suggested that reliance 
on the iura novit curia principle should prompt decision-makers to seek the parties’ input.723 This is 
notably the solution adopted in the recent Prague Rules,724 which allow tribunals to rely on legal 
authorities from outside the parties’ corpus, provided they retain a chance to comment.725 In practice, 
most courts and tribunals can be expected to remain within the debate set by the parties,726 as is 
evidenced by the fact that this kind of departure is sometimes acknowledged.727 Even the ICJ is said 
not to go beyond the arguments of the parties, in most circumstances at least.728 
Arbitral tribunals are often held to be more constrained by the parties in this respect, with 
authors citing their ad hoc character;729 their lack of institutional memory;730 and the fact that they 
 
719  Ibid. 
720  A. Feldman, “All Copying Is Not Created Equal: Examining Supreme Court Opinions’ Borrowed Language” (2016) 17 Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process 21, at 60. 
721  In some ways, this is related to the tension between managing the coherence of international law and resolving the dispute at hand, studied 
below at Chapter VII. 
722  This should also be related to the idea that process matters in all this. As noted, compliance with international decisions is ensured by 
creating an atmosphere in which parties “[are] engaged in a cooperative venture, in which performance that seems for some reasons 
unsatisfactory represents a problem to be solved by mutual consultation and analysis, rather than an offence to be punished.” See A. Chayes 
and A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press1995), 
at 26. 
723  See A. Bjorklund, Remarks on the panel “The Role of International Tribunals in Managing Coherence and Diversity in International 
Law” (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 180. 
724  Rules on the Efficient Conduct of Proceedings in International Arbitration (Prague Rules), 2018, available at 
http://praguerules.com/upload/medialibrary/9dc/9dc31ba7799e26473d92961d926948c9.pdf. 
725  See Ibid., ‘Article 7 – Iura Novit Curia’, at §2. 
726  GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award (31 March 2011), at §90. 
727  Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award 
(20 August 2007), at note 402. See also South American Silver Limited v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award 
(30 August 2018), Dissenting Opinion of Osvaldo Cesar Guglielmino: some ICJ opinions supported Mr. Guglielmino’s argument, 
“[h]owever, since the Parties have not introduced such legal authorities on the record, I refrain from referring to them”. 
728  C. J. Tams, supra note 648, at 93, note 146. 
729  Sacerdoti, supra note 633. 
730  Distinctions in institutional settings can have an impact on this: see S. Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law (Oceana 1984), 
at 119, regarding the ICJ: “frequently it is the Registrar’s responsibility to prepare full biographies relevant to the case.” 
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must rely much more on the arguments of the parties.731 Notwithstanding, arbitral tribunals keep 
some freedom732 to pick authorities within the “legal framework”733 of the parties’ submissions. The 
opinion of the ad hoc committee in Daimler v. Argentina is representative in this context: 
This Committee is of the view that an arbitral tribunal is not limited to referring to 
or relying upon only the authorities cited by the parties. It can, sua sponte, rely on 
other publicly available authorities, even if they have not been cited by the parties, 
provided that the issue has been raised before the tribunal and the parties were 
provided an opportunity to address it. […]. Once such an opportunity was provided 
the Tribunal was not obliged to confine itself to only those authorities, which had 
been cited by the parties. No rule of law or procedure or requirement of due process 
prevented it from referring to or relying upon other authorities that were in the public 
domain. Such reliance did not violate any rule of natural justice including the right 
to be heard.734 
Indeed, in most cases, even for arbitral tribunals, the authorities cited by the parties account 
for only between a fourth and a half of the authorities later cited in the decision.735 While part of the 
discrepancy is certainly due to the gaps in data collection,736 the magnitude of the phenomenon is 
unmistakable, especially at the ICJ and ITLOS (for whom the pleadings record is typically more 
exhaustive). These proportions hold even when counting only citations to precedents. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
All Authorities 43 40.6 19.4 13.6 36 
Only Precedents 44.4 44.5 19.7 14.2 38.5 
Table 10: Ratio of citations in decisions found in pleadings 
 
731  Sir F. Berman, “Authority in International Law” (2018) KFG Working Paper Series, no. 22, at 9: “The maxim jura novit curia does not 
mean that an international court has discretionary freedom to base its decision on whatever legal analysis it chooses, whether or not that 
has been debated before it between the parties. That constraint can be seen to operate particularly strongly in arbitration, and an arbitral 
award could indeed find itself being formally challenged if the tribunal were to do so. But it applies before standing courts as well.”  
732  M. Scherer, “Drafting the Award”, in Bernhard Berger and Michael Schneider (eds.), Inside the Black Box: how Arbitral Tribunals Operate 
and Reach their Decisions (Juris 2014), at 28-29. 
733  See Caratube International Oil Company LLP v. The Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Decision on the Annulment 
Application of Caratube International Oil Company LLP (21 February 2014), at §§297-299. In rejecting the investor’s challenge to an 
award with respect to an obiter dictum (which, Caratube contended, it had not been heard on), the committee opined that “the obiter 
dictum falls squarely within the legal framework established by Claimant in order to prove standing and jurisdiction.” 
734  Daimler Financial Services A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Decision on Annulment (7 January 2015), at §295. 
The tribunal’s stressing that authorities should be “publicly available” echoes Chapter III, subsection E above. 
735  This is only counting authorities from the fora studied in the Dataset, as well as teachings; parties in pleadings also sometimes cite 
authorities from other fora, which rarely figure in the ultimate decision and would have therefore only decreased these ratios. 
736  Not all pleadings are available for all cases, and it is often harder to automatically detect citations in pleadings submissions. 
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Reading key: only 43% of the authorities in the ICJ’s decisions were also cited by at least 
one party. In other words, 57% of the authorities cited by the Court in its decisions were, 
seemingly, not provided by one of the parties in their written submissions.737 
 What Table 10 tells us, then, is that iura novit curia is an empirical reality in international 
dispute settlement. This does not mean, however, that courts and tribunals decide cases exclusively 
based on authorities not found in the parties’ pleadings. Rather, a large part of the discrepancy is 
likely due to adjudicators citing more authorities than necessary, often on matters that are not 
particularly contentious, but in order, perhaps, to strengthen the coherence of their own 
jurisprudence by overciting it.738 And indeed, the average PageRank of authorities that are cited 
only in judgments is distinctively lower than the average PageRank of authorities cited also in 
pleadings, indicating that the authorities unique to decisions are, on average, likely less important 
than the one discussed by the parties. 
2. Features of authorities as cited in judgments 
What can we say of the authorities that are cited in decisions, and how do they differ from 
those that populate the parties’ pleadings and the judges and arbitrators’ individual opinions? 
A) Teachings in judgments 
As mentioned in Chapter III, decisions are much less likely to cite teachings than precedents. 
What are, therefore, the distinctive features of the teachings that are cited in these decisions, and 
how do they generally differ from teachings relied on by the parties or cited in individual opinions? 
First, the most-cited teachings in decisions tend also to be among the most-cited in individual 
opinions and in pleadings. Table 11 below retraces the clear overlap between the Top 15 teachings 
cited in the investment arbitration decisions and WTO reports (as measured by the number of 
unique documents citing to a writing, and not the absolute number of citations). Shaded in green 
 
737  This table differs from Table 9 above in that Table 9 references the number of authorities in pleadings that will later be found cited in 
the decisions based on those pleadings; by contrast Table 10: Ratio of citations in decisions found in pleadings refers to the proportion 
of authorities in decisions that can also be found in the parties’ submission.  
For instance, the submissions by the parties might, together, cite 100 different authorities, only 12 of which will be found in the resulting 
legal decision; this would be captured by Table 9. However, these 12 authorities might nonetheless constitute 40% of the 30 authorities 
cited by the tribunal, as captured in Table 10: Ratio of citations in decisions found in pleadings. 
738  This concords, for instance, with Pauwelyn’s observation that the WTO’s citation network is remarkably dense, with the Appellate Body 
in particular citing a broad range of its own precedents in any given decision: see Pauwelyn, supra note 683, at 144. 
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are those works that are most frequently cited in decisions and in opinions or pleadings. These works 
clearly account for a majority of all cited works.739 
Decisions Separate Opinions Dissenting Opinions Pleadings Pleadings (in 
decisions) 
Schreuer et al., The 
ICSID Convention 
Newcombe & Paradell, 
Law and Practice 
Schreuer et al., The ICSID 
Convention 
Schreuer et al., The 
ICSID Convention 
Schreuer et al., The 
ICSID Convention 
Crawford, ILC Articles 
on Responsibility 
Schreuer, FET in 
Arbitral Practice 
Douglas, The Int’l Law of 
Inv. Claims 
Brownlie, Principles 
Schreuer & Dolzer, 
Principles 
Cheng, General 
Principles of Law 
Schreuer et al., The 
ICSID Convention 
Schreuer & Dolzer, 
Principles 
Cheng, General 
Principles of Law 
Crawford, ILC Articles 
on Responsibility 
Brownlie, Principles 
McLachlan, Shore & 
Weiniger, Principles 
McLachlan, Shore & 
Weiniger, Principles 
Muchlinski, Ortino & 
Schreuer, Oxford 
Handbook 
Brownlie, Principles 
Schreuer & Dolzer, 
Principles 
Schreuer, FET: 
Interactions 
Broches, The ICSID 
Convention 
Crawford, ILC Articles 
on Responsibility 
Cheng, General 
Principles of Law 
Paulsson, Denial of 
Justice 
Vasciannie, FET in Law 
and Practice 
Douglas, the MFN Clause 
Paulsson, Denial of 
Justice 
Ripinsky & Williams, 
Damages 
Ripinsky & Williams, 
Damages 
Laviec, Protection et 
Promotion des 
Investissements 
UNCTAD, FET 
Ripinsky & Williams, 
Damages 
Newcombe & Paradell, 
Law and Practice 
Douglas, The Int’l Law 
of Inv. Claims  
Carreau, Droit 
International Public 
World Bank, Guidelines 
on the treatment of FI 
Newcombe & Paradell, 
Law and Practice 
Paulsson, Denial of 
Justice 
Dolzer & Stevens, BITs 
Cassese, International 
Law 
Sinclair, the Vienna 
Convention 
Amador, Baxter & 
Sohn, R. of States 
Douglas, The Int’l Law 
of Inv. Claims 
McLachlan, Shore & 
Weiniger, Principles 
Calvo, Le Droit 
International 
Brownlie, Principles Dolzer & Stevens, BITs 
Born, International 
Arbitration 
Marboe, Damages 
Salcedo, El Derecho 
Internacional 
Tudor, FET 
Douglas, The Int’l Law 
of Inv. Claims 
Caplan, the UNCITRAL 
Rules 
Crawford, ILC Articles 
(2nd report) 
Cheng, General 
Principles of Law 
Davis, Business Law in 
Egypt 
Redfern, Hunter, Law 
and Practice of Int’l 
Arbitration 
Vandevelde, BITs 
Newcombe & Paradell, 
Law and Practice 
Paulsson, Denial of 
Justice 
Newcombe & Paradell, 
Law and Practice 
Freeman, Denial of 
Justice 
McLachlan, Shore & 
Weiniger, Principles 
Schreuer, FET in 
Arbitral Practice 
Sornarajah,  
International Law on 
Foreign Inv. 
Crawford, ILC Articles on 
Responsibility 
Vandevelde, US Int’l 
Inv. Agreements 
Mann, British Treaties 
for the Protection of 
Inv. 
Broches, The ICSID 
Convention 
Kohler, Arbitral 
Precedent 
Marboe, Damages 
Bjorklund, Hannaford 
& Kinnear, Inv. 
Disputes under NAFTA 
Broches, The ICSID 
Convention 
 
739  The lack of citations in decisions at the ICJ and ITLOS prevents the analyses to be extended to these fora. As mentioned below in 
Chapter V, however, teachings in individual opinions track relatively well writings cited in pleadings.  
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World Bank, 
Guidelines on the 
treatment of FI 
Caplan, the UNCITRAL 
Rules 
Jennings and Watts, 
Oppenheim’s IL 
Mann, British Treaties 
for the Protection of 
Inv. 
UNCTAD, FET 
Table 11: Most cited teachings per type, INV 
Decisions Pleadings Pleadings (in decisions) 
Brownlie, Principles Brownlie, Principles Brownlie, Principles 
Sinclair, Vienna Convention Sinclair, Vienna Convention Sinclair, Vienna Convention 
Jackson, World Trade and 
the Law of GATT 
Jackson, World Trade and the 
Law of GATT 
Jackson, World Trade and the 
Law of GATT 
Gervais, The TRIPS 
Agreement Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement 
Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement 
Kazazi, Burden of proof and 
related Issues McNair, The Law of Treaties 
Kazazi, Burden of proof and 
related Issues 
Cheng, General Principles of 
Law 
Crawford, ILC Articles on 
Responsibility 
Cheng, General Principles of 
Law 
Jackson, WTO Disputes 
Procedure 
Cheng, General Principles of 
Law 
Jackson, WTO Disputes 
Procedure 
Dinh, Dallier & Pellet, Droit 
International Public 
Jackson, WTO Disputes 
Procedure McNair, The Law of Treaties 
Fitzmaurice, Law and 
Procedure of the ICJ 
Stewart, The GATT Uruguay 
Round 
Stewart, The GATT Uruguay 
Round 
McNair, The Law of Treaties Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure 
Dinh, Dallier & Pellet, Droit 
International Public 
Jackson, Davey & Sykes, 
Legal Problems 
Ricketson, The Berne 
Convention 
Fitzmaurice, Law and 
Procedure of the ICJ 
Stewart, The GATT Uruguay 
Round Jackson, World Trading System 
Jackson, Davey & Sykes, Legal 
Problems 
Lauterpacht, Report on the 
Law of Treaties 
Yasseen, L’interprétation des 
Traités 
Lauterpacht, Report on the 
Law of Treaties 
Table 12: Most cited teachings per type, WTO 
Two additional dimensions of this question deserves scrutiny: the average age of authorities 
cited in judgments, and the topics that prompt the citations to these authorities. 
B) Age 
 Authorities found in decisions are typically younger than those found in pleadings or even 
(in most cases) in individual opinions. As indicated in Table 13 below, precedents cited in ICJ 
judgments, for instance, have an average age of 16.44 years, whereas parties in their memos average 
citations to precedents of 20 years of age. A similar observation holds for all other fora in the Dataset, 
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save for the WTO, where parties would typically cite more recent authorities than the panel 
members.740 
  
Teachings Precedents 
ICJ 
Dissenting 21.7 17.6 
Judgment 51.8741 16.4 
Separate 26.9 18.8 
Pleadings 21.8 20.1 
INV 
Dissenting 14.8 6.5 
Judgment 14.0 6.7 
Separate 14.0 5.1 
Pleadings 17.5 6.7 
ITLOS 
Dissenting 23.0 19.6 
Judgment N/A 14.7 
Separate 19.6 22.1 
Pleadings 19.9 18.4 
IUSCT 
Dissenting 13.1 1.4 
Judgment 16.6 5.4 
Separate 14.9 1.6 
Pleadings 18.5 8.5 
WTO 
Judgment 18.0 6.6 
Pleadings 16.3 5.8 
Table 13: Average age of authorities cited, by type of document  
Reading key: teachings cited in ICJ dissenting opinions are 21.7 years old on average, 
while precedents cited in the same opinions are 17.6 years old on average. 
 Again, a court or a tribunal’s broader audience might drive this lower average age – as courts 
and tribunals would want to remain within the boundaries of what their audience know (i.e., up to 
a certain point, more recent cases are more likely to be known by a broader audience), while parties 
are freer to rely on a broader range of authorities, pushing up their average age. Since courts are 
 
740  This does not differ much between Appellate Bodies and Panels. 
741  Excluding one reference to Grotius, De Jure Praedae, which dates from 1604 and skewed the average given the ICJ’s very few citations to 
teachings. 
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focusing on the issue at hand, they may benefit from using relatively fresher precedents to do so 
(and maybe drill down a recent jurisprudential turn), while parties and individual judges are freer 
to pick authorities from a wider range in addressing a broader set of issues.  
For instance, nearly all citations to works that predate the year 1800 (works by Grotius, 
Vattel, Wolff, etc.742) are found in individual opinions or in pleadings – not in judgments. The WTO’s 
different practice in this respect might be due to the care the Panels and the AB take in developing 
their jurisprudence, especially over frequent allegations of overreach, which might prompt them to 
find security in the authoritativeness of age. On the other hand, as noted above, all courts and 
tribunals in the Dataset have trended towards citing older authorities in the past two decades. 
C) Topics 
Citations in judgments and awards are associated with similar topics as those treated in 
priority by the parties or individual judges; there is a great deal of overlap. More interestingly, 
however, decisions are typically associated with a narrower range of topics than pleadings or 
individual opinions: at the ICJ, for instance, 6 distinct topics garner more than 50% of all citations, 
while this number is 8 for individual opinions, and up to 10 for pleadings.  
Stark discrepancies also appear in the kind of authority different topics will attract. Some 
authors have suggested that procedural topics should be more likely to be attract citations to 
teachings than to precedents.743 There is little data to support this opinion. If the IUSCT did indeed 
cite a fair share of teachings on the topic of its [Inherent Powers], for instance, these citations were 
still dwarfed by the citations to precedents even on this topic.  
Rather, teachings in decisions are typically more cited on topics that are not specific to a forum 
in particular, with questions of [Equity], [Customary Law], [Estoppel] or [Res Judicata] among the 
top topics discussed with citations to teachings – even though, once again, in most cases these topics 
still command even more citations to precedents. 
 
742  The oldest authority found in the Dataset is Glanvill’s Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie, dated around 1188. It was 
cited in Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (Request for 
Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Written Statement of the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(19 August 2010), at §72, in support of the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus. 
743  See M. Peil, “Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International Court of Justice” (2012) 1 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, at 154-155. Yet see also Shahabuddeen, supra note 682, at 135 for the 
proposition that procedural precedents should probably be much more binding over the court, lest procedural injustices ensue 
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There is also a temporal element to the question:744 in common with the phenomenon identified 
above, at Chapter I, whereby the traditional role of teachings in international law has been 
supplanted by a growing jurisprudence, international courts and tribunals will often gradually adopt 
as their own solutions first encountered in teachings. In investment arbitration, for instance, no 
fewer than 16 topics745 were more often discussed with citations to teachings than to precedents in 
the first 10 years of the jurisprudence, but the situation has reversed since then for nearly all of 
these topics. 
D) The special case of “appellate” authorities  
Appeal mechanisms, where they exist, are susceptible to compound the authoritative impact 
of both institutional identity and individual identity. Armed with the power to annul decisions and 
thus, to discern authoritative from unauthoritative sources, their decisions are likely to be an 
important guide to future parties. Besides, like Supreme Courts in domestic systems, appellate 
mechanisms are usually limited in their scope of review, and therefore, in theory, more likely to rule 
on points of stronger precedential value. 746  At the same time, they are usually manned with 
(supposedly) more eminent adjudicators, which should also strengthen their authority. For instance, 
with respect to ICSID annulment committees, Campbell MacLachlan wrote that: 
[i]n formal terms, the decision of an annulment committee has no greater 
precedential effect than an award. Nevertheless, [...] the eminent experience in public 
international law of the Committee, suggest[s] that great weight should be given to 
the Committee’s categorical views on the central issues confronted in these cases.747 
And yet, this expected accrued authority is not systematically retraceable in the Dataset. 
While AB decisions are indeed central to the work (and citations) of subsequent WTO panels, 
decisions by ad hoc committees in the ICSID system do not enjoy the same importance.748  
These annulment decisions are indeed much less cited on average than arbitral 
awards: 368 citations on average for the latter in the ICSID investment jurisprudence, as opposed 
 
744  See Stappert, supra note 709, at 979-980, suggesting that “young fields” are more likely to attract citations to teachings. 
745  These are topics regarding [Exhaustion of remedies], [Good Faith], [Denial of Justice], [Interest], [State Responsibility], [Proof], 
[Declaration], [Estoppel], [Development], [Enforcement], [Remedy], [Interpretation], [Equity], [Res Judicata], [Sovereignty], and 
[Governing Law].  
746  Sacerdoti, supra note 633. 
747  See C. McLachlan, “Investment Treaties and General International Law” (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 390. 
748  Non-ICSID awards, of course, can also be overturned on appeal – but these proceedings take place before domestic courts, and thus did 
not enter the scope of the Dataset. 
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to 27 citations on average for every decision of an ad hoc committee (citations that are, besides, 
mostly coming from other ad hoc committees, and not from tribunals). By contrast, Appellate Body 
reports are overcited compared to panel reports: 206 citations on average against 73 for simple panel 
reports or arbitral awards. 
The same point is readily visible in a network analysis, which groups all decisions together 
around the most cited and important ones in the middle. As seen from Figure 10 below, AB reports 
stand in the centre of the WTO galaxy, while annulment committees at ICSID form their own hub 
of authorities on the outskirt of the galaxy formed by arbitral awards. These networks illustrate 
that for ICSID tribunals, annulment decisions are relevant only for limited matters.749 WTO panels, 
meanwhile, look up to the AB reports (and AB members cite their own reports in priority) on a wider 
range of issues. 
 
Figure 10: Network of decisions, per type, for INV (left),750 and WTO (right)751 
 
749  Citations from tribunals to ad hoc committee decisions are associated primarily with topics regarding their jurisdiction, such as the 
definition of [Investment] or the distinction between [Contract] and treaty claims. The latter topic is a testimony of the influence of the 
first annulment decision in the Vivendi v. Argentina case, the only annulment decision that is significantly cited in the Dataset. 
750  Nodes are coloured per type of decisions: awards and decisions on jurisdiction in green, annulment decisions in blue, challenge decisions 
in turquoise. Orange and Pink nodes represent provisional measures orders and decisions on rectification and interpretation respectively. 
Node size depends on number of citations to a particular decision. 
751  Nodes are coloured per type of decisions: AB reports in blue, panel reports in Green, article 21.5 reviews in Orange and other arbitrations 
in Turquoise. Node size depends on number of citations to a particular decision. 
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The relative isolation of annulment decisions in investment arbitration as opposed to AB 
decisions in the WTO system is also evidenced by an analysis of the full network of documents (i.e., 
decisions, opinions and pleadings as long as they cited at least one other document). In network 
analysis, modularity allows to identify groups of nodes with common and relevant links. Figure 11(a) 
below represents the full network of citations between cases and pleadings (teachings excepted) 
according to their forum; Figure 11(b) is the same map according to the modularity predicted of any 
node.  
While the modularity analysis maps remarkably well into the different fora studied here, it 
is telling that the algorithms predict two different modularity classes for the investment galaxy on 
the left-hand side; most of the nodes in orange turn out to be decisions by ad hoc committees. There 
is no such distinction for the WTO AB decisions, nor, even for ICJ advisory opinions.752 This indicates 
that decisions by ad hoc committees are sufficiently severed from investment awards to constitute 
their own ad hoc category, while AB reports (or advisory opinions at the ICJ) are better integrated 
within the scope of their respective forum.  
 
Figure 11: Full Network, per forum (left)753 and modularity (right) 
 
752  See above, at p. 69, for an introduction to modularity classes. While the WTO galaxy, on the top, also seems to encompass two modality 
class, it is because the analysis (puzzlingly) indicates that a set of decisions centred around EC – Hormones amounts to a modularity class 
in itself. Notice also how the ITLOS decisions have been phagocyted by the modularity class that represents the ICJ. 
753  Investment arbitration in blue, WTO in green, IUSCT in black, ICJ in Red, and ITLOS in yellow. In all cases, dark nodes indicate 
decisions and light ones, pleadings (there are no pleadings for the IUSCT). 
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One important difference between these two appeal mechanisms is likely to account for 
impact of their decisions: under the ICSID Convention, the scope of review of ad hoc committees is 
much more limited than the review of the WTO’s Appellate Body,754 as committees are designed to 
annul awards only subject to relatively stringent tests. The limited sets of questions addressed by 
ICSID annulment decisions, and the unlikelihood that an ICSID award be annulled, therefore likely 
explains why ICSID tribunals do not feel a strong need to consider and cite annulment decisions – 
as opposed to how WTO panels look up to the Appellate Body’s guidance.755 
3. The role of authorities in shaping decisions 
Beyond the written text of any given decision, what is the exact role of citations and 
authorities in the decision-making process that precedes that text? This interrogation is difficult, if 
not impossible to answer. All the caveats raised in the preceding chapters (regarding the limitation 
of citation analysis, the discrepancies of the practice of individual adjudicators, the gaps in the data 
collection, etc.) together prevent the development of a clear view as to the exact role of authorities 
in making a decision (as opposed to writing it). 
To some extent, the answer depends on what is expected of authorities. Casting the debate 
in terms of bindingness is a dead-end, as there are few examples of an international court or tribunal 
professing to be bound by another decision in an unrelated case. Putting it in terms of persuasiveness 
is also unsatisfying, for the reasons highlighted in Chapter III (although there are plenty of 
examples of adjudicators professing that they have been persuaded by an authority).  
Rather, the question is whether authorities have been material in influencing an outcome 
beyond their mere persuasiveness – and as much can cautiously be concluded from the fact that 
authorities are, as seen above, generally cited to justify a decision. 
In this context, a few observations can be made that can, at least, inform the debate and 
hopefully take it forward. 
 
754  See also Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision 
on the Challenge to the President of the Committee (3 October 2001), at §7: “on the other hand, the role of the Committee is narrowly 
defined and could be seen an ancillary to the arbitration function of ICSID as a whole” 
755  A second important difference likely resides in the fact that ad hoc committees are not drawn from a fixed, specialized body of adjudicators 
like the Appellate Body is. Non-permanent WTO panellists and arbitrators are thus more likely to follow the authority of permanent 
Appellate judges. 
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A) The question of ritualism  
As mentioned above, citing authorities sometimes runs the risk of turning into mere 
ritualism: authorities cited only following a blueprint of citations, with new authorities being 
aggregated to a growing list of statements in supports of boilerplate legal findings. Jennings, for 
instance, noted that the ICJ was not: 
above citing passages from previous judgments almost as if any pronouncement by 
the Court may be cited, not because it embodies the decision in the case but because 
it is a passage that has become hallowed into something akin to Holy Writ.756  
This has found empirical backings: in an important study of citations at the ICJ and the WTO, 
Niccolò Ridi found that “both the ICJ and the Appellate Body tend to use precedent in a rather 
‘textual’ manner, employing prefabricated, tested formulations as argumentative building blocks 
and stringing them together in their output.”757 Others have found that the European Court of 
Justice, for instance, was deeply ritualistic in its citation practice.758 And as mentioned above,759 
decisions are replete with citations that were not part of the parties’ debate. 
In another paper with Wolfgang Alschner, we demonstrated that only a minority of all 
citations in ICJ judgments (27%, from a smaller dataset of citations) could qualify as “ritualistic” in 
character.760 This conclusion was based on a measure of the number of paragraphs in ICJ judgments 
that cited the same couple of authorities as another paragraph. The underlying reasoning was that 
bundling precedents together in this way was an indication of pre-set, ritualistic citation blocks that 
were not necessarily central to a reasoning.761 
The same analysis, extended to the much broader Dataset, indicates that what is true of the 
ICJ also applies in other fora – with some interesting variations.  
 
756  Sir R. Jennings, “The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law” (1996) 45 The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
757  See Ridi, supra note 670, at 388. 
758  Y. Panagis and U. Šadl, “Making EU (Case) Law: Evidence from a Paragraph-to-Paragraph Network on the Cases Concerning the 
Citizenship of the European Union” (2010), available at www.karlbranting.net/law-and-big-data-workshop/LawBD-
2015_submission_3.pdf. 
759  At p. 158. 
760  W. Alschner and D. Charlotin, “The Growing Complexity of the International Court of Justice’s Self-Citation Network: Institutional 
Achievement or Access-to-Justice Concern?” (2018) 29 European Journal of International Law 1, at 105. 
761  Of course, a pair of authorities can also be cited in two different paragraphs only by coincidence. 
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Table 14 below retraces the proportion of “ritualistic” citing paragraphs (column “R”) per type 
of document and forum. In most cases, these paragraphs account only for a fifth to a quarter of all 
paragraphs. For the ICJ, ITLOS and WTO, however, there are markedly fewer such paragraphs in 
pleadings – parties are less likely to aggregate citations to their reasoning and more likely to engage 
directly with the authorities cited. WTO decisions are however more likely to add up similar pair of 
citations, testifying to the rather exhaustive style of citation in this forum.762 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Type / R / R / R / R / R 
Dissent 0.83 0.17 0.77 0.23 0.89 0.11 0.77 0.23 / / 
Decision 0.80 0.20 0.77 0.23 0.79 0.21 0.75 0.25 0.68 0.32 
Separate 0.81 0.19 0.76 0.24 0.82 0.18 0.80 0.20 / / 
Pleadings 0.88 0.12 0.74 0.26 0.94 0.06 / / 0.83 0.17 
Pleadings 
(in decision) 
/ / 0.68 0.32 / / 0.78 0.23 0.80 0.20 
Table 14: Percentage of paragraphs with "ritualistic" citations 
The main topics of these “ritualistic” paragraphs also differ from those of non-ritualistic ones. 
At the ICJ, for instance, the topic [Dispute] (i.e., the definition thereof) is often discussed in 
paragraphs that cite the same sets of precedents and authorities. Likewise, in investment awards, 
ritualistic paragraphs are primarily found in paragraphs that discuss [Annulment] standards 
(notably in decisions from ad hoc committees), or the fair and equitable standard of treatment. (At 
the ITLOS, IUSCT and in WTO cases, the main topics of the two types of paragraphs mostly overlap.) 
In other words, while international courts and tribunals seem indeed to engage in some kind 
of “ritualistic” behaviour when they cite authorities, this practice remains rather limited to a 
minority of citations, and with respect to relatively uncontested topics. In most cases, when courts 
and tribunals cite, it is likely in order to engage at some level with the authority being cited rather 
than just following a pre-set blueprint. 
B) The rare instances of express disagreement 
A second indicia that citations are useful to justify a decision lies in the fact that citations are 
virtually always adduced in a decision to support the view taken by the judges and arbitrators. 
 
762  And which results in the high density of the WTO’s network of citations, as noted by Pauwelyn, supra note 683, at 166. 
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Conflicting authorities most of the time are shunned altogether, even if cited and relied upon by the 
losing party. 
As mentioned above, there is a due process element to the activity of writing a decision, and 
ignoring the authorities relied upon by the losing side could be problematic in this context – this is 
why decisions sometimes expressly include boilerplate mentions to the effect that they have 
nonetheless considered all arguments. The ICSID ad hoc committee in Karkey v. Pakistan took a 
step further in this respect as it acknowledged that the jurisprudence on the question was not 
unanimous, yet opined that: 
The Parties have extensively referred to decisions of other ICSID ad hoc committees. 
The Committee has considered these decisions and the Parties’ arguments based 
upon them to the extent that they shed useful light on the issues at stake here. In 
view of the considerable number of the decisions accumulated by now regarding the 
stay of enforcement, and the diversity among them, it is obvious that the Committee 
cannot accept and come out in line with all conclusions in these earlier decisions. In 
its reasoning, the Committee will refer to only some of these decisions which it 
considers to be of particular relevance for its own conclusions in the present 
Decision.763 
Few decisions are as frank as this one, yet the practice of citing only supportive statements 
and ignoring unsupportive ones is common. As mentioned below in Chapter VI, it is consonant with 
the fact that courts and tribunals generally overcite the authorities relied upon by the winning party 
in a case as opposed to the authorities relied upon by the losing party. 
4.  Conclusions 
This foray into the citation practice of courts and tribunals (as distinguished from their 
individual judges or the parties before them) has allowed to shed light on a few distinctive features. 
In particular, this practice is seemingly in line with strategic considerations whereby courts orient 
their discourse not only to the two parties to the dispute, but also to a broader audience. This is 
evidenced by various elements of their citation practice, as courts and tribunals: ignore most of the 
authorities cited by the parties; focus on the most authoritative found in the pleadings of both parties; 
 
763  Karkey Karadeniz Elektrik Uretim A.S.v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/1, Decision on the stay of enforcement 
of the award (22 February 2018), at §5.  
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cite sua sponte plenty less authoritative authorities, seemingly making an extensive use of their iura 
novit curia powers; and engage in some degree of ritualism that is absent from the legal reasoning 
of the parties or these courts’ individual judges.   
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Chapter V – Citing authorities in individual opinions 
  
As noted in Chapter II, focusing on the citations found in decisions allows only a limited foray 
into the motivations of international courts and tribunals. Many citations remain implicit, and the 
authoritativeness of uncited authorities unacknowledged. To some extent, these authorities can be 
retraced in the parties’ pleadings (the subject of Chapter VI) and in individual opinions of the 
adjudicators, to which this Chapter turns. Both sets of documents offer clues as to what was at the 
back of the mind of the participants in any given case. 
Individual opinions are not only an appropriate proxy to understand the “implicit” citations 
in majority opinions, however: they also shed light on what persuaded some judges and failed to 
move others. Fortunately for the purpose of this thesis, individual opinions are also generally subject 
to less formalistic concerns with respect to citations. Individual adjudicators have ample leeway to 
speak in their own voice and, perhaps, to genuinely acknowledge the authorities they considered in 
taking a position. Individual adjudicators also have distinct strategic motives in citing or not citing 
authorities in their opinions. 
 Allowing adjudicators to write individual opinions, however, has sometimes attracted 
criticisms, in ways relevant for their authority – and their use of authorities. After reviewing these 
debates (Section 1), as well as two possible strategic motives underlying the decision to write an 
opinion, this Chapter will turn to the authors of individual opinions: who are they, and how do these 
characteristics likely influence their practice of citing authorities (Section 2). A last section will 
then analyse how citation patterns in individual opinions differ from those in judgments and awards, 
and how separate and dissenting opinions differ between themselves (Section 3). 
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1. Reasons for individual opinions 
Dissenting and concurring opinions are common in international dispute settlement. This is 
not a new phenomenon – the Alabama arbitration already had a dissenter764 – though it has grown 
together with the number of international disputes, as judges and arbitrators have increasingly 
taken the opportunity to “express their personal views on aspects of a case”.765 The principle of 
issuing individual opinions has however sometimes been contested – in respects that are relevant 
for this thesis’s inquiry into the marks of authority. The sections below review some of these 
criticisms, before turning to the expected benefit of penning individual opinions. 
A) Opinions in international adjudication  
Objections to judges airing out their individual opinions have been mounted in nearly all fora 
studied here; a (non-exhaustive) list follows: 
- For the ICJ, Kammerhofer pointedly criticised the use of individual opinions (albeit in 
the context of a single case), opining that it “simply is not healthy”;766 
- In investment arbitration, Albert Jan van den Berg sparked a debate about the 
appropriateness of dissenting opinions in a system relying on party-appointment;767 
- For the IUSCT, Gunmar Lagergren noted the impact of dissents on the authority of the 
Tribunal’s awards,768 on a background of bitter disagreements between the arbitrators; 
and 
- At the WTO, individual opinions are reportedly actively discouraged, and mandatorily 
anonymous.769 
The debate has deep roots. It flared at the time of writing the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, and then again in the first decades of the ICJ’s experience. In 1965, Ram 
 
764  See a summary in “Alabama Claims Arbitration 1872”, in J.B. Moore (ed.), History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which 
the United States has been a Party (1898), at 653, and Sir Alexander Cockburn’s Dissent (14 September 1872), at 659. 
765  H. Mistry, “‘The Different Sets of Ideas at the Back of Our Heads’: Dissent and Authority at the International Court of Justice” (2019) 
32 Leiden Journal of International Law 293, at 296. 
766  J. Kammerhofer, “Oil’s Well That Ends Well? Critical Comments on the Merits Judgement in the Oil Platforms Case” (2004) 17 Journal 
of International Law 695, at 716, opining that “[t]he more diligently the judges work on their own opinions, the more they undo the 
Court’s work”. 
767  See A.J. van den Berg, “Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration”, in Mahnoush Arsanjani, Jacob 
Cogan, Robert Sloane and Siegfried Wiessner (eds.), Looking to the Future: essays on international law in honor of W. Michael Reisman 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2010), at 821. 
768  G. Lagergren, “The Formative Years of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 23. 
769  See M. Lewis, “Dissents”, in Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio (eds.), Research Handbook on WTO Dispute Settlement (Edward 
Elgar 2018). 
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Prakash Anand recorded the views of commentators who deplored the bitter tone of dissents at the 
ICJ (in particular), as well as these opinions’ (alleged) corrosive impact on the authority of the 
Court’s judgments and advisory opinions.770 Similar criticisms have arisen in the arbitration field, 
in particular in response to the rise of higher-stake investment arbitration disputes.771 Although it 
is unnecessary to overstate the number of critics (who are a minority), the evergreen character of 
the debate indicates that it is not made of whole cloth. 
On some level, those unconvinced by the propriety of penning individual opinions are 
justified: dissenting (or emitting an opinion different from that of the majority) has a cost – not only 
for the dissenter, but also for the majority.772 Beyond the arguments on the merits aired out by the 
dissenter (which might or might not be convincing), the mere fact that a decision was non-unanimous 
lessens its inevitability; it enhances the sentiment that a different bench would have come to a 
different outcome, and that luck had a hand in this outcome. In short, dissents are expected to 
diminish the authority of majority decisions.773 
The critics’ position depends however on a matter of framing, i.e., on the idea that dissents 
are the exception rather than the norm.774 This framing is not a given.775 On the contrary, individual 
opinions can be expected to bloom in international law, a legal field “generally found to be notoriously 
imprecise, fragmentary, uncertain and controversial”.776 Given the multiplicity and diversity of 
states and points of view in international law, dissents are an important device to maintain 
confidence in the system, for they allow minority views to be aired.777  
For Ram Prakash Anand, the value of opinions further lies in making judges accountable and 
outcomes less susceptible of being influenced by politics; it also forces majority judges to give their 
 
770  R.P. Anand, “The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication” (1965) 14 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 788. 
771  See van den Berg, supra note 767. For commercial arbitration, see notably A. Redfern, “The 2003 Freshfields-Lecture Dissenting Opinions 
in International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” (2004) 20 Arbitration International 223. 
772  See L. Epstein, M. Landes and R.A. Posner, “Why (and when) judges dissent: A theoretical and empirical analysis” (2011) 3 Journal of 
Legal Analysis 101, at 105. 
773  G. Sacerdoti, “From Law Professor to International Adjudicator: The WTO Appellate Body and ICSID Arbitration Compared, a Personal 
Account” in David Caron, Stephan Schill, Abby Cohen-Smutny, Epaminontas Triantafilou (eds.), Practising virtue: inside international 
arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2015), at 213. 
774  See van den Berg, supra note 767, at 841. Rogers put it well: “If the appropriate baseline for the number of dissents were near zero, the 
22% [rate of dissent alleged by van den Berg] could be considered high”; see C. Rogers, “The Politics of International Investment 
Arbitrators” (2013) 12 Santa Clara Journal International Law 223, at 243. 
775  Ibid., at 243. 
776  See Anand, supra note 770, at 805. 
777  S.M. Schwebel, “The Docket and Decisionmaking Process of the International Court of Justice” (1989) 13 Suffolk Transnational Law 
Journal 543, at 556; see also Mistry, supra note 765, at 307. 
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best.778 As Max Huber expressed it, “[t]he authority of the Court could only be increased by the whole 
truth”,779 and that truth is enhanced by allowing individual judges to explain their reasons to vote 
as they did. 
The occurrence of individual opinions in this context might thus be a matter of design, not 
coincidence. In a system where individual and institutional identities both matter in terms of an 
authority’s authoritativeness (as explained in Chapter III), the freedom to write an opinion has 
consequences.780 For instance, a dissenting opinion might weaken or, as explained below, more likely, 
strengthen the majority’s decision,781 while concurring opinions can clarify it.782 ICJ judgments, for 
instance, benefit from these two effects, as dissenting opinions will often prompt a majority to partly 
rewrite its decision.783 
Beyond the individual case, individual opinions also serve the development of international 
law. Manley Hudson noted their importance in later judgments:  
the influence of some of the dissenting opinions may be traced in later judgments of 
the Court, and [...] some of them have been widely cited. It may not be too much to 
say, therefore, that they have made an important contribution to the materials out of 
which international law may be developed.784 
B) Strategical use of individual opinions 
From the perspective of the judge or the arbitrator, even before citation strategies come into 
play, why write an individual opinion, concurring or dissenting?785 
Some opinions might be directed as influencing the majority’s decision and its reasoning, for 
instance by prompting the majority to clarify its answer to the questions that prompt a dissent. 
ICJ judgments are often influenced in exactly this way by the dissents prepared by the judges.786 
Procedure has however a crucial role here: it is widely reported that the ICJ’s practice of asking each 
 
778  See Anand, supra note 770, at 794. 
779  Minutes of the 1929 Committee of Jurists, League of Nations Doc. No. C. 166.M.66. 1929, V., at 52. 
780  Mistry, supra note 765, at 306 et seq. 
781  See above, Chapter III, at 119. 
782  Mistry, supra note 765, at 307. 
783  See Schwebel, supra note 777, at 555. 
784  M. Hudson, International Tribunals (Washington, 1944), at 44. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes: “A dissent in a court of last resort 
is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into 
which the dissenting judge believes the Court to have been betrayed.” See C.E. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 
(Columbia University Press 1928), at 68. 
785  For an overview of the question, see van den Berg, supra note 767, at 821. 
786  Schwebel, supra note 777, at 555. See also R. Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013), at 1013. 
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judge to write preliminary notes encourages them to convert this Note into an individual opinion. 
Not all fora benefit from the same procedure, however. In the IUSCT practice, notably, it was 
common for arbitrators, Iranian like Americans, to file their dissent later, sometimes much later, 
than the Tribunal’s award.787 
More importantly, opinion-writers might seek to:  
(i) try to undermine the authoritativeness of a solution in the eye of future courts or 
tribunals;788 and/or  
(ii) (ii) influence future awards and decisions.789 
Undermine the authority of the majority opinion 
If judges intend to undermine or lessen the authority of a majority decision with their opinion, 
there is little evidence that this strategy is efficient in practice. In the context of the IUSCT, some 
arbitrators explicitly described opinions as strategic tools designed to vary the authoritativeness of 
certain decisions,790 in a context where all parties were conscious that the Tribunal’s awards would 
subsequently become authoritative precedents.791 Arbitrator Khalilian for instance warned in a 
dissent that: 
in light of the blatant defects therein, which I shall list herein-below […] it will not 
be possible to rely upon this Award as precedent.792  
At another juncture and for his part, Arbitrator Bahrami said that he:  
 
787  See, e.g., Watkins Johnson et al. v. Iran, Award No. 429-370-1 (27 July 1989), reprinted in 22 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 218, at 258, Dissenting 
Opinion of Arbitrator Noori (filed on 8 January 1990). 
788  See Lagergren, supra note 768, at 31. 
789  See P.A. Moin, “Dynamics of Decision-Making (III)”, in David D. Caron and John R. Crook (eds.) The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and 
the Process of International Claims Resolution (Transnational Publishers 2000), at 266, describing some opinions as “putting 
psychological pressure on the panel and paving the way for the next cases and awards”; see also C.N. Brower and J.D. Brueschke, The 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff 1998), at 661, explaining how the existence of “third-country” arbitrators set up 
“predictable dynamic, namely competition for the ‘hearts and mind’ of” these arbitrators. “Where,” they continue, “the vast bulk of claims 
is asserted against one side, namely Iran, clearly it is the Iranian side that must display the greater concern as regards the attitude of the 
third-country judges.” 
790  See ITT Industries v. Iran, Award No. 47-156-2 (26 May 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 356, at 357, Note by Dr. Shafie Shafeiei 
Regarding the Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich. 
791  Trooboff, supra note 696, at 297. 
792  Phillips Petroleum v. Iran, Award No. 425-39-2 (29 June 1989), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 79, at 196, Statement by Judge Khalilian. 
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would hope that such an award which is, as set forth above in this Opinion, devoid of 
legal reasoning and legal justification, will not be held up as a precedent in the 
Tribunal’s future proceedings.793 
This proposition can be tested by observing the citations of majority (as opposed to unanimous) 
awards and decisions as they in later decisions. In this respect, it appears that majority awards were 
cited nearly twice as often in subsequent IUSCT awards, and nearly four times as often when 
counting subsequent citations from individual opinions.794 The very award that arbitrator Khalilian 
hoped would not be seen as a precedent eventually was one of the most cited in later awards from 
the Tribunal. This is in line with Chapter III above, which found no evidence that majority decisions 
are less cited or relied upon than unanimous ones. (There is likewise no clear evidence that 
dissenting opinions in investment arbitration result in higher chances of annulment or set aside.)  
It is impossible to rule out that opinions lessen the authoritativeness of a particular decision, 
but additional effects might balance this corrosive impact. In particular, providing the majority of 
the court or tribunal is mindful of the legal strength of its reasoning and decision, decisions that are 
accompanied by individual opinions might actually be better reasoned, in order to answer the points 
from which these opinions sought to depart.795 And indeed, non-unanimous awards at the IUSCT 
are nearly three times longer than unanimous awards in the Dataset, running to 9,500 words on 
average against 3,500 words for unanimous awards.796 
It is unclear, however, in what direction the causation goes – as more difficult cases might 
entail both higher chances of dissent and higher length. As can be seen in Table 15 below, the same 
relation between dissents and ruling length holds for the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and for WTO 
panels and arbitrations, but not, surprisingly, for investment awards: 
 IUSCT INV ICJ WTO797 ITLOS 
Unanimous 1,890 28,500 (see below) 82,000 (see below) 
 
793  General Dynamics Telephone Systems Center v. Iran, Award No. 192-285-2 (4 October 1985), reprinted in 9 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 153, 
at 180, Dissenting Opinion of Hamid Bahrami. 
794  Of course, cases prompting dissents are more likely to have higher-stakes or involve less well-settled legal issues, which are additional 
reasons why they would be further cited in future cases.  
795  See S.A. Baker and M.D. Davis, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Practice: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1992), at 154. 
796  This concords with what can be observed at the United States Supreme Court and Federal Court of Appeals, for instance: see, respectively, 
A. Feldman, “An Opinion is Worth at Least 1,000 Word” (3 April 2018) Empirical SCOTUS, available at: 
https://empiricalscotus.com/2018/04/03/1000-words/; Epstein, Landes and Posner, supra note 772, at 105. 
797  Most of the discrepancy is due to AB reports in this respect, which are more than twice as long in the (few) cases decided by majority; 
panel reports and arbitration awards are actually slightly longer when unanimous. 
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Majority 7.200 26,600 110,300 
Table 15: Length of unanimous and majority decisions 
Reading key: IUSCT rulings taken unanimously number on average 1,890 words, while 
rulings taken by majority number on average 7,200 words.  
 The situation for the ICJ and the ITLOS is slightly different: given the high number of judges 
(as opposed to arbitral tribunals’ three members), and the participation of judges ad hoc, decisions 
are only rarely unanimous. The ICJ’s practice of holding several votes on distinct questions in each 
decision also further muddies the waters. As mentioned above, it is possible to create a composite 
measure of consensus of ICJ judgments (i.e., an “unanimity ratio”) on a basis of 100, such that 
judgments with unanimous votes on every question would score 100, while judgments decided by 
the casting vote of the president would score 50.  
On this measure, as seen in Figure 12 below, the relation between the number of negative 
votes (reflected in a unanimity ratio closer to 50) and the length of a judgment (reported in the 
number of print characters) is interesting. Longer judgments are for the most part associated with 
votes in which the dissenters represent 10 to 25% of all judges voting – in short, judgments will tend 
to be longer in cases where a strong majority is answering a non-negligible minority.798 Remarkably, 
this is in line with the finding of Chapter III above that the same kind of judgments at the ICJ (i.e., 
not unanimous nor split 50/50) tends to be ever-more-so authoritative in the jurisprudence.  
 
798  This might, once again, be due to the ICJ’s peculiar procedure, where a decision’s every sentence is reportedly discussed and  reviewed by 
the entire bench. In these circumstances, decisions adopted by a short majority will tend to hew closely to the most basic elements of a 
case and will not engage in additional considerations and obiter dicta – these will be left to concurring opinions. 
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Figure 12: Length of ICJ judgments (y-axis) per ratio of unanimity (x-axis) 
Individual opinions as future authorities 
Judges might also write individual opinions to steer and inform an ongoing legal debate, with 
the intention of becoming an authority for the future. If so, there is likewise limited evidence that 
this goal has ever been reached (regardless, of course, of some isolated opinions that became 
authoritative). Indeed, courts and tribunals rarely cite individual opinions, and the practice is not 
without detractors. 799  In his (generally critical) account of the role of individual opinions in 
investment arbitration, Albert van den Berg for his part faulted the reliance of the Helnan v. Egypt 
tribunal on an individual opinion as an authority,800 and remarked that: 
[t]he tribunal’s reliance on this dissenting opinion is remarkable because there is a 
large number of precedents, representing unanimous or majority awards, that make 
the same point. Actually, in the alphabetical listing of investment awards, one need 
go no further than the As to find an example of a unanimous award that has been 
referred to many times in subsequent awards and literature: Azinian […].801  
 
799  The tribunal in Rompetrol v. Romania was asked to opine on the authority of a “dissenting opinion in contrast to the Award itself”, but 
step-sided the issue: see The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Respondent’s Preliminary 
Objections on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (18 April 2008), at §85. 
800  See Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Award (3 July 2008), at §125. 
801  See van den Berg, supra note 767, at 826, note 21. 
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This argument targeted dissenting opinions in particular, and there is some evidence that 
this kind of opinion generally commands lower authoritativeness. The fact that dissenting opinions 
contradicted a majority will indeed always serve as a ready argument to rebut them,802 or to dismiss 
them as “not persuasive”.803 
In the US context, Epstein and Posner evaluated the benefit of dissenting opinions by the 
number of times they are later cited – and, on this measure, found that most dissents are hardly 
beneficial for future decisions.804 Likewise, citations to individual opinions are not unusual in the 
Dataset, yet confined nearly exclusively to other opinions and pleadings. By and large, they are not 
cited in majority judgments and awards, with a few exceptions. 
For Robert Kolb, “all [ICJ] judges [should] realise that the influence of their opinions is often 
in inverse proportion to their length.”805 And indeed, the most cited opinions are not necessarily the 
longest or the most comprehensive. While short opinions (or “Declarations” in the ICJ’s 
jurisprudence) are distinctively under-cited, the most cited separate and dissenting opinions all have 
between 5,000 and 20,000 words on average; longer opinions are by comparison under-cited. Nor is 
the authority of opinions correlated with the propensity to write opinions: the most cited authors 
published less than 10 opinions. Judge Oda participated in around 50 opinions (either as sole author 
or as co-author), and most of these were never cited back in future ICJ judgments or opinions. 
Most opinions are simply never cited at all: only 282 out of 785 dissenting opinions, and 252 
out of 718 separate opinions are cited at least once. Out of these, only 105 are cited more than five 
times, nearly equally split between separate and dissenting opinions. Both types are as likely to be 
cited in future opinions, with each type attracting around 1.2 citations per opinion. As such, if 
dissenting opinions are meant to be less authoritative, this seemingly does not affect the number of 
citations they attract. While there is a debate over the qualification of these opinions as “judgments” 
or as some kind of especially authoritative teachings,806 it seems in fact that individual opinions are 
cited less often, and with less authority, than some teachings. 
 
802  See, e.g., South American Silver Limited v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award (30 August 2018), at §256. 
803  As the Methanex v. USA tribunal held of the dissenting opinion of Eric Schwartz in S.D. Myers v. Canada: see Methanex Corp. v. United 
States of America, UNCITRAL, Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (7 August 2002), at 143. 
804  See Epstein, Landes and Posner, supra note 772, at 106: “We assume that the benefit of dissenting derives from the influence of the 
dissenting opinion and the enhanced reputation of the judge who writes the dissent. We proxy this benefit by the number of citations to 
the dissenting opinion.” The authors’ second possible benefit, a higher chance of the case being granted certiorari by the US Supreme 
Court, does not apply in the international context. 
805  See Kolb, supra note 786, at 1017.  
806  See Chapter III supra, note 511, and the associated quote. 
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2. The Opinionated 
The two strategic motives just identified – undermining the authority of a majority opinion 
or create an authority for future cases – are not the only (non-exclusive) reasons to write an 
individual opinion. A third possibility is that opinions are meant to raise the profile of the dissenting 
or concurring judge, or of a group of judges as opposed to the entire court or tribunal. Can this be 
observed in the citation practice of these judges? 
A) Sociology 
Individual judges have different approaches when it comes to citing authorities.807 To the 
extent authors of opinions write in their semi-individual capacity (i.e., writing as members of courts 
and tribunals, but not as the Court or Tribunal itself), their opinions allow to check the role of 
authorities in influencing particular types of decision-makers, in a way that the semi-anonymity of 
multi-members majority decisions cannot. In short, since “different actors will rely on different 
sources, which better match their arguments”,808 the sociology of the citer should influence what will 
eventually be cited.809 
When the drafters of the PCIJ Statute discussed whether to allow judges to append 
individual opinions to the judgments of the Court, one of the main axes of the debate was based on 
legal culture and education: individual opinions were understood to be associated with Common Law 
lawyers, and therefore alien to Civil Law judges. A look at a list of authors of individual opinions 
nowadays indicates that this dichotomy does not hold very well for the authoring of opinions. As 
seen below, it remains however relevant to the practice of citing in opinions. 
The importance of the nationality of individual judges and arbitrators should indeed not be 
overstated. For instance, the proportion of judges from a given UN Group authoring an opinion at 
the ICJ or at the ITLOS tracks remarkably well the proportion of judges sitting on these two bodies’ 
 
807  See R. Higgins, “Remarks of Rosalie Higgins” (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 217, noting that “some 
judges on a particular point of law will always want citations of as many as possible of the previous cases where we’ve decided that point. 
Others will say, ‘No. One will do. We’re here just to decide a case. Just mention the last one.’” 
808  See T. Schultz and N. Ridi, “Arbitration Literature”, in Thomas Schultz and Federico Ortino (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International 
Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2019). 
809  See A. Roberts, Is International Law International? (Oxford University Press 2017), at 85, discussing empirical studies that demonstrate 
that domestic judges are more likely to cite sources from the place of their degree. 
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benches, as Table 16 indicates. A judge’s gender seemingly has also little relevance in this context, 
although the overall extremely low number of female judges prevents clear conclusions. 
 
ICJ ITLOS 
In decisions In opinions In decisions In opinions 
# % # % # % # % 
Eastern Europe 588 14.17 164 11.59 194 11.76 21 9.59 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
591 14.24 198 13.99 289 17.52 42 19.18 
Asia Pacific 701 16.90 257 18.16 338 20.48 33 15.07 
Western European and 
Others 
1529 36.85 511 36.11 474 28.73 78 35.62 
Africa 740 17.84 285 20.14 355 21.52 45 20.55 
Table 16: Judges on bench and authoring opinions per geographical origin 
 
ICJ ITLOS 
In decisions In opinions In decisions In opinions 
# % # % # % # % 
M 3963 95.52 1346 95.12 1618 98.06 213 97.26 
F 186 4.48 69 4.88 32 1.94 6 2.74 
Table 17: Number of judges on bench and authoring opinions per gender 
The distinction between Common Law and Civil Law tradition should likewise not be 
overstated, given that with few exceptions, all judges in the Dataset are prone to cite precedents and 
authorities in their opinions. Where they tend to differ, however, is in the extent to which they cite 
and rely on authorities: at the ICJ, the list of the top citers (in terms of number of citations per 
1,000 words) is populated with judges hailing from Common Law jurisdictions, whereas the bottom 
of the same list mostly hails from Civil Law ones. (These judges also tend, on average, to write 
shorter opinions).810 
Rank Name Citation per 
1k words 
Nationality # Opinions Total Words 
Top 10 ALFARO 6.0 Panama 2 5,498 
 
810  This can be compared with the findings of J. Hsiang and J. Nyarko, “Precedent Citation at the WTO-Shifting the Empirical Focus to 
Panelists” (2016), available at http://acle.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-center-for-law--
economics/conferences/celse-2016/conference-papers/session-iii/paper-hsiangnyarko-2016.pdf?1466066673136, at 19, that there is 
no observable differences at the WTO in the use of precedents in panel reports between Common law and Civil law-hailing chairs. 
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HIGGINS 5.4 United Kingdom 23 79,938 
CRAWFORD 4.3 Australia 3 13,349 
JESSUP 3.6 United States 9 199,026 
MAVUNGU 3.6 Congo (DR) 2 14,888 
S. RAO 3.5 India 1 8,891 
DE CARA 3.5 France 1 11,007 
XUE 3.2 China 10 28,037 
SHAHABUDDEEN 3.2 Guyana 23 176,190 
TRINDADE 3.1 Brazil 29 691,877 
DONOGHUE 3.0 United States 13 55,595 
 
[…]   
   
Bottom 10 
TANAKA 0.4 Japan 6 119,755 
FORTIER 0.4 Canada 2 5,712 
BASDEVANT 0.4 France 8 22,663 
STASSINOPOULOS 0.4 Greece 2 7,927 
ALVAREZ 0.4 Chile 11 40,289 
FERNANDES 0.3 Portugal 1 9,630 
SORENSEN 0.3 Denmark 2 15,670 
HOLGUIN 0.2 Colombia 1 8,290 
DAUDET 0.2 France 1 4,698 
BUSTAMANTE 0.2 Peru 8 76,823 
CORDOVA 0.2 Mexico 3 12,646 
Table 18: Most and least frequent citers at the ICJ 
Related to nationality and legal background, ideology 811  can also weigh in a judge’s 
inclination to pen an opinion and cite authorities.812 In another paper, for instance, I noted how 
Iranian judges at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal were less likely to cite precedents from the 
International Court of Justice, and suspected that this was related to the Tribunal’s generally 
diminished reputation in the 1980s to the eye of non-Western countries.813 
 
811  See the example of the socialist judges as related in K. Grzybowski, “Socialist Judges in the International Court of Justice” (1964) Duke 
Law Journal 536, at 536. 
812  See, e.g., M. Waibel and Y. Wu, “Are arbitrators political?” (2011) LawEcon Workshop Bonn, available at: http://www-
bcf.usc.edu/~yanhuiwu/arbitrator.pdf. 
813  See D. Charlotin, “A Data Analysis of The Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s Jurisprudence – Lessons for International Dispute settlement 
Today” (2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 443. 
184 
 
Lastly, there is evidence that decision-makers are more likely to rule in favour of their 
appointed party.814 This makes strategic sense: in a context where parties have a say in appointing 
the decision-maker (and thus, a context characterised by a principal-agent relationship), parties 
typically go to great lengths to select adjudicators that will support their views.815  
In this context, it could be expected that decision-makers would favour the party appointing 
them by voting in its favour and/or penning an opinion that support that party’s views. The empirical 
data supports this theory, as on average judges appointed by a party at the ITLOS or the ICJ devote 
more of their citations to the authorities cited by the party appointing them, and especially to the 
authorities cited only in the submission of the appointing party. 
This principal-agent relationship has another consequence for ad hoc judges at the ICJ, 
whose separate (but, intriguingly, not dissenting) opinions and declarations are on average typically 
and distinctly longer in terms of words than opinions from permanent judges. Beyond displaying 
support for their appointing party (virtually all opinions by ad hoc judges are in favour of the 
appointing party), this might also reflect an attempt, at least for some of those judges, to be re-
appointed permanently to the Court by showcasing their skills and knowledge. 
Type Judge Declaration Dissenting Separate 
Ad Hoc 2,396 4,706 17,007 
Not Ad Hoc 1,421 9,365 6,187 
Table 19: Average length of opinions for ad hoc judges 
B) Topics 
Opinion-writers seemingly dedicate their opinions to a carefully selected number of topics, as 
the majority of the citations found in these opinions relate to a handful of topics they keep coming 
back to. 
The topic analysis collected around 91 different topics of international law in the Dataset. 
Yet, for the vast majority of judges who wrote individual opinions, more than 50% of their citations 
was dedicated to one or two topics only, and none of them dedicated more than 50% of their citations 
to more than 6 topics. These topics, far from being pet causes, are often among the most discussed 
 
814  See the results in E. Posner and M. de Figueiredo, “Is the International Court of Justice Biased?” (2005) 34 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 599. 
815  See the discussion and examples noted in Rogers, supra note 774, at 251 et seq. 
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topics in decisions (questions of [Interpretation], for instance, or the law on [Delimitation]), although 
a few individual judges also use the space of their individual opinions to discuss topics that are less 
likely to figure in the Court’s majority decision. (Judge Cançado Trindade, for instance, is rather 
fond of discussing questions of [Human Rights] – a topic that is rarely found in majority decisions 
at the ICJ.) 
C) Relationships 
A review of the citation practice of individual judges indicate that judges, to the extent they 
cite anything, are relatively fond of citing other opinions. 
There are 833 citations in the Dataset between individual opinions at the ICJ, and 45 at the 
ITLOS.816 Figure 13 below is a network analysis based on these citations, which sheds light on who 
cites whom in these individual opinions, and which judges develop particularly authoritative 
positions in the view of their colleagues.817 
In another paper, I retraced how judges at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal mostly cited opinions 
of their co-nationals; I interpreted this practice as a strategy designed to create a bloc of self-
supporting jurisprudence.818 In the network analysis of the broader Dataset, Iranian judges at the 
IUSCT have the highest scores in terms of “clustering coefficient” – i.e., the tendency to cluster 
together (in citations) as opposed to citing beyond their cluster. This also shows in their semi-
detached position in Figure 13. 
There are no equivalent tight clusters of judges in other fora. As indicated by node size (which 
depends on PageRank), the most authoritative judges often hail from the “Western European and 
Others” group at the United Nations (the pink nodes). Within this group, judges from the US and 
the UK – two countries with a strong tradition of individual legal opinions – stand out as well. 
 
816  Citations from opinion to opinion in investment arbitration decisions were too few to be of use in this part. 
817  More precisely, citations between individual judges of joint opinions were dis-amalgamated for sources and targets of citations. For 
instance, there are 8 different links (2 * 4) for the citation of the Joint declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma in the Application of the 
Genocide Convention case to the Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, Hsu Mo in the Reservations advisory 
opinion. 
818  See Charlotin, supra note 813. 
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Figure 13: Individual opinions network, by UN Group819 
A modularity analysis820 of this latter graph indicates distinct boundaries between ITLOS 
opinion-writers (orange, on the top side of the graph) and ICJ ones, with some degree of overlap: 
Judge Oda’s opinions in cases involving law of the sea matters have often been cited by ITLOS judges, 
making him a member of that class, for instance.821 IUSCT judges, meanwhile, are understood (by 
 
819  Pink nodes are judges from the “Western European and Others” UN group; green from the “Asia Pacific” group; blue from the “Latin 
America and Caribbean” group; Orange from the “Africa” group; and red for “Eastern European” group. 
820  Modularity Analyses are explained above in Chapter II supra, at p. 69. 
821  Something he might not have predicted: see S. Oda, “The International Court of Justice Viewed from the Bench” (1995) 244 Recueil 
des Cours – Académie de Droit International de La Haye 23, at 144. 
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the modularity algorithm) as being closer to a subset of ICJ judges, centred around Judge 
Fitzmaurice.822 The few citations to individual opinions in investment arbitration suffice to create a 
modularity class in itself (in green) – although one that is not related to the IUSCT, in sharp contrast 
with investment awards (who cite IUSCT award profusely). For the rest, modularity classes seem 
based to a large extent on the judges’ terms on the Bench, as they are indeed more likely to cite 
judges in contemporary cases than in older cases. 
 
Figure 14: Individual opinions network, by modularity 
 
822  IUSCT judges notably cited Judge Fitzmaurice’s separate opinion in Barcelona Traction. 
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D) Self-citing 
It is not only other judges that opinion-writers cite; sometimes, they only cite themselves.  
The Dataset contains more than 350 self-citations of this kind, be it to prior individual 
opinions (individual or joint) or to doctrinal teachings by a given judge. At the ICJ, Judge Oda’s 
inclination to cite himself did not go unnoticed,823 and indeed with 39 self-citations he takes the 
second place of the podium. The first place belongs to Judge Cançado Trindade – although most of 
the citations in his individual opinions are to his own writings rather than his previous opinions. 
Judges Self-Citations to 
Teachings 
Self-Citations to 
Individual opinion 
Trindade 178 25 
Oda 5 33 
Fitzmaurice  17 
Kooijmans  16 
Gros 
 
11 
Weeramantry 4 6 
Schwebel 1 6 
Bula-Bula 2 4 
Lauterpacht  5 
Kreca 
 
4 
Mavungu 2 2 
Simma 4 
 
Ahmadi 3 
 
Castro 
 
3 
Donoghue  3 
Hackworth 3 
 
Table 20: Top 15 of judges citing themselves 
 
823  See Kolb, supra note 786, at 1015. 
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Reading key: 203 citations of Judge Cançado Trindade were to himself, 178 to his 
writings and 25 to his own past opinions. 
 Nearly all judges listed in Table 20 have sat at the ICJ – the practice is simply rarer in other 
fora (except at the IUSCT), certainly because the number of individual opinions is much lower and 
the practice of writing them less well-ingrained. This pattern concords with the authoritativeness of 
individual opinions in general, which are rarely cited in investment arbitration or even at the IUSCT, 
but distinctly more important in ICJ proceedings. The judges listed in Table 20 also score higher on 
average in terms of their authoritativeness, or that of their opinions. 
 A look at the topics treated most frequently in these self-citations indicate a certain tendency 
for the most prolific judges to try to push a point or a legal proposition that is dear to them. For the 
majority of the 15 judges above, the main topic of their self-citations matched the main topic that 
prompted all of their non-self-citations. Thus, Judge Fitzmaurice cited several times his joint 
dissenting opinion with Sir Percy Spender in the South West Africa case when questions related to 
the League of Nations’ [Mandate] System came back to the fore in the Namibia Advisory Opinion. 
Meanwhile, a full 90% of all self-citations by Judge Cançado Trindade bear on questions of [Human 
Rights] – indeed the main topic of his individual opinions in the Dataset. 
3. The Opinion 
A) Contrast with majority judgment 
A first contrast between individual opinions and decisions is that the former cite a broader 
scope of authorities. Individual opinions for instance cite to more external authorities, and more 
scholarship than majority opinions. It is as if the reluctance of courts and tribunals to cite teachings 
was counterbalanced by the greater liberty of individual writers to do so.824 Opinions, indeed, “have 
a character and individuality which cannot be expected of decisions or opinions embodying the 
combined views of some ten or twelve judges.”825 
 
824  As noted in J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012), at 43. 
825  See G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles and Substantive Law” (1950) 
27 British Yearbook of International Law 1, at 2. 
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The Dataset bears witness to this reality, as the proportion of external precedents 826 
(column “Ex” below in Table 21) is nearly always higher in dissenting and separate opinions. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
 
/ Ex / Ex / Ex / Ex / Ex 
Dissent 99 1 94 6 75 25 94 6 
  
Decision 100 0 95 5 51 49 98 2 100 0 
Separate 99 1 89 11 76 24 87 13 
  
Pleadings 96 4 94 6 25 75 
  
100 0 
Pleadings (in 
decision) 
  
97 3 
  
92 8 100 0 
Table 21: Proportion of external precedents in citations  
Reading key: At the ICJ, around 1% of all citations to precedents in dissents are oriented 
towards non-ICJ precedents, while there is next to no such citation in ICJ decisions. 
This broader range of authorities might explain why the authorities cited in dissenting and 
concurring opinions are usually older on average than those cited in majority decisions, as seen in 
Table 13 in the preceding Chapter. This is also consistent with a model in which opinion writers are 
freer to engage with a larger set of materials in explaining their vote or their disagreement with the 
majority decision. 
B) Contrasts between “dissenting” and “separate” opinions 
What are the differences between dissenting and separate opinions? 
A preliminary point is in order: adjudicators are generally free to label their opinions as they 
think fit, and there are no standard criteria in this respect. Some concurring opinions, or even 
declarations, contain the most scathing criticisms of the related decision,827 while certain dissents 
are so mild as to be cosmetic.828 Separate opinions in particular are meant to reflect a “disagreement 
on reasoning but concurrence with result”829 – a relatively awkward position that soon turns into a 
 
826  I.e., authorities from outside a judge’s own forum. See further Chapter VIII below. 
827  See Mistry, supra note 765, at 297, and the examples cited. 
828  See Fitzmaurice, supra note 825, at 21, giving the example of an opinion styled as “dissenting” but for the most part actually concurring 
with the majority decision. 
829  See van den Berg, supra note 767, at 837. See also ITT Industries v. Iran, Award No. 47-156-2 (26 May 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-
U.S.C.T.R. 356, at 357, Note by Dr. Shafie Shafeiei Regarding the Concurring Opinion of George H. Aldrich. 
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certain kind of dissent. These considerations should colour the observations below, which rely on the 
way judges have themselves categorised their opinions in the various fora.  
Dissents and separate opinions first differ in terms of tone and sentiment. Anand aptly 
advised that a dissent “should express disagreement without being disagreeable”.830 This seems to 
be a tough line to walk, however. “Disagreeableness” can be roughly assessed by calculating the 
average “sentiment score” of a text.831 When comparing the score of dissents and separate opinions, 
the former are usually more negative (on average) than citing paragraphs in separate opinions.832 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT 
Dissenting 0.051 0.054 0.073 0.041 
Separate 0.07 0.075 0.068 0.064 
Table 22: Average sentiment score of dissents, separate opinions and judgments 
Reading key: Citing paragraphs in dissenting opinions at the ICJ have a sentiment score 
of 0.051, lower than separate opinions.  
Dissents are also distinctly longer than separate and concurring opinions. As Table 23 
indicates, however, this length does not result in a higher number of citations, as the ratio between 
the number of citations and the length of their opinions is lower for dissents than for separate 
opinions. This could reflect either a greater willingness to engage with the facts of a case (which 
would not prompt citations), or a greater tendency to ramble. Alternatively, it could also reflect a 
practice for authors of separate opinions to expound on a broader range of reasons, including reasons 
that have no support in precedents and teachings, to decide as they did. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT 
 
Dissenting Separate Dissenting Separate Dissenting Separate Dissenting Separate 
Length 9681 6685 9593 4823 5651 4630 5923 2700 
Citations per 
1,000 words 1.22 1.78 2.11 2.18 1.11 1.49 1.77 4.12 
 
830  See Anand, supra note 770, at 807. 
831  In data science, sentiment analysis assigns a score ranging from -1 to +1 to texts, with lower scores reflecting more “negative” language 
and tone. The analysis was performed on citing paragraphs and not on the entire text of an opinion for the same considerations that 
informed the collection of topics (see above, Chapter II), but also because sentiment analysis works best on shorter snippets of text. 
832  The differences are statistically significant for all fora, except for the ITLOS, the only fora where dissenting opinions are seemingly more 
positively-toned than separate ones. 
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Table 23: Length and number of citations per 1000 word  
Reading key: dissenting opinions at the ICJ are 9681-word long on average, with 1.22 
citations per 1,000 words. 
Prior studies have found that dissents at the US Supreme Court are more prone to cite 
scholarship.833 This is also the case in dissents at the ICJ and ITLOS, but not for dissents in 
investment arbitration and before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, where separate opinions contain 
more citations to teachings than dissents. 
While the reasons for this discrepancy are not altogether clear, it might reflect a distinction 
between the existence of appellate mechanisms of some sort; the different expected audiences of 
different courts, as explained above in Chapter IV, might also play a role. Dissenting judges at the 
ICJ and ITLOS, addressing themselves to the entire assembly of states, might be more inclined to 
explain at some length (and quite academically) why a majority erred. By contrast, dissenters in 
investment tribunals could be more preoccupied with crafting a punchier argument, and hope to 
convince appellate authorities of the weaknesses in the majority’s position.834  
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT 
 
Dissenting Separate Dissenting Separate Dissenting Separate Dissenting Separate 
ICJ 45 56 4 4 54 60 4 6 
INV 0 0 83 68 / / 0 1 
ITLOS 0 0 / / 18 19 / / 
IUSCT 0 0 1 2 / / 70 50 
WTO 0 / 0 1 / / / / 
Teachings 55 44 12 26 27 20 26 43 
Table 24: Percent of all citations to specific sources per type of opinion 
Reading key: citations to ICJ precedents amount to 45% of all citations in dissents at the ICJ 
 
833  See A. Feldman, “With a Little Help from Academic Scholarship” (31 October 2018) Empirical SCOTUS, available at: 
https://empiricalscotus.com/2018/10/31/academic-scholarship/ 
834  Not to mention that judges at the ICJ and ITLOS are more likely to benefit from more time and resources (in terms of research assistance, 
notably) than ad hoc arbitrators in writing their opinions. 
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 Table 24 also indicates that separate opinions in investment arbitration cases and at the 
IUSCT are much more likely to dedicate a substantial part of their citations to external precedents. 
However, this is not necessarily associated with separate opinions broaching a broader range of 
topics, as in both dissenting and separate opinions, the same number of unique topics account for 
the majority of citations. The above-average interest for non-forum citations in these separate 
opinions is accordingly unlikely to be an attempt to bring external topics into the jurisprudence – 
but rather more to inform their review of the case at hand with the experience of other fora. 
4. Conclusions 
Individual opinions (in the fora that allow them) have distinct citation practices, reflecting 
the greater freedom and idiosyncrasies of the judges who write them. In particular, the authorities 
cited in these opinions are broader in scope, age, or nature. There is no clear difference in this respect 
between dissenting and separate opinion, perhaps reflecting the fact that the distinction between 
these two types of opinions is itself to some extent artificial.  
Judges are however relatively likely to cite themselves, or to cite other judges. In so doing, 
they might pursue a strategic agenda to build up a set of common jurisprudence to which they can 
later rely. A similar strategic motive might underlie the practice of some judges to self-cite, notably 
when dealing with topics on which these judges intend to develop an expertise. 
These findings could support the view that the motives to write an opinion are, at least partly, 
to raise one’s profile, maybe in view of further appointments.835 The quality of the legal reasoning, 
in this respect, might not matter too much: as explained, there is no indication in the dataset that a 
dissent has an impact on the authoritativeness of the majority’s decision, nor that an individual 
opinion is likely to gain much authoritativeness itself. Most of the few citations to individuals 
opinions in the Dataset are found in other opinions, as well as in the pleadings of the parties. 
 
835  I reviewed such an hypothesis for investment arbitration, and found evidence that writing an opinion does indeed correlate with increased 
appointments down the line – though not necessarily with increased partisan appointment: see D. Charlotin, “Separate Opinions and 
Appointments in Investment Arbitration: Signalling and Crystallisation” (22 February 2018), available at 
https://medium.com/@damien.charlotin/separate-opinions-and-appointments-in-investment-arbitration-signalling-and-
crystallisation-1f5e838542c3.  
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Chapter VI – Citing authorities in pleadings 
  
Citing is not a practice specific to international law decisions and the opinions appended to 
them, but a ubiquitous feature of international dispute settlement, as evidenced by the fact that 
parties commonly cite authorities in their pleadings and submissions.836 If anything, authorities are 
even more important for parties than for courts and tribunals: parties will often try to rebut an 
unfavourable argument by challenging the authorities supporting it, and rarely miss a chance to 
point out when no authority is supporting the opposing party’s case.837 Parties (or at least, their 
counsel) likewise spend time and resource monitoring legal developments for more authorities and 
chances to sail on favourable jurisprudential and doctrinal winds.838 Some parties even engage in 
strategic moves that will create favourable authorities for future use.839 
 And yet, the use of authorities by disputing parties in international dispute settlement has 
been frequently overlooked by the literature, which tends to focus unhealthily on courts, tribunals 
and individual adjudicators. All too often, international legal scholarship implicitly proceeds on the 
assumption that international courts operate in a vacuum; that these court’s conclusions emerge all 
formed from the Olympian foreheads of the men and women on the bench. This approach overlooks 
that every case has been argued – sometimes exhaustively – before being decided, and as such “only 
 
836  See, e.g., Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández, Farewell speech, 21 May 2018, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ricardoramirezfarwellspeech_e.htm: “I’ve never seen a [WTO] Member who has not 
argued its case based on previous case law.” 
837  See Valores Mundiales, S.L. and Consorcio Andino S.L. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/11, Award 
(25 July 2017), at §801, where the tribunal preferred the submissions of the claimant’s experts over Venezuela’s because the former made 
“abundant and relevant reference to the financial literature, including to the opinions of renowned experts like Damodaran and Copeland, 
while the experts of [Venezuela] relied on subjective appreciations […]” (translation from original Spanish.) 
838  China Heilongjiang International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp., Beijing Shougang Mining Investment Company Ltd., and 
Qinhuangdaoshi Qinlong International Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Mongolia, PCA Case No. 2010-20, Award (30 June 2017), at §64, 
describing the tribunal setting up a “procedure for the Parties to introduce additional legal authorities in light of the extended time since 
the Parties’ written submissions.” 
839  See, e.g., M. Daku, K.J. Pelc, “Who Holds Influence over WTO Jurisprudence” (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 233, 
finding that the language used in some pleadings is later adopted by panel reports; on this criteria, wealthier, more litigation-seasoned 
countries exert much more influence over the content of WTO law irrespective of their record in winning the merits. 
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captures part of the picture.”840 A full account of the importance of authorities in international 
dispute settlement simply cannot ignore their use by parties to international proceedings. 
The following pages sketch the outlines of such an account. Just as with decisions and 
opinions, there are specific reasons and strategic considerations behind the citations to authorities 
in pleadings and other written submissions – the topic of section 1 below. Section 2 then tries to 
assess the weight of authorities in adjudicating a case on the merits. A third and last section will 
mention the use of pleadings as authorities. 
1. Strategic argumentation from authority 
A) No pleadings without authority 
It is the rare written submission now that cites no authority at all in support of what a party 
seeks from a Court or a tribunal. The ubiquity of legal authorities in pleadings does not only stem 
from a general practice adopted by parties, however: citations and recourse to authorities are 
sometimes explicitly required of them. Some tribunals explicitly ask parties to explain their 
positions on some legal matters and to “refer to apposite authorities.”841 Given these expectations, 
parties will sometimes explicitly acknowledge and explain why they have been unable to cite 
anything.842 As seen in Figure 15 below, the proportion of pleadings documents with at least one 
citation has been steadily growing for the past 20 years. 
 
840  S. Sivakumaran, “The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law” (2017) 66 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1, at 29: “Citation by States in pleadings is equally important but more frequently overlooked.” 
841  B-Mex, LLC and others v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/16/3, Procedural Order No. 5 (4 June 2018), on post-
hearing briefs, at 1(i), but also at 5, 6. Questions from the tribunal included, at 1(ii): “Is there any NAFTA or other authority directly 
answering the foregoing questions either in the affirmative or the negative?” or at 1(iii): “Please identify the NAFTA or other authorities 
addressing the question of […].” 
842  See, e.g., in Dunkwa Continental Goldfields Limited & Continental Construction and Mining Company Limited v. Ghana, ICC 
Case No. 18294/ARP/MD/TO, Final Award (30 July 2015), at §180, the Respondent “explain[ing] that it cannot point to a precedent 
for the application of the principle in a case such as this, because the Claimants’ case is so unorthodox.” 
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Figure 15: Percent of pleadings documents with at least one citation 
This is to be expected. As mentioned above, authorities “redistribute argumentative 
burdens”843: they often represent focal points and signals around which the parties will frame their 
debate. Consider for example the scope of MFN clauses in investment arbitrations, and the opposite 
positions represented by the awards in Maffezini v. Spain and Plama v. Bulgaria. The role of 
authorities in such circumstances is often to clarify the intellectual and jurisprudential lineage of 
the solution advocated by a party. 
Failing to cite a satisfying authority – or indeed, to cite any authority – readily becomes a 
chief argument to reject a party’s contention. In Olin v. Libya, for instance, the tribunal dismissed 
an argument from Libya by noting that “[…] the Respondent’s arguments in this respect: a) Are not 
supported by any legal authorities; […].”844 Alleging that the other party’s position is not backed up 
by proper authorities is a common argumentative device.845 
 
843  See A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Courts and Tribunals”, in Cesare Romano, 
Karen Alter and Yuval Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2013), at 504. 
844  See Olin Holdings Ltd v. Libya, ICC Case No. 20355/MCP, Award on Jurisdiction (28 June 2016), at §164(a). 
845  See Bridgestone Licensing Services, Inc. and Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/34, Panama’s 
Reply on Expedited Objections (7 August 2017), at §9, noting that “Claimants’ second assertion […] like their first, is unaccompanied 
by citation […]”. 
 On the other hand, excessive reliance on authorities can also being criticised. See, e.g., UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and 
C.D. Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Award (9 October 2018), at §86. 
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Parties are therefore likely incentivised to over-cite authorities, lest they miss out on the one 
authoritative source that will win them the argument.846 If the determining weight of any given 
authority is, on average, rather low (in the sense that it is the rare authority on which the entire 
case hinges847), their combination can however be more than the sum of their parts. If, as seen in 
Chapter III, consistency and unanimity are important features of authoritativeness, piling up 
authorities should reap authoritativeness harvests. 848  Besides, citing several authorities will 
reassure the adjudicator that an argument has been thoroughly and exhaustively briefed.  
All these strategic pressures explain why parties are significantly more likely to cite a large 
number of broad authorities in support of their reasoning, compared with courts and tribunals and 
individual judges. This “kitchen-sink” approach to citations is evidenced by the fact that around 55% 
of the paragraphs in the pleadings Dataset cite more than one authority.849 This approach might 
also explain why, as evidenced in Table 9 above (at p. 150), only a portion of the parties’ authorities 
find their way into a final decision. In this respect, citations by one side of a dispute might prompt 
more citations by the other side: in any given case, there is a very strong correlation (R² of 0.83) 
between the number of citations in claimants’ and respondents’ pleadings. As explained below, 
however, only a portion of citations between the two sets of pleadings are generally shared between 
the parties, indicating that each party is likely to match the other party’s level of citations by citing 
anything – and not necessarily the authorities cited in the other parties’ pleadings. 
 
846  J. Crawford, A. Pellet and C. Redgwell, “Anglo-American and Continental Traditions in Advocacy before International Courts and 
Tribunals” (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International & Comparative Law 715, at 13. See also the passive-aggressive observations of 
the tribunal in Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award (27 March 2007), 
at §88: “the transcript is 485 pages long”; “[t]he file occupies about five meters of shelf length”. 
847  This is reflected in the approach of some adjudicator to some authorities, whereby they wo not necessary read them entirely but work on 
the basis of rough familiarity. See, e.g., the comments of the Chair in Zbigniew Piotr Grot and others v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/16/8, Hearing on Jurisdiction and the Merits – Transcript, Day 1 (11 December 2017), at 34:10-14: “We have read 
everything. We have read the pleadings, we have read the exhibits, we have read the reports, we have read the witness statements. We are 
generally familiar with the authorities, and you can proceed on that basis.” 
848  See an interesting example in the set aside proceedings of the international award in Deutsche Telekom v. India, PCA Case No. 2014-10, 
Interim Award (13 December 2017). The Swiss Federal Tribunal recounted that the investor had allegedly criticised the state for citing 
a single authority in support of its definition of “investment”. The state then cited several authorities in reply and in defence. Remarkably, 
however, the Swiss judges found that DT never actually made this argument, and that India had just overreacted: see No. 4A_65/2018, 
Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (11 December 2018), at 3.2.1.2.4. 
849  This proportion however tracks the same measure in judgments and opinions, which also typically cite two or more authorities in 50% 
(the ICJ) to 65% (the IUSCT) of their paragraphs. 
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B) Ignoring authorities relied on by the other party 
Discussing authorities, like citing them, is costly. Parties need to spend resources researching 
ways to convincingly distinguish an adverse authority, or to find some other way to challenge the 
opposing party’s reliance on this adverse authority. 
They might sometimes be inclined to ignore them instead. Consider the following submission 
by Mexico in an investor-state arbitration, which is quite telling as to how parties see authorities as 
strategic tools in support of their argumentation: 
Finally, the Respondent notes that, in their submissions regarding Mexico’s objection 
to registration, the Claimants relied on several arbitral decisions and awards for their 
contention that the requirements under Article 1121 are merely procedural and can 
be cured at a later stage of the proceedings. Mexico has a response for each of them, 
but will not elaborate upon them here unless the Claimants reaffirm their reliance 
on them in their Counter-Memorial on jurisdiction. It simply bears noting that such 
arguments must be rejected because they violate the principle of effet utile, and also 
that the contemporary NAFTA jurisprudence and the consistent submissions of the 
NAFTA Parties together establish conclusively that Article 1121 must be applied as 
written.850 
In short, Mexico declined to engage in an individual rebuttal of the authorities relied by the 
claimant; at the same time, however, the state indicated that it was relying on sources that are more 
authoritative than what the claimants managed to marshal. (Mexico eventually discussed these 
authorities in its Reply in this case; ultimately, the tribunal ruled in favour of the claimants.851)  
Yet, the practice of ignoring authorities can be dangerous. In the Dataset, when an authority 
in a decision is not cited by both parties (in other words, when an authority has been ignored by one 
of the two parties), that authority is more likely than not to have been introduced in the pleadings 
of the prevailing party. Given, besides, the importance that most courts and tribunals grant to 
authorities that are cited by both parties (as greater portion of which is cited in the final decision, 
 
850  B-Mex, LLC and others v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/16/3, Mexico’s Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections 
(30 May 2017), at §93 
851  A divided tribunal eventually upheld jurisdiction over the case: see B-Mex, LLC and others v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/16/3, Partial Award (19 July 2019). 
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as seen in Table 9 above), parties are well advised not to miss the opportunity to discuss the 
authorities cited by the other party. 
C) Challenging authorities 
Given the now common reliance on authorities by international adjudicators, parties have an 
uphill challenge directly impugning an authority.852 For parties inclined to take that route, however, 
there are roughly two avenues to do so. 
First, criticisms often go to the substantial relevance of the authority, its persuasiveness writ 
large: an authority can be unpersuasive due to its intellectual merits, but also because it refers to a 
factual and legal situation that differs in one way or another. The second situation usually entails 
the process of distinguishing (or “reverse analogy”853). The idea is to lessen the challenged authority’s 
level of authoritativeness. 
A variant of this argument consists in pointing out that an authority does not say what it is 
purported to say. In EuroGas and Belmont v. Slovakia,854  for instance, the tribunal faulted a 
claimant’s for relying on only a (supportive) section of an (otherwise unsupportive) authority. In a 
twist, the tribunal later lent great weight to that authority (in its long form) in its own reasoning, 
observing that this authority’s authoritativeness was established by the fact that both parties had 
cited it (although the claimants had only cited a portion).855 
Some authorities are also sometimes challenged as simply not applicable because of their 
nature, regardless of their content. In other word, the goal of this type of argument is to deny any 
authoritativeness to the authority. This challenge is often framed in terms of “bindingness”, a chief 
concept at play by international parties to distinguish between relevant and non-relevant 
authorities.856 “Non-bindingness” notably took an important role in the answer of many investment 
tribunals to the European Court of Justice’s ruling in Achmea v. Slovak Republic, with arbitrators 
unvaryingly insisting that the latter’s authority was not binding upon them.857 
 
852  See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 843, at 511: “since courts have an interest in consistency and only very seldom overrule earlier 
decisions, parties are well advised to try to give precedents another spin rather than to argue for their reversal.” 
853  M. Jacob, “Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005, at 1028. 
854  EuroGas Inc. and Belmont Resources Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/14, Award (18 August 2017), at §413. 
855  Jacob, supra note 853, at 1029. 
856  See J. d’Aspremont, “Bindingness”, in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: Contributions to 
Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018). 
857  See, e.g., United Utilities (Tallinn) BV (UUTBV) and AS Tallinna Vesi (ASTV) v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/24, 
Award (21 June 2019), at §498. 
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There is evidence that parties do challenge the authorities relied upon by the opposing party, 
especially if this authority is, usually, more favoured by this opposing party (as claimant or 
respondent) in terms of citations. Using the source of citations to an authority as a proxy, it is indeed 
possible to find claimant-favoured authorities and respondent-favoured authorities. These 
authorities, in turn, are cited differently by the different parties, as claimants tend to talk about 
respondents’ authorities in more negative terms (e.g., these paragraphs have a lower sentiment 
score) and vice-versa. 
 
 Authority favoured by 
Claimant Respondent 
Paragraph 
by 
Claimant 0.0527 0.0431 
Respondent 0.0432 0.0463 
Table 25: Average sentiment score of paragraphs citing authorities 
Reading key: Paragraphs found in claimants’ pleadings discussing authorities more often 
cited by claimants have an average sentiment score of 0.0527, higher than paragraphs by 
respondents discussing the same claimant-favored authorities. Higher sentiment scores 
indicate a more positive tone in the text of these citations.858  
D) Sycophancy – does it pay? 
Parties spend a lot of time vetting adjudicators to appoint, scouring hell, earth, and heaven 
to find any opinion he or she ever uttered.859 But once that individual has been appointed, is it 
enough to trust him or her to stay faithful to his or her past opinions? The alternative is to try to 
strategically cite these past opinions in a given case, as a gentle reminder of the adjudicator’s past 
inclinations. 
This is not a not uncommon practice, as it represents 0.45% of all citations, and a full 2% of 
citations to teachings in pleadings. Without being necessarily obsequious, the idea is probably to 
 
858  Differences in averages are statistically significant. Only citations to precedents are counted here, as there are few citations to teachings 
that are distinctly cited by one party over another. 
859  C.N. Brower and C.B. Rosenberg, “The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van Den Berg Presumption That 
Party-Appointed Arbitrators Are Untrustworthy Is Wrongheaded” (2013) 29 Arbitration international 7, at 17. 
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work on the notion of consistency that, as demonstrated above (in Chapters III and IV), acts as a 
powerful factor in the authoritativeness of an authority. 
A telling example can be drawn from the experience of the ICJ: Peru in the Asylum case cited 
the opposing party’s ad hoc judge (and called him an “eminent author”) as supporting its case.860 
This citation came in support of an a contrario argument to demonstrate that nobody, not even its 
hand-picked judge, would follow Colombia’s arguments. Likewise, in China 
Heilongjiang v. Mongolia, the respondent enlisted on its side of the debate “the academic writings 
of Claimants’ own counsel.”861 
This does not seem to be a fruitful strategy, however, as the rate of such citations when 
controlling for outcomes does not differ in systematic ways for any of the fora studied here. 
Sycophancy, it seems, does not pay – although it is not clear that it entails costs either. 
A more widespread practice consists in citing authorities that merely involved one or more of 
the adjudicators in a given dispute: for instance, a precedent in which at least one of the adjudicators 
was already on the Bench. On this measure, around 14% of all citations by a party refer to a 
precedent or a writing related to at least one of the adjudicators on the Bench (column “S” in Table 
26 below862). This proportion however differs markedly between the different fora in the Dataset. 
The discrepancies are likely due to the fact that some fora have stable benches, and citing 
recent decisions will necessarily entail citing precedents in which the adjudicators have participated. 
Parties are however on average less likely than tribunals to engage in this practice: presumably 
because courts and arbitrators are often even more familiar with the precedents in which they 
participated themselves. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
 
/ S / S / S / S / S 
Pleadings 47.55 52.45 91.87 8.13 72.73 27.27 / / 96.87 3.13 
Pleadings 
(in decision / / 88.87 11.13 / / 62.79 37.21 92.11 7.89 
 
860  See Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), Rejoinder submitted by the Government of the Republic of Peru (15 June 1950), at 408-409. 
861  China Heilongjiang et al. v. Mongolia, supra note 838, at §261. See also Christian Doutremepuich and Antoine Doutremepuich v. The 
Republic of Mauritius, PCA Case No. 2018-37, Award (23 August 2019), at note 66, in which respondent cited claimant’s lead counsel. 
 As any good thing, parties might sometimes abuse citations to their adjudicators’ writings. 
862  Only citations to precedents from the same forum are counted in this analysis.  
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Dissenting 45.82 54.18 90.50 9.50 28.00 72.00 90.65 9.35 / / 
Judgment 37.49 62.51 87.09 12.91 20.98 79.02 53.64 46.36 88.90 11.10 
Separate 47.39 52.61 88.01 11.99 7.41 92.59 84.82 15.18 / / 
Table 26: Percent of citations to in-forum authorities involving adjudicators 
Reading key: parties in pleadings at the ICJ cite authorities in which at least one of the 
adjudicators has participated 52.45% of the time.863 
2. Measuring success in using authorities 
The precedent subsection leads to the broader questions of whether the strategic citation of 
authorities in pleadings has any weight in the outcome of a case. Ubiquitous as they are, are citations 
material in helping a party to prevail in a case and defeat an opposing party’s arguments?  
As mentioned above with respect to decisions, the ultimate role of authorities in determining 
a legal outcome is a question that is impossible to answer definitively. There is certainly a feeling 
that authorities, at their individual level, usually matter little.864 Yet, as with decisions, what the 
individual case level cannot reveal, a pattern of cases maybe can. With pleadings as well, the practice 
of citing authorities displays interesting patterns that could inform our appreciation of their role in 
the eventual decision. 
A) Citing as claimant or respondent 
In most instances, claimants cite more than respondents, either in terms of unique authorities 
or in terms of the total number of citations. This is expected: research in the context of US domestic 
courts has found that successful claimants cite more authorities than respondents, since the latter 
merely need to defend their case.865 The discrepancy, however, is not particularly large – although, 
as always, this needs to be qualified by the incomplete state of the pleadings Dataset. 
 
863  Observe also how this proportion increases between standalone pleadings and pleadings as summarised in decisions. To the extent the 
adjudicator is responsible for writing these summaries, it is unsurprising that he or she would focus on the authorities he or she knows 
best. 
864  See, e.g., Zbigniew Piotr Grot and others v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/8, Hearing on Jurisdiction and the 
Merits – Transcript, Day 1 (11 December 2017), at 31:5-9, about an objection to one authority (because it was only in Spanish), the 
following remarks by the chair: “My experience with these case [sic], both formally as counsel and now sitting as Arbitrator, is invariably 
you end up focusing on a single line of an arbitral award on which it would be extraordinary if a huge amount turned.”. 
865  See B. Hoover, “Introducing Clerk”, Judicata Blog (5 October 2017), available at https://blog.judicata.com/introducing-clerk-
848abbed8fd3.  
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ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Claimant 
All  45.8 41.6 16.9 4.2 12.1 
Unique  24.6 16.3 10.1 3.2 4.5 
Respondent 
All  35.1 37.9 47.2 4.7 11.2 
Unique  18.6 15.2 20.7 3.8 4.5 
Table 27: Citations in pleadings, average of total and of unique authorities cited 
Reading key: Claimants in ICJ proceedings cite authorities 45.8 times on average in their 
briefs, and 24.6 unique authorities on average. 
While claimants and respondents generally invoke a broad range of authorities in support of 
their respective cases, their corpora of authorities have but a limited overlap: on average, only 10% 
of the authorities cited by the parties are found in the pleadings of both parties. 
As indicated by Table 9 above, however, these authorities shared between two parties are more 
likely to be cited back by courts and tribunals – especially when counting only precedents.866 This is 
also, of course, because authorities cited by both parties will usually be at the centre of the debate, 
and thus more likely to be cited back by the adjudicators. Indeed, authorities shared between the 
parties have on average a higher PageRank score than authorities that are found on only one side 
of an opposite pair of submissions. 
Finally, claimants and respondents do not really differ in their use of different types of 
authorities: in any given pair of submissions, the proportions of teachings, or of external citations 
cited by claimants or respondents is roughly equivalent. 
 
866  For examples from the jurisprudence, see, e.g., Orascom TMT Investments S.à.r.l. v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/35, Award (31 May 2017), at §261: “Indeed, as can be seen from the excerpts quoted above, both Parties have 
invoked the same legal authorities in this particular respect. In particular, both Parties rely on Rompetrol and KT Asia.” See also European 
Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols from Indonesia, WT/DS442/R, Report of the Panel 
(16 December 2016), at note 206. 
 The argument that consists in stressing the parties’ agreement on an authority can be abused, however. For instance, in South American 
Silver Limited v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Osvaldo Guglielmino in dissent faulted the majority for its 
reliance on one academic article allegedly cited by both parties. The dissenter pointed out that (i) this was only one authority; and (ii) the 
parties did not actually agree on their interpretation of this authority. See Dissenting Opinion of Osvaldo Cesar Guglielmino 
(30 August 2018), at §224. 
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B) Contrast with the authorities cited in the decision 
These two types of citations, however, are much more common in pleadings compared to 
decisions (as indicated by Table 3 and Table 4 above). The willingness of parties to cite a broader set 
of authorities concords with the doctrinal observations of some authors,867 but also with common 
sense: since they are generally less concerned with the impact of one particular pleading on their 
future authoritativeness (as contrasted with courts),868 parties can be expected to cite a broader 
range of sources. 
The parties’ citing style is however not entirely disconnected from that of the adjudicators. 
The reluctance of courts to cite teachings should be expected to impact pleadings, for that reluctance 
indicates that citing only scholarship is a risky strategy.869 Given the generally higher status of 
precedents, scholarship is therefore usually reserved to contentions that are not well-settled by 
precedents.870 A general trend is observable in the Dataset, whereby citations by parties to teachings 
typically plunge between the early days of a forum and its more recent cases. For instance, between 
1949 and 2000, 40% of all citations in respondents’ briefs at the ICJ were to teachings, a proportion 
that has dropped to 16% since then. The few topics that remain frequently pleaded with reference 
to teachings are typically less-established in the case law. At the ICJ, for instance, pleadings (but 
also individual opinions) often cite teachings on questions of [Equity], a topic mostly discussed in 
scholarly teachings. 
The temporal scope of the authorities cited in pleadings is also usually broader than in 
decisions (but not individual opinions). As Table 28 below indicates, the average minimum age 
(column “Amin”) of authorities cited by claimants at the ICJ is 3.73 years, whereas the youngest 
authority cited by Court in judgments usually is on average twice as old. All other fora, by contrast, 
seem more mindful of integrating recent jurisprudence and teachings into their decisions: the 
 
867 See J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012), at 43: “There are many references to 
writers in pleadings before the Court.” 
868  Yet, consider the policy of some states to pursue coherent interpretation of some treaties (e.g., the NAFTA parties in investment 
arbitration) or of some fields of international law (e.g., France’s attitude with respect to the notion of jus cogens). 
869  See, for instance, Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on stay 
of enforcement of the award (12 August 1988): “The only authority relied on by MINE is the unsupported opinion of van den Berg” 
870  For instance, in Sedelmayer v. Russia, an early case in investment arbitration, the claimant cited three doctrinal articles for the proposition 
that the definition of an investor entailed the “control” over the investment, while Russia cited a commentary (in German) of the Germany 
USSR bilateral investment treaty. See Mr. Franz Sedelmayer v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 106/1998, Arbitration Award 
(7 July 1998). In the years since then, more than 95% of the citations associated with this topic cite to precedents. 
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average age of the youngest authority they cite being lower than the youngest age of the parties’ 
pleadings. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
 
Amin Amax Amin Amax Amin Amax Amin Amax Amin Amax 
Claimant 3.43 53.25 2.96 26.17 5.09 67.00 4.38 9.31 3.49 11.81 
Respondent 3.82 56.69 3.01 26.42 5.31 46.81 4.24 17.24 3.63 11.72 
Tribunal 6.81 29.97 2.64 27.27 4.72 22.66 2.79 9.54 1.52 14.66 
Opinion 3.73 58.14 3.79 31.85 5.92 41.88 8.88 33.12   
Table 28: Average age of authorities, per party 
Reading key: on average, the youngest authority cited claimants at the ICJ had a 
minimum age of 3.43 years, and the oldest a maximum age of 53.25 years. 
 Likewise, it is only at the ICJ that pleadings cite a larger number of unique authorities 
compared to the average judgment. Although this should be qualified by the lack of exhaustive 
pleadings data for the other fora, this is likely a feature of the ICJ having a more parsimonious style 
of writing. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Claimant 25.57 16.22 10.05 3.29 4.42 
Respondent 19.55 15.22 20.74 4.25 4.53 
Tribunal 7.14 19.45 12.21 15.96 24.49 
Table 29: Average number of unique authorities cited by party  
Reading key: on average, claimants before the ICJ cite 25.57 unique authorities in their 
pleadings, while the Court makes do with an average of 7.14 
 This writing style also possibly explains why ICJ decisions cite authorities that are much 
more authoritative on average than the authorities found in the parties’ pleadings – whereas in 
other fora the average PageRank score of decisions track the average of the parties’ pleadings. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Claimant 9.2 6.9 9.2 3.1 8.1 
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Respondent 9.1 6.4 7.9 3.1 8.2 
Tribunal 14.6 6.8 5.1 5.0 8.2 
Table 30: Average PageRank score of cited authorities 
Reading key: the average PageRank of authorities cited by claimants and respondents at 
the ICJ is 9.2 and 9.1 respectively, while the PageRank of authorities cited by the Court 
itself is higher by a half 
C) Authorities in final decisions 
Turning, finally, to the main question: do the parties’ citations affect the outcome of a dispute? 
As indicated in Table 10 above (in Chapter IV), only a portion of the citations found in decisions 
originated from the pleadings of the parties. Controlling for outcome, as done in Table 31 below, 
adds nuance to this observation. 
Indeed, investment tribunals, the IUSCT and the ITLOS seemingly draws more from the 
authorities cited by the prevailing party (although only marginally for investment tribunals).871 The 
WTO DSB, by contrast, tends to cite more authorities cited by respondents, whatever the outcome 
of a case, whereas the situation is inversed at the ICJ, which consistently prefers to cite authorities 
cited by claimants. 
These discrepancies might indicate different adjudicative styles: investment tribunals are 
more focused on resolving a dispute and will adopt a reasoning (and cite authorities) consonant with 
the argument of the prevailing party; the ICJ and WTO, with an eye to their broader audiences, 
might want to discuss at length the cases of claimants and respondents respectively. 
 
Outcome in favour of ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Authorities cited by 
Claimant 
Claimant 39.0 27.9 3.4 6.2 8.3 
Respondent 26.4 27.4 0.0 4.3 18.9 
Authorities cited by 
Respondent 
Claimant 29.4 25.6 6.8 4.7 11.8 
Respondent 25.2 27.2 10.6 26.5 22.3 
Table 31: Ratio of authorities in decisions also found in pleadings 
 
871  As usual, these findings need to be caveated by the limited Dataset with respect to pleadings. 
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Reading key: When a claimant prevails at the ICJ, 39% of the authorities cited by the 
Court are also cited by that claimant, a ratio that fells to 26.4% when respondent prevails. 
Beyond this, the parties’ citation practice rarely predict outcomes in a reliable manner. The 
age of the authorities cited, for instance, seems to have little impact on who prevails in a given case, 
although the prevailing party tend to cite the youngest authority on average. Likewise, for the size 
of submissions: while in the US context, scholars found a strong correlation between submission 
length and outcomes at the appellate level (despite the frequent diatribes of federal judges against 
overly long briefs872), extra length does not correlate with the outcome of the disputes before the ICJ. 
The only other feature that seems to have an impact in this respect, albeit limited, is the range 
of authorities cited by a party. Although claimants tend to cite more than respondents in all cases 
(as seen above) and whoever the prevailing party, the difference between claimants and respondents 
fluctuates with the outcome of a dispute: cases won by claimants are characterised by claimants 
citing an extra average of unique authorities compared to cases in which respondent prevailed. In 
other words, it seems that citing more unique authorities helps to prevail in a case. This is consistent, 
once again, with the role of consistency in establishing authoritativeness. 
 
Outcome in favour of ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Claimant 
CLAIMANT 30.8 16.6 10.6 3.6 3.2 
RESPONDENT 24.6 16.0 1.3 1.8 8.7 
Respondent 
CLAIMANT 21.9 14.5 18.9 3.8 3.9 
RESPONDENT 18.6 16.2 20.3 4.0 8.5 
Table 32: Number of unique authorities cited per party and per outcome 
Reading key: claimants cite on average 30.8 authorities in cases they win at the ICJ, as 
opposed to 24.6 in cases where respondent prevailed. This is then a difference of 6.2 extra 
unique authorities cited by claimants in cases where claimants prevail. 
 
872  See G. Sisk and M. Heise, “‘Too Many Notes’? An Empirical Study of Advocacy in Federal Appeals” (2015) 12 Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 578. 
The World Court also likes to complain of the length of the parties submissions: see R. Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart 
Publishing 2013), at 1017. 
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Finally, prevailing parties at the ICJ (the forum with the most exhaustive data on citations 
in pleadings) do cite authorities characterized by a higher PageRank score on average. This indicates, 
although this is far from a surprise, that citing authoritative authorities likely helps in prevailing 
in a case. 
3. Pleadings as cited authorities 
Pleadings do cite authorities; pleadings can also, themselves, sometimes serve as authorities. 
Citations to pleadings were not collected in the Dataset, and it is unclear how prevalent the 
practice is. A few examples, however, indicate that citing pleadings as an authority is not unknown 
in international dispute settlement. 
The bulk of this kind of citations is likely to be found not in decisions, or even in individual 
opinions, but in other pleadings. Frequently, briefs and submissions serve as instruments to 
interpret treaties. This is particularly plain in arbitrations under the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”), as NAFTA parties routinely refer to available pleadings and submissions of 
themselves or of their NAFTA counter-parties.873 Likewise, in Bridgestone v. Panama, Panama 
chose to debate the interpretation of the denial-of-benefit clause in the underlying investment treaty 
with reference to a submission of the United States, the investor’s host state, in an unrelated case 
(Renco v. Peru) that involved a similar clause.874 In the same vein, pleadings are also sometimes 
cited as evidence of state practice.875 
More interestingly (especially in view of Chapter VIII below), pleadings also evidence the 
limits of international law. Cases in which some pleadings and contentions were disregarded, 
contradicted, or dismissed by an international adjudicator indicate the boundaries of what is an 
authoritative legal argument and what is not. For instance, in US & Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York v. Iran & Bank Markazi, the tribunal dismissed an argument by Iran by pointing that a similar 
argument by Slovakia had been dismissed in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case.876 
 
873  See, e.g., B-Mex and Others v. Mexico, Mexico’s Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections, supra note 850, at §84, citing a U.S. amicus brief 
in BG Group v Argentina, UNCITRAL, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae (10 May 2013).  
874  See Bridgestone Licensing Services, Inc. and Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/34, Panama’s 
Reply on Expedited Objections (7 August 2017), at §12. 
875  See e.g., Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, U.S. Rejoinder on Competence and 
Liability (1 October 2001), at 43, citing the UK’s pleadings in Anglo-American Oil Co v. Iran. 
876  See Case No. A28, Dec. No. 130-A28-FT (19 December 2000), at §§81-82. 
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Further cases of unrelated pleadings being cited in a decision are presumably exceedingly 
rare.877 Yet, there are multiple instances of pleadings being cited in individual opinions of ICJ judges, 
on various subjects. At the ICJ, an important part of these citations refers to the pleadings in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf case, a case whose judgment tops the list of most-cited authorities in 
the Dataset.878 It is possible that, just like authoritative authorities become more authoritative over 
time,879 a sort of “halo effect” operate such that the documents associated with these authorities 
acquire their own derived authority. 
4. Conclusions 
The citation practice of parties in international dispute settlement is shaped by strategic 
pressures, and notably the concern of not citing enough. The fact that international courts and 
tribunals increasingly expect parties to explicitly list the authorities they rely on, and the risks 
involved in ignoring authorities cited by the other party, contribute to this concern, and create a self-
reinforcing pattern of increasing citations among the parties – as evidenced by the clear and strong 
correlation between the number of citations in the parties’ pleadings. 
This results in a frequent “kitchen-sink” approach to the citation of authorities in a given 
case. This is especially the case for claimants, who on average cite more authorities than respondents 
– as expected from the fact that they bear the onus of proving their legal arguments.  
There are indications that this “kitchen-sink” approach is useful to an extent, but only insofar 
parties cite more unique authorities than the other party. Besides, and in accordance with intuition, 
parties citing more authoritative authorities tend to get the upper hand in a dispute – a conclusion 
that underlines how important it is to better pin down what makes an authority authoritative, as 
discussed in Chapter III above. 
 
877  See K. Ameli, “Confidentiality of Arbitral Proceedings before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal” (2010) paper presented to the 
International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, at 3.  
878  See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 38, Separate 
opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, and the several references to the pleadings in the North Sea Continental Shelf case. 
879  The notion of “Preferential Attachment” explained above, at p. 134. 
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Chapter VII – External citations 
  
As seen in the four previous Chapters, the practice of citing precedents and teachings in 
international dispute settlement is widespread. In the next two Chapters, two consequences of this 
widespread practice for the authoritativeness of authorities are reviewed in more details. First, 
Chapter VII reviews the role played by authorities in the fragmentation of international law, and 
notably within the judicial dialogue meant to remedy it. Second, and in a more general manner, 
Chapter VIII identifies the role of authorities in international law in general, and what this entails 
for the set of authoritative authorities. 
It should not be surprising to see courts and tribunals, individual judges, and parties cite the 
jurisprudence of the forum hearing a case.880 This type of citation plays maximally on the features 
of authoritativeness noted above, including the ideas of consistency, consensus, and the natural 
inclination of courts and tribunals to take into account their own precedents.  
This differs however from “external citations”, whereby a precedent from another forum is 
cited as an authority; these citations entail different considerations and their own set of issues and 
questions.881 The jurisprudence displays a range of positions with respect to these citations, from 
the (usually tacit) fear of some adjudicators that citing to other courts and tribunals will undermine 
their own authority, to the hopes of others that external citations will foster a “judicial dialogue” 
that could remedy the fragmentation of international law.882  
Even the latter position however does not suffice to hide pervading suspicions attached to 
external citations, which will frequently be suspected of amounting to cherry-picking by adjudicators 
pressed to justify their conclusions, somehow. To a large extent, the “alien-ness” of external 
authorities is bound to impact their authoritativeness; citations to external authorities should 
 
880  C.P. Romano, “Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue” (2008) 41 NYU Journal of International law 
and Politics 755, at 758: “[…] judicial autarchy and self-reference are the default posture of international courts. […] citing in 
international judgments will generally be done sparingly, selectively, and reluctantly.” 
881  D. Charlotin, “Of Islands and Bridges: an empirical Study of Citations between World Courts”, Sciences Po’s Parcours d’Iniation à la 
Recherche memorial, directed by Horatia Muir-Watt, on file with the author. 
882  See below, note 910, and the quote from Judge Greenwood. 
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remain exceptional. Conversely, however, the authoritativeness of these authorities should have an 
impact on their likelihood of being cited by a different forum. 
Section 1 below first reviews the debate regarding the fragmentation of international law, 
before turning, in Section 2 to what might prompt a court to cite another forum. Finally, Section 3 
will investigate what, to the contrary, could discourages external citations between different fora. 
1. Background: fragmentation of international law and judicial dialogue 
A) Fragmentation 
Much has been written and said about the fragmentation of international law, to the extent 
that some scholarly fatigue might have taken hold. (Recent works argue that it could be time to say 
farewell to the concept.883) The concept of fragmentation relates to the increased risk of different 
bodies of international law developing concurrently and, god forbids, contradictorily. The 
phenomenon is fed by the “proliferation” of new courts and tribunals entrusted with the task of 
settling international law disputes. 884  These courts and tribunals’ sometimes overlapping 
jurisdictions is, in this narrative, prone to conflicting interpretation of international law.885  
This proliferation arises out of two broad trends: the regionalisation and specialisation of 
international law. 886  For Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, in the “increasing density and 
complexity” of international law, fragmentation is both symptom and cause. The fuzzy boundaries 
of some international legal systems compound the issue, as an increasing number of fora finds 
themselves dealing with question straddling several regimes of international law.887 This growing 
complexity is at the advantage of more powerful states, who strategically exploit the cracks in the 
system for their own benefit.888 
The literature on fragmentation has frequently been focused on assessing the seriousness of 
the phenomenon in the actual practice of international courts and tribunals. Few cases of overt 
 
883  M. Andenas and E. Bjorge, A Farewell to Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
884  C. Rogers, “The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators” (2013) 12 Santa Clara Journal International Law 223, at 257. 
885  F. Zarbiyev, “Saying Credibly What the Law Is: On Marks of Authority in International Law” (2018) 9 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 291, at 299. 
886  See L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Plurality in the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a Managerial Approach: A 
Rejoinder – Fears and Anxieties” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1275, at 30-31. 
887  S. Puig, “Experimentalism, Destabilization and Control in International Law: Afterword to Laurence Boisson de Chazournes’ Foreword” 
(2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1267, at 1272. 
888  E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, “The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law” (2007) 
60 Stanford law review 595. 
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fragmentation, some have pointed out, are markedly problematic, while the same examples of 
inconsistent rulings are unavoidably always cited.889 On the other hand, and despite the best efforts 
of international legal scholars, many conflicts might just be under-reported.890 Besides, and in any 
case, the pragmatic observation that there are few conflicts does not however necessarily assuage 
more principled fears regarding the phenomenon. 
The threat of increasing fragmentation also stems from circumstances that are not expected 
to disappear, such as the fact that courts and tribunals are irremediably prone to favour their own 
jurisprudence and jurisdiction (so as to maintain their relevance and activity in the future). This 
inclination in turn is the fate of every organisation bent on ensuring its survival – that is to say, of 
every organisation.891 The problem is further compounded by the fact that ensuring the coherence 
of international law might occasionally conflict with the plain duty of adjudicators to rule on the 
dispute before them. 892  The preference for internal over external authorities is, under these 
circumstances, unsurprising.893 
B) Judicial dialogue 
Solutions have been offered to the fragmentation problem, most notably in a report by the 
ILC that focused on the law of treaties as a tool to ensure some kind of coherence. 894 Others, 
meanwhile, have insisted on the need to mitigate the risks associated with fragmentation by 
fostering a “judicial dialogue” between international courts and tribunals. If international 
adjudicators lent attention to what is happening in other fora, and remained vigilant not to let 
international law take contradictory courses, the argument goes, the worst of fragmentation might 
be averted.  
 
889  Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 886, at 32. See also R. Higgins, “A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench” (2006) 
55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 791, at 797. 
890  See Y. Shany, “Plurality as a Form of (Mis) Management of International Dispute Settlement: Afterword to Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes’ Foreword” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1241, at 1248, opining that adjudicators might deliberately 
stay mute as to the consequences of their findings in light of the broader international jurisprudence. 
891  “Organisation survival” is a key assumption in the sociology of organisations: see, e.g., T. Watson, Sociology, Work and Organisation 
(Routledge 2012), at 155. 
892  Shany, supra note 890, at 1245. 
893  See, e.g., Zbigniew Piotr Grot and others v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/8, Hearing on Jurisdiction and the Merits, 
Transcript, Day 1 (11 December 2017), at 30:22-24, in which the investor opposed Moldova’s reliance on the award in Rhone & Cervin v. 
Costa Rica; the chair (Phillipe Sands), after asking which type of award it was, opined that: “As an ICSID Tribunal, it is a little difficult 
for one ICSID Tribunal to say we are not going to have regard to another one.” 
894  United Nations, International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law”, A/CN.4/L.682, available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf. 
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External citations do seem to be increasing in the Dataset, especially since the turn of the 
century when most of the fora studied here started to operate. This is all the more remarkable than, 
as mentioned below, it is frequent for fora to display a large proportion of external citations at their 
beginnings and before they have had the opportunity to build their own body of jurisprudence. 
 
Figure 16: Percent of external citations in the Dataset, 12-month moving average 
This phenomenon is partly spurred by individual international lawyers, as the same 
individual populate the participants in disputes between the various courts and tribunals in the 
Dataset.895 The frequent citations to WTO jurisprudence in Continental Casualty v. Argentina,896 for 
instance, have been related to Giorgio Sacerdoti, a former AB Member, chairing that case. 897 
Conversely, one of the few citations to investment jurisprudence by parties in WTO proceedings was 
to a case chaired by a former chairman of the Appellate Body.898 
In the same vein, Fuad Zarbiyev observed that “decisions or opinions issued by arbitrators 
with a public international law background are often replete with references to the case law of the 
ICJ, [while] decisions issued by arbitrators with a different background often contain few if any such 
references.”899 There is evidence for this view in the data, as tribunals that comprise an ICJ judge, 
past or present, cite half as much more ICJ decisions as tribunals that do not. (Investment awards 
 
895  See Zarbiyev, supra note 885, at 310. 
896  Continental Casualty Co. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award (5 September 2008). 
897  As noted in A. Stone Sweet and F. Grisel, The Evolution of International Arbitration: Judicialization, Governance, Legitimacy 
(Oxford University Press 2017), at 164. 
898  See United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, Report of the Panel 
(10 November 2004), Annex C, responses of Canada to questions from the Panel, citing the award in ADF Group Inc. v. United States 
of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award (9 January 2003). Canada even made sure to mention that Mr. Florentino Feliciano 
was President of that tribunal, without mentioning his co-arbitrators. 
899  See Zarbiyev, supra note 885, at 309: “in investment arbitration, the authority of the ICJ is not felt with the same intensity depending on 
the composition of arbitral tribunals. 
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with ICJ judges on the tribunal are also ever-so-slightly more likely to be cited in the future, and 
have in general a marginally higher PageRank score.)  
 
No ICJ judge on tribunal ICJ judge on tribunal 
ICJ 1.62 2.22 
INV 85.72 86.22 
ITLOS 0.01 0.04 
IUSCT 2.23 1.86 
WTO 0.07 0.03 
Teachings 9.86 8.68 
Table 33: Percent of external citations in INV, depending on presence of ICJ Judge on tribunal 
Reading key: 2.22% of all citations by investment tribunals that comprise an ICJ judge 
are directed to ICJ precedents, as opposed to only 1.62% for tribunals that do not 
If a dialogue is to be had, however, the onus should fall on all participants in international 
law proceedings.900 Secretariats and registrars, for instance have an important role to play in this 
respect.901  This is also, if not more, true of the parties to international disputes. In the very 
Continental Casualty case mentioned above, the claimant took care to argue its case based on AB 
jurisprudence – and notably on jurisprudence in which the tribunal’s chair had participated.902 As 
can be seen in Table 34 below, pleadings are the prime supplier of external citations in any given 
case. Parties therefore have a role in ensuring that tribunals are fully briefed as to the systemic 
relevance of their findings.903 Fortunately, fostering this judicial dialogue is also often in the interest 
of parties themselves.904  
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Dissenting 5.81 4.21 7.39 40.94 / 
Judgment 2.49 36.12 23.86 27.17 59.26 
 
900  On top of the judges and parties mentioned below, see also T. Streinz, “Winners and Losers of the Plurality of International Courts and 
Tribunals: Afterword to Laurence Boisson de Chazournes’ Foreword” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1251, at 1255, 
also mentioning clerks, research assistants, etc. 
901  G. Sacerdoti, “Remarks by Giorgio Sacerdoti” (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings 168, at 168. 
902  Stone Sweet and Grisel, supra note 897, at 164. 
903  Sacerdoti, supra note 901, at 168. 
904  See Sir F. Berman, “Authority in International Law” (2018) KFG Working Paper Series, no. 22, at 10: “it would be unthinkable for a 
litigating State, and possibly irresponsible so far as its counsel are concerned, not to cite to the ICJ the reasoned and considered decisions 
of other bodies in comparable cases.” 
215 
 
Separate 7.47 0.92 21.55 24.80 / 
Pleadings 84.23 43.62 47.20 / 24.69 
Pleadings (in decision) / 15.12 / 7.09 16.05 
Table 34: Percent of external citations per forum and per type of document 
This does not mean that external citations are a panacea to fragmentation. As any citation, 
external citations can also obfuscate complicated debates, and the adoption of a concept from one 
system to another might alter that concept.905 External citations do not necessarily take place in “a 
friendly, almost bucolic, environment in which actors, driven by a shared desire to avoid 
discrepancies and achieve coherence, respectfully listen to each other.”906  
Yet, as explained in the next Chapter, citations matter beyond their mere application to a 
given case: they indicate, for future disputes and future parties, the boundaries of what can be cited 
and what cannot. A growing practice of citing externally, therefore, should foster the habit of parties 
and adjudicators to consider the jurisprudence and practice of external fora – and argue from it. 
Adjudicators should also be mindful that their decision “have effects beyond individual disputes. 
They exceed the confines of concrete cases and bear on the general legal structures.”907 Adjudicators 
need to be careful of what they cite in view of future citations.908 
All in all, however, the “judicial dialogue” theme has seemingly taken its due space at the 
back of the adjudicators’ mind – some of them anyway.909 Judge Greenwood for instance held in an 
2012 opinion at the ICJ, that “[i]nternational law is not a series of fragmented specialist and self-
contained bodies of law, […] it is a single, unified system of law and each international court can, 
and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals.”910 
 
905  See J. Odermatt, “The International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European Union: Between Fragmentation and 
Universality of International Law”, forthcoming in William A. Schabas and Shannonbrooke Murphy (eds.), Research Handbook on the 
International Court of Justice (Edward Elgar 2019). 
906  V. Bílková, “The Threads (or Threats?) of a Managerial Approach: Afterword to Laurence Boisson de Chazournes’ Foreword” (2017) 
28 European Journal of International Law 1259, at 1261. 
907  See A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers”, in Armin von Bogdandy and 
Ingo Venzke (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking (Springer 2012), at 3. 
908  See the examples cited in A. Pellet, “Should We (Still) Worry about Fragmentation?”, in Andreas Føllesdal and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), The 
Judicialization of International Law: A Mixed Blessing? (Oxford University Press 2018), starting at 230.  
909  R. Wolfrum, Statement to the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (29 October 2007), at 6-7. 
910  Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 324, 
Declaration of Judge Greenwood, at 394.  
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2. Citations to other fora 
International courts and tribunals do cite external precedents – they just do not do so 
consistently, to the same extent, or following any kind of clear or explicit rules. This is in part due 
to a lack of explicit rules on this respect,911 leaving external citations a pure matter of practice, 
susceptible to change over time and to differ markedly between fora. 
External citations, although growing in importance, remain relatively rare, as they amount 
to less than 5% of all citations to the fora in the Dataset. As noted in Figure 11 above, a modularity 
analysis over the full network of citations overlaps remarkably well with the network’s divisions 
between fora – which indicates that internal citations are much more frequent than external 
citations.  
Two further observations stand out and are reviewed in turn below: (i) the International 
Court of Justice has assumed a central place in international jurisprudence; and (ii) not all topics 
are similarly prone to attract external citations. 
A) Centrality of the ICJ 
A critical aspect of external citations at the international level is that, in line with its own 
aspirations, the ICJ has attained a certain centrality in the view of other international courts and 
tribunals. 912  Recognising this importance is now a lieu commun. 913  Even when they deny the 
existence of any “hierarchy” proper in international law,914 it seems fair to say that international 
adjudicators “do look to the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and are aware 
of its judgments and so forth.”915 
 
911  One exception resides in the status of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138, article 20: “[t]he Judges of the Appeal 
Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda”. See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 886, at 39, for further examples. 
912  For instance for the WTO’s Appellate Body, see G. Sacerdoti, “Precedent in The Settlement of International Economic Disputes: The 
WTO And Investment Arbitration Models”, in Arthur W. Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: 
The Fordham Papers (Brill 2011) 225, at note 47. 
913  See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 886, at 21-22, and 24. 
See also S. McCaffey, “Remarks by Stephen McCaffey” (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 170. 
914  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, Judgment (25 May 2001), at §15, with the Appeals Chamber opining that: 
[T]his Tribunal is an autonomous international judicial body, and although the ICJ is the “principal judicial organ” 
within the United Nations system to which the Tribunal belongs, there is no hierarchical relationship between the two 
courts. 
915  See remarks by McCaffey, supra note 913, at 170. 
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The ICJ accounts for the major part of all external citations in the Dataset, and is by far the 
main target of citations for all non-ICJ fora, as seen in Table 35 below. 
 
ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
ICJ  61.8 99.0 96.5 86.4 
INV 26.3  0.8 3.5 9.9 
ITLOS 21.4 0.3    
IUSCT 46.2 31.5 0.2  3.7 
WTO 6.1 6.4 0.1   
Total of External Citations 262 4443 1731 254 81 
Table 35: Percent of external citations’ target per forum 
Reading key: 26.3% of the 262 external citations in the ICJ’s jurisprudence are directed 
to investment arbitration awards, and another 21.4% to ITLOS decisions 
Why this predominance? The features of authoritativeness identified in Chapter III above 
certainly explain part of it. The Court is widely held to be composed of experts in international law, 
and gains from the authority of its individual members, which are numerous and diverse (not to 
mention that acceding to a seat on its bench is seen as the pinnacle of any international legal career). 
The Court’s judgments are published and available in English (and French), while its proceedings 
evidence a high level of process, with each case going through lengthy written and oral submissions 
by both parties. 
A further part of this hegemony is also likely the result of a sociological process. International 
law remains taught through heuristics that divide it between a “general” practice and specialised 
one. In this context, “general” international law is especially associated with the ICJ, itself seen as 
the embodiment of a socially-sanctioned expertise in general international law. In other words, 
“generations of so-called ‘generalist international lawyers’ have equated public international law 
with its representation by the ICJ.” 916  Crucially, this impression is seemingly shared by 
international adjudicators themselves:  
In [their] minds, international courts seem to be divided between generalists (like 
the ICJ) and specialists (all others), and between regional courts and the so-called 
 
916  See Zarbiyev, supra note 885, at 304. 
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universal courts, that is to say, those whose jurisdiction is not restricted to any 
particular geographic area.917 
This explanation fits well with the data, as the Court is indeed mostly cited on topics of 
general international law, such as the law of treaties or of international responsibility. In a speech 
to the UN, the President of ITLOS smiled at the Tribunal’s practice of citing ICJ precedents, and 
described it as a “constructive manner of maintaining consistency in international law and 
reinforcing the necessary coherence between general international law and the law of the sea.”918 
This is not necessarily a pure question of reserving general international law question to the ICJ, 
however, as the borrowings can help foster a forum’s own contributions to general international law. 
Although the WTO’s Appellate Body, notably, has often cited the ICJ on matters of interpretation,919 
this did not prevent it from developing its own influential case law on the subject.920 
The ICJ’s importance on matters of general international law is readily observable in the 
topics that bring up citations to the World Court in other fora – although different fora find an 
interest in different topics from the ICJ.  
INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
Remedy Delimitation Nationality Obligations 
Jurisdiction Dispute Provisional 
Measures 
Interpretation 
Dispute Jurisdiction Interpretation Governing Law 
Prima Facie 
Jurisdiction 
Provisional 
Measures 
Jurisdiction Dispute 
Expropriation Negotiations Procedure State 
Responsibility 
Table 36: Top 5 most frequent topics of citation to the ICJ, per forum 
The ICJ’s predominance in the field of general international law is by now well-established. 
It might even have resulted, in some contexts, in a kind of intimidation of other courts and tribunals, 
 
917  D. Terris, C. Romano and L. Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), at 121. 
918  See Wolfrum, supra note 909, at 7. 
919  See, e.g., China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, WT/DS363/R, Report of the Panel (21 December 2009), at §396, note 705.  
920  See M. Waibel, “International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation”, in Rainer Hofmann and Christian J. Tams (eds.), International 
Investment Law and General International Law : from Clinical Isolation to Systemic Integration? (Nomos 2011), observing that the 
WTO interpretative practice has been “radiant”; more generally, I. van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body 
(Oxford University Press 2009). See also Table 37 below. 
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as is generally bound to happen in a core-periphery framework.921 In this respect, this illustrates 
well Makane Moïse M’Bengue’s proposition that precedents set by international courts and tribunals 
are: 
thus in reality an instrument of domination, in particular in an era of multiplication 
of international courts and tribunals. It allows international courts and tribunals to 
put themselves, consciously or unconsciously, into a nexus of hierarchical positions.922 
B) Topics prompting external citations 
Table 37 below retraces the 10 most cited topics underlying citations to the precedents of the 
five fora studied in the Dataset. Investment tribunals and the IUSCT are primarily cited on matters 
of expropriation, while the ICJ is most often cited on questions of delimitation (although virtually 
only by the ITLOS). The influence of the WTO’s jurisprudence on matters of interpretation, 
meanwhile, has been noted in the literature.923 
Forum ICJ INV ITLOS IUSCT WTO 
# Number of 
citations to 
2,784 100 71 1,525 302 
Top 10 Topics 
Delimitation Expropriation Territory Expropriation Interpretation 
Jurisdiction Dispute Delimitation Quantum Discrimination 
Interpretation Negotiations Environment Damages Proof 
Dispute Annulment Costs Interest Obligation 
Remedy Interpretation Customary Shareholders Products 
Provisional 
Measures 
Provisional 
Measures Procedure Evidence Control 
Prima Facie 
Jurisdiction Equity Risk Remedy Evidence 
Customary 
Exhaustion of 
remedies Interpretation Argument Argument 
Governing Law Argument 
Provisional 
Measures Jurisdiction Due Process 
 
921  See Zarbiyev, supra note 885, at 305, note 84, citing the Concurring Opinion of Judge Peollonpää, joined by Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza, in 
Al Adsani v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (21 November 2001), at §2. Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Caflisch, joined by Judge Ziemele in Hirschhorn v. Romania, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment (26 June 2007), at §2. 
922  See M.M. M’Bengue, “Precedent”, in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: Contributions to 
Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018), at 717. 
923  See Waibel, supra note 920. 
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Expropriation Control Vessels Contract Dumping 
Table 37: top 10 most cited topic from each forum 
Just like the ICJ is cited on matters of general international law, specialised fora will often 
be cited on matters in which they specialise.924 Accordingly, decisions from the ITLOS are cited on 
Law of the Sea matters, decisions from the WTO on trade matters, etc. There is likely, in this respect, 
a first-mover advantage whereby certain fora acquire a reputation for developing expertise with 
respect to a particular field.925 This reputation might be more important for its authority than a 
forum’s exact output. For instance, the perceived specialisation of the IUSCT on questions of 
[Expropriation] made it a prime source on this topic (especially before the rise of investor-state 
arbitration) – notwithstanding that the Algiers Accords had a definition of “taking” that was much 
broader than customary international law on expropriation, or even broader than most BITs.926 
Beyond this, however, external citations fall in two main (and non-exclusive) 
categories: (i) filling gaps in the jurisprudence and (ii) developing the boundaries of a common 
judicial function. 
Gaps 
One of the main reasons to cite an external authority is often, simply, a lack of internal 
guidance or precedent on a given topic – such that the decision-maker will attempt to draw 
inspiration from other courts and tribunals when dealing with a matter of first impression. Faced 
with a new procedural development (a request for interpretation), the tribunal in Wena v. Egypt 
expressed it as such:  
Wena’s Application for Interpretation is the first request of its kind ever received by 
ICSID. Accordingly, no previous decisions by ICSID arbitral tribunals exist that deal 
with the purpose, scope and limits of the interpretation procedure. However, in 
making its decision, the Tribunal was able to rely not only on the relevant provisions 
of the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules and their interpretation 
 
924  See, e.g., J.P. Commission, “Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration-A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence” (2007) 24 
J. Int’l Arb. 129, at 153. 
925  See G. Marceau, A. Izaguerri, and V. Lanovoy, “The WTO’s influence on other dispute settlement mechanisms: a lighthouse in the storm 
of fragmentation” (2013) 47 Journal of World Trade 481–574, at 492. 
926  See A. Bjorklund, Remarks on the panel “The Role of International Tribunals in Managing Coherence and Diversity in International 
Law” (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, at 175. 
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by well-known scholars, but also on decisions by other tribunals, in particular, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) and its successor, the ICJ.927 
This gap-filling is practiced by most international courts and tribunals. At the WTO, for 
instance, the Appellate Body has referred to jurisprudence from the PCIJ at times to deal with issues 
that are not treated in its constitutive instruments.928 Terris et al. describe external citations by 
judges chiefly as a practice that consists in looking at other precedents when none is at hand (apart 
from that, they write, “citing [from external sources] is generally done sparingly, selectively, and 
grudgingly”929). 
This is notably why external citations are typically more numerous in the beginnings of an 
international legal regime. Most courts and tribunals studied here started with a proportion of out-
forum citation higher than in- forum citations, with the ratio gradually reverting through time. (For 
the ITLOS, it never fully reverted, as ICJ precedents remain crucial to the work of the Tribunal. At 
the ICJ, it is the external citations found in individual opinions that account for the phenomenon: 
the Court’s well-known reluctance to cite externally is further studied below.) 
 
927  Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on the Application by Wena Hotels Ltd. for 
Interpretation of the Arbitral Award (31 October 2005), at §72. 
928  See M.Q. Zang, “Shall We Talk? Judicial Communication between the CJEU and WTO Dispute Settlement” (2017) 28 European 
Journal of International Law 273, at 282. 
929  See Terris, Romano and Swigart, supra note 917, at 120. 
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Figure 17: Proportion of external citations over time 
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Shared topics 
Although, as noted above, fora are often cited on topics close to their field of expertise, a 
substantial part of external citations is also prompted by topics that are not associated with any 
given forum. 
Some external citations relate, for instance, to procedural matters.930 This tendency to cite 
the procedural experience of other courts has not been unnoticed,931 with the WTO’s Appellate Body 
in particular being eager to learn and adopt practice developed elsewhere.932 In this context, one of 
the most frequent topic underlying external citations is the topic of [Provisional Measures], with the 
ICJ’s jurisprudence in LaGrand particularly cited on this point.933 Closely related, external citations 
have often informed the question of the importance of precedents in international law. The WTO’s 
report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) is exemplary in this regard, as it cites a precedent from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia together with an investment arbitration award on 
this topic, as well as a citation to Hersch Lauterpacht’s doctrinal writings.934 
Finally, another set of topics make a frequent appearance in the set of external 
citations: questions of [Evidence] and [Proof], and of [Res Judicata]. This is not surprising, as these 
issues are largely uncodified in international law (notwithstanding the existence of authoritative 
material on the subject), and as such often litigated by international parties with reference, not only 
to teachings (as noted above in Chapter IV), but also to the experience of other courts and tribunals. 
For all these topics, besides, it would be unfortunate if different international courts and tribunals 
were to adopt varying standards.935 
There is a common thread linking these topics: they all relate to the extent and scope of the 
international judicial function writ large. That these topics are a cause for external citation says a 
lot about international adjudicators being willing to cite and use example from other fora as a way 
to better understand the extent and scope of their powers in ruling over international cases. In so 
 
930  On this topic, see notably C. Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2007), at 52-53. 
931  A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Courts and Tribunals”, in Cesare Romano, Karen 
Alter and Yuval Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2013), at 517. 
See also N. Miller, “An International jurisprudence? The Operation of ‘precedent’ across international tribunals” (2002) 15 Leiden 
Journal of International Law, at 496, for an early empirical finding that external citations are often prompted by procedural topics. 
932  Marceau, Izaguerri and Lanovoy, supra note 925, at 497. 
933  On this topic, see notably K. Oellers-Frahm, “Expanding the competence to issue provisional measures-strengthening the international 
judicial function”, in von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 907, at 389. 
934  See United States – Final anti-dumping measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, Appellate Body Report 
(30 April 2008), at §116. See also Sacerdoti, supra note 901, at note 52. 
935  Zang, supra note 928, at 291. 
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doing, these courts and tribunals demonstrate that they “regard themselves as forming part of a 
community of international courts”, which, according to Chester Brown, is bound to “have positive 
implications for the further development of the international legal system.”936 
3. Not citing from other fora 
If external citations are so beneficial, why, then, do courts often refrain from citing to other 
fora?  
As noted above, courts and tribunals are jealous of their own prerogatives and prone to insist 
on developing their own jurisprudence in priority to citing other tribunals.937 In this context, judicial 
dialogue might at times be antithetical to a forum’s self-built authority. At the risk of being 
irrelevant and/or subordinated, a court should insist that its jurisprudence matters. Strategical 
considerations in terms of attracting disputes, in a context of competition between courts and 
tribunals and of forum-shopping by parties,938 will further prompt courts and tribunals to insist on 
citing their own output over the legal production of any other court or tribunal. 
The ICJ is a case in point, as it has long been well-known for citing only itself and a few ad 
hoc tribunals, usually manned by its members, 939  while shying away from recognising the 
contribution of other international bodies. For Franklin Berman, this was not only a question of 
politics to shore up the court’s “status and authority”,940 but was also explained by the fact that 
parties mostly cited from the Court’s jurisprudence in ICJ proceedings. As noted in the next Chapter, 
the two practices are self-reinforcing: the Court works from the sources cited by the parties, which 
prompt future parties to follow the (implicit) instruction of the Court to consider that only ICJ 
jurisprudence is worthy of a citation. 
 
936  C. Brown, “The Cross-Fertilization of Principles Relating to Procedure and Remedies in the Jurisprudence of International Courts and 
Tribunals” (2008) 30 Loy. LA Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 219–245, at 244. 
937  See also Miller, supra note 931, at 499, venturing that “[t]ribunals’ preferences with respect to type of reference could perhaps be explained 
as a function of their desire to maintain their independence and the integrity of their jurisprudence while respecting that of other tribunals”. 
938  See Benvenisti and Downs, supra note 888, at 628. 
939  In a speech to the United Nations, Judge Gilbert Guillaume took care of emphasising this few citations to ad hoc tribunals to deny the 
charge that the Court was mostly navel-gazing: see G. Guillaume, “The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for 
the International Legal Order” (2000) Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, available at 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/events/2013/springlectures2013/documents-1/guillaume-proliferation-intnat-judicial.pdf.  
940  See Berman, supra note 904, at 9. 
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The ICJ has however recently slightly changed course and accepted to consider citations from 
other fora, with scholars pointing to the Court’s judgment in the Diallo case in particular.941 Yet, a 
close look at what happened in that case indicates that this was not a plain and simple ouverture of 
the ICJ’s jurisprudence to external authorities. Instead, the shift was made in the Court’s own terms. 
The ICJ did not merely cite to the HRC, it also – crucially – offered expansive reasons to justify this 
citation. Those reasons, which for the most part overlap with the determinants of authoritativeness 
identified above, were meant to be seen as a standard that external authorities should meet to be 
worth a mention.942 In other words, rather than engaging in dialogue, the ICJ has tried to lay down 
its rules.943  
Every court jealous of its prerogatives – that is, every court – is likely to operate similarly. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union offers another good example in this respect: the CJEU 
frequently deals with trade matters, in which it could or should take guidance from the main forum 
in this respect, the WTO. However, as noted by Michelle Zang, the CJEU never cited the WTO DSB 
in a judgment, even when invited to do so by its Advocate Generals, preferring, instead, to hew 
closely to the WTO’s jurisprudence without ever mentioning it.944 We are far from judicial dialogue 
being a “two-way non-hierarchical conversation”.945 
This failure to cite can be problematic. This is especially the case when parties continue to 
rely on authorities that are being shunned in that fashion. Michelle Zang rightly opines that the 
CJEU’s “muted dialogue” strategy with the WTO is probably mistaken,946 and observes that it 
lessens certainty: parties do not know whether the Court will ever follow or not follow the WTO DSB. 
Likewise, Paolo Palchetti agrees that clear criteria about what is authoritative and what is not helps 
international litigants by strengthening transparency and predictability, “thereby reducing the risk 
of [a court] being perceived as selective, or even arbitrary, in its reliance on external precedents.”947 
 
941  See P. Palchetti, “The Authority of the Decisions of International Judicial or Quasi-judicial Bodies”, in Decisions of the ICJ as Sources 
of International Law? (Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series ed, International and European Papers Publishing 2018), at 113-114. See also 
A. Pellet, “Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law?”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (International and European Papers 
Publishing 2018), at 33, note 63. 
942  See also S. Sivakumaran, “The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law” (2017) 66 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1, at 7. 
943  See Palchetti, supra note 941, at 118. The main rule in this respect is that external authorities will be considered only if they stem from 
specialised bodies. It is probably then ironic that the Court, not a specialised body, was not entitled deference by the ICTY in Tadic. 
944  Certainly, this practice enhances the Court’s discretion to ignore the WTO’s guidance whenever it wishes. 
945  See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 886, at 41. 
946  Zang, supra note 928, at 285. 
947  See Palchetti, supra note 941, at 117. Palchetti also observes that “determining the ‘rules of the dialogue’ is a delicate exercise.” 
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Yet, the concerns of courts and tribunals are not unreasonable. While some have tried to side-
step these concerns by noting that “referring to and even quoting a judgment of another court does 
not make it a formal source”948, this is mistaken: as the concerns and the impediments to a fuller 
judicial dialogue indicate, precisely, that what can be cited and what cannot is irremediably linked 
to the question of sources of law. By citing external authorities, international courts and tribunals, 
explicitly and implicitly, rule on which other courts and tribunals they wish to cite or rely upon, and 
in so doing to which authority they grant authoritativeness or not. And as explained in the next 
Chapter, what is true of external authorities is also true of all authorities. 
  
 
948  See Terris, Romano, and Swigart, supra note 917, at 120. 
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Chapter VIII – The boundaries of international law 
  
Law is whatever can stand as a legal proposition. That much is not new: legal realists and 
others have been arguing along these lines for decades. A variant of realism, in turn has 
underpinned the turn to empirical legal analysis, sometimes in an avowed contrast with some 
branches of doctrinal theorising that are held as too far disconnected from the law in action.949 
The hope is that empirical inquiries, insofar they focus on the law as it is acted out, indeed 
reveal what the law is. This is well put by Urska Šadl and Henrik Palmer Olsen, for whom: 
[q]uantitative techniques or citation network approach are relevant for the study of 
international case law primarily because (contrary to many methods used by political 
scientists) they clearly shift the focus from legal/doctrinal questions to the content of 
judicial decisions, meaning the law itself.950 
If the law is revealed and acted out in legal reasoning, and if, as seen in Chapter I, citations 
are key to that reasoning, then it follows that the law is whatever can be cited. Citations indicate 
the boundaries of what a community consider authoritative and, ultimately, legal. They delineate 
the “belief system” of the community of international lawyers.951 A similar line of thinking also 
underpins the realism of Louis Sohn: 
I submit that states really never make international law on the subject of human 
rights. […] If you go to the State Department and they have a question, where do they 
 
949   See T. Ginsburg and G. Shaffer, “The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship” (2012) 106 The American Journal of 
International Law 1, at 3: “Theory, in other words, must not supplant the rigorous empirical examination of practice, and thus the testing 
of theory.” 
950  U. Šadl and H.P. Olsen, “Can Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using Citation Network and Corpus 
Linguistic Analysis to Understand International Courts” (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, at 327. 
951  See F. Zarbiyev, “Saying Credibly What the Law Is: On Marks of Authority in International Law” (2018) 9 Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement 291, at 296.  
See also ibid., at 298: Marks of authority “are ‘socially accepted criteria’ that link authority to its social basis—an authority of a person 
or an institution exists because and to the extent that that person or institution possesses properties that are socially sanctioned as 
commanding deference.” 
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find the answer? If they find it in Ms. Whiteman’s Digest, they consider that they 
have solved the problem.952 
In this belief system, not every citation will be endowed with authority, and not to the same 
extent. As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, authorities in international dispute 
settlement – precedents and teachings – differ in their authoritative weight, sometimes widely. To 
some extent that weight is a matter of subjective appreciation, and different citers will adopt various 
citing patterns depending on their positions as parties, individual judges or members of a majority. 
Within this belief system, further, adjudicators will feel the need to remain within the boundaries 
of what had been decided before (and can then be cited).953 At the other end of the process, they shall 
also be careful of what they write, for their decisions will likely have systemic effect.954 
The previous Chapters have offered various examples and illustrations that support these 
observations. Chapter I indicated that arguing from authorities is not only a valid argumentative 
method – it is also the main way to argue in legal matters. Chapter III showed that what makes an 
authority “authoritative” is a complex mix of features and characteristics – rather than only 
persuasiveness, indicating that international law is more than mere “reason” applied to a set of pre-
existing rules. Chapters IV, V and VI have identified how courts, judges and parties cite authorities 
– and demonstrated that arguing is often a matter of delineating a corpus of authorities, in line with 
strategic considerations depending on the citing party. Finally, Chapter VII has analysed how 
international courts are engaged in a common exercise of attributing or refusing authoritativeness 
between themselves. 
Together, these elements support the thesis that the law is whatever is citable – with 
consequences as to the definition of the boundaries of the “citable”. Accordingly, Section 1 below 
first reviews the role of citations and authorities in making international law. Section 2, in turn, 
concludes with the main consequences deriving from this role, namely, the strategic delimitation of 
what can and cannot be cited in any given forum. 
 
952  See L.B. Sohn, “Sources of International Law” (1995) 25 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 399. 
953  See, e.g., ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 
Award of the Tribunal (2 October 2006), at §293. 
954  See A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers”, in Armin von Bogdandy and 
Ingo Venzke (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking (Springer 2012), at 979. See also Sir G. Fitzmaurice, “Hersch Lauterpacht, The 
Scholar as Judge: Part I” (1961) 37 British Yearbook of International Law 1, at 18: “[t]he international community is peculiarly dependent 
on its international tribunals for the development and clarification of the law.” 
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1. The development of international law based on authorities 
A) The “develop-not-make” fiction 
Debates in international law literature and scholarship have frequently maintained, 
discussed or challenged a classic fiction according to which international adjudicators do not make 
law but only, at most, develop it. With the growing importance and magnitude of international 
dispute settlement, and the ever-expanding range of precedents from courts and tribunals, the 
distinction, however, has proven increasingly “difficult to maintain in practice.”955 
As explained in Chapter III, this fiction is complemented and strengthened by a focus on 
authorities as cited only in function of their persuasiveness: if authorities are material only insofar 
as they are persuasive, then precedents and teachings truly have no law-making effects; if courts 
and tribunals only “develop” the law, then they should be judged on the merits of their efforts of 
developing that law through their reasoning.956 Both fictions are equally useful for adjudicators, as 
it coheres with their expected role, and contribute to a “prevailing and self-reinforcing judicial 
ethos.”957 
Yet, both fictions are betrayed by their inherent contradictions. Alain Pellet rightly said that 
we call “legislation” what we do not like and development what we endorse. But he himself talks 
along this useful fiction, whereas in other circumstances he has no cavil admitting that some part 
of international law is essentially “judge-made”958 – just like most scholars are agreed that the Law 
of the Sea is to a large extent “ICJ Law”.959 
An increasing number of commentators have however taken the further step to admit that 
international courts and tribunal indeed do make law, and in a systemic fashion960 – with impact, 
 
955  See C.J. Tams, “The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (ed.) 
Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law? (International and European Papers Publishing 2018), at 69. 
956  In the same sense, see G. Hernández, “Interpretative Authority and the International Judiciary”, in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and 
Matthew Windsor (eds.), Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015), at 181. 
957  See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 954, at 984. 
958  With respect to the law of international responsibility: see A. Pellet, “Some Remarks on the Recent Case Law of the International Court 
of Justice on Responsibility Issues”, in Peter Kovacs (ed.), International Law – A Quiet Strengh (Miscellanea in memoriam Geza Herczegh) 
(Pazmany Press 2011), at 112. 
959  See, e.g., Tams, supra note 955, at 84. 
960  See, e.g., J. Alvarez, “What are International Judges for? The Main Functions of International Adjudication”, in Cesare Romano, Karen 
Alter and Yuval Shany (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2013), at 169: “in many 
cases, the main function of an international adjudication is to render an authoritative judgment on a disputed point of law and not merely 
to fill those ‘interstitial’ legal gaps needed to resolve a concrete dispute”; Hernández, supra note 956, at 181: “Whether or not judgments 
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as argued in the next part, on what can or should be cited in any given case. This law-making activity 
on the part of courts and tribunals, but also of individual adjudicators961 and scholars, is why 
authorities, which are cited to build up new legal reasoning, are so important. The disputes around 
these authorities and their authoritativeness are further evidence of their importance to the 
participants in the international legal system.962 
This important role is a feature rather than a bug. International law having, for the most 
part, no legislator, there is then little by way of “solid” authorities that could clearly lay out the law. 
(States, in their treaty-making power, only cover a part of what ends up being litigated.) When it 
comes to settling a dispute, it is therefore a system particularly prone to reliance on international 
courts and tribunals963 and, in turn, on the authorities studied in this thesis;964 precedents and 
teachings might be challengeable and lack the firm authoritativeness of clearly laid-out law – yet 
they have for them that they exist, are available, can be cited and relied upon. 
The modern structure of international law further facilitates this role for authorities. 
Whereas “bindingness” is key to international legal argument, international practitioners have 
taken to assign (and dispute) binding character to rules that have been validated in the international 
legal order.965 In other words, rules, once validated by judicial application or endorsement from an 
authority, can become “eligible for use in international legal argumentation.”966 Precedents and 
teachings are a primary receptacle for these validated rules, and in turn primary material for valid 
 
are a source of law or merely a means for the determination of the law, a court’s interpretation nevertheless contributes to the creation of 
what it finds”; G. Messenger, “The Practice of Litigation at the ICJ: the Role of Counsel in the Development of International Law”, in 
Mosh Hirsh and Andrew Lang (eds.), Research Handbook on the Sociology of International Law (Elgar 2018), at 210: “the dividing 
line between interpretation and creation far less clear than can be portrayed”; N. Ridi, “The Shape and Structure of the ‘Usable Past’: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International Adjudication” (2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200, 
at 245: “International lawyers are, by and large, sensitive to the appeal of the systemic: cases having bearing on systemic issues – sources, 
interpretation, other fundamental doctrines – are often ready at the fingertips of an academic and act as a fundamental building block in 
her argumentative toolbox. International adjudicators, it appears, are far less interested in systemic questions – or in so appearing.” 
But see von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 954, at 980, saying that theory and doctrine are yet to take stock of this increasing reality. 
961  See R. Kolb, The International Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013), at 1014, opining that individual opinions at the ICJ can 
“influence the development of international law.” 
962  See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 954, at 992. 
963  See S.M. Schwebel, “The Docket and Decisionmaking Process of the International Court of Justice” (1989) 13 Suffolk Transnational 
Law Journal 543, at 547. 
964  See M. Jacob, “Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1005, at 1017. 
965  See J. d’Aspremont, “Bindingness”, in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: Contributions to 
Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018), at 69-70. 
966  Ibid, at 70. 
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international law arguments and reasoning.967 As such, their binding force is a matter of fact, and 
not necessarily of law.968  
Besides, to the extent that legal reasoning “builds systemic relationships between rules and 
principles”, this reasoning increasingly obeys the “political obligation on law-appliers to make their 
decisions cohere with the preferences and expectations of the community whose law they 
administer”.969  Frequently, these preferences and expectations are themselves embodied in the 
authorities studied in this thesis, which are then cited to display a legal reasoning’s “insertion in a 
whole […], in an order that [this legal reasoning] contributes to create, as well as by this judgment’s 
potential to alter or correct this order.” 970  In short, in line with the argument of Chapter I, 
authorities are legal arguments; it does not take much from there to find that, in some cases and de 
facto, the argument is the law itself. 
B) The role of authorities in setting legal boundaries 
Concluding on the systemic role of authorities in legal reasoning, Frederick Schauer explained 
that: 
what counts as a legal source, [… is] what counts as a legal argument; and what 
counts as a legal argument – as opposed to a moral, religious, economic or political 
one – is the principal component in determining just what the law is. The boundaries 
of law are set by the boundaries of legal authority, and law speaks as law through its 
sources.971  
Ditto for international law. In the framework identified above in which courts and tribunals 
commonly make law by deciding disputes, authorities occupy a crucial place in delineating the 
boundaries of what is and is not a proper international law argument. Two mechanisms are 
operating concurrently: (i) international legal decisions (but also, to a lesser extent, individual 
opinions and submissions) indicate the boundaries of international law by endorsing and dismissing 
 
967  See also I. Venzke, “Semantic Authority”, in d’Aspremont and Singh, supra note 965, at 816, arguing that international law-making 
“unfolds in the communicative practice of its everyday operation.” 
968  B. Jia, International Case Law in the Development of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2017), at §193. 
969  M. Koskenniemi, ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682), 
970  G. Canivet, “L’autorité du jugement”, in Antoine Compagnon (ed.), De l’autorité (Odile Jacob 2008), at 28 
971  F. Schauer, Thinking like a lawyer (Harvard University Press 2009), at 84, who adds that: “When previously prohibited authorities 
become optional, and when previously optional authorities become mandatory, the nature of legal sources has changed, and with that 
change comes a transformation in the nature of the law itself.” 
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some authorities and not others; (ii) these decisions themselves become authorities that clarify the 
extent, scope and content of international law. 
As to the second effect, it results from the fact that “[n]orms are generally strengthened 
through their encounters with judicial actors, and their content is made more determinate, not 
indeterminate.”972 Part of a decision’s authoritativeness is likely due to this power to clarify what 
used to be indeterminate: the clearer the authority, the likelier the citation. Through becoming an 
authority, decisions then acquire performative effects.973 They become examples and inform the 
future choices of parties in international disputes.974  
Precedents are a good example of what is at stake. Alf Ross, writing shortly after the ICJ was 
established, explained that: 
There is reason to believe that gradually, as the number of precedents of the 
Permanent Court increases, an international judge-made law will be established by 
practice, a law which will be of the greatest importance by giving to International 
Law that stability in which it is now so wanting. Whether or not the court formally 
believes in the binding force of precedents is actually of no great consequence.975  
In other words, the authority of precedents and their role in framing international law do not 
depend on whether they are binding or not; they do not strictly depend on their degree of 
persuasiveness; they depend on these precedents’ mere existence, on the fact that the Court formally 
adopted a solution that will later inform the behaviour of international law practitioners. This is 
also what Lauterpacht had in mind when he mentioned “the mysterious birth of an authoritative 
source of law out of what is evidence of the existing law.”976  
 
972  See L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Plurality in the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a Managerial Approach: A 
Rejoinder – Fears and Anxieties” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1275, at 35. She likens it to the benefits of 
fragmentation.  
973  See A. von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, “The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Courts and Tribunals”, in Romano, Alter 
and Shany, supra note 960, at 506: “Some jurists likewise ‘succumb to their own timorous fiction, that a statement of ‘the law’ is a 
statement of fact.’ But it can hardly be denied that statements of fact are themselves performative statements that contribute to the 
construction of the world and the making of the law.” 
974  See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 954, at 979. 
975  See A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law (London 1947), at 86-87. 
976  See H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Cambridge University Press 1934), at 20; 
Lauterpacht also explained that this process was not much studied because it is “of small practical importance.” Closer to our times, see 
J. d’Aspremont, “If International Judges Say So, It Must Be True: Empiricism or Fetishism?” (2016) 4 ESIL Reflections 9, at 4, noting 
that “[f]or most international lawyers, the key doctrines around which legal arguments must be articulated acquire their authenticity as 
structures of legal argumentation only once they have received the seal of international courts.” 
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The same performative effects also characterise the choice of citations in international legal 
argument. A first citation to an authority becomes the foundation for future citations by parties or 
judges, who expect it to be a proper authority and to support their argument. The Dataset illustrates 
this: for the majority of authorities (and especially decisions from courts or tribunals), their rate of 
citation increases following a first citation by an international court and tribunal (as compared to 
their share of citations before then). The effect is especially strong when looking at citations in 
pleadings, indicating that parties are receptive of the “favour” granted by adjudicators to some 
authorities in their decisions. For instance, following the ICJ’s citation to the UNHRC in 2010 in the 
Diallo case, no fewer than 27 different cases have seen citations to the Committee, either by parties 
or the tribunal – including 22 investment arbitrations and two WTO proceedings.  
As has been noted, international law operates and evolves through legal argumentation: 
“[w]hatever else international law might be, at least it is how international lawyers argue […] and 
this can be articulated in a limited number of rules that constitute the ‘grammar’ – the system of 
production of good legal arguments.”977 Or, as Judge James Crawford commented, “[i]n the absence 
of a coherent corpus of jurisprudence, all that is left for international law is argument – and the 
system as presently.”978 Parties, individual judges and courts and tribunals all participate in this 
argument – although, as seen in Chapter III, some voices are louder than others. 
In this context, whether a citation in a given case did or did not have any “influence” on that 
case’s outcome has limited relevance for its weight in the broader legal argument. Just like decisions, 
citations have systemic effects.979 Legal argumentation is a practice that, in turn, informs future 
practitioners, framing their actions and their understanding of what is international law. 980 
Citations, whatever the motives underlying then, will then delineate the sources of international 
 
977  See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge University Press 2005), at 568. See also I. Scobbie, “Towards the elimination 
of International Law: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical Radicalism” (1990) 61 British Yearbook of international Law 346. See 
also N. MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of law: a Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005), at 53. 
978  See J. Crawford, Chance, Order, Change : The Course of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2013), at 128. 
979  See H.G. Cohen, “Theorizing Precedent in International Law”, in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds.), 
Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015), at 281: “Conceptions of authoritative sources are constantly being 
constructed through the interaction of the various actors.” See also S. Manley, “Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court” 
(2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 191–214, at 214. 
 This is why this conclusion is not affected by the opinion of J. Kammerhofer, “Law-making by scholars”, in Catherine Brölmann (ed.), 
Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Law-Making (Edward Elgar 2016), at 322, that “factual analysis cannot 
provide a feed-back loop to determine the legal powers of scholarship”. The legal import of an authority for a given case is indeed (mostly) 
beyond reach of investigation; systemic import, however, does not depend on the use of a legal authority in any given case. 
980  See C.P. Romano, “Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue” (2008) 41 NYU Journal of International 
law and Politics 755, at 765. 
 See also M.Q. Zang, “Shall We Talk? Judicial Communication between the CJEU and WTO Dispute Settlement” (2017) 28 European 
Journal of International Law 273, at 285, faulting the CJEU for seemingly following yet never citing the WTO precedents, and arguing 
that it is detrimental to consistency and certainty in EU law. 
234 
 
law by endowing some sources with legitimacy, and refusing such legitimacy to others.981 In this 
context, the persuasiveness of the authority, or even its bindingness, will not be determinative as to 
its authoritativeness.982 
As such, what can and cannot be cited will be decided by the actual practice of courts, tribunals, 
and litigators.983 For instance, consider the GATT and WTO panels and Appellate Body reports that 
provided unadopted panel reports with authority.984 It is practice, in opting for one “learned” source 
over another (such as the ILC in priority over other doctrinal authorities), that indicates where 
authority (and power) lies in international law.985 (No wonder then that international courts are 
reluctant to cite “teachings of publicists.”986) Authorities often cited gain in legitimacy; those ignored 
lose their “vitality.”987 
Citations cumulatively determine what is deemed a legitimate legal source and what is not.988 
They delineate the boundaries of international law.989 For Grant Lamond: 
All of the preceding devices [i.e., citations] have the effect of giving primacy to the 
collective view of the judiciary over any individual judge’s view. There would be no 
need for such devices if judges had Herculean powers, or could straightforwardly 
reach the correct decision “according to law.” But the legal system must work with 
judges who have human capabilities. These devices create a feedback system in which 
judges must persuade other judges that their reasoning is convincing as a matter of 
 
981  As put by F. Schauer, “Authority and Authorities” (2008) 94 Virginia Law Review 1931, at 1934: “[…] then something as seemingly 
trivial as citation practice turns out to be the surface manifestation of a deeply important facet of the nature of law itself.” 
982  Jacob, supra note 964, at 1015: “a simple binary ‘on-or-off’ or ‘black-or-white’ understanding of precedents’ authority is not very helpful 
when considering the import of prior cases. Bindingness is not sine qua non for system-building.” 
983  G. Lamond, “Persuasive Authority in the Law” (2010) 17 The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19, at 32. 
984  See Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Appellate Body Report 
(1 November 1996), at 14: “we agree that ‘a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report 
that it considered to be relevant’.” As seen in Chapter III, however, unadopted panels reports have a starkly lower authoritativeness; still, 
they continue to be cited. 
985  See N. Duxbury, Jurists and Judges: An Essay on Influence (Hart Publishing 2001), at 13. 
986  See M. Peil, “Scholarly Writings as a Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International Court of Justice” (2012) 1 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, at 146. 
987  See P.M. Wald, “The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings” (1995) 62 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 1371, at 1399. 
988  See also Schauer, supra note 971, at 80, assessing the US debate over foreign sources as being “about which sources should be taken as 
genuinely authoritative, even if not absolutely so. This is a debate that goes to the heart of the authoritative character of law itself […].” 
989  See A. Pellet, “Decisions of the ICJ as Sources of International Law?”, in Gaetano Morelli Lecture Series (International and European 
Papers Publishing 2018), at 44, with respect to the ICJ. 
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law. It inclines them to draw on the common stock of arguments and values shared 
by the judiciary.990 
The practice of citation, better than formal rules such as article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, 
better than any textbook treatment, then identifies what counts as law in international dispute 
settlement. It sheds light on the corpus of permissible authorities, permissible arguments, that 
inform the law in any given case. In seeking to persuade the audience by invoking an authority, the 
citing party engages in a process with systemic implications991 – which, in turn, shape the nature of 
authorities,992 and of international law itself.  
2. The strategic use of authorities by adjudicators and parties 
If, as indicated above, citing is a highly strategic activity with systematic effects, then two 
conclusions follow: that adjudicators will try to delineate the range of permissible authorities (A), 
and, consequently, that these boundaries will be up for debate (B). 
A) The strategic designation of a range of citable authorities 
Although some authorities are recognised as being authoritative and others (by not being 
cited) are not, the range of authoritative authorities remains relatively open-ended. 
Certainly, as seen in Chapter III, not all ICJ precedents, for instance, are authoritative to 
the same extent. Yet, despite their varying authoritativeness, the entire category of “ICJ decisions” 
– which is open-ended as long as the Court is extant – is presumably authoritative for disputes 
occurring in fora that accept ICJ precedents as authoritative sources of international law (and as 
long as these fora do so). In other words, once one particular set of authorities is cited by an 
adjudicator, parties can legitimately assume that all elements falling in that category will be 
authoritative (if not necessarily to the same extent) in similar circumstances. 
This is why the recognition of the authority of some sources often come with more specific 
rules as to the extent of this authoritativeness. We witnessed this in Chapter VII in the ICJ laying 
 
990  Lamond, supra note 983, at 33. See also H.G. Cohen, “International Precedent and the Practice of International Law”, in Michael Helfand 
(ed.), Negotiating State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press 2015), 
at 174. 
991  Just like forum shopping is “about strengthening the authority of one site relative to that of others”: see N. Krisch, “Liquid Authority in 
Global Governance” (2017) 9 International Theory 237, at 248. 
992  Of authorities in general, but also of the specific authorities being cited in each case, as indeed each citation endows this particular authority 
with additional meaning. On this point, see W. Werner, “Recall it again, Sam. Practices of Repetition in the Security Council” (2017) 
86 Nordic Journal of International Law 151, at 158. 
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down rules as to its reliance on specialised bodies such as the HRC, but this is also what is at stake 
in the common position of all international adjudicators that they are not bound by previous 
international law decisions. In so doing, they limit the amount of the authoritativeness they just, in 
the same stroke, grant to (some) of these decisions. Jean d’Aspremont puts it well, observing that: 
After all, the choice to turn down the principle of stare decisis and the rejection of a 
formal doctrine of precedents boils down to a choice for a wide communicative 
discretion about how the past is used and constituted. In other words, the current 
state of the practice pertaining to precedents is itself a strategy about how much 
leeway international courts and arbitral tribunals enjoy when they communicate 
about the relevance and content they give to the past in the present.993 
Adjudicators are often situated in a double-bind, as they wish both: 
- to shore up the authority of their own decisions, not only for the parties at stake in the 
case, but in the future as well. This is due to their judicial ethos, yet takes particular 
salience, as discussed above, in a context of competition between courts and tribunals;994 
and 
- to limit the authoritativeness of future authorities, whose content is necessarily 
unpredictable. 
This double bind means that, if adjudicators could in theory expand their discretion in a 
particular case in relying on a broader range of authorities (and therefore a broader range of 
justifications for new or unexpected legal solutions),995 this would be a costly strategy for future 
adjudication. In so doing, they would also likely constrain their own discretion in future cases by 
expanding the range of sources, or “argumentative burdens”, they cannot simply overlook. As seen 
above in relation to external citations, if laying out clear criteria as to what is authoritative and 
what is not enhances predictability and transparency, not doing so strengthens a court or tribunal’s 
ultimate discretion to rely on the sources it prefers. 
 
993  See J. d’Aspremont, “The Control Over Knowledge by International Courts and Arbitral Tribunals”, in Thomas Schultz and Federico 
Ortino (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2019).  
994  See M.M. M’Bengue, “Precedent”, in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: Contributions to 
Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018), at 718. 
995  This is exactly what is at stake in the debate surrounding the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law: for Antonin Scalia, the majority’s use of 
“cherry-picked” precedents from other countries allowed it to justify things it could not have gotten away with under strictly American 
sources. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551, 627 (Scalia J, dissenting). 
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This is also why citation practices frequently have an all-or-nothing character: remember the 
ICJ’s long practice of not citing other international courts, or the CJEU’s steadfast policy not to cite 
WTO authorities. Courts and tribunals, especially when they are institutionalised like the ICJ or 
the WTO, will rarely slip and cite the odd authority that does not conform to their explicit or implicit 
criterion. Doing otherwise would lessen the strength of the signals of authoritativeness. It also 
entails a degree of informality in the practice of citing, which is likely to (i) reduce the deference due 
to the most authoritative sources; and (ii) lower the barrier of entry for new authorities to challenge 
central ones.996 
All this should lead to an equilibrium whereby (i) precedents are not binding; (ii) yet operate 
as argumentative burdens; (iii) precedents of one own’s court are granted more authority over 
external precedents; (iv) only a few teachings (e.g., from the “most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations”) will have some authoritativeness. This is exactly the equilibrium that obtains in 
the data, as demonstrated throughout this thesis. 
Three consequences also further follow from this equilibrium. 
The first is that, to the extent only some and not all precedents are granted authoritativeness, 
parties and adjudicators will need to draw as much as they can from the few sources imbued with 
authority. As has been noted, “a multitude of legal positions can be wriggled out of precedents if only 
one is willing to argue accordingly”.997  If only ICJ precedents, for instance, are endowed with 
particular authority, then parties and decision-makers will try to locate ever more legal propositions 
in the closed set of existing ICJ precedents, even though better-suited but less-authoritative sources 
concurrently exist.998 The Dataset indicates a clear correlation (R² of around 0.6, depending on the 
forum) between the PageRank score of an authority and the number of unique topics that authority 
is cited about. This repurposing of old sources for new legal propositions might actually explain why 
the average age of authorities cited in decisions is increasing, as seen in Chapter IV.  
A second consequence of all this is that the increase of citable authorities within open-ended 
authoritative categories of sources might render disputes more complicated – not less. In another 
 
996  Krisch, supra note 991, at 246. 
997  See Jacob, supra note 964, at 1016. He adds: “[…], no matter whether stare decisis is officially endorsed or not.” 
998  We evidenced this phenomenon in W. Alschner and D. Charlotin, “The Growing Complexity of the International Court of Justice’s Self-
Citation Network: Institutional Achievement or Access-to-Justice Concern?” (2018) 29 European Journal of International Law 1, at 101, 
where we demonstrated that the same paragraphs from ICJ precedents are increasingly used in support of a growing number of legal 
propositions. 
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paper with Wolfgang Alschner, we argued that the increasing complexity of the ICJ’s citation 
network entails a greater complexity of litigating disputes before the World Court, as “an increase 
in the use of precedents places greater demands on parties and judges to effectively navigate the 
maze of judicial authorities.” 999  Other scholars have reached the same conclusion for WTO 
disputes.1000 
B) Contested rules of citation 
The third, and most important consequence of this strategic use of authorities, is that the 
choice of what categories of authorities are authoritative and which are not will be imbued with 
strategical considerations and become a prime source of contestation. In other words, this will 
become a battleground for the parties, adjudicators and commentators, alike, who will dispute what 
can and cannot be cited in international proceedings.1001 
A 2009 decision of the IUSCT offer a good example.1002 In this decision, a majority of the 
Tribunal adopted an interpretation of the principle of res judicata drawn from WTO jurisprudence 
and with support taken from two doctrinal authorities. In a commentary, Michael Ottolenghi 
deplored that the Tribunal’s decision on this point: 
[…] rel[ied] on obiter dicta from a decision by a World Trade Organization dispute 
panel and the opinions of two commentators. […] This departure from the Tribunal’s 
established practice is unsupported by the practice of other international courts and 
tribunals, as evidenced by the Tribunal’s reliance on obiter dicta from a WTO panel-
which is, at best, of questionable relevance, given the very different institutional 
structure of the WTO and the different rules and guidelines governing its dispute 
panels.1003  
This results in frequent propositions to add more criteria to what can or cannot be cited. 
Parties in investment arbitration have for instance proposed that precedents not based on the same 
 
999  See ibid., at 112. 
1000  See J. Pauwelyn and W. Zhang, “Busier than Ever? A Data-Driven Assessment and Forecast of WTO Caseload” (2018) CTEI Working 
Papers CTEI-2018-02, at 20. 
1001  A related question lies in the debate as to international courts and tribunals should or should not accept amicus curiae submissions. In the 
Shrimp-Turtle case, the AB disagreed with the panel on the admissibility of amici curiae, especially unsolicited ones – a split that makes 
sense when viewed as question (and a conflict) over the range of valid authorities in deciding a dispute. See United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (12 October 1998). 
1002  See Iran v. United States, Case No. B61, Partial Award No. 601-A3/A8/A9/A14/B61-FT (17 July 2009), at §119. 
1003  See M. Ottolenghi, “Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States: Case Nos. A3, A8, A9, A14, and B61 International Decisions” (2010) 
104 American Journal of International Law 474, at 478. As noted above in Chapter IV and in Chapter VII, questions regarding “res 
judicata” frequently occasion citation to external authorities and to teachings. 
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treaty should not be granted any authority. At the annulment stage in Vieira v. Chile, the claimant 
asked the tribunal to annul the award inter alia because of the tribunal’s reliance on a dictum from 
the Luccheti v. Peru case under a different bilateral investment treaty.1004 The ad hoc committee, 
however, only saw there a “common practice” of “citing the precedents of other tribunals or ICSID 
ad hoc committees […] when making a decision”. 
Likewise, the respondent in Standard Chartered Bank v. TANESCO argued that only past 
decisions can be relied upon. In that case, the Bank was trying to challenge the tribunal’s decision 
on the basis of the unrelated legal findings of the tribunal in Burlington v. Ecuador. TANESCO 
replied:  
In TANESCO’s view, the Burlington v. Ecuador decision, referenced by SCB HK in 
the Annulment Proceeding, is not relevant to the proceeding before this Committee. 
It recalls that the decision in Burlington v. Ecuador was published almost three years 
after the Decision on Jurisdiction was issued and five months after the publication of 
the Award. Thus, according to TANESCO, even if Burlington v. Ecuador supported 
SCB HK’s position, it would be impossible to justify the Tribunal’s reconsideration of 
the Decision by reference to a later case, which of course it did not consider.1005 
At a more granular level, parties will also often debate what individual authorities can and 
cannot be added to the record, with the hope that this expanded or restricted corpus of authorities 
will determinative in the outcome. This is common in investment arbitration, where developments 
in the law typically arise quicker, and sometimes result in requests for unavailable authorities: for 
example, in Koch v. Venezuela, the claimant tried to obtain a jurisdictional finding adverse to the 
state in the unrelated Longreef v. Venezuela case, but the tribunal refused to order Venezuela to 
produce it.1006 
In short, international lawyers fight and debate about what should and should not enter the 
corpus of authorities that should resolve a legal dispute. International law, in last analysis, is often 
nothing more than this corpus, and legal argumentation a debate about its scope and extent.  
 
1004  See Sociedad Anónima Eduardo Vieira v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7, Decision of the ad hoc Committee of the Application for 
Annulment by the Claimant (10 December 2010), at §77. The investor also pointed out that this award had nearly been annulled, given 
that an ad hoc committee in that case only upheld the award by majority, and this should somehow discount its authoritativeness. On this 
point, however, see above, Chapter III, Section 2, subsection D.  
1005  Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited v. Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/20, Decision 
on Annulment (22 August 2018), at §99. 
1006  See Koch Minerals Sàrl and Koch Nitrogen International Sàrl v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/19, Award 
(30 October 2017), at §§1.63-1.65. 
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Chapter IX – Conclusions 
 
  “the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the 
man of the future is the man of statistics.” 
Holmes, The Path of the Law 
 
 In their seminal article on the use of legal data analysis in international scholarship, Urška 
Šadl and Henrik Palmer Olsen argued that: 
[…] quantitative methods, such as corpus linguistics and citation network analysis, 
ensure the reproducibility , generalizability , and empirical validity of doctrinal 
studies. They add to the transparency of legal methodology while substantially 
clarifying the legal method. They can provide empirical evidence to validate hunches 
and prove legal intuitions correct.1007 
At more than 200 pages, this foray into the citation practice of five international courts and 
tribunals attempted to do just this. 
The previous chapters have analysed an exhaustive Dataset of citations in nearly all known 
disputes before the International Court of Justice, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, WTO panels and investment arbitration tribunals. The thesis 
extends our understanding beyond the existing literature with respect to the role and relevance of 
two types of authorities in international dispute settlement, precedents and teachings.  
At many points, the “hunches” and “legal intuitions” of scholars were found to be correct, at 
least to the extent that the empirical analysis –  acknowledging its limits – is not disproved by future 
analyses.  
 
1007  Šadl, U. and H. P. Olsen, “Can Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using Citation Network and Corpus 
Linguistic Analysis to Understand International Courts” (2017) Leiden Journal of International Law 327–49 
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That many of these intuitions were confirmed does not discount the value of the exercise. 
Data analyses typically elicit higher expectations for novelty and surprise than warranted. Yet it is 
often just as good, if not better, if these analyses merely confirm what everyone knew – or, better, 
what everyone thought they knew. 
In other respects, this thesis reveals novel findings that the previous literature has not 
broached. In particular, this thesis was especially interested in variation of authoritativeness across 
different authorities, and in what makes some of them more – sometimes much more – cited than 
others. Scholars and practitioners know there are “beacons” and “flicker” in the set of authorities 
they could possibly cite or study; most legal practitioners would concur on the “landmark” cases as 
well as the most authoritative scholars in their fields. Yet, there is no clear way to distinguish these 
landmarks from other cases, no evident “authority” to vouchsafe the authoritativeness of certain 
authorities over others. “Persuasiveness”, in particular, fails to satisfactorily answer the question of 
what makes some authorities not only more authoritative or cited, but significantly so.  
The analyses performed at Chapter III, relying on an exhaustive Dataset of citations to 
authorities, therefore innovated in investigating some likely determinants of the authoritativeness 
of authorities. This chapter evidences that some categories of authorities (precedents over teachings) 
typically command greater authoritativeness; and that this quality also varies depending on an 
authority’s author, its language or age. This latter criterion is particularly important, as a “rich-get-
richer” phenomenon is at play to ensure that already-authoritative authorities steadily and 
disproportionately gain in authoritativeness over time. By contrast, other possible candidates, such 
as the time spent or the number of procedural events that occurred in a given case, seemingly do not 
have an impact on a precedent’s later authoritativeness. 
These analyses are all the more important now that authorities are ubiquitous in 
international legal arguments. Ubiquity that does not, however, involve uniformity. Chapters IV, V 
and VI have investigated the citation practices of different protagonists in international disputes, 
and found that they differ in line with some expected strategic considerations. 
Courts and tribunals are expected to give reasons for their findings. There are several ways 
for them to do so, however, and the exercise is mostly shaped by the recipient of these reasons. In 
this respect, the Dataset indicates that, to various degrees, the courts and tribunals studied here 
write their decisions and rely on authorities for audiences broader than the parties to a given dispute. 
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As opposed to the parties or individual judges, courts and tribunals will rely on a more limited set 
of authorities, of higher authoritativeness in general, and presumably more familiar to their 
respective audiences. They will also take care of embedding their findings in their existing 
jurisprudence, whether that jurisprudence was or was not cited by the parties. In line with a 
scholarship that found all international courts and tribunals to move further from a dispute 
settlement mindset to a greater concern for international law and governance, finally, the citation 
practice of the courts and tribunals studied here seem to converge in this respect. 
The citation practice of individual judges, meanwhile, is likely driven by different 
considerations. Writing an individual opinion, in itself, is a strategic move for these judges, although 
it is unclear if some of the strategic goals likely pursued by this exercise are really within 
reach: there is little evidence that dissenting opinions for instance undermine the reasoning of a 
majority decision, nor that these opinions acquire their own authoritativeness for future legal 
debates. The citation practice of individual judges, besides, display no particular distinction between 
dissenting and concurring opinions. The fact, however, that party-appointed judges cite more 
authorities in favour of the party appointing them, as well as more opinions by other judges, indicate 
that citing in individual opinions is partly a social exercise, aimed perhaps at raising one’s profile 
(for instance, on the basis of self-citations) or at building coalitions of like-minded judges. 
Parties, meanwhile, are under pressure of citing as much as possible: to keep up with the 
opposite party’s own corpus of supporting authorities, and lest they overlook any authority that 
could, perhaps, prove key to the ultimate outcome. In particular, parties are prone to cite authorities 
by the decision-makers themselves. While there is little evidence that this is a successful strategy, 
citing more unique authorities than the opposing party, to some extent, helps to prevail in any given 
dispute – indicating that a “kitchen-sink” approach to citations may be a reasonable course of action. 
Whereas anything can go in the “kitchen sink”, however, is debatable, as Chapters VII and 
VIII indicated, what can or cannot be cited is, perhaps increasingly, a matter of contention. 
International courts, between themselves, are notably wary of citing external precedent and 
authorities, despite the threat of fragmentation in international law. The experience of the ICJ is 
telling in this respect, as its partial opening to external authorities was made on its terms and limits. 
As Chapter VIII concluded, this is sensible: what can or cannot be cited, ultimately, reflects 
the boundaries of what is or not the law to be applied – or at least, taken into account – in any given 
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dispute. In this context, citing anything has systemic effects beyond the scope of a single case; a 
citation is a signal that endorses the authoritativeness of some categories of authorities over others. 
As a result, parties, judges, and courts are engaged in a constant struggle to define the scope of 
citable authorities. The latter in particular walk a tight rope, as citing more broadly could in theory 
enhance their reasoning a given case – at the cost, however, of expanding the legal debate in future 
cases, and perhaps reducing their discretion. 
The practice of citing authorities in international dispute settlement is an important object 
of study and enriches international legal scholarship. Far from pertaining only to the legal craft, 
and varying from dispute to dispute, a “distant reading” of this practice displays its patterns and 
variations, but also its important legal implications. Beyond the day-to-day dispute between parties 
as to what is or is not a proper authority, and the mundane argumentative practices aiming at the 
authoritativeness of any given authority in any given case, there is a systemic phenomenon at play 
that is relevant for the very boundaries of what is or is not international legal argument – and 
international law. 
The key to these debates, perhaps, may reside in clearer indications as to the range of proper 
and improper authorities in international dispute settlement. Whether these can validly, usefully, 
and definitively be delineated a priori, however, is a question for another thesis.    
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Annex I – Topics 
  
The topic analysis described in Chapter II identified 150 topics in the Dataset. This number 
was set semi-arbitrarily after several trials to identify a number that would do justice to the expected 
breadth and diversity of topics to be expected in the Dataset. The algorithm returned a number of 
key words associated with each topic. I manually tagged these topics according to what I deemed the 
most accurate idea linking these key words together. Often, different sets of keywords pertained to 
a single topic. 
Several topics, not reproduced below, were impossible to tag with accuracy and labelled as 
“other”; these topics were then ignored when tagging individual paragraphs with reference to the 
most likely topic of that paragraph. Some topics are associated with more than one cluster below, 
which likely reflect nuances in these topics in the Dataset. 
 The topics and their keys are as follow, in alphabetical order. 
Topic Keys 
Advisory 
Opinion 
opinion advisory question court request legal case judicial give questions para present 
opinions reports jurisdiction political icj organ pp proceedings  
Annulment ad hoc tribunal annulment excess law powers committee manifest decision icsid 
jurisdiction apply power applicable parties error judges failure judge  
Annulment annulment icsid stay award committee hoc ad decision enforcement rule procedure scb hk 
tanesco fundamental application committees departure proceedings party  
Annulment reasons tribunal committee annulment award ad hoc state decision reasoning failure 
contradictory requirement icsid point ground stated conclusion follow based  
Arbitrariness treatment arbitrary standard fair equitable discriminatory measures conduct unreasonable 
investment investor arbitrariness measure reasonable state unfair elsi foreign rational 
standards  
Argument argument claim argues support claims case fact position based failed alleged arguments 
asserts submits contends basis rejected memorial evidence legal  
Argument fact case question position made time point view clear situation matter action make effect 
present reason put argument circumstances simply  
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Bank bank payment account funds credit amount banks guarantee security transfer interest 
letter loan pay banking payments exchange made debt  
Challenge arbitrator icsid case impartiality independence arbitration challenge party arbitrators 
disqualification lack proposal parties facts counsel kohler independent professor decision 
ubs  
Compliance original measure article dsb measures proceedings comply panel rulings recommendations 
compliance ec proceeding dispute para claims dsu claim wto scope  
Consular states united court judgment mexico nationals obligation review rights paragraph consular 
reconsideration avena article state interpretation federal result mexican execution  
Contract contract contractual breach treaty clause bit claims obligations tribunal umbrella claim 
party rights sgs breaches agreement violation investment state contracts  
Contract contract equipment payment work performance amount invoices claimant force contracts 
services letter termination majeure project contractual majority reprinted goods paid  
Contract nioc contract contracts agreement claimant osco party equipment joint parties oil 
payment hcc certificate agreements insurance claim procurement clearance amount  
Control entity government control public governmental authority entities body state private 
activities commercial legal controlled agency owned functions conduct procurement single  
Costs costs party arbitration expenses legal fees tribunal incurred award bear case claimant 
proceedings pay cost parties circumstances icsid respondent amount  
Couterclaim claim counterclaim tribunal claims counterclaims jurisdiction contract claimant filed 
amendment based social respondent contracts paragraph statement dismissed transaction 
arise party  
Customary international law customary rule practice general rules principle tribunals treaty state 
principles custom states lex treaties decisions juris existence legal  
Customs customs duties tariff duty import measures ec ii ordinary measure price parts hs para 
products issue heading specific charges classification  
Damages damages loss compensation damage losses award suffered tribunal claim claimant lost 
caused breach result profits awarded amount incurred moral injury  
Declaration jurisdiction declaration reservation declarations case compulsory paragraph made 
acceptance clause unilateral reservations effect force consent legal intention court present 
parties  
Delimitation delimitation line para equidistance case equitable relevant method circumstances 
maritime coasts continental shelf area result boundary court special median areas  
Delimitation boundary maritime frontier court para map line delimitation case cameroon nigeria 
judgment agreement maps dispute area temple land cambodia parties  
Delimitation continental shelf sea delimitation rights territorial maritime zone natural areas para 
coastal exclusive miles area economic prolongation waters nautical law  
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Delimitation line coast point boundary islands island area territorial maritime deg sea waters north 
miles east channel south points part water  
Denial of 
Justice 
justice denial law judicial court international courts decision tribunal process due national 
procedural emphasis added administration result judgment failure system  
Development economic interests countries international development country system political policy 
developing purpose important interest importance world protection legal role social states  
Discrimination treatment discrimination investors circumstances foreign national discriminatory 
investments investor nafta accorded measure domestic nationality investment ca 
favourable favorable based intent  
Discrimination discrimination xx measure chapeau unjustifiable arbitrary countries restriction applied 
conditions disguised trade manner para tyres international prevail application gatt ban  
Dispute dispute existence legal case parties claim views party application court matter para fact 
law conflict disagreement judgment determination interpretation exists  
Dispute dispute dsu wto panel settlement para panels agreements covered ec adopted system 
parties procedures rights disputes reports provisions party dsb  
Domestic court courts decision law decisions domestic tribunal proceedings international judicial 
judgment appeal review administrative national case local claim justice tribunals  
Due Process process due rights opportunity procedural procedure proceedings parties fundamental fair 
legal heard fairness notice provide present reasonable proceeding claims conduct  
Dumping information confidential facts parties interested authority investigating investigation para 
essential dumping provide disclosure provided authorities data party determination basis 
ec  
Dumping dumping usdoc review sunset determination reviews determinations likelihood duty 
administrative anti original investigation order para injury continuation margins resistant 
investigations  
Dumping dumping anti duties duty vi margin countervailing amount para gatt investigation 
imposition assessment exporter ad scm investigations specific action determination  
Dumping dumping investigating investigation authority producers authorities evidence information 
para determination facts exporters ec ad examination producer objective exporter rolled 
individual  
Dumping industry domestic imports injury factors data analysis production increase market 
investigation period usitc ec relevant producers determination trends para increased  
Dumping dumping zeroing comparison methodology export product transactions average margins 
margin normal para ec transaction weighted comparisons investigation sentence ad price  
Dumping imports injury factors dumped effects domestic analysis causal industry para investigating 
determination authority caused increased causation link usitc injurious subject  
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Dumping price prices export para differences product domestic normal comparison market sales 
comparability undercutting authority investigating suppression pattern country 
adjustment significant  
Enforcement award tribunal arbitral awards arbitration enforcement tribunals parties decision 
international decisions final rendered icc binding arbitrators courts state arbitrator party  
Enforcement tribunal award request decision filed claim iran settlement claims rules case refusal 
registrars dec chamber paragraph final foremost full jurisdiction  
Environment environmental environment harm impact principle damage water uruguay para activities 
river obligation precautionary development international transboundary protection 
significant assessment resources  
Equity law international principle principles legal general rights rule rules fundamental equity 
recognized concept jus obligations justice equality case application doctrine  
Estoppel estoppel spirits tax distilled alcohol ii pisco soju party alcoholic applied taxation shochu 
whisky beverages content conduct made taxes supra  
Evidence evidence statements submitted facts record fact case made presented statement support 
documents testimony witness sufficient alleged weight information based proof  
Evidence documents document information inferences adverse produce evidence requested 
production inference request submitted failure draw provide party order produced 
possession relevant  
Exhaustion of 
remedies 
remedies local justice denial international effective exhaustion courts claim judicial system 
means claims remedy law requirement tribunal rule claimant exhaust  
Exports export item financing edc aircraft eu costs rates market interest credit para oecd terms 
profit production rate regional records commercial  
Expropriation expropriation property rights investment measures deprivation indirect tribunal taking 
interference investor measure effect economic law state government expropriated owner 
actions  
Expropriation compensation expropriation unlawful property taking standard lawful law date 
expropriated full market investment international fair payment tribunal case 
nationalization amount  
Expropriation property claimant properties iran expropriation ownership iranian mr shares decision 
respondent tribunal cc foundation date real expropriated revolutionary estate riahi  
Facts population people war persons native local life authorities forced territory made notam 
labour country area members men children civil part  
Forum jurisdiction contract clause disputes tribunal claims forum courts parties article selection 
settlement arising iranian ii paragraph competent clauses dispute declaration  
Genocide genocide group icty intent judgment chamber para court trial convention acts crime part 
committed criminal prosecutor destruction crimes case genocidal  
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Good Faith faith good protection security obligation full standard due diligence physical principle legal 
investment state exercise duty provide protect host international  
Governing 
Law 
law international rules applicable legal domestic municipal principles case laws relevant 
apply provisions accordance national applied tribunal application general treaty  
Human Rights human rights international pp law cf case state inter protection de iacthr icj justice present 
time opinion individuals life legal  
Immunity immunity international criminal crimes state law jurisdiction arrest foreign warrant 
belgium case court territory committed courts immunities prosecution drc national  
Inherent 
Powers 
power exercise powers judicial authority act functions inherent function action 
competence organ decisions international law organs sovereign decision rights respect  
Interest interest rate award compound date awarded payment simple amount compensation rates 
tribunal claimant damages post tribunals investment due commercial case  
Interpretation term provision interpretation provisions scope meaning context language reference text 
terms specific phrase general view definition clear word application refers  
Interpretation meaning term context ordinary interpretation purpose terms treaty object word light 
interpreted text words accordance practice definition provision parties relevant  
Interpretation treaty convention article parties interpretation treaties international law agreement rules 
states provisions party vienna contracting application art force state accordance  
Interpretation interpretation treaty principle interpreted meaning text provisions provision effect parties 
purpose rule words treaties intention terms object give general result  
Interpretation text interpretation meaning travaux version means conclusion supplementary treaty 
history preparatoires negotiating english preparatory work bit texts siege translation 
article  
Intervention case court legal interest intervention decision party rights intervene parties judgment 
interests state proceedings affected application nature states present subject  
Investment investment icsid definition contribution bit economic tribunal risk test host development 
criteria term investments meaning duration made contract tribunals arb  
Investment claimant mining permit license tribunal government law project found rights revocation 
granted actions business permits decree environmental federal concession issued  
Investment investment bonds transaction icsid tribunal operation economic investments bit made 
security territory financial entitlements sovereign funds csob part banka case  
IP eu trips trademark rights ect ec protection trademarks registration law property 
intellectual ecj subject member intra registered bridgestone tfeu gi  
Judicial 
Economy 
panel claims measure dispute make findings para measures economy gatt issue judicial ec 
recommendations wto order respect panels inconsistent recommendation  
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Jurisdiction jurisdiction tribunal merits objection objections preliminary jurisdictional case admissibility 
claims claim question decision issue raised issues dispute proceedings competence 
respondent  
Jurisdiction arbitration icsid consent dispute bit jurisdiction tribunal investor investment parties 
disputes requirement agreement state arbitral international treaty courts arbitrate offer  
Jurisdiction claims tribunal declaration settlement states iran article united paragraph claim 
jurisdiction government ii vii claimant january case nationals republic islamic  
Jurisdiction jurisdiction court case ratione paragraph proceedings question para parties cases 
competence basis article present dispute statute personae provisional judgment measures  
Jurisdiction jurisdiction case application proceedings para court date principle applicant dispute time 
present icj jurisprudence filing condition pp filed institution international  
Legality investment investor investments tribunal bit icsid protection treaty host law made 
investors state foreign jurisdiction international abuse requirement purpose arbitration  
Legality conduct criminal tribunal corruption fraud allegations law alleged evidence arbitration 
faith illegal case public respondent illegality investigation claimant violation proceedings  
Legality investor investment foreign state host regulations act para investments tribunal approved 
government administrative manner plan approval business treatment transparency 
investors  
Legitimate 
Expectations 
expectations legitimate investor investment legal framework fair treatment equitable host 
state regulatory standard made expectation investors tribunal reasonable specific foreign  
Mandate mandate mandates territory trusteeship league south system mandatory africa territories 
supervision pp resolution administration obligations nations international trust rights 
agreement  
Measure measure application measures general para dispute challenged wto rule prospective norm 
existence settlement conduct challenge panel issue instruments ec applied  
Measure administration ec customs laws administrative regulations gatt para application uniform 
measure measures decisions manner general panel substantive requirement reasonable 
legal  
Measure measure safeguard imports unforeseen injury developments xix increased measures usitc 
competent remedy adjustment report conditions application authorities applied 
investigation extent  
Measure measure cool tbt tuna products para dolphin regulatory impact legitimate detrimental 
mexico safe origin distinction technical livestock objective regulation dolphins  
MFN bit clause mfn treaty dispute provisions tribunal treatment settlement investors 
arbitration treaties provision resolution clauses investments bits investment protection 
nation  
Nationality nationality nationals protection national foreign state diplomatic control law person claim 
company persons corporate case dual international rights claims legal  
250 
 
Nationality nationality claimant states effective united dominant tribunal relevant national period 
claim evidence iranian iran dual citizen date nationals citizenship time  
Necessity necessity state essential measures xi international security obligations treaty law interests 
defense bit ilc application emergency breach defence interest countermeasures  
Negotiations dispute settlement agreement negotiations parties disputes negotiation agreed settled 
arbitration solution matter means negotiate settle obligation good diplomatic present 
view  
Nuclear nuclear weapons force armed international threat law defence military disarmament war 
attack weapon prohibition intervention pp principle states humanitarian rmi  
Nullification ec suspension dsu concessions measure impairment dsb nullification article level violation 
wto obligations compliance arbitrator inconsistent authorization determination iii 
countermeasures  
Obligation obligation obligations ii provisions requirements paragraph iii set respect specific provision 
article general violation vi conditions comply substantive requirement part  
Obligation gatt wto trade ec provisions obligations agreements para agreement commitments part 
tariff rights measures xxiv concessions ii iii interpretation paragraph  
Obligation wto legislation inconsistent mandatory law obligations practice discretionary 
administrative provisions action section measure consistent panel para discretion 
distinction legislative laws  
Obligation xx gatt measure measures compliance laws regulations para secure defence inconsistent 
justified provisions exceptions requirements exception analysis paragraph xiv wto  
Prima Facie 
Jurisdiction 
jurisdiction tribunal facts facie prima merits case alleged claims claimant jurisdictional 
claim bit test provisions stage treaty dispute allegations basis  
Principles A 
and B 
states united iran tribunal declarations algiers general claim properties iranian claims 
principle courts court paragraph litigation assets obligation order case  
Procedure respondent claimant claimants memorial tribunal reply counter hearing rejoinder article 
argues para submits post contends statement paras transcript citing day  
Procedure submission para written paras question response statement argues meeting submits 
referring oral substantive opening notes citing party ec refers considers  
Procedure hearing parties request filed proceedings submissions submitted submission oral case 
party requested written order evidence submit file time comments dated  
Procedure panel request measures consultations measure reference terms para establishment issue 
identified dispute ec dsu specific scope legal subsequent included requests  
Products products iii imported domestic treatment gatt measure favourable para conditions 
product internal competitive origin goods competition sale requirement ec panel  
Products products product competitive iii directly likeness domestic imported ec para market end 
substitutable consumers characteristics physical relationship case sentence competition  
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Products ec product tbt technical regulation products characteristics requirements measure para 
seal regulations eu mandatory definition labelling tpp packaging document compliance  
Proof burden proof party case evidence facie prima establish claim prove complaining 
presumption proving bears sufficient fact established para provision rule  
Provisional 
Measures 
measures provisional rights interim order request dispute proceedings case harm 
irreparable tribunal party relief decision requested prejudice urgency parties para  
Public Policy public measures health policy measure protect tobacco human protection objective ban 
purpose objectives life morals legitimate concerns environmental mtbe ethanol  
Quantum market price increase industry costs prices cent business cost economic sales high million 
capacity rate higher share significant demand production  
Quantum valuation profits method future dcf market based million tribunal damages cash 
investment lost approach rate fair date project expert amount  
Quotas goods xiii services iii sale allocation purchase quota trade substantial shares trq suppliers 
rights tariff timber customs arrangements ec supplying  
Ratione 
Temporis 
date force dispute entry acts time prior events treaty occurred breach act conduct facts 
continuing bit entered case jurisdiction alleged  
Ratione 
Temporis 
nafta loss tribunal damage knowledge breach time period claimant claim limitation 
investor rl limitations incurred continuing acquired alleged measure date  
Reasonable 
Period 
period time reasonable years months date year delay days implementation case periods 
month notification end long relevant circumstances limit required  
Remedy act reparation compensation international damage restitution case principle wrongful law 
damages consequences illegal situation breach committed obligation full caused 
internationally  
Res Judicata res judicata judgment decision tribunal parties principle binding final issue case decided 
effect identity decisions proceedings operative force question request  
Restriction measure para objective trade alternative contribution restrictive measures analysis 
technical ii proposed necessity cool issue regulation degree pursued tbt legitimate  
Restriction import xi measure importation products gatt restrictions measures restriction imports 
para trade licensing panel effect limiting requirement requirements quantitative export  
Restriction export domestic conservation xx restrictions measures production natural resources quota 
china supply quotas consumption measure rare panel para foreign exhaustible  
Risk risk scientific assessment evidence sps measure relevant para sufficient ec measures 
insufficient panel based level basis international information objective protection  
Risk sps measures measure para protection level panel alop relevant ec international products 
sanitary risk disease eu oie phytosanitary standards procedures  
Risk risk hormones assessment ec scientific para panel meat experts evidence sps oestradiol 
jecfa effects potential risks growth treated adverse studies  
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Services services service gats suppliers supply gambling measure xvii measures treatment para cpc 
gas distribution trade commitments sector xvi natural specific  
Shareholders investment claims company bit tribunal investor investments rights indirect shareholders 
claim treaty case companies shares icsid directly arbitration claimants shareholder  
Shareholders shares ownership company owned corporation claim claimant control interest stock held 
companies shareholders legal share evidence entity percent capital claims  
Shareholders shares company sale market price assets purchase transaction business privatization 
companies paid sales ii transactions fair capital ownership share million  
Shareholders company control shareholders companies directors management appointed bankruptcy 
board appointment government managers rights controlled shareholder assets manager 
director action majority  
Standard of 
Review 
panel evidence facts para review authority objective assessment determination standard 
dsu panels relevant authorities investigating ec explanation conclusions record factual  
Standard of 
Treatment 
standard treatment international fair equitable law minimum customary nafta protection 
tribunal investment standards content treaties foreign bit security full tribunals  
Standard of 
Treatment 
standard international law breach tribunal high threshold minimum violation nafta 
treatment customary standards domestic arbitrariness conduct process manifest lack 
tribunals  
Standard of 
Treatment 
treatment standard process conduct fair equitable lack unfair claimant arbitrary due 
judicial tribunal minimum faith transparency discriminatory breach grossly unjust  
State 
Responsibility 
state responsibility international acts law ilc act conduct articles responsible wrongful draft 
commission internationally attributable states article attribution actions commentary  
Subsidies government benefit market scm financial contribution para prices benchmark iv country 
subsidy recipient private provision conditions goods usdoc analysis benchmarks  
Subsidies subsidy export subsidies scm para contingent granting prohibited de programme 
enterprises products contingency specificity performance commitments facto fact granted 
footnote  
Subsidies subsidies effects subsidy ec panel market scm adverse para lca prejudice msf la member 
sales product analysis subsidized price effect  
Tax tax taxes income taxation revenue vat due ii rate payment foreign fsc measure payments 
rules subject exemption paid transactions fiscal  
Territory territory sovereignty title costa rica territorial islands nicaragua case island possidetis uti 
court colonial para effectivites state british honduras occupation  
Time time circumstances situation years conditions period force change termination continued 
continue fact events changed result end crisis long date place  
UN Resolution united nations resolution general council security assembly charter resolutions states 
international court secretary article adopted members member organization doc peace  
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Unclean 
Hands 
doctrine patent hands law clean utility promise principle patents unclean invention cases 
case applied application requirement claims international courts disclosure  
Use of Force oil doc attacks platforms commerce war shipping vessels rights gti pipeline government 
mines gas jva attack peru neutral crude ships  
Vessels vessels article flag sea freedom fishing seas paragraph convention navigation high ship 
vessel itlos coastal state rights commerce jurisdiction states  
Waiver claim arbitration waiver tribunal nafta cafta claimant claims notice dr jurisdiction 
proceedings investor requirement consent requirements submission compliance 
respondent jurisdictional  
Yugoslavia fry court yugoslavia united nations membership serbia genocide application convention 
party para bosnia legal judgment republic vis admission federal status  
Yugoslavia icty applicant croatia chamber trial croatian serb forces jna crimes judgment para serbs 
respondent military committed serbian gotovina operation krajina  
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